Why is Cheating Wrong?

Since cheating is obviously wrong, arguments against it (it provides an unfair advantage, it hinders learning) need only be mentioned in passing. But the argument of unfair advantage absurdly takes education to be essentially a race of all against all; moreover, it ignores that many cases of unfair (dis)advantages are widely accepted. On the other hand, the fact that cheating can hamper learning does not mean that punishing cheating will necessarily favour learning, so that this argument does not obviously justify sanctioning cheaters.     

Why is conversation so easy?

Traditional accounts of language processing suggest that monologue--presenting and listening to speeches--should be more straightforward than dialogue--holding a conversation. This is clearly not the case. We argue that conversation is easy because of an interactive processing mechanism that leads to the alignment of linguistic representations between partners. Interactive alignment occurs via automatic alignment channels that are functionally similar to the automatic links between perception and behaviour (the so-called perception-behaviour expressway) proposed in recent accounts of social interaction. We conclude that humans are "designed" for dialogue rather than monologue.     

Why is there anything except physics?

In the course of defending his view of the relation between the special sciences and physics from Jaegwon Kim’s objections Jerry Fodor asks “So then, why is there anything except physics?” By which he seems to mean to ask if physics is fundamental and complete in its domain how can there be autonomous special science laws. Fodor wavers between epistemological and metaphysical understandings of the autonomy of the special sciences. In my paper I draw out the metaphysical construal of his view and argue that while in a sense it answers Fodor’s question it is immensely implausible.     

Are affordances normative?

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - In this paper we explore in what sense we can claim that affordances, the objects of perception for ecological psychology, are related to normativity....     

Why is a truth-predicate like a pronoun?

I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of “true” in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that the comparison with proforms is explanatorily idle. The last objection is that, given a complete semantic account of pronouns, proadjectives, antecedents, etc., together with a complete (PT), the essential semantic character of “true” could be deduced, but then, the idleness of the comparison with pronouns would be apparent. It turns out that objections (2) and (3) are related in the following way: the prosentential terminology is held to conceal the lack of unity in (PT), by describing the different data in the same terms (“proform”, “antecedent”, etc.). But this, I argue, is only a way of truly describing, rather than explaining, the data, these being certain relations of equivalence and consequence between sentences. I consider a language for which (PT) would be not only true, but also explanatory, but note that this language is very different from English. I end by showing that Robert Brandom’s case that “is true” is not a predicate fails, and that his motivation for saying so is based on fallacious reasoning (namely, Boghossian’s argument against deflationism).     

Why is it easy to control your arms ?

The complexity of our muscular systems may be regarded, not as a complication for the brain, but as a source of variety providing enough easily controlled movement recipes to do most of the things we ordinarily need to do. This simplifies the control task, in that if there are enough ways of moving, a recipe involving just a few of them can usually be found that will approximate any desired movement with little supervision. In particular, the presence of"redundant" degrees of freedom allows us to use ballistic (free swinging) movements, so that physics, rather than computation, accounts for much of trajectory. Computations are required to set up the constraints defining initializing a low-dimensional subsystem in such a way that a satisfactory movement exists. One theme of current research is that these recipes may generated by specifying the parameters of oscillators and spring-like components. We should expect actions to be represented as patchworks of recipes, each working best for some subset of variants of the action.     

Why is intelligence associated with stability of happiness?

In the National Child Development Study, life‐course variability in happiness over 18 years was significantly negatively associated with its mean level (happier individuals were more stable in their happiness, and it was not due to the ceiling effect), as well as childhood general intelligence and all Big Five personality factors (except for Agreeableness). In a multiple regression analysis, childhood general intelligence was the strongest predictor of life‐course variability in life satisfaction, stronger than all Big Five personality factors, including Emotional stability. More intelligent individuals were significantly more stable in their happiness, and it was not entirely because: (1) they were more educated and wealthier (even though they were); (2) they were healthier (even though they were); (3) they were more stable in their marital status (even though they were); (4) they were happier (even though they were); (5) they were better able to assess their own happiness accurately (even though they were); or (6) they were better able to recall their previous responses more accurately or they were more honest in their survey responses (even though they were both). While I could exclude all of these alternative explanations, it ultimately remained unclear why more intelligent individuals were more stable in their happiness.     

Why is working memory related to fluid intelligence?

Nearly 1,000 adults performed a battery of cognitive tests and working memory tasks requiring simultaneous storage and processing of information. Because the amount of to-be-remembered information, or set size, varied randomly across trials, the relation between fluid intelligence and working memory could be examined across different levels of complexity and across successive trials in the working memory tasks. Strong influences of fluid intelligence were apparent in the simplest versions and on the initial trials in the working memory tasks, which suggests that the relation between working memory and fluid intelligence is not dependent on the amount of information that must be maintained, or on processes that occur over the course of performing the tasks.     

Does knowledge secure warrant to assert?

This paper fortifies and defends the so called Sufficiency Argument (SA) against Classical Invariantism. In Sect. 2, I explain the version of the SA formulated but then rejected by Brown (2008a). In Sect. 3, I show how cases described by Hawthorne (2004), Brown (2008b), and Lackey (forthcoming) threaten to undermine one or the other of the SA’s least secure premises. In Sect. 4, I buttress one of those premises and defend the reinforced SA from the objection developed in Sect. 3.