Is quantum mechanics an atomistic theory?

If quantum mechanics (QM) is to be taken as an atomistic theory with the elementary particles as atoms (an ATEP), then the elementary particlcs must be individuals. There must then be, for each elementary particle a, a property being identical with a that a alone has. But according to QM, elementary particles of the same kind share all physical properties. Thus, if QM is an ATEP, identity is a metaphysical but not a physical property. That has unpalatable consequences. Dropping the assumption that QM is an ATEP makes it possible to replace the assumption that elementary particles are individuals with the assumption that there are various kinds of elementary stuff that have smallest quantities — the smallest quantity of light, for example, is a photon. The problems about identity disappear, and the explanatory virtues of an ATEP are maintained.I would like to thank various referees for their comments, as well as David Albert, Gerald Feinberg, Isaac Levi, James Lewis, Andre Mirabelli, Sidney Morgenbesser, Sarah Stebbins, Chris Swoyer, and Steve Yablo for useful discussions, and Arthur Fine for his comments on a presentation at Stanford University of a preliminary version of this paper in 1986.     

Is guidance an applied science?: The role of theory in the careers guidance interview

Some of the findings of a study investigating careers officers' use of theoretical models in the careers guidance interview are discussed. Data were collected through visits to institutions offering Diploma in Careers Guidance courses, a large-scale questionnaire survey of careers officers, and semi-structured interviews and group discussions. There was evidence that in initial training, theory is used to support, rather than determine, the development of skills. Results also suggested that practising careers officers are familiar with a fairly wide range of theories, although in their interviewing they tend to apply broad principles of theory, rather than specific elements. Careers officers who trained some time ago were less familiar with theories than were those who trained more recently, and there was no support for the hypothesis that long service leads to a greater recognition of the relevance of theories generally. Familiarity with guidance and counselling theories appears to be more influential than knowledge of career theories on the way careers officers think about interviewing. Overall, the findings cast doubt on the view that careers guidance is an applied science.     

Is undergoing psychoanalysis essential for the appraisal of psychoanalytic theory?

Psychoanalysis often claims that an appraisal of its constituent hypotheses necessitates a personal analysis on the part of the critic with respect to the latter's ability to render a worthwhile and insightful evaluation of psychoanalytic theory. The objection to this position, namely one of ‘privileged access’, has been voiced in numerous contexts, but a philosophical defense of the position has rarely been offered. In this paper such a defense is put forth, and it is argued that psychoanalysis is, in certain crucial respects, analogous to physics in its scientific or structural respects, and insofar as this analogy holds, certain claims about one's familiarity with the latter also hold with respect to the former. Thus, a knowledge of physics entails an understanding of the laboratory procedures whereby physicists carry on their investigations. In the case of psychoanalysis certain ‘laboratory operations’ and ‘instruments’ are identifiable also. Where in the physics laboratory the physicist deals with cyclotrons, thermometers and the like, the psychoanalyst deals with the character traits of himself and the analysand. The character trait is the instrument whereby the analyst understands the analysand in a specifically psychoanalytic manner. Since the philosopher must know how the physicist works in the physics laboratory in order to understand physics, one must also understand the laboratory methodology of the analyst. Without the experience of psychoanalysis, however, such an understanding is truncated at best and nonexistent at worst.     

The status of psychoanalytic theory∗

What is the place of Psychoanalytic Theory on our map of knowledge and belief? Various alternatives are considered. Is it a scientific theory? — a myth? — or like a prescientific example of natural philosophy? — a branch of medical knowledge? — a premature empirical synthesis that is an approximation to the truth? Each of these answers runs into objections and difficulties, some of which are examined or noted. On the assumption that it is a provisional story which approximates to the truth, the question is then raised: what can we do to find out how much of an approximation to the truth the theory really is? The relevance and value of psychological studies are discussed; and the suggestion is made that the status of Psychoanalytic Theory will remain an ambiguous one for some time to come.     

Academic career intention beyond the PhD: can the theory of planned behavior explain gender differences?

Are women less interested in becoming professors than men? We applied the theory of planned behavior (TPB) to investigate the intention to pursue an academic career. Postdocs who recently finished their PhD at a German university participated in an online survey (N = 380, mean age: 33; 45% women). Women reported lower academic career intentions (d = 0.40); TPB variables (attitude, subjective norm, self‐efficacy) explained 87% of this gender difference. At an 8 month follow‐up, we found no gender difference in the intention to continue in an academic career among the postdocs who were still working in academia (n = 129). Addressing TPB constructs early in women's academic careers could encourage them to remain in academia and strive for a professorship.     

Is a naturalistic theory of communication possible?

This article presents a theoretical discussion of the relationship between language and communication. I discuss Chomsky’s position on this topic. Chomsky claims that if it is possible to construct a scientific theory of the language faculty, there is no possibility to construct a scientific theory of communication because in communication human intentionality is involved. This position is contrasted by philosophers of language considering that communication is to be studied as a form of rational action. I maintain that both these positions are not supported by the evidence coming from developmental research. Taking a cognitive point of view I contend that a communicative faculty can be defined that develops since infancy to adulthood, which has features independent of language and action. Different steps in the development of the communicative ability are linked to a parallel development of the theory of mind. I then argue in favor of a distinction between collective action and communication considering that while collective action is common to human and nonhuman primates, communication is typically human.     

Is David Lykken's theory of crime likely?

Lykken proposed a model of antisocial behaviour based on the criminal's temperamental difficulties. Personality traits stressed by this model are impulsivity, fearlessness, and sensation seeking. The present study compares one sample taken from the general population with a sample of prison inmates on these traits. The results indicate that prison inmates score higher than the general population on sensation seeking and fearlessness, whereas their scores on impulsivity are lower. Some implications are discussed.     

Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness

A number of philosophers have recently argued that (i) consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that (ii) we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau’s influential version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our “phenomenal” and “material” concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts can’t co-refer. I claim that this account fails. To begin with, it is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn’t be. Further, and worse, the account predicts that an “intuition of distinctness” will arise in cases where it clearly does not. In conclusion, I make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and (physicalist) alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim (ii).     

Is the principle of minimization of secondary moments validated during various fingertip force production conditions?

During the application of fingertip forces with simultaneous flexion of the four fingers, namely index, middle, ring, and little fingers, a stable force sharing among fingers is adopted. Several studies have hypothesized that this stable force sharing is established to minimize unnecessary rotational moments (different from the main flexion moments). This principle labeled "minimization of secondary moments" is presented in the literature as a principle used by the central nervous system to solve musculoskeletal redundancy. However, this principle has only been tested with one solicited degree of freedom and in one finger posture. Our study tests this principle with various degrees of freedom solicited as secondary moments and in two different finger postures. Participants (n=6) were asked to apply a downward vertical force using their four fingers with the forearm placed in two different configurations: a "horizontal" condition (involving flexion/extension and pronation/supination at the wrist joint) and a "vertical" condition (involving flexion/extension and radial/ulnar deviation at the wrist joint). Additionally, two finger postures were tested in each forearm configuration: in the first, the distal inter-phalangeal joints (DIP) were extended and the proximal inter-phalangeal joints (PIP) highly flexed. In the second finger posture, both DIP and PIP joints were flexed. The resultant four-finger force and the relative involvement of each finger in the resultant four-finger force (force sharing) were analyzed. Results showed that the finger postures did not influence the finger force sharing, showing that the minimization of the secondary moment principle was stable among the finger joint angle configurations. Nonetheless, the relative involvement of each finger was dependent on the secondary degree of freedom solicited (pronation/supination vs. radial/ulnar). The modifications of the finger force sharing between the "horizontal" and "vertical" conditions were in accordance with the principle of minimization of the secondary moments.     

Is the whole more than the sum of the parts? Re-evaluating social status in marketing

Data from 2 national surveys were examined to determine whether the components of social status (education, income, occupation) as separate individual factors could explain more variance than social status composites (Coleman, Hollingshead, Census). In general the evidence implies that the components are better predictors than the composite score, and that in the majority of cases only the raw education and income information is required for prediction.     

Is there an effect of handedness on the position of the egocentric reference?

Forty normal subjects (20 left-handed; 20 right-handed) were submitted to a proprioceptive straight ahead pointing task while blindfolded to study the effect of the hand used and of the hand preference on the estimation of the subjective sagittal middle. Results showed that left-handed and right-handed subjects both deviated to the left of the objective sagittal middle and presented an effect of the hand used and of the starting point affecting their straight ahead performance in a similar way. In all subjects whatever their manual preference, using the left hand and starting 30 degrees to left induced a tendency to deviate to the same side, whereas using the right hand and starting 30 degrees to right induced a tendency to place the subjective middle to the right of the objective middle. These results are interpreted with regard to the hypothesis of a cortical control of the position of the egocentric reference.     

Is the startle reaction an emotion?

In this study, we examined startle reactions in which the subjects did and did not know when a blank pistol would be fired. In addition, we asked subjects to suppress their startle response and to simulate a startle when there was no gunshot. Detailed measurement of facial muscular actions supported most of the findings reported by Landis and Hunt (1939), but our findings suggested that startle be considered a reflex not an emotion. The findings are considered in terms of current disagreements about exactly what constitutes an emotion, including the argument between Zajonc (1980) and Lazarus (1984) about the role of appraisal.     

Is counterpart theory inadequate?

Conclusion Counterpart theorists need not posit the counterpart relation in addition to the identity relations as an Additional relation relating objects across possible worlds. Identity can be viewed as a relation applicable to individuals within possible worlds, while the counterpart relation replaces identity in translations of ordinary utterances which correlate individuals in different possible worlds and, hence, in all modal utterances. CT is, in other words, a theory of modal discourse — it proposes a way of understanding all modal predications. As such, it is not to be seen as providing a second looser sense of identity across worlds, in addition to the narrow sense. Perhaps Lewis' original formulation encourages this misunderstanding insofar as it (see, especially, P2) denies strict identity across possible worlds. Accordingly, I have suggested a modification of CT whereby syntactic restrictions upon variables eliminates any temptation to posit two parallel relations applicable to entities existing in different possible worlds.As has been argued by Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, The Clarendon Press, (Oxford, 1974), Chapter VI.     

Is predictive processing a theory of perceptual consciousness?

Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offered by PP theorists mostly concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine material substrate of consciousness untouched.     

Is there an Ethics of Computing?

ABSTRACT  The article constitutes an attempt to answer the question contained in the title, by reference to three example topics: individual privacy, ownership of software, and computer 'hacking'. The ethical question is approached via the legal one of whether special, computer–specific legislation is appropriate. The conclusion is in the affirmative, and rests on the claim that computer technology has brought with it, not so much the potential for committing totally new kinds of crimes, as a distinctive set of linguistic and conceptual apparatus which makes it necessary to describe computer–related activity in special ways.