THE CONCEPT OF DIGNITY IN THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

This essay examines the function of the concept of human dignity (both as an inherent feature of human existence and as an ideal achievement) in the United Nations's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It explains why the key framers of the document affirmed an inherent human dignity in order to provide an explanatory basis for the validity of universal human rights while eschewing any religious or metaphysical justification for this affirmation. It argues that the key framers, while aware of the Christian anthropology informing the modern Western concept of the dignity of the person, grasped (1) that the Declaration, to be ratifiable, would need to be free of religious reference, and also (2) that the notion of inherency suffices to suggest heuristically not only a universal human nature but also, crucially, a transcendent reality in which all persons participate.     

Human dignity – the foundation of political human rights? Empirical research among youth in Germany

This article focuses on political human rights and on the empirically assessed legitimation of these rights. This research considers the rights of refugees, the active and passive right to vote, and the right of protest. Given that the research is empirical research, respondents are requested to express agreement, disagreement or neutrality. The assumption is that contextual factors influence people’s assessment of rights. One contextual factor is, firstly, the concept of human dignity. International human rights covenants regard human dignity as the very foundation of all rights. That said, the concept of human dignity is subject to different understandings and – certainly in the past – the understanding of what constitutes human dignity has varied. Dignity can be related to the appreciation of the person given by others, to the moral behaviour of a person, and it can be understood as inherently related to the individual as a human being. It is this last understanding that forms the basis of modern declarations of human rights. Furthermore, the respondents’ value orientations and religious beliefs, along with society’s socio-political perception, will be examined to ascertain whether these factors have any influence on respondents’ attitudes towards political rights. The key question is: does human dignity influence people’s view of the legitimacy of political rights and do other factors also count? The empirical analysis was undertaken done with German youth (N=2244). Findings show that the concept of inherent human dignity is a strong predictor for respondents’ attitudes towards political rights, but that it is not the unique predictor; relevant concepts are the value orientation of youth and their socio-political orientation. The significance of religious beliefs as a predictor is low.     

A JEWISH CONCEPTION OF HUMAN DIGNITY

This paper depicts the meanings of human dignity as they unfold and evolve in the Bible and the Halakhah. I posit that three distinct features of a Jewish conception of human dignity can be identified in contrast to core characteristics of a liberal conception of human dignity. First, the original source of human dignity is not intrinsic to the human being but extrinsic, namely in God. Second, it is argued that the “dignity of the people” has precedence over personal autonomy and liberty, which are core liberal pillars. The third characteristic pertains to the potential conflict between personal autonomy and liberty, and God's commandments. The theoretical analysis of human dignity is then examined in light of several Supreme Court decisions in Israel during the 1990s. I illustrate that Jewish religious and secular‐liberal conceptions pull in different directions in the rulings of liberal and religious Justices in Israel.     

Should Inherent Human Dignity Be Considered Intrinsically Heuristic?

What are “human rights” supposed to protect? According to most human rights doctrines, including most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), human rights aim to protect “human dignity.” But what this concept amounts to and what its source is remain unclear. According to Glenn Hughes (2011), human rights theorists ought to consider human dignity as an “intrinsically heuristic concept,” whose content is partially understood but is not fully determined. In this comment, I criticize Hughes's account. On my view, understanding inherent human dignity as an intrinsically heuristic concept tethers it to an “indeterminateness of sense,” which leaves it open to exploitation from theorists unsympathetic to the moral salience of rights and what rights are supposed to protect.     

Are Human Rights Redundant in the Ethical Codes of Psychologists?

The codes of ethics and conduct of a number of psychology bodies explicitly refer to human rights, and the American Psychological Association recently expanded the use of the construct when it amended standard 1.02 of the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct. What is unclear is how these references to human rights should be interpreted. In this article I examine the historical development of human rights and associated constructs and the contemporary meaning of human rights. As human rights are generally associated with law, morality, or religion, I consider to which of forms of these references most likely refer. I conclude that these references in ethical codes are redundant and that it would be preferable not to refer to human rights in codes. Instead, the profession should acknowledge human rights as a separate and complimentary norm system that governs the behavior of psychologists and should ensure that they have adequate knowledge of human rights and encourage them to promote human rights.     

作为一项权利的人的尊严

The concept of human dignity and the relationship between dignity and human rights have been important subjects in contemporary international academia. This article first analyzes the different understandings of the concept of dignity, which has left great influences in history (including the “theory of attribution-dignity”, the “theory of autonomy-dignity” or the “theory of moral completeness/achievement-dignity”, and the “theory of end-in-itself-dignity”); it then exposes the obvious defects of these modes of understanding; finally, it tries to define dignity as a moral right to be free from insult. Meanwhile, the relationship between human dignity and human rights is clarified as a result of this research: Rather than being the foundation of human rights, human dignity is one of human rights. The idea of dignity nevertheless has a particular status in ethics in that it embodies a kind of core moral concern, representing a basic demand rooted in the human self or individuality, and hence representing an important aspect of human rights. We may anticipate that sooner or later, the idea of human dignity will become, together with other human rights, the only intangible cultural heritage of human society. __________ Translated by Zhang Lin from Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2008, (6): 85–92     

生命伦理学:权力与不公正--在第六届国际生命伦理学大会的致辞

在现代生命伦理学的讨论中,主要关注的是改造医患关系中的权力关系。通过强调人权和对个人尊严的尊重,对脆弱人群授予权利已经达到。然而,在卫生保健中,权力的不平衡依然普遍存在。这在相当程度上与对社会不公正的关注不够有关。那种权力的不平衡加之新的权力形式的发展,例如,通过新的遗传生物技术,产生了对日益增长的社会不公的恐惧与忧虑。由此,扩展与公共卫生有关的伦理学讨论将受到关注。政治哲学研究也需要变为改造国际权力关系和改善人口健康。     

基因权的证成和体系

基因科技对人的主体性造成冲击,需要通过立法对于人的基因利益予以保障。基因具有人格性,同时也负载着经济利益。现有的权利体系无法全面涵盖基因上的利益关系,基因权成为一项新型权利。基因权的证成建立在基因具有道德意义的基础上,又因为其关涉人的物种尊严、人格尊严和身体尊严,并具有巨大的经济利益,而使得基因权表现为立体化多面向的权利束。基因权利体系包括基因隐私权、基因平等权、基因知情权和基因利益分享权。在我国现行权利框架下,适宜以单行法的方式完善基因权利制度。     

论生命伦理学中的人的尊严概念

人的尊严概念亟需得到清晰说明。在生命伦理学语境中,人的尊严可以在三种意义上合理地使用,即人类物种的尊严、普遍尊严和获得性尊严。人类物种的尊严是作为一个整体的人类物种所拥有的尊严,它的基础是人类物种的典型本质,它的道德要求是保护人类的本质不受侵蚀。个体层面的尊严分为普遍尊严和获得性尊严。普遍尊严是每个人平等具有的道德地位,为全体人类成员赋予了平等的基本权利。获得性尊严是每个人通过体现了人类卓越性的行为在不同程度上获得的。它不是一种道德地位,但可以给人树立更高的道德目标。     

International Human Rights and National Discretion

This paper argues that the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights couldserve as a model for an international court ofhuman rights to be builtupon the United Nations Committee on HumanRights. It argues that theconcerns states might have over the surrenderof a significant portion oftheir national sovereignity might be lessenedif such an internationalcourt were to incorporate the margin ofappreciation doctrine employed bythe European Court of Human Rights. Thisdoctrine is intended to respectthe customs and traditions of sovereign statesin dealing with humanrights issues, while maintaining that somerights such as the right not tobe tortured will be considered as basic andwill stand independently ofthe customs and traditions of sovereignstates.     

Regulating Nanomedicine—The Smallest of Our Concerns?

This paper, guided by the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, assumes that regulators should aim to support the development of nanomedicine while, at the same time, putting in place whatever limits or safeguards are indicated by ethical considerations. Relative to this regulatory objective, it is argued that, notwithstanding the importance of precaution (characteristically, concerning health, safety, and the environment), ethical reflection needs to go both broader and deeper. It is suggested that, by attending to the basic matrix of ethical debate and the “bioethical triangle” through which the matrix is currently articulated, the breadth, depth, and conflictual plurality of ethical concerns about nanomedicine will be clarified. In this light, the conventional thinking about precaution is revisited and concerns about human dignity and informed consent (under conditions of extreme uncertainty) are analysed. The paper concludes that, once the range of ethical pluralism is grasped, the extent of the challenge facing regulators will be more clearly appreciated.

The council of Europe’s instruments on biomedical research: how is conflict of interest addressed?

Conflict of interest is an issue that has been put in the spotlight by the commercial application of the new biomedical technologies. This paper presents the approach of the Council of Europe and the binding legal instruments to deal with this problem. The main focus is on the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, and its draft additional Protocol on Biomedical Research. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an International Conference on “Conflict of Interest and its Significance in Science and Medicine” held in Warsaw, Poland on 5–6 April, 2002. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect any official position of the Council of Europe.     

Ethical and Legal Considerations for Internet-Based Psychotherapy

The provision of mental health services over the Internet is becoming increasingly commonplace as new technologies continue to develop. Evidence in support of the efficacy of many such interventions is accumulating. Given the potential global reach of Internet-based psychological services, the authors examine ethical issues relating to this growing area of practice through the lens of the Universal Declaration of Ethical Principles for Psychologists (International Union of Psychological Science, 2008). They also raise issues relating to potential liability risks and offer recommendations intended to guide mental health practitioners who are considering involvement in the provision of Internet-based services.     

The International Significance of Human Rights

A comparative examination of four alternative ways of understandingwhat human rights are supports an institutional understanding assuggested by Article 28 of the Universal Declaration: Human rightsare weighty moral claims on any coercively imposed institutionalorder, national or international (as Article 28 confirms). Any suchorder must afford the persons on whom it is imposed secure accessto the objects of their human rights. This understanding of humanrights is broadly sharable across cultures and narrows the philosophical and practical differences between the friends ofcivil and political and the champions of social, economic, andcultural human rights. When applied to the global institutionalorder, it provides a new argument for conceiving human rights asuniversal – and a new basis for criticizing this order as tooencouraging of oppression, corruption, and poverty in the developing countries: We have a negative duty not to cooperatein the imposition of this global order if feasible reforms ofit would significantly improve the realization of human rights.     

Communication Rights in a Divided World

This article explores the implications of advances in communication technology for communication rights and the political, economic, and cultural challenges at global, national, and local levels. It argues that digital transformation cannot be left to market forces or to a benign vision of a world in which all governments are sufficiently liberal minded to permit dissent and peaceful revolution. Rather, digital transformation needs to be driven by the needs of peoples and communities who help construct communication and information ecosystems that are firmly rooted in principles of justice, freedom, equality, and mutual solidarity. To that extent, people and communities must be enabled to reach their own consensuses around their needs and what should be done, and they must be regularly and constructively consulted by those charged with implementing, regulating, and monitoring such ecosystems.