Body parts and early-learned verbs

This article reports the structure of associations among 101 common verbs and body parts. The verbs are those typically learned by children learning English prior to 3 years of age. In a free association task, 50 adults were asked to provide the single body part that came to mind when they thought of each verb. Analyses reveal highly systematic and structured patterns of associations that are also related to the normative age of acquisition of the verbs showing a progression from verbs associated with actions by the mouth, to verbs strongly associated with actions by hand and arm, to verbs not so strongly associated with any one body part. The results have implications for proposals about embodied verb meaning and also for processes of early verb learning.     

New insights into the regulation of synaptic plasticity from an unexpected place: Hippocampal area CA2

The search for molecules that restrict synaptic plasticity in the brain has focused primarily on sensory systems during early postnatal development, as critical periods for inducing plasticity in sensory regions are easily defined. The recent discovery that Schaffer collateral inputs to hippocampal area CA2 do not readily support canonical activity-dependent long-term potentiation (LTP) serves as a reminder that the capacity for synaptic modification is also regulated anatomically across different brain regions. Hippocampal CA2 shares features with other similarly "LTP-resistant" brain areas in that many of the genes linked to synaptic function and the associated proteins known to restrict synaptic plasticity are expressed there. Add to this a rich complement of receptors and signaling molecules permissive for induction of atypical forms of synaptic potentiation, and area CA2 becomes an ideal model system for studying specific modulators of brain plasticity. Additionally, recent evidence suggests that hippocampal CA2 is instrumental for certain forms of learning, memory, and social behavior, but the links between CA2-enriched molecules and putative CA2-dependent behaviors are only just beginning to be made. In this review, we offer a detailed look at what is currently known about the synaptic plasticity in this important, yet largely overlooked component of the hippocampus and consider how the study of CA2 may provide clues to understanding the molecular signals critical to the modulation of synaptic function in different brain regions and across different stages of development.     

Divine authority and the virtue of religion: a Thomistic response to Murphy

In his book, An Essay on Divine Authority, Mark Murphy argues that God does not have practical authority over created, rational agents. Although Murphy mentions the possibility of an argument for divine authority from justice, he does not consider any. In this paper, I develop such an argument from Aquinas’s treatment of the virtue of religion and other parts of justice. The divine excellence is due honor, and, as Aquinas argues, honoring a ruler requires service and obedience. Thus, a classical conception of God coupled with some of Aquinas’s theses concerning justice show that God has practical authority over all created, rational agents.

     

The history of philosophy in contemporary philosophy: The view from Germany

Conclusion I have frequently mentioned objective problems and topics in the preceding sections. But what exactly is the force of objective here? As my remarks should have made clear I have been using objective to contrast with purely historical. A purely historical approach never gets beyond reproduction, commentary, and interpretation. I call an approach objective when it involves a philosopher who advances his own theses and claims.This minimal understanding of objectivity (in the context of my remarks in this paper) by no means implies that there are problems and topics, systems of concepts, methods, and similar factors that are eternal, completely independent of the contingencies of history (of philosophy, of the sciences), that are not relative to a language, to a logic, to a model, etc. Indeed whether there are problems, etc., in just this absolute, atemporal sense is itself a question for systematic philosophy. It seems clear that the formulation of a problem can only take place against a cognitive background of some sort and within some conceptual scheme.³⁴ Such an assumption is made by most if not all analytic philosophers. But the fact that a philosophical tradition recognizes conceptual schemes does not make it a purely historical, non-objective philosophy, in the sense already introduced and described. A philosopher who explicitly accepts a certain conceptual scheme proceeds in an entirely objective and systematic (and not purely historical) manner when, within this framework, he formulates his own theses.This paper is the text of a talk. the title is due to Barry Smith.     

Bioethics, Christian charity and the view from no place.

This essay contrasts the notions of charity employed by Traditional Christianity and by liberal cosmopolitan bioethics, arguing that: (1) bioethics attempts to reconstruct the notion of charity in a manner that is caustic to the Traditional Christian moral vision, (2) Christians are, on the whole, more charitable than proponents of bioethics' reconstructed view (even given the standards of the latter), and (3) the theistically oriented conception of charity employed by Traditional Christianity cannot be expressed in bioethics' purportedly neutral public vocabulary. The upshot is that, in the name of neutrality and pluralism, liberal cosmopolitan bioethicists seek to impose an impoverished moral vocabulary that reflects liberal cosmopolitan ideology while excluding input from Traditional Christianity and other non-liberal-humanistic moral visions.     

Into the brain: where philosophy should go from here

The maturation of the cognitive neurosciences will throw light on many central philosophical issues. Among them: semantic theory, perception, learning, social and moral knowledge, and practical reasoning and decision making. As contemporary medicine cannot do without the achievements of modern biology, philosophy would be pitiful if it disregarded the achievements of brain research.     

Matteo Ricci's teaching on the goodness of human nature: its Thomistic and neo-Confucian sources

The Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci's teaching on the goodness of human nature in The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven represents the fruit of the first encounter between Catholicism and Confucianism. This article will consider the Thomistic and neo-Confucian sources in Ricci's enunciation of the Catholic doctrine on the goodness of human nature in this Chinese catechism. It will illustrate that Ricci developed his teaching, which is fundamentally Thomistic, with the help of terminology borrowed from the Chinese philosophical tradition. His distinction between the good of nature and the good of virtue leads to prioritising the cultivation of human nature. Ricci's teaching reflects the early modern Jesuits’ appreciation of human freedom. It also displays a Catholic reaction to the sixteenth-century neo-Confucian intellectual trend that ignored the importance of moral cultivation.     

Folk concepts and intuitions: from philosophy to cognitive science

Analytic philosophers have long used a priori methods to characterize folk concepts such as knowledge, belief and wrongness. Recently, researchers have begun to exploit social scientific methodologies to characterize such folk concepts. One line of work has explored folk intuitions with cases that are disputed within philosophy. A second approach, with potentially more radical implications, applies the methods of cross-cultural psychology to philosophical intuitions. Recent work in this area suggests that people in different cultures have systematically different intuitions surrounding folk concepts. A third strand of research explores the emergence and character of folk concepts in children. These approaches to characterizing folk concepts provide important resources that will supplement, and perhaps in some cases displace, a priori approaches.     

On experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy: a reply to Sorell

In this paper, we reply to Tom Sorell’s criticism of our engagement with the history of philosophy in our book, The Theory and Practice of Experimental Philosophy. We explain why our uses of the history of philosophy are not undermined by Sorell’s criticism and why our position is not threatened by the dilemma Sorell advances. We argue that Sorell has mischaracterized the dialectical context of our discussion of the history of philosophy and that he has mistakenly treated our use of the history of philosophy as univocal, when in fact we called on the history of philosophy in several different ways in our text.     

Science and common sense: perspectives from philosophy and science education

Synthese - This paper explores the relation between scientific knowledge and common sense intuitions as a complement to Hoyningen-Huene’s account of systematicity. On one hand,...