老年人对情绪性事件的情景模拟:回忆过去与想象未来

研究采用自传体访谈技术,首次考察了老年人在对情绪性事件进行回忆和想象中生成的内部细节和外部细节数量,及其对回忆和想象内容的主观评估。结果发现:(1)无论是回忆还是想象任务,老年人都比年轻人提供了更少的内部细节和略多的外部细节;(2)与年轻人相似,老年人在想象未来积极事件时产生了更多的内部细节,表现出对积极信息的加工偏好;(3)老年人比年轻人更倾向于认为想象的事件与过去发生的事件相似度高,表明该群体在想象过程中更多地依赖了过去的记忆。该结果揭示了老年人对情绪性事件的回忆和想象特点,说明在回忆和想象过程中出现的与年龄有关的缺陷同样会体现在情绪性事件中,这很好地支持了建构性情景模拟假说。     

Thinking about the future early in life: The role of relational memory

The constructive episodic simulation hypothesis suggests that we imagine possible future events by flexibly recombining details of past experiences to produce novel scenarios. Here we tested this hypothesis by determining whether episodic future thinking is related to relational memory ability during the preschool years. Children (3- to 5-year-olds) were asked to remember a past event and imagine a possible future event using an adapted version of the recombination paradigm. Relational learning and inference were assessed using a task adapted from the neuroimaging literature. The results show that preschoolers were able to describe both past and possible future events; however, they produced more specific episodic details in relation to past events relative to future events. Episodic future thinking performance was correlated with performance on the relational inference task, consistent with the idea that the ability to flexibly recombine relational knowledge is critical in episodic future thinking.     

Emotional intensity in episodic autobiographical memory and counterfactual thinking

Episodic counterfactual thoughts—imagined alternative ways in which personal past events might have occurred—are frequently accompanied by intense emotions. Here, participants recollected positive and negative autobiographical memories and then generated better and worse episodic counterfactual events from those memories. Our results suggest that the projected emotional intensity during the simulated remembered/imagined event is significantly higher than but typically positively related to the emotional intensity while remembering/imagining the event. Furthermore, repeatedly simulating counterfactual events heightened the emotional intensity felt while simulating the counterfactual event. Finally, for both the emotional intensity accompanying the experience of remembering/imagining and the projected emotional intensity during the simulated remembered/imagined event, the emotional intensity of negative memories was greater than the emotional intensity of upward counterfactuals generated from them but lower than the emotional intensity of downward counterfactuals generated from them. These findings are discussed in relation to clinical work and functional theories of counterfactual thinking.     

Phenomenal characteristics associated with projecting oneself back into the past and forward into the future: influence of valence and temporal distance

As humans, we frequently engage in mental time travel, reliving past experiences and imagining possible future events. This study examined whether similar factors affect the subjective experience associated with remembering the past and imagining the future. Participants mentally "re-experienced" or "pre-experienced" positive and negative events that differed in their temporal distance from the present (close versus distant), and then rated the phenomenal characteristics (i.e., sensorial, contextual, and emotional details) associated with their representations. For both past and future, representations of positive events were associated with a greater feeling of re-experiencing (or pre-experiencing) than representations of negative events. In addition, representations of temporally close events (both past and future) contained more sensorial and contextual details, and generated a stronger feeling of re-experiencing (or pre-experiencing) than representations of temporally distant events. It is suggested that the way we both remember our past and imagine our future is constrained by our current goals.     

Remembering the past and imagining the future: examining the consequences of mental time travel on memory

Cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging evidence suggests that remembering the past and imagining the future rely on overlapping processes in episodic memory. The three experiments reported here examine the consequences of remembering the past and imagining the future on the accessibility of other information in memory. Participants first studied events associated with a specific context and then either (a) retrieved past autobiographical events associated with that same context or (b) imagined future autobiographical events associated with that same context. Replicating and extending evidence of retrieval-induced forgetting, remembering autobiographical events from the past caused participants to forget the related studied events. However, imagining future autobiographical events failed to cause participants to forget the related studied events. These results suggest an important difference in the memorial consequences of remembering and imagining.     

Remembering the past and imagining the future: Examining the consequences of mental time travel on memory

Cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging evidence suggests that remembering the past and imagining the future rely on overlapping processes in episodic memory. The three experiments reported here examine the consequences of remembering the past and imagining the future on the accessibility of other information in memory. Participants first studied events associated with a specific context and then either (a) retrieved past autobiographical events associated with that same context or (b) imagined future autobiographical events associated with that same context. Replicating and extending evidence of retrieval-induced forgetting, remembering autobiographical events from the past caused participants to forget the related studied events. However, imagining future autobiographical events failed to cause participants to forget the related studied events. These results suggest an important difference in the memorial consequences of remembering and imagining.     

The association between past and future oriented thinking: Evidence from autism spectrum disorder

A number of recently developed theories (e.g., the constructive episodic simulation, self-projection, and scene construction hypotheses) propose that the ability to simulate possible future events (sometimes referred to as episodic future thinking, prospection, or foresight) depends on the same neurocognitive system that is implicated in the recall of past events (episodic memory). In this paper, we argue that autism spectrum disorder (ASD) offers an ideal test of such theories, given that it is a developmental disorder that is characterized by impairments in episodic memory. Each of these theories would predict concomitant impairments in episodic future thinking among individuals with ASD. We review evidence concerning episodic future thinking in ASD, as well as studies of prospective memory (remembering to do something in the future), planning, navigation, and theory of mind, which some theories suggest also rely on the same mechanism as episodic future thinking.     

Make it real: Belief in occurrence within episodic future thought

While the cognitive and neural bases of episodic future thinking are well documented, questions remain as to what gives the sense that an imagined event belongs to one’s personal future. Capitalizing on previous research on metacognitive appraisals in autobiographical remembering, we propose that episodic future thinking involves, in varying degrees, a subjective belief in the potential occurrence of imagined future events and we explore the nature and determinants of such belief. To this aim, participants provided justifications for belief in occurrence for a series of past and future events. For each event, they also assessed their subjective feelings (belief in occurrence, autonoetic experience, and belief in accuracy) and rated various characteristics of mental representations that might contribute to these feelings. Results showed that belief in the occurrence of future events mostly related to their integration in a broader autobiographical context, especially their relevance to personal goals and their personal plausibility. We also found that belief in occurrence, autonoetic experience, and belief in accuracy represented distinct subjective appraisals of future events, which depended in part on different determinants. Based on these findings, we propose a new theoretical model of subjective feelings associated with episodic future thinking that conceives of belief in occurrence as arising from metacognitive appraisals that shape the sense that imagined events belong to one’s personal future.     

Visual perspective in remembering and episodic future thought

According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, remembering and episodic future thinking are supported by a common set of constructive processes. In the present study, we directly addressed this assertion in the context of third-person perspectives that arise during remembering and episodic future thought. Specifically, we examined the frequency with which participants remembered past events or imagined future events from third-person perspectives. We also examined the different viewpoints from which third-person perspective events were remembered or imagined. Although future events were somewhat more likely to be imagined from a third-person perspective, the spatial viewpoint distributions of third-person perspectives characterizing remembered and imagined events were highly similar. These results suggest that a similar constructive mechanism may be at work when people remember events from a perspective that could not have been experienced in the past and when they imagine events from a perspective that could not be experienced in the future. The findings are discussed in terms of their consistency with—and as extensions of—the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis.     

Individual differences in time perspective predict autonoetic experience

Tulving (1985) posited that the capacity to remember is one facet of a more general capacity—autonoetic (self-knowing) consciousness. Autonoetic consciousness was proposed to underlie the ability for “mental time travel” both into the past (remembering) and into the future to envision potential future episodes (episodic future thinking). The current study examines whether individual differences can predict autonoetic experience. Specifically, the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI, Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999) was administered to 133 undergraduate students, who also rated phenomenological experiences accompanying autobiographical remembering and episodic future thinking. Scores on two of the five subscales of the ZTPI (Future and Present-Hedonistic) predicted the degree to which people reported feelings of mentally traveling backward (or forward) in time and the degree to which they reported re- or pre-experiencing the event, but not ten other rated properties less related to autonoetic consciousness.     

Eye movements disrupt episodic future thinking

Remembering the past and imagining the future both rely on complex mental imagery. We considered the possibility that constructing a future scene might tap a component of mental imagery that is not as critical for remembering past scenes. Whereas visual imagery plays an important role in remembering the past, we predicted that spatial imagery plays a crucial role in imagining the future. For the purpose of teasing apart the different components underpinning scene construction in the two experiences of recalling episodic memories and shaping novel future events, we used a paradigm that might selectively affect one of these components (i.e., the spatial). Participants performed concurrent eye movements while remembering the past and imagining the future. These concurrent eye movements selectively interfere with spatial imagery, while sparing visual imagery. Eye movements prevented participants from imagining complex and detailed future scenes, but had no comparable effect on the recollection of past scenes. Similarities between remembering the past and imagining the future are coupled with some differences. The present findings uncover another fundamental divergence between the two processes.     

Episodic future thinking: Linking neuropsychological performance with episodic detail in young and old adults

Episodic future thinking (EFT) has been linked with our ability to remember past events. However, its specific neurocognitive subprocesses have remained elusive. In Experiment 1, a study of healthy older adults was conducted to investigate the candidate subprocesses of EFT. Participants completed a standard EFT cue word task, two memory measures (Verbal Paired Associates I, Source Memory), and two measures of executive function (Trail Making Test, Tower Test). In Experiment 2, healthy young adults also completed an EFT task and neuropsychological measures. The link between neurocognitive measures and five characteristics of EFT was investigated. Specifically, it was found that Source Memory and Trail Making Test performance predicted the episodic specificity of future events in older but not younger adults. Replicating previous findings, older adults produced future events with greater semantic but fewer episodic details than did young adults. These results extend the data and emphasize the importance of the multiple subprocesses underlying EFT.     

Remembering the past and imagining the future: attachment effects on production of episodic details in close relationships

Attachment theories and studies have shown that Internal Working Models (IWMs) can impact autobiographical memory and future-oriented information processing relevant to close relationships. According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (CESH), both remembering the past and imagining the future rely on episodic memory. We hypothesised that one way IWMs may bridge past experiences and future adaptations is via episodic memory. The present study investigated the association between attachment and episodic specificity in attachment-relevant and attachment-irrelevant memory and imagination among young and older adults. We measured the attachment style of 37 young adults and 40 older adults, and then asked them to remember or imagine attachment-relevant and attachment-irrelevant events. Participants’ narratives were coded for internal details (i.e., episodic) and external details (e.g., semantic, repetitions). The results showed that across age group, secure individuals generated more internal details and fewer external details in attachment-relevant tasks compared to attachment-irrelevant tasks; these differences were not observed in insecure individuals. These findings support the CESH and provide a new perspective to understand the function of IWMs.     

Individual differences in the phenomenology of mental time travel: The effect of vivid visual imagery and emotion regulation strategies

It has been claimed that the ability to remember the past and the ability to project oneself into the future are intimately related. We sought support for this proposition by examining whether individual differences in dimensions that have been shown to affect memory for past events similarly influence the experience of projecting oneself into the future. We found that individuals with a higher capacity for visual imagery experienced more visual and other sensory details both when remembering past events and when imagining future events. In addition, individuals who habitually use suppression to regulate their emotions experienced fewer sensory, contextual, and emotional details when representing both past and future events, while the use of reappraisal had no effect on either kind of events. These findings are consistent with the view that mental time travel into the past and into the future relies on similar mechanisms.     

“I can see clearly now”: The effect of cue imageability on mental time travel

Mental time travel (MTT) is the ability to mentally project oneself backward or forward in time, in order to remember an event from one’s personal past or to imagine a possible event in one’s personal future. Recent work has suggested that, although past and future MTT may rely on shared neurocognitive substrates, the two temporal directions may interact differently with components of this underlying system. Here, we asked 151 participants to recall or imagine past and future autobiographical events in response to high- and low-imageable cue words. The results showed that high- and low-imageable cued events differed markedly on almost all measures, suggesting that imagery acts as a facilitator when constructing both past and possible future events. In line with previous work, future events less often referred to specific events, contained fewer details, and were more positive and idyllic than past events. However, these main effects were qualified by a number of interactions. In particular, we found an increased effect of cue imageability for past as compared to future events, suggesting that the generation of past events is more sensitive to the ability of the cues to invoke the sensory components of the encoding context, whereas the construction of future events is more driven by context-independent schemata.     

Episodic future thought: Contributions from working memory

The ability to imagine hypothetical events in one’s personal future is thought to involve a number of constituent cognitive processes. We investigated the extent to which individual differences in working memory capacity contribute to facets of episodic future thought. College students completed simple and complex measures of working memory and were cued to recall autobiographical memories and imagine future autobiographical events consisting of varying levels of specificity (i.e., ranging from generic to increasingly specific and detailed events). Consistent with previous findings, future thought was related to analogous measures of autobiographical memory, likely reflecting overlapping cognitive factors supporting both past and future thought. Additionally, after controlling for autobiographical memory, residual working memory variance independently predicted future episodic specificity. We suggest that when imagining future events, working memory contributes to the construction of a single, coherent, future event depiction, but not to the retrieval or elaboration of event details.     

Remembering the Historical Roots of Remembering the Personal Past

As scholars, remembering the historical past in one's area of study provides a foundation for purposefully pursuing knowledge. As individuals, remembering our personal past provides direction and purpose in everyday life. Taken together, these percepts provide the impetus for the current paper, which traces the contributions of six early pioneers who wrote about how humans remember their personal past. Analysis demonstrates how their historical ideas support current literatures focused on the personal past: reminiscence‐based mental health interventions, the adaptive psychosocial functions of autobiographical remembering, and the construction of identity as a life story. Three future research directions are also briefly presented: the human ability for mental ‘time travel’, a lifespan approach to remembering the personal past, and reflection on one's past as a route to wisdom. Understanding the human phenomenon of remembering the personal past has long‐standing historical roots that continue to stimulate basic and applied research. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

自我相关未来思考:两种基本类型及其主要心理成分比较

自我相关未来思考是个体产生自我相关未来想法的心理加工,它包括未来情景思考和未来个人语义思考两种基本类型。两类思考都需记忆、自我和主观时间三种主要心理成分参与,但参与的具体形式可能有所不同:未来情景思考可能主要依赖于情景记忆和语义记忆、情景自我知识和语义自我知识、经验时间;未来个人语义思考可能主要依赖于语义记忆、语义自我知识和知道时间。三种主要心理成分在两种思考类型中的作用可能是相同的,其中,记忆是原材料,自我起引导作用,主观时间是先决条件。将来可以参照思考未来公众抽象问题的研究进一步明确自我和记忆在未来个人语义思考中的作用,还可以通过探究不同心理成分内部及成分间的交互作用进而了解各成分在自我相关未来思考中的作用机制。