Aesthetic Protectionism

ABSTRACT  Aesthetic protectionists think nature worth preserving and protecting from harm on aesthetic rather than moral grounds. Their outlook can be compared with the drive to shelter and sustain artworks. As such, protectionists seem rather like curators. However, this kind of attention to natural objects leads to a minimisation of the significance of the naturalness of those objects. This raises questions about the protectionist's real regard for nature. By examining what in nature is aesthetically worthy of protection, and then asking how far one is entitled to go in one's protective mission, it transpires that protectionists have no special stake in sustaining the independence of nature. Indeed, its independence often conspires against their aims. Since that very independence is essential to the natural, protectionism is exposed as having no intrinsic regard for nature.     

Aesthetic Acquaintance

If, as Richard Wollheim says, the Acquaintance Principle is ‘a well-entrenched principle in aesthetics,’ it would be surprising if there were not something true at which those who have asserted it have been aiming. I argue that the Acquaintance Principle cannot be true on any traditional epistemic interpretation, nor on any usability interpretation of the sort Robert Hopkins has recently suggested. I then argue for an interpretation of the principle that treats acquaintance as the end to which judgments of aesthetic value are the means as opposed to the other way around.     

Aesthetic knowledge

Philosophical Studies - What is the source of aesthetic knowledge? Empirical knowledge, it is generally held, bottoms out in perception. Such knowledge can be transmitted to others through...     

Aesthetic Disobedience

This article explores a concept of artistic transgression I call aesthetic disobedience that runs parallel to the political concept of civil disobedience. Acts of civil disobedience break some law in order to publicly draw attention to and recommend the reform of a conflict between the commitments of a legal system and some shared commitments of a community. Likewise, acts of aesthetic disobedience break some entrenched artworld norm in order to publicly draw attention to and recommend the reform of a conflict between artworld commitments and some shared commitments of a community. Considering artistic transgressions under the concept of aesthetic disobedience highlights often‐overlooked features of modern artworld practices. Most significantly, it draws attention to the deliberative participation of a wide variety of citizens of the artworld, including not just artists and performers but also members of audiences, in the transformation of the rules and boundaries of the artworld itself.     

Aesthetic experience

An initial clinical question, ‘Why does an analysand talk about his/her relationship with an aesthetic object?’ opens an investigation into the nature of aesthetic experience. Three principal aspects of the psychoanalytic approach are presented: sublimation, a Freudian concept concerning the vicissitudes of the drives; reparation, a Kleinian concept linked to depressive anxiety; and transformation, a concept of object‐relations theory about primitive ego‐states. The article discusses the psychic function of aesthetic feelings in mastering anxiety as related to ego, id and superego. The transformation of the experience of passivity is a common link underlying these aspects. Such transformation relies on tolerating ambiguous and contrary feelings within the self, fostered by contact with an aesthetic object. This balance can, however, be upset: two excessive forms of aesthetic experience ensue, namely, fascination and bewitchment. The first belongs to the experience of awe; the second can lead to claustrophobic anxiety. The initial clinical question requires an elaboration of aesthetic transference, a variant of the narcissistic transference, whereby the analysand invites the analyst to share his/her internal state as a common unspoken object.     

Aesthetic cognition

The purpose of this article is to integrate two outstanding problems within the philosophy of science. The first concerns what role aesthetics plays in scientific thinking. The second is the problem of how logically testable ideas are generated (the so-called "psychology of research" versus "logic of (dis)proof" problem). I argue that aesthetic sensibility is the basis for what scientists often call intuition, and that intuition in turn embodies (in a literal physiological sense) ways of thinking that have their own meta-logic. Thus, aesthetics is a form of cognition. Scientists think not in equations or words or other logical abstractions, but emotionally and sensually, using visual and aural images, kinesthetic and other proprioceptive feelings, sensations, patterns, and analogies. These aesthetic forms of thinking have their own logics that I call "synosia", from the root words synaesthesia (a combining of senses) and gnosis, "to know". Synosia denotes understanding that integrates feeling that one knows with feeling what one knows. Eminent scientists universally describe an explicitly secondary process in which such personal knowledge must be "translated" into a formal language, such as words or equations, in order to be communicated to other people. Many of the unsolved problems that philosophers of science (as well as psychologists and artificial intelligence researchers) have had in making sense of scientific thinking have arisen from confusing the form and content of the final translations with the hidden means by which scientific insights are actually achieved.     

Aesthetic Animism

Philosophical Studies - I argue that the main existing accounts of the relationship between the beauty of environmental entities and their moral standing are mistaken in important ways. Beauty does...     

Aristotle's Aesthetic Ethics

It is sometimes asked whether virtue ethics can be assimilated by Kantianism or utilitarianism, or if it is a distinct position. A look at Aristotle's ethics shows that it certanly can be distinct. In particular, Aristotle presents us with an ethics of aesthetics in contrast to the more standard ethics of cognition: A virtuous agent identifies the right actions by their aesthetic qualities. Moreover, the agent's concern with her own aesthetic character gives us a key to the important role the emotions play for Aristotle, which further distinguishes him from the other two theories we have mentioned.     

Aesthetic Pleasure Explained

One of the oldest platitudes about beauty is that it is pleasant to perceive or experience. In this article, I take this platitude at face value and try to explain why experiences of beauty are seemingly always accompanied by pleasure. Unlike explanations that have been offered in the past, the explanation proposed is designed to suit a “realist” view on which beauty is an irreducibly evaluative property, that is, a value. In a nutshell, the explanation is that experiences of beauty are experiences in which it appears that something is beautiful, and that such experiences are identical to experiences of aesthetic pleasure.