When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus

It is often suggested that disagreement among scientific experts is a reason not to trust those experts, even about matters on which they are in agreement. In direct opposition to this view, I argue here that the very fact that there is disagreement among experts on a given issue provides a positive reason for non-experts to trust that the experts really are justified in their attitudes towards consensus theories. I show how this line of thought can be spelled out in three distinct frameworks for non-deductive reasoning: namely, Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Inference to the Best Explanation, and Inferential Robustness Analysis.     

Cognitive Diversity and Consensus in Group Decision Making: The Role of Inputs, Processes, and Outcomes

This study contributes to the new and growing body of research on shared cognition by examining how individuals entering a group decision-making context with different perspectives of the issues to be discussed arrive at cognitive consensus. Cognitive consensus refers to similarity among group members regarding how key matters are conceptualized and was operationalized as shared assumptions underlying decision issues in the present research. Utilizing 37 student groups participating in a multi-issue decision-making exercise, the study investigated antecedents and correlates of cognitive consensus. Results revealed that unanimity decision rule groups achieved more cognitive consensus than majority rule groups. In addition, group members inquiring concerning the reasons underlying others' decision preferences, accepting others' viewpoints as legitimate, and incorporating others' perspectives into their own interpretations of the issues was positively related to arriving at a greater degree of cognitive consensus. Cognitive consensus also positively influenced expectations regarding decision implementation and satisfaction.     

To Follow Expert Advice When Making a Decision: An Examination of Reactive Versus Reflective Autonomy

The present study examined whether reactive and reflective autonomy moderated individuals' responses to expert influence. Participants were given the opportunity to win money at a racetrack betting task for which they were provided with objective information about horses' previous performances along with specific expert recommendations. The experts were made to look either credible or noncredible by manipulating information on the success rate of their previous predictions. The results showed that the two forms of autonomy led to exactly opposite behaviors in response to the advice of credible experts. Reflective autonomy was significantly positively associated with following the recommendations of credible experts whereas reactive autonomy was significantly negatively associated with following the recommendations. The results also showed that it was particularly after losing their first race that reactive autonomy was related to rejecting the advice of experts. These findings indicate that reactive and reflective forms of autonomy may yield opposite patterns of behavior in certain situations.     

Hindsight Bias,Visual Aids,and Legal Decision Making: Timing is Everything

Once individuals learn the outcomes of events, they tend to overestimate the ability with which they could have predicted the event (hindsight bias). We discuss the relation between processing fluency and hindsight bias in the context of visual animations designed to clarify complex events. Visual reconstructions, by increasing clarity while masking gaps or uncertainty in the underlying data, have been shown to increase hindsight bias in legal settings. More generally, any computer‐generated visual may not only clarify data sets, but breed overconfidence. Further, by taking a broader view of judgments shift over time, a clearer portrait of hindsight bias may be achieved.     

判断与决策中的证实性偏差

证实性偏差是指个体在决策时, 倾向于有意或无意地寻找支持已有信念、预期或假设的信息和解释, 忽视可能与之不一致的信息和解释。目前, 研究者主要从肯定检验策略、认知失调理论以及错误规避三个方面解释证实性偏差的心理机制。证实性偏差还受到条件性参考框架、任务的抽象性、个体经验以及认知闭合的需要等因素的影响。虽然证实性偏差不能完全消除, 但是可以通过竞争性假设分析法和考虑对立面的方法降低其程度。未来的研究可以从证实性偏差的产生根源、研究范式、群体决策中的证实性偏差以及拓展应用研究这四个方面进行探讨。     

Decision Making When the Acceptable Options Become Unavailable

Research examined what decision makers do when, after screening out unacceptable options in preparation for making a choice from among the acceptable survivors, they find that all of the survivors have become unavailable and that no new options are forthcoming. Subjects were presented options in the form of rooms to rent and were required to screen them to prepare a "short list" from which a choice could be made. They also rated the importance of the room′s characteristics. Then they were told that the rooms on the short list all had been rented, and that no new rooms had become available so they would have to create a new short list from among the previously rejected rooms. Then they rescreened the rejected options and rerated the importance of the characteristics of the rooms. It was found that nearly 90% of the subjects would prefer to begin again with new options rather than rescreen rejected options. It also was found that when forced to rescreen rejected options, subjects reduced their ratings of the importance of the options′ characteristics, apparently in an effort to compensate, at least in part, for having to select options that, only moments before, had been regarded as unacceptable. Efforts to discourage ratings reductions proved futile. Implications of the results for screening and choice are discussed.     

Accuracy,Consensus, In-Group Bias,and Cultural Frame Shifting in the Context of National Character Stereotypes

We examined Finns’ and bilingual Swedish-Finns’ stereotypes regarding personality differences between Finns and Swedish-Finns and compared them with their respective self-ratings. Stereotype ratings by both groups converged on depicting Swedish-Finns as having a more desirable personality. In-group bias also influenced stereotypes. Contrary to predictions based on the Stereotype Content Model, out-group stereotypes were not compensatory. Consistent with the kernel of truth hypothesis of national stereotypes, Swedish-Finns’ aggregate self-ratings resembled their stereotype of personality differences between the two groups, and their personality self-ratings were more desirable than Finns’ self-ratings. Tentatively suggesting the occurrence of cultural frame shifting, the resemblance between Swedish-Finns’ self-ratings and their stereotype of Swedish-Finns was, although only marginally statistically significantly, somewhat stronger when the self-ratings were provided in Swedish.     

Self-Evaluation Bias of Social Comparisons in Ethical Decision Making: The Impact of Accountability

The purpose of this paper is to examine how accountability and judgment biases that occur in social comparisons may be related to ethical decision making. Using Jones' (1991 ) model as the theoretical framework to investigate this phenomenon, we found that self-enhancing individuals (i.e., those who thought they were more ethical in comparison to their peers) demonstrated higher responsiveness to increases in accountability than did self-effacing individuals (i.e., those who thought they were less ethical in comparison to their peers). We discuss these findings and outline the implications for future ethics research. Further, we provide practical guidance to those who administer ethics compliance programs on effective ways of facilitating ethical behavior in organizations.     

When Fatigue Turns Deadly: The Association Between Fatigue and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot

Racial bias in the decision to shoot can be minimized if individuals have ample cognitive resources to regulate automatic reactions. However, when individuals are fatigued, cognitive control may be compromised, which can lead to greater racial bias in shoot/don't-shoot decisions. The current studies provide evidence for this hypothesis experimentally using undergraduate participants (Study 1) and in a correlational design testing police recruits (Study 2). These results shed light on the processes underlying the decision to shoot and, given the high prevalence of fatigue among police officers, may have important practical implications.     

Regulatory Focus and Political Decision Making: When People Favor Reform Over the Status Quo

Two studies examined the impact of self‐reported use of promotion‐related (i.e., eagerness) and prevention‐related (i.e., vigilance) strategies when making “risky” or “conservative” decisions about economic reform under good, average, or poor economic conditions. Consistent with regulatory focus theory ( Higgins, 1997, 1998, 2000 ), in both studies strategic vigilance was associated with making a conservative choice, whereas strategic eagerness was associated with making a risky choice. In addition, along with perceptions of economic conditions, chronic strength of prevention focus (Study 1) or situationally induced prevention focus (Study 2) was associated with using strategic vigilance, whereas chronic strength of promotion focus (Study 1) or situationally induced promotion focus (Study 2) was associated with using strategic eagerness. Finally, regulatory focus and economic perceptions indirectly predicted economic reform decisions through their impact on strategy use. Our studies are the first to demonstrate that vigilant or eager strategy use is associated with “conservative” or “risky” political decisions.     

青少年情绪预测偏差与决策的关系研究

在决策过程中人们通常选择那些使其感到快乐的行为,决策结果与所预测的高兴或悲伤、满意或不满意紧密相连,以往研究发现这类预测即情绪预测存在偏差。本研究以188名中小学生为被试,采用自编情绪评定表和最后通牒游戏范式,对情绪预测偏差与决策的关系进行探索。结果表明青少年在预测对未来事件的情绪反应时存在强度偏差和持续时间偏差,情绪预测的强度偏差和持续时间偏差影响青少年回避或趋向决策。     

行为决策中的忽略偏差：心理机制与影响因素

忽略偏差是指在由忽略所导致的损失与由行为所导致的同等的或者更少的损失之间, 个体更容易接受忽略所导致的损失。个体在日常行为决策的各种领域, 特别是在公共政策制定中均会出现忽略偏差。目前忽略偏差的心理机制主要有损失规避和标准理论两种。忽略偏差的影响因素主要包括保护性价值观、选择结果的信息知悉度、负性情绪、社会角色和文化价值观念等。未来的研究则需要从忽略偏差的产生根源, 与决策规避中其他偏差的关系, 群体决策中忽略偏差的影响以及忽略偏差的应用研究领域, 特别是公共管理与公共政策领域等方面进行深入的研究。     

Ethical Decision Making in the Conduct of Research: Role of Individual, Contextual and Organizational Factors

Despite the importance of scientific integrity to the well-being of society, recent findings suggest that training and mentoring in the responsible conduct of research are not very reliable or effective inhibitors of research misbehavior. Understanding how and why individual scientists decide to behave in ways that conform to or violate norms and standards of research is essential to the development of more effective training programs and the creation of more supportive environments. Scholars in business management, psychology, and other disciplines have identified many important factors that affect ethical behavior, including individual, contextual, and organizational factors. Surprisingly little research has been conducted to examine the role of these factors in either the development of ethical decision-making skills, or their applicability to ethical issues commonly encountered in research and other scholarly and professional activities. Interdisciplinary approaches combined with research and discipline relevant paradigms should greatly enhance understanding of the individual contextual and organizational factors involved in ethical and unethical research conduct. Such studies will inform and facilitate the development of more effective ethics education programs in the sciences and engineering professions.     

Effects of Consensus Information and Task Demonstrability on Preference-Consistent Information Evaluation and Decision Quality in Group Decision Making

Groups often fail to solve hidden profiles even when all information is exchanged. This is partly due to biased evaluation of information. We examined the effects of consensus information and task demonstrability on preference-consistent information evaluation and decision quality. The results showed that the evaluation of unshared but not shared information was moderated by consensus information and task demonstrability. For unshared information, majority members exhibited a higher evaluation bias favoring preference-consistent information than minority members. Task demonstrability reduced the evaluation bias only when group members received no information about the other members' preferences. Finally, majority members were less likely to solve the hidden profile than minority members, and this was partially mediated by the evaluation bias favoring preference-consistent unshared information.     

遗传因素在风险决策加工中的作用

风险决策是指个体对不同选项及其概率进行权衡之后做出决定的过程。它是一个复杂的加工过程, 需要平衡奖赏选项的诱惑和损失选项的忧虑。风险决策能力是人脑最重要的高级功能之一。在现实生活中, 风险决策能力具有非常大的个体差异, 而遗传和环境各自都在其中起着关键的作用。在这篇文章中, 我们首先综述近年来风险决策研究领域中探讨遗传影响风险决策加工的研究, 包括双生子研究与分子遗传学研究。在介绍分子遗传学研究时, 按照基因所属神经递质系统, 分别介绍了多巴胺递质系统相关基因(如COMT、DAT等)、五羟色胺递质系统相关基因(如SLC6A4、TPH1等)和其他基因(如BDNF)对风险决策能力个体差异的影响。随后, 我们探讨了环境对风险决策个体差异的影响, 以及基因-环境交互作用对风险决策个体差异的影响。接下来, 我们介绍了将脑的结构与功能作为内表型来考察基因和环境对风险决策个体差异的影响的最新进展。在文章的最后, 我们指出今后对风险决策个体差异的研究应该同时考虑遗传和环境, 并考察脑的结构和功能在其中的中介作用。     

法律决策中消极程度及消除策略对后见偏差的影响

该研究考察法律决策中消极结果严重程度及消除策略对后见偏差的影响。实验采用3(严重程度:轻微损害、中度损害、严重损害)×3(有无策略:后见组、分散注意组、指导组)两因素被试间设计。采用自编两个案例及问卷测查法律决策中后见效应的差异,实验结果发现,后见偏差的强度随着事件消极结果严重程度的增加而显著增强。在消极结果的严重损害程度下,产生出最大的后见偏差。同时,两种策略指导都能够有效减少法律决策中的后见偏差。     

Deliberation Versus Intuition: Decomposing the Role of Expertise in Judgment and Decision Making

What produces better judgments: deliberating or relying on intuition? Past research is inconclusive. We focus on the role of expertise to increase understanding of the effects of judgment mode. We propose a framework in which expertise depends on a person's experience with and knowledge about a domain. Individuals who are relatively experienced but have modest knowledge about the subject matter (“intermediates”) are expected to suffer from deliberation and to benefit from a more intuitive approach, because they lack the formal knowledge to understand the reasons underlying their preferences. Individuals who are high (“experts”) or low (“novices”) on both experience and knowledge are expected to do well or poorly, respectively, regardless of decision mode. We tested these predictions in the domain of art. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that intermediates performed better when relying on intuition than after deliberation. Judgments of experts and novices were unaffected. In line with previous research relating processing style to judgment mode, Experiment 3 showed that the effect of processing style (global versus local) on judgment quality is similarly moderated by expertise. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Confidence in Dyadic Decision Making: The Role of Individual Differences

Groups typically express more confidence than individuals, yet how individual‐level confidence combines during collaborative decision tasks is not well understood. We prescreened 686 community members using a novel confidence measure (a true/false trivia test) intentionally designed to be difficult (accuracy rates were not significantly better than chance) and randomly assigned 72 individuals to collaborate on a matched version of the same test in dyads composed of two low‐confidence individuals, two high‐confidence individuals, or one of each (“mixed”). Consistent with past research, we found that the confidence expressed by dyads was higher than the confidence expressed by individuals; importantly, however, this pattern varied markedly by dyad type, with low‐confidence dyads showing the largest increase, mixed dyads showing a moderate increase, and high‐confidence dyads showing no increase—despite the fact that all dyads showed similarly low accuracy (about 55%). These results highlight the conditions under which groups express greater confidence than individuals and offer insights for the composition of collaborative decision‐making teams. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When Experts Argue: Explaining the Best and the Worst of Reasoning

Expert reasoning is responsible for some of the most stunning human achievements, but also for some of the most disastrous decisions ever made. The argumentative theory of reasoning has proven very effective at explaining the pattern of reasoning’s successes and failures. In the present article, it is expanded to account for expert reasoning. The argumentative theory predicts that reasoning should display a strong confirmation bias. If argument quality is not sufficiently high in a domain, the confirmation bias will make experts tap into their vast knowledge to defend whatever opinion they hold, with polarization and overconfidence as expected results. By contrast, experts should benefit even more from the power of group discussion to make the best of the confirmation bias—when they genuinely disagree that is, otherwise polarization is again likely to ensue. When experts interact with laymen other mechanisms can take the lead, in particular trust calibration and consistency checking. They can yield poor outcomes if experts do not have a sustained interaction with laymen, or if the laymen have strong opinions when they witness a debate between experts. Seeing reasoning as a mechanism of epistemic vigilance aimed at finding and evaluating arguments helps make better sense of expert reasoning performance, be it in individual ratiocination, in debates with other experts, or in interactions with laymen.