Objects and attention: the state of the art

What are the units of attention? In addition to standard models holding that attention can select spatial regions and visual features, recent work suggests that in some cases attention can directly select discrete objects. This paper reviews the state of the art with regard to such 'object-based' attention, and explores how objects of attention relate to locations, reference frames, perceptual groups, surfaces, parts, and features. Also discussed are the dynamic aspects of objecthood, including the question of how attended objects are individuated in time, and the possibility of attending to simple dynamic motions and events. The final sections of this review generalize these issues beyond vision science, to other modalities and fields such as auditory objects of attention and the infant's 'object concept'.     

Sensory conflict in judgments of spatial direction

Artificial discrepancy was created between information about azimuth coming from different sense modalities. The resolution of this discrepancy was examined for the cases of vision and proprioception, proprioception and audition, and vision and audition. Vision biases proprioceptive and auditory judgments. Proprioception biases auditory judgments and has a small effect on visual judgments. The results suggest that the combinations of sense modalities do not behave as an integrated system and the data are interpreted as indicating that different processes are involved in the resolution of discrepant directional information from different pairs of modalities.     

SHAPING YOUR OWN LIFE

Abstract: A distinction is made between imagination in the narrow sense and in the broad sense. Narrow imagination is characterised as the ability to “see” pictures in the mind's eye or to “hear” melodies in the head. Broad imagination is taken to be the faculty of creating, either in the strict sense of making something ex nihilo or in the looser sense of seeing patterns in some data. The article focuses on a particular sort of broad imagination, the kind that has to do with creating, not a work of art, a scientific theory or a political vision but one's own life. We shape our lives through our actions, and these actions not only influence our future—a commonplace—but also determine our past, which is a new and more controversial perspective.     

Perceptual categorization of cat and dog silhouettes by 3- to 4-month-old infants

Given evidence that silhouette information can be used by adults to form categorical representations at the basic level, four experiments utilizing the familiarization-novelty preference procedure were performed to examine whether 3- and 4-month-old infants could form categorical representations for cats versus dogs from the perceptual information available in silhouettes (e.g., global shape and external outline). Experiments 1 and 2 showed that infants could form individuated categorical representations for cat and dog silhouettes, whereas Experiments 3 and 4 revealed that infants could use silhouette information from the head, but not the body, to categorically separate the two species. These results indicate that general shape or external contour information that is centered about the head is sufficient for young infants to form individuated categorical representations for cats and dogs. The data thus provide information regarding the nature of the perceptual information that can be used by infants to form category representations for individual animal species and are discussed in terms of domain-general versus domain-specific processing accounts.     

Unitary vs multiple semantics: PET studies of word and picture processing

In this paper we examine a central issue in cognitive neuroscience: are there separate conceptual representations associated with different input modalities (e.g., Paivio, 1971, 1986; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) or do inputs from different modalities converge on to the same set of representations (e.g., Caramazza, Hillis, Rapp, & Romani, 1990; Lambon Ralph, Graham, Patterson, & Hodges, 1999; Rapp, Hillis, & Caramazza, 1993)? We present an analysis of four PET studies (three semantic categorisation tasks and one lexical decision task), two of which employ words as stimuli and two of which employ pictures. Using conjunction analyses, we found robust semantic activation, common to both input modalities in anterior and medial aspects of the left fusiform gyrus, left parahippocampal and perirhinal cortices, and left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47). There were modality-specific activations in both temporal poles (words) and occipitotemporal cortices (pictures). We propose that the temporal poles are involved in processing both words and pictures, but their engagement might be primarily determined by the level of specificity at which an object is processed. Activation in posterior temporal regions associated with picture processing most likely reflects intermediate, pre-semantic stages of visual processing. Our data are most consistent with a hierarchically structured, unitary system of semantic representations for both verbal and visual modalities, subserved by anterior regions of the inferior temporal cortex.     

The experience of force: the role of haptic experience of forces in visual perception of object motion and interactions, mental simulation, and motion-related judgments

Forces are experienced in actions on objects. The mechanoreceptor system is stimulated by proximal forces in interactions with objects, and experiences of force occur in a context of information yielded by other sensory modalities, principally vision. These experiences are registered and stored as episodic traces in the brain. These stored representations are involved in generating visual impressions of forces and causality in object motion and interactions. Kinematic information provided by vision is matched to kinematic features of stored representations, and the information about forces and causality in those representations then forms part of the perceptual interpretation. I apply this account to the perception of interactions between objects and to motions of objects that do not have perceived external causes, in which motion tends to be perceptually interpreted as biological or internally caused. I also apply it to internal simulations of events involving mental imagery, such as mental rotation, trajectory extrapolation and judgment, visual memory for the location of moving objects, and the learning of perceptual judgments and motor skills. Simulations support more accurate judgments when they represent the underlying dynamics of the event simulated. Mechanoreception gives us whatever limited ability we have to perceive interactions and object motions in terms of forces and resistances; it supports our practical interventions on objects by enabling us to generate simulations that are guided by inferences about forces and resistances, and it helps us learn novel, visually based judgments about object behavior.     

The effects of interference on recognition of haptic pictures in blindfolded sighted participants: the modality of representation of haptic information

Haptic picture recognition was tested in 36 undergraduate students to determine whether haptic representations are visual or multi-modal. Participants explored target haptic pictures and were asked to recognize the target from three alternatives. Each participant completed eight control and eight interference trials in visual, lexical and tactile recognition modalities. For interference, participants were assigned to either an articulatory suppression (repeat "the" at a constant rate) or a visual interference (watch a visual display) condition, to prevent recoding into a verbal or visual code. The results showed that accuracy was higher at control compared to interference trials and for tactile compared to lexical recognition. Additionally, lexical and tactile recognition decreased with articulatory suppression whereas only tactile recognition decreased with visual interference. These findings suggest that haptic pictures may be represented by coordinating visual and verbal codes.     

Spatial working memory for locations specified by vision and audition: Testing the amodality hypothesis

Spatial working memory can maintain representations from vision, hearing, and touch, representations referred to here as spatial images. The present experiment addressed whether spatial images from vision and hearing that are simultaneously present within working memory retain modality-specific tags or are amodal. Observers were presented with short sequences of targets varying in angular direction, with the targets in a given sequence being all auditory, all visual, or a sequential mixture of the two. On two thirds of the trials, one of the locations was repeated, and observers had to respond as quickly as possible when detecting this repetition. Ancillary detection and localization tasks confirmed that the visual and auditory targets were perceptually comparable. Response latencies in the working memory task showed small but reliable costs in performance on trials involving a sequential mixture of auditory and visual targets, as compared with trials of pure vision or pure audition. These deficits were statistically reliable only for trials on which the modalities of the matching location switched from the penultimate to the final target in the sequence, indicating a switching cost. The switching cost for the pair in immediate succession means that the spatial images representing the target locations retain features of the visual or auditory representations from which they were derived. However, there was no reliable evidence of a performance cost for mixed modalities in the matching pair when the second of the two did not immediately follow the first, suggesting that more enduring spatial images in working memory may be amodal.     

Intentionality and Presence: On the Intrinsic Of-ness of Consciousness from a Transcendental-Phenomenological Perspective

This paper discusses the nature of consciousness?? intrinsic intentionality from a transcendental-phenomenological viewpoint. In recent philosophy of mind the essentially intentional character of consciousness has become obscured because the latter is predominantly understood in terms of ??qualia?? or the ??what-it-is-like-ness?? of mental states and it is hard to see why such subjective ??feels??, of all things, could bestow states with objective reference. As the paper attempts to demonstrate, this is an inadequate understanding of consciousness, which should instead be defined in terms of presence. Consciousness essentially takes place as presence-of, i.e., consists in something coming to appearance. This presence-of is not only a fundamental, irreducible phenomenon, but also in a radical sense un-naturalisable. Naturalism only knows ??nature??, as the world of objects, and the question of intentionality then seems to be how certain inner-worldly objects can be ??representations?? of other inner-worldly objects. In fact, no object is ever intrinsically ??about?? anything. This is exclusively the nature of subjectivity qua consciousness, which is not an object alongside other objects but rather exists as the manifestation of objects.     

Learning directions of objects specified by vision,spatial audition,or auditory spatial language

The modality by which object azimuths (directions) are presented affects learning of multiple locations. In Experiment 1, participants learned sets of three and five object azimuths specified by a visual virtual environment, spatial audition (3D sound), or auditory spatial language. Five azimuths were learned faster when specified by spatial modalities (vision, audition) than by language. Experiment 2 equated the modalities for proprioceptive cues and eliminated spatial cues unique to vision (optic flow) and audition (differential binaural signals). There remained a learning disadvantage for spatial language. We attribute this result to the cost of indirect processing from words to spatial representations.     

East of West,West of East: a matter of global and local identity

Research is a very personal matter. On the basis of experiences in different countries with researchers from different cultures over many years, some observations will be described. The conceptual frame of this attempt is to look for anthropological universals and cultural specifics. Much can be learned from spatial representations in the arts. Whereas in the West since Renaissance time the central perspective has become dominant in visual art, in Eastern landscape paintings the “floating view” is typical. The claim that the central perspective corresponds to geometric laws and matches how we see the world is misleading for at least two reasons: It violates mechanisms of size constancy, and the visual world is spatially reduced in pictures to the perifoveal region only. Research on spatial attention has disclosed two different attentional systems being responsible either for near-fovea vision or for the far periphery. This fundamental principle as a global characteristic of visual processing is neglected in Western art. In Eastern art with a floating view geometric laws are violated, and different potential perspectives are integrated within a holistic pattern. The semantics of what shall be expressed becomes important irrespective of physical parameters. The latter may also create the unique phenomenon of becoming subjectively part of the picture confirming personal identity. Cultural specifics like in the arts (what one might expect) can surprisingly also be observed in theoretical considerations about visual processing. Whereas in the tradition of Western science visual percepts are built up with local elements like feature detectors, in an important Chinese theory global topological features are analyzed first. An important task of the brain is to create the identity of a percept on the basis of spatially and temporally distributed neural activities. It is, thus, an important theoretical question how to deal with the challenge to create and maintain the identity of a percept for some time. It is suggested that one should leave behind a monocausal reasoning for such explanations but adopt for analytical strategies the concept of complementarity as a generative principle.     

The History of Vision

One of the most influential ideas of twentieth‐century art history and aesthetics is that vision has a history and it is the task of art history to trace how vision has changed. This claim has recently been attacked for both empirical and conceptual reasons. My aim is to argue for a new version of the history of vision claim: if visual attention has a history, then vision also has a history. And we have some reason to think that at least in certain contexts (namely, in the context of looking at pictures), visual attention does have a history.     

An Early Modern Scholastic Theory of Negative Entities: Thomas Compton Carleton on Lacks,Negations, and Privations

Seventeenth century scholastics had a rich debate about the ontological status and nature of lacks, negations, and privations. Realists in this debate posit irreducible negative entities responsible for the non-existence of positive entities. One of the first scholastics to develop a realist position on negative entities was Thomas Compton Carleton. In this paper I explain Carleton's theory of negative entities, including what it is for something to be negative, how negative entities are individuated, whether they are abstract or concrete, and how they affect their subjects. I argue that for Carleton, negative entities are conceived as spatially extended simples that affect their subjects by means of spatial overlap. I also show how Carleton responds to some theological worries about his realism concerning negative entities.     

Picture book exposure elicits positive visual preferences in toddlers

Although the relationship between “mere exposure” and attitude enhancement is well established in the adult domain, there has been little similar work with children. This article examines whether toddlers’ visual attention toward pictures of foods can be enhanced by repeated visual exposure to pictures of foods in a parent-administered picture book. We describe three studies that explored the number and nature of exposures required to elicit positive visual preferences for stimuli and the extent to which induced preferences generalize to other similar items. Results show that positive preferences for stimuli are easily and reliably induced in children and, importantly, that this effect of exposure is not restricted to the exposed stimulus per se but also applies to new representations of the exposed item.     

Varieties of Pictorial Illusion

This article focuses on a potentially perplexing aspect of our interactions with pictorial representations (including film, paintings, pictures, drawings, photographs, even video games): in some cases, it seems that visual representations can play tricks on our cognitive faculties. We may either come to believe that objects represented in pictures are real or perhaps perceive them as such. The possibility of widespread pictorial illusions has been oft discussed, and discarded, in the aesthetics literature. I support this stance. However, the nature of the illusion is more complicated than is usually considered. I argue that there are five different types of potential illusions and present reasons for rejecting each. I also explore in detail the most persistent illusion: the “object recognition perceptual illusion thesis,” which states that we undergo a perceptual illusion while viewing pictorial representations simply in virtue of seeing objects in the representation. I contend that a rejection of this thesis depends on the nature of perceptual content, an issue with far‐reaching consequences in aesthetics.     

Implicit and explicit object recognition at very large visual eccentricities: No improvement after loss of central vision

Little is known about the ability of human observers to process objects in the far periphery of their visual field and nothing about its evolution in case of central vision loss. We investigated implicit and explicit recognition at two large visual eccentricities. Pictures of objects were centred at 30° or 50° eccentricity. Implicit recognition was tested through a priming paradigm. Participants (normally sighted observers and people with 10–20 years of central vision loss) categorized pictures as animal/transport both in a study phase (Block 1) and in a test phase (Block 2). In explicit recognition participants decided for each picture presented in Block 2 whether it had been displayed in Block 1 (“yes”/“no”). Both visual (identical) and conceptual/lexical (same-name) priming occurred at 30° and at 50°. Explicit recognition was observed only at 30°. In people with central vision loss testing was only performed at 50° eccentricity. The pattern of results was similar to that of normally sighted observers but global performance was lower. The results suggest that vision, at large eccentricity, is mainly based on nonconscious coarse representations. Moreover, after 10–20 years of central vision loss, no evidence was found for an increased ability to use peripheral information in object recognition.     

Mental imagery: in search of a theory

It is generally accepted that there is something special about reasoning by using mental images. The question of how it is special, however, has never been satisfactorily spelled out, despite more than thirty years of research in the post-behaviorist tradition. This article considers some of the general motivation for the assumption that entertaining mental images involves inspecting a picture-like object. It sets out a distinction between phenomena attributable to the nature of mind to what is called the cognitive architecture, and ones that are attributable to tacit knowledge used to simulate what would happen in a visual situation. With this distinction in mind, the paper then considers in detail the widely held assumption that in some important sense images are spatially displayed or are depictive, and that examining images uses the same mechanisms that are deployed in visual perception. I argue that the assumption of the spatial or depictive nature of images is only explanatory if taken literally, as a claim about how images are physically instantiated in the brain, and that the literal view fails for a number of empirical reasons--for example, because of the cognitive penetrability of the phenomena cited in its favor. Similarly, while it is arguably the case that imagery and vision involve some of the same mechanisms, this tells us very little about the nature of mental imagery and does not support claims about the pictorial nature of mental images. Finally, I consider whether recent neuroscience evidence clarifies the debate over the nature of mental images. I claim that when such questions as whether images are depictive or spatial are formulated more clearly, the evidence does not provide support for the picture-theory over a symbol-structure theory of mental imagery. Even if all the empirical claims were true, they do not warrant the conclusion that many people have drawn from them: that mental images are depictive or are displayed in some (possibly cortical) space. Such a conclusion is incompatible with what is known about how images function in thought. We are then left with the provisional counterintuitive conclusion that the available evidence does not support rejection of what I call the "null hypothesis"; namely, that reasoning with mental images involves the same form of representation and the same processes as that of reasoning in general, except that the content or subject matter of thoughts experienced as images includes information about how things would look.     

What is it like to have type-2 blindsight? Drawing inferences from residual function in type-1 blindsight

Controversy surrounds the question of whether the experience sometimes elicited by visual stimuli in blindsight (type-2 blindsight) is visual in nature or whether it is some sort of non-visual experience. The suggestion that the experience is visual seems, at face value, to make sense. I argue here, however, that the residual abilities found in type-1 blindsight (blindsight in which stimuli elicit no conscious experience) are not aspects of normal vision with consciousness deleted, but are based fragments of visual processes that, in themselves, would not be intelligible as visual experiences. If type-2 blindsight is a conscious manifestation of this residual function then it is not obvious that type-2 blindsight would be phenomenally like vision.     

Conventions and Rules in Literature

Views of what role convention plays in the creation and appreciation of art works gravitate towards two extremes. One view holds that works of art can be apprehended and appreciated as well as created with no reference to convention. The other claims that conventions fully determine how works of art are apprehended and are therefore necessary conditions for the creation of works of art as well as constitutive of appreciation. The former is a version of the Romantic view of art as something that appeals spontaneously to man's most profound emotions, to man's sentient nature, without making use of or needing mediating conventions. The conventionalist view denies that it is possible to respond spontaneously to art. All apprehension and appreciation of art are structured by conventions, and the reader/audience cannot go beyond these conventions because they constitute , the experience of the work of art. This paper explains the sense in which the constitutive view may be best understood.