The predictive strength of personal constructs versus conventional constructs: self-image disparity and neuroticism

Idiographic personal construct (PC) measures of self-image disparity were hypothesized to be stronger than nonidiographic conventional construct (CC) measures in predicting neuroticism. Ninety-six college students completed PC and CC measures of real self, ideal self, social self, and ideal social self; the NEO Five-Factor Inventory; and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. Content analysis showed that individuals' PC measures were unique. The disparity between real self and ideal self and the disparity between social self and ideal social self were computed for PC and CC; test-retest reliabilities were .76 to .81. Results of simultaneous multiple regression analyses supported the hypothesis. Also, the two-variable PC self-image disparity scores were stronger than one-variable PC esteem scores in predicting neuroticism. Implications were discussed for research method, self-concept theory, personal construct theory, neuroticism, and psychotherapy.     

Clinical and grid predictions of inconsistencies in individuals' personal constructs

An experiment was conducted to determine the ability of the coordinate grid to assess logical inconsistencies that characterize individuals. Previous research has shown the grid differentiates groups predicted to vary in inconsistency. In the present study therapists' were significantly likely to differentiate real from bogus grid reports of their clients' inconsistencies. Results suggest the grid does assess inconsistencies that characterize the individual.     

Testing a computational model of interpersonal judgment with personal constructs

In a repertory grid experiment based on elicited personal constructs we tested several predictive implications of a computational model of interpersonal judgment developed by Lefebvre, Lefebvre, and Adams-Webber (1986). Results are compared with related findings within the framework of personal construct theory.     

Linguistic factors in reasoning

An experiment is reported which attempts to demonstrate the effects of manipulating two linguistic variables on a propositional reasoning task, one relating to the linguistic form of the logical rule, and the other to the presence and absence of negative components. The results are discussed in relation to Evans' (1972a) distinction between interpretational and operational factors in reasoning. Problems arising from the application of this distinction are discussed in detail.     

Linguistic factors in conditional reasoning

An experiment is reported which demonstrates the influence of three cognitive variables on adults' abilities to reason with conditional arguments embedded in either causal-temporal or class inclusion content. The three variables are the linguistic form of the conditional rule, the principle of conditional reasoning, and the order of the components in the conditional rule. The results showed considerable similarity in the effects of these factors for the two types of concrete content, but some interesting differences were found. The findings are discussed in relation to the results of recent investigations which involved abstract content and/or other deductive reasoning paradigms.     

Linguistic and psychometric factors in propositional reasoning

An experiment is reported which demonstrates the effects of linguistic and psychometric factors on adults' performance on a propositional reasoning task. The three linguistic factors were the semantic content in which the logical rule was embedded, the linguistic form of the logical rule, and the polarity of the major premise of the logical arguments. The two psychometric factors were the mode of response and the order of presentation of the different types of content. The results showed that the linguistic factors had a pronounced effect on adults' propositional reasoning abilities, whereas the influence of the psychometric factors was negligible. These findings are discussed in relation to operational and interpretational factors in reasoning.     

Revisiting the imaginary audience and personal fable constructs of adolescent egocentrism: a conceptual review

Adolescents are thought to believe that others are always watching and evaluating them, and that they are special and unique, labeled the imaginary audience and the personal fable, respectively. These two constructs have been fixtures in textbooks on adolescent development, and have been offered as explanations for self-consciousness and risk-taking. However, their characterization of adolescent social cognition as biased has not been supported empirically, the measures used to assess them lack construct validity, and alternative explanations for both ideation patterns have not been explored. Despite these issues, the imaginary audience and personal fable constructs continue to be considered prototypical representations of social cognitive processes during adolescence. This paper (1) reviews theoretical models of the imaginary audience and the personal fable, and the empirical data pertaining to each model, (2) highlights problems surrounding the two most commonly used measures, and (3) outlines directions for future research, so that a better understanding of the imaginary audience and personal fable, and their roles in adolescent development, may be achieved.