EMILE,OR ON DEVASTATION: WHEN VIRTUAL BOUNDLESSNESS MEETS INNER EMPTINESS

The author's starting point is a psychoanalysis conducted with Emile, a teenager who was unable to form close relationships and was living in a virtual world, planning a school massacre. For him, virtual reality functioned as a bottomless container in which he was no longer a victim of bullying but rather a god. When the boundlessness of cyberspace encounters a “black hole” in the psyche, any fantasies can be put into virtual realization and actions. By recounting his wickedness, violence, destructiveness, and perversion, Emile could start restoring his self boundaries and create his own autobiographical narrative. Unable to sustain the pain of mourning his envelope of invulnerability and omnipotence, however, he prematurely terminated analysis.     

Schelling on freedom,evil and imputation: A puzzle

This paper is focused on F. W. J. Schelling's view of freedom during the period of the Freiheitsschrift (1809) and related works. It is argued that the standard way this has been understood may be too simplistic. On this standard interpretation of his view, evil is made a matter of free choice by the agent, but where the choice does not concern individual actions, but the choice of the agent's essence in an atemporal act. As a result of this choice, it is argued, Schelling can then make evil imputable. By contrast, I argue that for Schelling freedom does not involve choice, but necessity, but in a way that is still internal to the agent and hence non-coercive, and thus in a way that remains free and makes evil imputable. How Schelling comes to have this view is considered, and some responses are given to ways it might be challenged both interpretatively and philosophically.     

Psychology,individual, and society: An interview with Seymour Sarason

The phenomenal unity of consciousness must flow from some element immutably present in each and every representation of the individual and binding the whole into one. To unearth and accurately define this phenomenal self becomes one of the fundamental tasks of psychology.We will assume that any kind of psychology that explains the behavior of the individual also explains the behavior of society, in so far as the psychological point of view is applicable to and sufficient for the study of social behavior. It is true that for certain purposes it is very useful to look away entirely from the individual and to think of socialized behavior as though it were carried on by certain larger entities which transcend the psycho-physical organism. But this viewpoint implicitly demands the abandonment of the psychological approach to the explanation of human conduct in society … Social behavior is merely the sum, or better, arrangement of such aspects of individual behavior as are referred to culture patterns that have their proper context, not in the spatial and temporal continuities of biological behavior, but in historical sequences that are imputed to actual behavior by a principle of selection.The life of a man is a double series—a series of effects produced in him by the rest of the world, and a series of effects produced in that world by him. A man's make-up, or nature, equals his tendencies to be influenced in certain ways by the world and to react in certain ways to it. To describe even one man's intellect and character fully, at even any one time, it would be necessary to list all the world's happenings that he might possibly encounter, and to state in each case how he would feel and think and act in response to that happening.     

Conflict and Compromise in International Calvinism: Ysbrand Trabius Balck's Pastoral Mediations in Exile and Beyond

Abstract

The life of frequent banishment and exile of the respected minister, Ysbrand Trabius Balck (c.1530-c.1600), offers an opportunity to see a refugee pastor in action and to witness the practical concerns that faced the Reformed Church, both while ‘under the cross’ and after establishment. Balck's early Reformed ministerial post was in Antwerp, which he left for exile to Emden, Germany, shortly after the outbreak of iconoclasm in the Netherlands. After Emden, he left for England, where he served as pastor in four congregations of Dutch refugees before returning to Antwerp ten years later. Subsequent turbulence caused additional periods of exile from Antwerp, including stints in Leiden, Poland, and Friesland. Balck's experience in international refugee networks led him to be called to serve as a mediator in congregational conflicts; here his practical experiences kept him aware of the local situations that he needed to consider in any conflict resolutions. This article investigates Balck's practical role as negotiator and mediator in three controversies involving charity and church discipline: first and foremost during his brief Emden exile, which has been overlooked by scholars, and two more widely known episodes in Leiden. Such an investigation underscores the complicated reality of international Calvinism, as the exile experience and his pastoral obligations sharpened Balck's firm doctrinal convictions while at the same time causing him to emphasize accommodation and striving to find ways to live together despite conflict.     

Two cheers for Tanhā

The central character in Sartre's 1938 novel La Nausée, Antoine Roquentin, has lost his sense of things, and now the world appears to him as utterly unstable. Roquentin suffers from what he calls ‘nausea,’ a condition caused by an ontological intuition that the self, as well as the world through which that ‘self’ moves, lacks a substantial nature. The novel portrays Sartre's own philosophical account of the self in La transcendence de l'égo. Here Sartre argues that Husserl's account of consciousness is not radical enough; the ‘I’ or ego is a pseudo-source of activity (and Sartre thus draws very close to a particularly Buddhist account of personal identity). My essay questions Roquentin's response to his ontological insight: why is this the occasion for ‘nausea’? Why doesn't Roquentin (as King Milinda famously does) celebrate and embrace his ‘non-self’? I argue that Sartre's depiction of Roquentin's ailment, and the unsatisfactory solution he provides, misunderstands both the aggregate nature of things as well as authentically rendered consciousness-only (vijñaptimātra).     

Experience and the Absolute other

In Experience and the Absolute (2004) and other works, Jean‐Yves Lacoste develops a phenomenology of a way of life he calls “liturgy,” in which one refuses one's being‐in‐the‐world in favor of a more basic form of existence he calls “being‐before‐God.” In this essay I argue that if there is indeed such a thing as being‐before‐God, Lacoste has not sufficiently considered the possibility that it is characterized in part by a disturbance of one's being‐in‐the‐world similar to, or perhaps even identical with, the disruptive encounter with the human other that constitutes the self as responsible according to Levinas's unique notion of ethics. Lacoste's dismissal of Levinas, evidently based on a misunderstanding of what Levinas means by the word “ethics,” leads him to overlook the potential relevance of Levinas's ideas to his phenomenological project at a number of significant points in his work.     

Descartes and the Labyrinth of the World

In the Rules the young Descartes likens his method to the thread that guided Theseus. The simile is born of a confidence that he has seen through the art of the followers of Daedalus and this has given him a model of how to unriddle the labyrinth of the world. From the very beginning Descartes had an interest not only in optics, perspective, and painting, but in using his knowledge of them to duplicate some of the effects said to have been created by the thaumaturgic magicians. Anamorphoses and automata not only provided Descartes with examples of deceptive appearance, but also pointed the way to the solution of the riddle they posed. Yet it is precisely the attempt to take this exit from the labyrinth of the world that threatens to lead back into it, as the search for truth is threatened by the infinity of space. To claim absolute truth, the natural philosopher would have to show that the mechanical model he has proposed is the only one that could account for the phenomena in question. This, as Descartes himself is forced to recognize, he is unable to do. Are we back in the labyrinth? Instead of seeing in Descartes's method an Ariadne's thread, Father Bourdin likens that method to Icarus. Annoyed, Descartes ridicules the good Father. But Bourdin's too often empty rhetoric raises a serious question: is Descartes Theseus, Daedalus, or Icarus? At stake is our understanding of the world we live in.     

Fear of breakdown and the unlived life

Winnicott's Fear of breakdown is an unfinished work that requires that the reader be not only a reader, but also a writer of this work which often gestures toward meaning as opposed to presenting fully developed ideas. The author's understanding of the often confusing, sometimes opaque, argument of Winnicott's paper is as follows. In infancy there occurs a breakdown in the mother–infant tie that forces the infant to take on, by himself, emotional events that he is unable to manage. He short‐circuits his experience of primitive agony by generating defense organizations that are psychotic in nature, i.e. they substitute self‐created inner reality for external reality, thus foreclosing his actually experiencing critical life events. By not experiencing the breakdown of the mother–infant tie when it occurred in infancy, the individual creates a psychological state in which he lives in fear of a breakdown that has already happened, but which he did not experience. The author extends Winnicott's thinking by suggesting that the driving force of the patient's need to find the source of his fear is his feeling that parts of himself are missing and that he must find them if he is to become whole. What remains of his life feels to him like a life that is mostly an unlived life.     

Operants Were Never "Emitted," Feeling Is Doing, And Learning Takes Only One Trial: A Review Of B. F. Skinner's Recent Issues In The Analysis Of Behavior

This final collection of Skinner's papers was intended for the professional, although other readers will find much of interest. The first five chapters are devoted to what Skinner called “theoretical issues” and include clear presentations of his positions on “feelings” and on the “self” as an apparent agent of volition. Skinner skillfully discusses thinking, the origins of cognitive-mediational theories, and a favorite topic: the similarity of processes occurring in the histories of species and of individuals. The next four chapters cover what he called “professional issues,” including the often-misunderstood philosophy known as radical behaviorism as well as the operant aspects of behavior therapy and attempts to influence educational practices. He seemed disappointed in the lack of acceptance of programmed learning methods and pessimistic about the possibility of improving education practices. This pessimism was evident in the final section, “personal issues,” in which he expressed doubt that the powerful and self-serving forces of government, business, and religion will ever permit the changes that could be wrought by the application of behavior analysis to the great problems of society. Two other chapters in the last section will be useful to historians who are curious about the influence of logical positivism on Skinner's thinking (apparently there was not much influence) and to sophisticated readers who are interested in Skinner's retrospective consideration of his work.     

Event-causal libertarianism,functional reduction,and the disappearing agent argument

Event-causal libertarians maintain that an agent’s freely bringing about a choice is reducible to states and events involving him bringing about the choice. Agent-causal libertarians demur, arguing that free will requires that the agent be irreducibly causally involved. Derk Pereboom and Meghan Griffith have defended agent-causal libertarianism on this score, arguing that since on event-causal libertarianism an agent’s contribution to his choice is exhausted by the causal role of states and events involving him, and since these states and events leave it open which decision he will make, he does not settle which decision occurs, and thus “disappears.” My aim is to explain why this argument fails. In particular, I demonstrate that event-causal libertarians can dismantle the argument by enriching the reductive base in their analysis of free will to include a state that plays the functional role of the self-determining agent and with which the agent is identified.     

The major's therapy: Ernest Hemingway's “In Another Country”

“In Another Country” draws upon Hemingway's experiences during World War I. Narrated by a wounded young American, this story is a parable of early machine-rehabilitation therapy, one in which the strong optimism of a physician employing new machines is contrasted with the skepticism of an Italian major (“the greatest fencer in Italy”) who, disbelieving in the machines, nevertheless comes regularly for therapy to his hand. That daily attendance is interrupted only when the major's young wife dies suddenly. The major, who had instructed the American never to put himself “in a position to lose,” has himself just “lost” the wife he had married when he felt sure that his own wounding had effectively taken him out of danger of being killed at the front. His continued stoicism offers the young soldier an example of ethical and moral behavior, for after her funeral he resumes his daily routine of machine-therapy. Seen against the ineffectiveness of the machines, the major's behavior seems to offer an example of the only “therapy” possible in this world of wounds and machines.     

ANGST. EN PSYKOANALYSES FORLØB

Throughout his adulthood, man weighs the amount and quality of his masculinity in his attempts to accomplish, on his own, what he regards as worthwhile in life. His deeply-rooted ideal is to prove that his capabilities and strength are sufficient in the pursuit of desired satisfactions. His worst fear is that he is incapable in the face of the challenges of the world; that he would become castrated by life when trusting in his own activity. In the beginning of life, the psyche, in its early absoluteness, regards as evil everything that destroys good, or everything that makes it impossible to reach the desired pleasure. The more dominant the derivatives of this ultimate interpretation are in man's life project, the more he is inclined to see the realities of life as a camouflage of the hidden evil, and the more it is thus necessary for him to mobilize his compensatory phallicism as a weapon and fortress for the sake of the security of his self. When the phallicism thus increases, the black side of it, fear of castration, also grows in force, and a vicious circle is created. In this paper, the psychodynamics of captain Ahab and his crew in Herman Melville's Moby Dick are explored in order to illustrate and analyze these phallic-narcissistic layers of masculinity.     

Cross-National Identity Transformation: Becoming a Gay ‘Asian-American’ Man

Prior to moving to the U.S., the author, a gay Japanese man, was secure in his multiple identities. After the cross-national transition to the U.S., however, he confronted unique and particular challenges in negotiating his multiple identities. As a foreigner, adopting the cultural discourse of the gay Asian-American identity as a way of life shocked and surprised him—especially because of the ways in which others communicated with him. In particular, others generally viewed his identity expression as reinforcing the stereotypical image of gay men and failing to conform with the social perception of Asian-Americans. Also, the racialized and gendered image of gay Asian-American men became a conflict in his interactions with gay and bisexual men because its image did not fully represent who he is. Being trapped by his dual-identity conflict, he faced difficulty in negotiating performative aspects of gay Asian-American male identity construction. At the same time, this contradiction became an opportunity for him to (de)construct his dual identity conflict and to finally name himself with such labeling. This analysis employs autoethnography to explore the author’s cross-national transformation process of becoming a gay Asian-American man. Finally, this analysis intends to link his personal experience and the cultural and social experiences of gay Asian-American male identity.     

On not being able to enter Noah's Ark

The paper describes the psychoanalytic psychotherapy of a patient who had originally been referred at the age of 15 because of his social isolation. In fact, he suffered from high-functioning Asperger's syndrome and lived in an almost delusional world populated by a number of imaginary companions, which he used to counteract a deep void and sense of deadliness within him. After five years of therapy, the patient was able to move on, allowing him to be successful in his academic studies, and to abandon his imaginary friends. This paper focuses on a subsequent phase of the therapy when the patient, as a young man, began to show an interest in and attraction to the world of intimate relationships. The paper is grounded in Meltzerian theory, especially his ideas about the role of beauty in the mother–child relationship, and about the world of intimate links as opposed to conventional ones.     

Freud, Dora, and the maid: a study of countertransference

Early advances in psychoanalytic knowledge, profound though they were, were incomplete structures to be built upon, modified, and partially discarded. In addition to errors due to insufficient knowledge, Freud's difficulties with Dora stemmed from countertransference. Dora's transference included an identification with a governess/maid. Important oedipal role played by a nursemaid in Freud's life made him vulnerable to being left by Dora. The maid, Monika, "the prime originator" of Freud's neurosis, seduced him, chastised him, and taught him of hell. In his self-analysis she was associated with Freud's mother who left him when she gave birth to his sister. When he was two and a half years old, Monika was discharged and jailed for stealing. I suggest that Freud's attraction to Dora revealed itself in his libidinal imagery of the treatment and his premature sexual interpretations, the effects of which he misjudged. Defending against his attraction, he pushed her away from him, did not act to keep her in analysis or allow her to reenter analysis later. In addition, since Dora had left him as he must have felt his childhood nursemaid had, he reacted as if she were that maid. Hurt, saddened, and angered, he used reversal and deserted her, thus damping his feelings.     

Leibniz on Conatus, Causation, and Freedom

Abstract: In this paper, I address the topic of free will in Leibniz with particular attention to Leibniz's concept of volition, and its analogue in his physics – his concept of force. I argue against recent commentators that Leibniz was a causal determinist, and thus a compatibilist, and I suggest that logical consistency required him to adopt compatibilism given some of the concepts at work in his physics. I conclude by pointing out that the pressures to adopt causal determinism in Leibniz's system are perhaps more severe than those facing the contemporary libertarian, pressures that stem from empirical considerations about the behavior of bodies in the physical world, and the “well‐founding” of those bodies in simple substances.     

Singing the Blues: Reflections on African American Men,the Emergence of Melancholic Selves,and the Search for Transformational Objects

This article examines the texts of four African American men—Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr., James Baldwin, and Ta-Nehisi Coates—arguing that each text reflects, in part, the emergence of a melancholic self. This melancholic self arises as a result of internalizing the ubiquitous negative projections that come from social, political, economic, and cultural institutions or disciplinary regimes and the attending narratives that support, foster, and enforce racist beliefs (e.g., White superiority, Black inferiority). The internalization of negative projections, I contend, means that some Black children struggle to discover a positive sense of self in the public realm, and it is this ongoing encounter that gives rise to a melancholic faith wherein the child can expect not fidelity, trust, and hope vis-à-vis the public realm but rather betrayal, distrust, and futility vis-à-vis the possibility of the world ever presenting to him a positive self. In these texts, each man also identifies a moment in his early life when he became conscious of racist projections and the accompanying humiliations, as well as of the presence and power of his melancholic self. At the same time, this awareness, which is the first step in redemptive resistance, initiates a search for a transformational “object” that will liberate him from being in bondage to the melancholic self and its accompanying racial logic and faith, which, in turn, transforms his agency.     

Dialectics and the Transcendence of Dialectics: Adorno's Relation to Schelling

The influence of the thought of the great German Idealist philosopher G.W.F Hegel on the thought of Theodor Adorno, the leading thinker of the first generation of the Frankfurt School, is unmistakeable, and has been the subject of much commentary. Much less discussed, however, is the influence of Hegel's prominent contemporary, F.W.J. Schelling. This article investigates the influence of Schelling on Adorno, and the sometimes striking parallels between fundamental motifs in the work of both thinkers. It argues that Adorno's critique of Hegelian (and indeed of his own, negative) dialectics, his conception of the relation between nature and spirit, and his philosophy of history (amongst other aspects of this thought) owe a considerable debt to Schelling. Furthermore, when adequately explicated, Schelling's position on a range of problems which confronted German Idealist philosophy often prove intrinsically preferable to those of Hegel.