THE IMPORTANCE OF OVERCOMING METAPHYSICS FOR THE LIFE OF FAITH

This essay proceeds, first, with an analysis of the theme of overcoming metaphysics in Kant and Heidegger to see just what it is that needs overcoming and how this might be of service to the life of biblical, ecclesial faith. This is followed by an account of how Jean‐Luc Marion sees the right kind of phenomenology as performing this task and of John Milbank's counterclaim that “only theology overcomes metaphysics”. Marion's position is then defended as a genuine, if partial overcoming that needs theology for its completion. Finally, a brief account is offered of the authentically metaphysical dimension of theology.     

THE CALL AND THE GIFTED IN CHRISTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: A CONSIDERATION OF BRIAN ROBINETTE'S CRITIQUE OF JEAN‐LUC MARION

In his recent article, ‘A Gift to Theology? Jean‐Luc Marion's ‘Saturated Phenomena’ in Christological Perspective’, Brian Robinette has critiqued Marion's phenomenology for confining theology to a one‐sided approach to Christology, one that stresses only the passive, mystical reception of Christ. To correct this imbalance, Robinette brings Marion into dialogue with those more active Christologies or ‘prophetical‐ethical’ liberation theologies of Gustavo Gutierrez, Johann Baptist Metz and others that stress a life‐praxis focused on confronting evil and suffering. In this essay I am arguing that Robinette has not fully developed the ‘logic’ of Marion's phenomenology of the ‘call and the gifted’, in which both a passive and an active element are operative. I explore more fully that very dynamic phenomenological process of the call‐and‐the‐gifted as developed in Marion's work Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness. Once viewed in Christological perspective, and especially in light of Christ's death and resurrection, Marion's phenomenology entails an ethical trope consistent with the mission of Christ as rendered in Scriptural revelation, and thus the gap between Marion's work and the prophetical‐ethical theologies of Gutierrez and Baptist Metz becomes narrowed.     

The Problem of Obligation,the Finite Rational Will,and Kantian Value Realism

Abstract

Robert Stern's Understanding Moral Obligation is a remarkable achievement, representing an original reading of Kant's contribution to modern moral philosophy and the legacy he bequeathed to his later-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century successors in the German tradition. On Stern's interpretation, it was not the threat to autonomy posed by value realism, but the threat to autonomy posed by the obligatory nature of morality that led Kant to develop his critical moral theory grounded in the concept of the self-legislating moral agent. Accordingly, Stern contends that Kant was a moral realist of sorts, holding certain substantive views that are best characterized as realist commitments about value. In this paper, I raise two central objections to Stern's reading of Kant. The first objection concerns what Stern identifies as Kant's solution to the problem of moral obligation. Whereas Stern sees the distinction between the infinite will and the finite will as resolving the problem of moral obligation, I argue that this distinction merely explains why moral obligations necessarily take the form of imperatives for us imperfect human beings, but does not solve the deeper problem concerning the obligatory nature of morality—why we should take moral norms to be supremely authoritative laws that override all other norms based on our non-moral interests. The second objection addresses Stern's claim that Kantian autonomy is compatible with value realism. Although this is an idea with which many contemporary readers will be sympathetic, I suggest that the textual evidence actually weighs in favor of constructivism.     

Love from Afar: Distance,Intimacy and the Theology of Love

Proceeding from Jean‐Luc Marion's The Erotic Phenomenon, this article discusses how the Christian concept of love can manifest intimacy. While most theological concepts of love spell out the requirement of distance, they do not pay sufficient attention to the intimate variants of love. The article argues that a full‐fledged theological account should make room for love's different economic and donative variants, as well as for love's advance from ‘distance’ to ‘visibility’ and, finally, ‘intimacy’. Concrete examples of intimate love include mystical union, transforming hospitality, fidelity and love that is as strong as death.     

IN (THE) PLACE OF THE SELF: A CRITICAL STUDY OF JEAN‐LUC MARION'S “AU LIEU DE SOI. L'APPROCHE DE SAINT AUGUSTIN”1

This review article discusses Jean‐Luc Marion's latest book Au lieu de soi. L'approche de Saint‐Augustin, in which Marion lets the theology and phenomenology of givenness interact with Augustine's ?uvre. The article provides an extensive summary of Marion's book and offers a critical analysis by linking Au lieu de soi to Marion's earlier work. Apart from this, this review hopes to open some parallels with the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jean‐Yves Lacoste if only to show how easily a certain strand of Augustinianism blends with contemporary thought.     

Love Between Embodiment and Spirituality: Jean‐Luc Marion and John Paul II on Erotic Love

While theological discourse on love traditionally bifurcates between love as a body‐bound passion and its superior and disembodied spiritual counterpart, a growing number of accounts have recently challenged the traditional division arguing for the fundamental unity of the phenomenon of love. Could such a dichotomy be overcome if one reversed the conventional hierarchy between bodily erotic and intellectual agapeic love and made erotic love between man and woman the fundamental paradigm of all kinds of loves? Could the reversal recuperate the affective aspect that has traditionally been downplayed? An answer to these questions is explored through an imaginary dialogue between Jean‐Luc Marion's phenomenology of one‐way erotic love and John Paul II's theology of embodied love.     

A GIFT TO THEOLOGY? JEAN‐LUC MARION'S ‘SATURATED PHENOMENON’ IN CHRISTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Jean‐Luc Marion has recently established himself as one of the most important and theologically fertile thinkers within the phenomenological tradition. With his study of ‘the gift’ and ‘the saturated phenomenon’, Marion presents a challenge to theology to rethink revelation in its surprising givenness, as exceeding the boundaries often set up in advance by metaphysics and a priori anthropological foundations. This paper examines Marion's mature thought, particularly within the perspective of Christology. The paper argues that Marion's phenomenological style of reflection, as adapted to theology, is deeply contemplative and markedly Johannine in sensibility. As a strategy for theology, the phenomenological style gives to it important incentives and skills for reading off God's self‐revelation in Christ in its surprising and counter‐intuitive beauty. Marion's challenge/gift to theology is, however, in need of a balancing emphasis, one that appears too infrequently in his work: the ethical‐prophetic dimension of the Christ event. In view of keeping both the mystical and prophetic poles of theology closely linked, the paper argues that just as beauty is a key category for saturated phenomena, so too is the reality of suffering and evil. However, whereas beauty invites a humble receptivity to and contemplative enjoyment of the gift, the inscrutable reality of suffering and evil, which so often exceeds comprehension, touches off a critical and practical response. In broadening the study of saturated phenomena to include the refractory character of experience, especially that which threatens humanity, Marion's valuable contributions to theology require a complementary emphasis from those narrative‐practical Christologies that highlight the prophetic aspects of the tradition.     

DIONYSIUS IN HANS URS VON BALTHASAR AND JEAN‐LUC MARION

This article evaluates Jean‐Luc Marion's retrieval of Dionysius against the backdrop of the debate in recent continental philosophy over the identity and meaning of “negative theology”. Marion's interpretation and use of Dionysius draws heavily on that of Hans Urs von Balthasar, both in his manner of approaching Dionysius and with the central elements of the Corpus Dionysiacum upon which he focuses. Through this comparison, it is clear that different polemical and apologetic interests shape their similar but distinct retrievals. Marion, like Balthasar before him, is translating Dionysius for a new audience. With this translation, I argue that Marion provides a richer and more complex confrontation with Dionysius than has previously been offered within the contemporary discussions of “negative theology”.     

Traces of Reduction: Marion and Heidegger on the Phenomenon of Religion

In his work, Being Given, Jean‐Luc Marion calls for a phenomenological investigation of the givenness (donation) of the phenomenon. As a phenomenologist of religion, Marion aims to give a philosophical account of the possibility of revelation, something which by definition is unconditionally given. In Being Given, he contends that his phenomenological reduction to unconditional givenness (in the figure of the saturated phenomenon) can account for religious phenomena in a way that respects the subject matter, all the while remaining philosophically neutral. In this paper I argue that Marion's aim to maintain strict philosophical neutrality interferes with his attempt to respect the subject matter of his own investigation, i.e., the givenness of revelation, since revelation is recognizably given, even as possibility, only in the non‐neutral context of an interpretive tradition. I establish the latter claim with recourse to Heidegger's early hermeneutic sketches of ‘primordial Christian religiosity.’ In turn, I call for a phenomenological Destruktion of Marion's work in order to release its potential as a non‐neutral investigation of a distinctively Catholic religiosity.     

ONTOTHEOLOGICAL TURNINGS? MARION,LACOSTE AND LEVINAS ON THE DECENTRING OF MODERN SUBJECTIVITY

In this article, Schrijvers examines the decentering of the modern subject at issue in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, Jean‐Luc Marion, and Jean‐Yves Lacoste from the perspective of ontotheology. Schrijvers contends that in both Marion's and Lacoste's phenomenology an unexpected return to the subject‐object distinction occurs, and asks whether a simple reversal of the subject‐object distinction suffices to break out of the ontotheological scheme. In a second move, Levinas’ account of a “relation without relation” is developed as a solution to the problem perceived in the works of Marion and Lacoste. Via a critique of Levinas, Schrijvers suggests that what is at stake in reversing the subject‐object distinction entails less an “overcoming” of ontotheology and more a matter of comporting oneself towards it in an appropriate way.     

Kant's Musical Antiformalism

According to the orthodox view of Kant's philosophy of music, Kant is the founder of musical formalism, the view that music is pure, contentless form, and appreciated as such. On this orthodox view, Kant is an innovator in philosophy of music, though his views are confused and sometimes contradictory. Sometimes, we are told, Kant indicates that music is a fine art and sometimes that it is merely an agreeable art. None of the orthodox position is correct. Kant's views on music are familiar, even a little old fashioned for their time. His views are consistent. He believes that some music is fine art and that the fine arts are imitative arts. Imitative arts have content, and Kant believes that at least some music has content. Our views on Kant's philosophy of music ought to be thoroughly revised.     

Love,Respect, and Individuals: Murdoch as a Guide to Kantian Ethics

I reconsider the relation between love and respect in Kantian ethics, taking as my guide Iris Murdoch's view of love as the fundamental moral attitude and a kind of attention to individuals. It is widely supposed that Kantian ethics disregards individuals, since we don't respect individuals but the universal quality of personhood they instantiate. We need not draw this conclusion if we recognise that Kant and Murdoch share a view about the centrality of love to virtue. We can then see that respect in the virtuous person cannot be blind to the individual, as critics of Kantian ethics contend. My approach contrasts recent efforts (Velleman and Bagnoli) to assimilate Kantian respect to Murdochian love, which overlook Murdoch's distinctive claims about the singularity of moral activity. This idea is not as un‐Kantian as it seems, and it should inform any Kantian ethics that aims to address the charge about individuals.     

Kant on the Emotion of Love

Although recent Kant scholarship has focused on Kant's treatment of various emotions, one that has not received much attention is love. There are three main reasons for this. First, Kant does not have a single, sustained analysis of the emotion of love; what he does say appears scattered throughout his corpus. Second, Kant identifies a number of different kinds of love, and it is not always clear which kinds are emotions or how the different kinds of love are related. Finally, in general Kant is quite critical of the emotion of love, and his critical remarks seem not to fit with the intuitions of some people when it comes to some of the more positive instances of love (e.g., the love a parent has for a child). In this paper I pursue two related aims. First, I identify and sort out the different kinds of love in Kant's writings, and I address a particular difficulty of interpretation, namely the status of love of human beings (Menschenliebe) in Kant's writings. Second, I argue that, despite Kant's criticisms of the emotion of love, he views it as an expression of our unsocial sociability, and it plays a positive and indispensible role in the moral development of human beings.     

Kant's Commitment to Metaphysics of Morals

A definitive feature of Kant's moral philosophy is its rationalism. Kant insists that moral theory, at least at its foundation, cannot take account of empirical facts about human beings and their circumstances in the world. This is the core of Kant's commitment to ‘metaphysics of morals’, and it is what he sees as his greatest contribution to moral philosophy. The paper clarifies what it means to be committed to metaphysics of morals, why Kant is committed to it, and where he thinks empirical considerations may enter moral theory. The paper examines recent work of contemporary Kantians (Barbara Herman, Allen Wood, and Christine Korsgaard) who argue that there is a central role for empirical considerations in Kant's moral theory. Either these theorists interpret Kant himself as permitting empirical considerations to enter, or they propose to extend Kant's theory so as to allow them to enter. With some qualifications, I argue that these interpretive trends are not supported by the texts, and that the proposed extensions are not plausibly Kantian. Kant's insistence on the exclusion of empirical considerations from the foundations of moral theory is not an incidental feature of his thought which might be modified while the rest remains unchanged. Rather, it is the very centre of his endeavours in moral philosophy. If we disagree with it, I argue, we have grounds for moving to a distinctly different theoretical framework.     

Value and Obligation Once More

In Understanding Moral Obligation (2012), Robert Stern sets out to provide a fresh interpretation of the role of autonomy in Kant's moral philosophy and attempts to rectify J. B. Schneewind's standard account in The Invention of Autonomy (1998). While Stern agrees that Kant's resort to autonomy is at the basis of a constructivist account of moral obligation, he claims that autonomy plays no role in Kant's theory of value, such that, in this respect, Kant remains a realist. Accordingly, Stern characterizes Kant's moral philosophy as a “hybrid” view because he sees it as involving a compromise between realism with regard to value and constructivism with regard to obligation. Stern's interpretation relies on a sharp distinction between value and obligation. The purpose of the present article is to question Stern's reliance on that rigid distinction, which involves intermixing theoretical and practical reason and assumes a distorted view of human agency.     

FROM EPISTEMOLOGY TO ETHICS: Theoretical and Practical Reason in Kant and Douglass

The aim of this essay is to provide a philosophical discussion of Frederick Douglass's thought in relation to Christianity. I expand upon the work of Bill E. Lawson and Frank M. Kirkland—who both argue that there are Kantian features present in Douglass as it relates to his conception of the individual—by arguing that there are similarities between Douglass and Kant not only concerning the relationship between morality and Christianity, but also concerning the nature of the soul. Specifically, I try to show that the moral weakness of slaveholding Christianity that Douglass attacked is found in the ecclesial formation of the slaveholding Christian church; it is a formation that begins with epistemology, but ignores ethics. I conclude, in part, that both Douglass and Kant reject a Cartesian psychological dualism in favor of a conception of the soul that is more attentive to one's moral development.     

Beyond the Apophatic Circle: Rethinking the Debate Between Jean-Luc Marion and Jacques Derrida

This study offers a new perspective on the much-discussed debate between French phenomenologist Jean-Luc Marion and postructuralist theorist Jacques Derrida on the question of ‘negative theology’ and the Christian mystical tradition. It argues that Marion's critique of Derrida betrays a fundamental misunderstanding, specifically, that it fails to recognise that Derrida is not interested in negative theology qua theology, but rather as a discursive practice with certain resources for the performative ‘unsaying’ of logocentric systems. It continues to show that Derrida's principal object is not the God of apophatic theology, but the broader, juridico-political implications of all ‘transcendental signifieds’. Finally, it suggests that Marion's oversight of these facts in his defence of the apophatic tradition unwittingly legitimates Derrida's critique, to the extent that it insulates the Christian tradition from external criticism, and thereby limits the responsiveness of that tradition to the demands of justice.     

THE HISTORICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE GOLDEN RULE AND THE SECOND GREATEST LOVE COMMAND

The golden rule, perhaps the most recognizable moral maxim in Western culture, is an inadequate basis for morality. In light of its flaws as a precept and its apparent lack of moral content, it is initially perplexing that the historic Judeo‐Christian tradition has often linked the golden rule with the second greatest command to love one's neighbor as oneself. However, after examining the presuppositions behind this link and investigating the biblical context of these sayings, it is clear that the Judeo‐Christian tradition is justified in making this connection. Although the golden rule and the love command should not be conflated and their distinctions should not be abandoned, the biblical intention of the golden rule can only be understood and properly practiced in connection with the love command.     

Moral Philosophers as Ethical Engineers: Limits of Moral Philosophy and a Pragmatist Alternative

Ever since Kant, moral philosophers have been more or less animated by the mission of discovering inescapable law‐like rules that would provide a binding justification for morality. Recently, however, many have started to question (a) whether this is possible and (b) what, after all, this project could achieve. An alternative vision of the task of moral philosophy starts from the pragmatist idea that philosophizing begins and ends in human experiencing. It leads to a view where morality is seen as a “social technology” that aims to make living together possible, and strengthens people's capability to live a good life within a society. The role of moral philosophy is, accordingly, to develop our moral tools further. Moral philosophers become ethical engineers who use their expertise in ethical topics to criticize existing “moral technology” and construct new concepts, tools, and theories that better answer the current challenges for living a good life.