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1.
    
A prevalent assumption among philosophers who believe that people can intentionally deceive themselves (intentionalists) is that they accomplish this by controlling what evidence they attend to. This article is concerned primarily with the evaluation of this claim, which we may call ‘attentionalism’. According to attentionalism, when one justifiably believes/suspects that not-p but wishes to make oneself believe that p, one may do this by shifting attention away from the considerations supportive of the belief that not-p and onto considerations supportive of the belief that p. The details of this theory are elaborated, its theoretical importance is pointed out, and it is argued that the strategy is supposed to work by leading to the repression of one's knowledge of the unwelcome considerations. However, I then show that the assumption that this is possible is opposed by the balance of a relevant body of empirical research, namely, the thought-suppression literature, and so intentionalism about self-deception cannot find vindication in the attentional theory.  相似文献   

2.
    
HAMID VAHID 《Theoria》2008,74(2):146-163
Abstract: Moore's sentences of the form “P & ∼I believe that P” and “P & I believe that ∼P” are thought to be paradoxical because they cannot be properly asserted despite being possibly true. Solutions to the paradox usually explain the oddity of such sentences in terms of phenomena as diverse as the pragmatics of speech acts, nature of belief or justification. In this paper I shall argue that despite their seemingly different approaches to the problem, there is a single strategy that underlies all such proposals. Having criticized these suggestions, I shall defend my own solution according to which Moorean sentences are defective not because of some associated logical impropriety but because their assertion violates a certain interpretive constraint, viz., the principle of charity, on an adequate theory of meaning.  相似文献   

3.
    
ANTHONY BRUECKNER 《Theoria》2009,75(3):245-247
In a recent article in Theoria, Hamid Vahid offered an explanation of the phenomenon of Moore‐paradoxicality which employed Davidson's Principle of Charity regarding radical interpretation. I argue here that Vahid's explanation fails.  相似文献   

4.
    
An analysis of Moore's paradox is given in doxastic logic. Logics arising from formalizations of various introspective principles are compared; one logic, K5c, emerges as privileged in the sense that it is the weakest to avoid Moorean belief. Moreover it has other attractive properties, one of which is that it can be justified solely in terms of avoiding false belief. Introspection is therefore revealed as less relevant to the Moorean problem than first appears.  相似文献   

5.
    
Beall and Cotnoir (2017) argue that theists may accept the claim that God's omnipotence is fully unrestricted if they also adopt a suitable nonclassical logic. Their primary focus is on the infamous Stone problem (i.e., whether God can create a stone too heavy for God to lift). We show how unrestricted omnipotence generates Curry‐like paradoxes. The upshot is that Beall and Cotnoir only provide a solution to one version of the Stone problem, but that unrestricted omnipotence generates other problems which they do not adequately address.  相似文献   

6.
    
Several authors have argued that a version of Curry's paradox involving validity motivates rejecting the structural rule of contraction. This paper criticizes two recently suggested alternative responses to “validity Curry.” There are three salient stages in a validity Curry derivation. Rejecting contraction blocks the first, while the alternative responses focus on the second and third. I show that a distinguishing feature of validity Curry, as contrasted with more familiar forms of Curry's paradox, is that paradox arises already at the first stage. Accordingly, blocking the second or third stages won't suffice for resolving the paradox.  相似文献   

7.
I argue that a general logic of definitions must tolerate ω‐inconsistency. I present a semantical scheme, , under which some definitions imply ω‐inconsistent sets of sentences. I draw attention to attractive features of this scheme, and I argue that yields the minimal general logic of definitions. I conclude that any acceptable general logic should permit definitions that generate ω‐inconsistency. This conclusion gains support from the application of to the theory of truth.  相似文献   

8.
Recent works showed that tool use can be impaired in stroke patients because of either planning or technical reasoning deficits, but these two hypotheses have not yet been compared in the field of neurodegenerative diseases. The aim of this study was to address the relationships between real tool use, mechanical problem‐solving, and planning skills in patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD,= 32), semantic dementia (SD,= 16), and corticobasal syndrome (CBS,= 9). Patients were asked to select and use ten common tools, to solve three mechanical problems, and to complete the Tower of London test. Motor function and episodic memory were controlled using the Purdue Pegboard Test and the BEC96 questionnaire, respectively. A data‐transformation method was applied to avoid ceiling effects, and single‐case analysis was performed based on raw scores and completion time. All groups demonstrated either impaired or slowed tool use. Planning deficits were found only in the AD group. Mechanical problem‐solving deficits were observed only in the AD and CBS groups. Performance in the Tower of London test was the best predictor of tool use skills in the AD group, suggesting these patients had general rather than mechanical problem‐solving deficits. Episodic memory seemed to play little role in performance. Motor dysfunction tended to be associated with tool use skills in CBS patients, while tool use disorders are interpreted as a consequence of the semantic loss in SD in line with previous works. These findings may encourage caregivers to set up disease‐centred interventions.  相似文献   

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