Hume as a trope nominalist

In this paper, I argue that Hume's solution to a problem that contemporary metaphysicians call “the problem of universals” would be rather trope-theoretical than some other type of nominalism. The basic idea in different trope theories is that particular properties, i.e., tropes are postulated to account for the fact that there are particular beings resembling each other. I show that Hume's simple sensible perceptions are tropes: simple qualities. Accordingly, their similarities are explained by these tropes themselves and their resemblance. Reading Hume as a trope nominalist sheds light on his account of general ideas, perceptions, relations and nominalism.     

No logic of cogency: Reply to Oakley

Despite the fact that the nature of the properties of causation is rarely discussed within the mental causation debate, the implicit assumption is that they are universals as opposed to tropes. However, in recent literature on the problem of mental causation, a new solution has emerged which aims to address the problem by appealing to tropes. It is argued that if the properties of causation are tropes rather than universals, then a psychophysical reductionism can be advanced which does not face the problem of multiple realizability. However, the 'trope solution' rests upon the assumption that one can combine a trope monism with a type dualism. I argue that such a combination cannot be allowed. Given a plausible interpretation of types within a trope ontology, trope monism in fact entails type monism. Consequently, if one identifies mental tropes with physical tropes, one must also identify mental and physical types and in doing so face a modified version of the multiple realizability argument.     

Neither Mereology nor Magic,but Teleology

Contemporary theories of universals have two things in common: first, they are unable to account for necessary connections between universals that form a structure. Second, they leave teleology out of their accounts of instantiation. These facts are not unrelated; the reason why contemporary theories have such trouble is they neglect the ancient idea that universals are ends at which nature aims. If we want a working theory of universals, however, we must return to this idea. Despite its unpopularity among realists, teleology is not a disposable eccentricity, and its dismissal is not an improvement on ancient views.     

Why We Shouldn't Swallow Worm Slices: A Case Study in Semantic Accommodation

A radical metaphysical theory typically comes packaged with a semantic theory that reconciles those radical claims with common sense. The metaphysical theory says what things exist and what their natures are, while the semantic theory specifies, in terms of these things, how we are to interpret everyday language. Thus may we “think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar.” This semantic accommodation of common sense, however, can end up undermining the very theory it is designed to protect. This paper is a case study, showing in detail how one popular version of temporal parts theory is self‐undermining. This raises the specter that the problem generalizes to other metaphysical theories. The traditional flavor of temporal parts theory, Worm Theory, claims that everyday objects are four‐dimensional space‐time worms. An alternative flavor, Slice Theory, claims that objects are not space‐time worms but are instead momentary slices of these worms. The differences, we find, are not nearly as great as advertised. In fact, the differences in the two metaphysical theories are entirely masked by compensating differences in the accompanying semantic theories. As a result, the two theories generate exactly the same truth conditions. Common sense says that I was born years ago. Slice Theory adopts a semantic theory that accommodates such claims, but in doing so, it also endorses the claim that I, like other everyday objects, persist and thus do not exist for a mere moment. That is, the metaphysical claims constitutive of Slice Theory are denied by the very semantic theory Slice Theory adopts to accommodate common sense. Slice Theory thus undermines itself.     

Underdetermination,realism and empirical equivalence

Are theories ‘underdetermined by the evidence’ in any way that should worry the scientific realist? I argue that no convincing reason has been given for thinking so. A crucial distinction is drawn between data equivalence and empirical equivalence. Duhem showed that it is always possible to produce a data equivalent rival to any accepted scientific theory. But there is no reason to regard such a rival as equally well empirically supported and hence no threat to realism. Two theories are empirically equivalent if they share all consequences expressed in purely observational vocabulary. This is a much stronger requirement than has hitherto been recognised—two such ‘rival’ theories must in fact agree on many claims that are clearly theoretical in nature. Given this, it is unclear how much of an impact on realism a demonstration that there is always an empirically equivalent ‘rival’ to any accepted theory would have—even if such a demonstration could be produced. Certainly in the case of the version of realism that I defend—structural realism—such a demonstration would have precisely no impact: two empirically equivalent theories are, according to structural realism, cognitively indistinguishable.     

PRESENTISM,PERSISTENCE AND COMPOSITION

Pace Benovsky's ‘Presentism and Persistence,’ presentism is compatible with perdurantism, tropes and bundle‐of‐universals theories of persisting objects. I demonstrate how the resemblance, causation and precedence relations that tie stages together can be accommodated within an ersatzer presentist framework. The presentist account of these relations is then used to delineate a presentist‐friendly account of the inter‐temporal composition required for making worms out of stages. The defense of presentist trope theory shows how properties with indexes other than t may be said to exist at t. This involves an account of how times other than t exist at t, and how times may be multiply located at any given time. Benovsky's objection to bundles of universals is shown to assume that a bundle of properties must have the properties of its element properties.     

Identity Through Time and Trope Bundles

This paper brings together two theories that I have propounded separately elsewhere. The first is the view that concrete individuals are constituted completely by tropes, that they are trope bundles. The second and more recently developed theory is that of the two major categories of concrete individuals, continuants and occurrents, the latter are ontologically more basic than the former and that continuants are to be viewed as invariants among occurrents under equivalence relations. The latter theory embodies on its own an account of the nature of identity through time of things that are in time but not extended in time. The question is whether this view is compatible with the trope bundle account of concrete particulars, and, assuming it is (both theories being separately attractive) whether bringing them together entails any modifications (other than complexity) to either theory. After examining likely metaphysical difficulties the tentative conclusion is that the attractiveness of the trope bundle theory persists despite the marriage, but that the mental picture of what tropes and trope bundles are must be overhauled. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Horst Wessel: Contributions to the Theory of Logical Consequence,Non-Traditional Theory of Predication and Logical Theory of Terms

The present work takes the decease of Horst Wessel as an opportunity to present and honour his work (and that of his group), which has not received the attention it deserves. The focus will be on works which might not be sufficiently well-known. Wessel was, as we aim to show, familiar with the international debate concerning logical and philosophical issues and strived to solve them by considering theories of logical consequence, a non-traditional theory of predication and the theory of logical terms, all of which he developed in joint work with Alexander Sinowjew. Wessel had to significantly refine these theories in order to formulate his criticism towards alternative logics and to apply the theories to a treatment of intensional contexts. He was vehemently opposed to approaches which revised fundamental laws of classical logic. Questions concerning the history of Philosophy are addressed in Wessel’s criticism of the Kantian antinomies of pure reason, in Wessel’s contributions to the problem of universals and his analyses of fatalism, tychism and antifatalism.     

The bundle theory and the substratum theory: deadly enemies or twin brothers?

In this paper, I explore several versions of the bundle theory and the substratum theory and compare them, with the surprising result that it seems to be true that they are equivalent (in a sense of ‘equivalent’ to be specified). In order to see whether this is correct or not, I go through several steps: first, I examine different versions of the bundle theory with tropes and compare them to the substratum theory with tropes by going through various standard objections and arguing for a tu quoque in all cases. Emphasizing the theoretical role of the substratum and of the relation of compresence, I defend the claim that these views are equivalent for all theoretical purposes. I then examine two different versions of the bundle theory with universals, and show that one of them is, here again, equivalent to the substratum theory with universals, by examining how both views face the famous objection from Identity of Indiscernibles in a completely parallel way. It is only the second, quite extreme and puzzling, version of the bundle theory with universals that is not equivalent to any other view; and the diagnosis of why this is so will show just how unpalatable the view is. Similarly, only a not-so-palatable version of the substratum theory is genuinely different from the other views; and here again it’s precisely what makes it different that makes it less appealing.

Indiscernible universals

Universals have traditionally thought to obey the identity of indiscernibles, that is, it has traditionally been thought that there can be no perfectly similar universals. But at least in the conception of universals as immanent, there is nothing that rules out there being indiscernible universals. In this paper, I shall argue that there is useful work indiscernible universals can do, and so there might be reason to postulate indiscernible universals. In particular, I shall argue that postulating indiscernible universals can allow a theory of universals to identify particulars with bundles of universals, and that postulating indiscernible universals can allow a theory of universals to develop an account of the resemblance of quantitative universals that avoids the objections that Armstrong’s account faces. Finally, I shall respond to some objections and I shall undermine the criterion of distinction between particulars and universals that says that the distinction between particulars and universals lies in that while there can be indiscernible particulars, there cannot be indiscernible universals.     

顿悟:是进程监控还是表征转换

当前解释顿悟问题解决机制的理论主要有表征转换理论和进程监控理论。进程监控理论主要解释了顿悟问题为什么困难,但事实上它并没有说明顿悟问题为什么会解决,只回答了在什么情况下被试才会寻求其他的方法,而且它把顿悟问题解决的一般过程看成是同常规问题解决方法相同的过程。而表征转换理论主要解释了顿悟是如何获得的——顿悟的获得是由于问题解决者对问题的表征实现了正确的转变,但它并没有解释表征什么时候、怎么样才能转变?顿悟问题的解决经历了三个认知加工阶段,顿悟问题的解决需要在消除定势情况下激活正确的启发信息(线索),并验证了顿悟问题的原型激活和关键启发信息理论假说。     

Tropes in space

Tropes are particular features of concrete objects. Properties—the extensions of predicates—are primitive resemblance classes of tropes. Friends of tropes have been criticized for failing to answer three questions. First, are there fundamental items other than tropes? Second, what criteria determine whether some tropes are all and only the features of some one object? Third, can trope classes be formed adequately using only primitive resemblance? Trading on the spatiotemporal status of tropes, this essay offers new responses to each of these questions. The novel thesis is that there is a sui generis property called ‘markedness’, whose tropes “mark” certain locations in an ontologically basic way. The spatiotemporal distribution of markedness tropes fixes the distribution of familiar characterizing tropes like mass and charge, and characterizing tropes are bundled by being co-contained in the location of a maximally connected markedness trope. This novel theory of trope bundling is defended by appeal to theoretical utility: it is ontologically parsimonious and solves outstanding problems involving co-location and resemblance class construction.     

Three Trope Theories

Universals are usually considered to be universal properties. Since tropes are particular properties, if there are only tropes, there are no universals. However, universals might be thought of not only as common properties, but also as common aspects (“determinable universals”) and common wholes (“concrete universals”). The existence of these two latter concepts of universals is fully compatible with the assumption that all properties are particular. This observation makes possible three different trope theories, which accept tropes and no universals, tropes and determinable universals and tropes and concrete universals.

带良好条件句的真理不动点理论

各种真理不动点理论的一个主要问题在于：它们通常缺乏像样的条件句。本文旨在提出两种新的想法去处理这个问题。在介绍克里普克的真理不动点理论之后,本文的作者探讨了对真理不动点理论的种种反对意见,并回答了其中的一部分。然后,作者说明了菲尔德的真理理论,并说明该理论如何在克里普克的真理不动点理论至上增加了条件句。不过,本文的作者争论说,菲尔德的条件句仍有许多不尽理想之处。为了弥补这些缺点,作者提出了两个想法：一个是在不动点理论至上增加亚当斯条件句,另一个则是在其上增加史多内克条件句。     

Mapping Moral Motivation

In this paper we defend a version of moral internalism and a cognitivist account of motivation against recent criticisms. The internalist thesis we espouse claims that, if an agent believes she has reason to A, then she is motivated to A. Discussion of counter-examples has been clouded by the absence of a clear account of the nature of motivation. While we can only begin to provide such an account in this paper, we do enough to show that our version of internalism can be defended against putative counter-examples. All theories of motivation which take what motivates to be a psychological state run foul of the following plausible constraint: the reason why you ought to do an action and the reason why you do it can be the same. In our view, however, while what motivates is a reason (which is a fact) the state of being motivated is a cognitive stage, viz. the belief that one has reason to act. In cases where the agent's relevant beliefs are false, then she has no reason to act, but nontheless her action can be explained in other ways.     

NEO-PIAGETIAN THEORY: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

In the present article, the neo-Piagetian theories that were presented in the previous articles are placed in historical context; then compared and contrasted. It is suggested that all the theories arose in response to a common dilemma, namely that of building a revised theory of development which would preserve the strengths of classical Piagetian theory, while elminating its weaknesses. Since one of the strengths of the classical theory was its ability to explain the universal features of cognitive development, most of the new theories retained the core set of structural postulates which made this explanation possible. This gives the new theories a strong family resemblance with regard to their structural claims. Since one of the weaknesses of the classical theory was its inability to explain the aspects of cognitive development that are not universal, most of the new theories have modified and/or added to this set of core postulates, and specified a set of structural transformation processes which go beyond the classical theory as well. In this latter regard there are more dissimilarities among the new theories than there are similarities. Two reasons for this divergence are suggested. The first is that Piaget's structural transformation model was less clearly falsified than other aspects of his theory, by the data on cognitive-developmental non-universality. It was therefore less clear which aspects of the transformation model should be retained, and which eliminated. The second reason is that current theorists are divided on the question of which other theoretical approach - among those that are currently available in other branches of psychology - offers the greatest promise, when it comes to extending Piaget's transformation model in a productive fashion.     

Group-based reasons for action

This article endorses a familiar, albeit controversial, argument for the existence of group-based reasons for action, but then rejects two doctrines which other advocates of such reasons usually accept. One such doctrine is the willingness requirement, which says that a group-based reason exists only if (sufficient) other members of the group in question are willing to cooperate. Thus the paper argues that there is sometimes a reason, which derives from the rationality of some group action, to play one's part unilaterally in that group action. This seems implausible only because we tend wrongly to accept a second doctrine, monism about the unit of agency. Monism claims that, for any given deliberative problem, there is only one unit of agency to which reasons attach. If we are monists who believe in group-based reasons, the willingness requirement will seem necessary in order to avoid recklessness. We should reject monism, and if we do so we can recognise genuine conflict between individual-based and group-based reasons, and in doing so we can explain, without endorsing the willingness requirement, why we should not act recklessly.     

The sound-board account of reasoning: A one-system alternative to dual-process theory

In order to explain the effects found in the heuristics and biases literature, dual-process theories of reasoning claim that human reasoning is of two kinds: Type-1 processing is fast, automatic, and associative, while Type-2 reasoning is slow, controlled, and rule based. If human reasoning is so divided, it would have important consequences for morality, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. Although dual-process theorists have typically argued for their position by way of an inference to the best explanation, they have generally failed to consider alternative hypotheses. Worse still, it is unclear how we might test dual-process theories. In this article, I offer a one-system theory, which I call the Sound-Board Account of Reasoning, according to which there is one reasoning system which is flexible, allowing the properties used to distinguished Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning to cross-cut one another. I empirically distinguish my theory from the two dominant versions of dual-process theory (parallel-competitive and default-interventionist dual-process theory) and argue that my theory’s predictions are confirmed over both of these versions of dual-process theory.     

Giving Wrongdoers What They Deserve

Retributivist approaches to the philosophy of punishment are usually based on certain claims related to moral desert. I focus on one such principle:

Censuring Principle (CP): There is a moral reason to censure guilty wrongdoers aversively.

Principles like CP are often supported by the construction of examples similar to Kant’s ‘desert island’. These are meant to show that there is a reason for state officials to punish deserving wrongdoers, even if none of the familiar goals of punishment, such as deterrence, will be achieved. When suitable variants of such examples are presented, however, it is evident that there cannot be much reason to punish such wrongdoers, even if there is some. The same problem besets claims that there is intrinsic value in the suffering of wrongdoers, or that wrongdoers deserve to suffer. All such claims are relatively weak normatively.

     

Attitudinal and Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure

On phenomenological theories of pleasure, what makes an experience a pleasure is the way it feels. On attitudinal theories, what makes an experience a pleasure is its relationship to the favorable attitudes of the subject who is having it. I advance the debate between these theories in two ways. First, I argue that the main objection to phenomenological theories, the heterogeneity problem, is not compelling. While others have argued for this before, I identify an especially serious version of this problem that resists existing solutions, and I explain why even this version of the problem does not undermine phenomenological theories. Second, I argue that a grand reconciliation can be effected between the two types of theory: it can be true both that pleasures are pleasures in virtue of the way they feel and that they are pleasures in virtue of how they are related to their subjects' favorable attitudes, so long as the attitudes that are constitutively related to pleasures are ones that feel a certain way. Hybrid views of this sort have significant advantages over pure attitudinal or phenomenological views.