Selective exposure to information and cognitive dissonance

Despite numerous attempts, the selective exposure prediction of Festinger's (A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957) theory of cognitive dissonance has not been consistently demonstrated. In previous studies, this failure can be attributed to design deficiencies, and other related problems. The present study manipulated dissonance by having subjects write a counterattitudinal essay under conditions of high or low choice. Information in the form of pamphlets and discussion groups was offered to the subjects such that they could choose information that was consonant and dissonant with the decision to write the essay. The information was offered either before or after an attitude measure on the essay topic, as the attitude measure could also be a source of dissonance reduction. The results indicate that the high choice manipulation yielded greater attitude change than the low-choice manipulation. High-choice subjects desired consonant information more and dissonant information less than did low-choice subjects. This effect was found for both measures of information desire (pamphlets and discussion groups). Low-choice subjects who received the attitude questionnaire before the information measures wanted information more than if offered the information before the attitude questionnaire, implying a sensitizing effect produced by the attitude questionnaire for the low-choice subjects. The various effects are discussed as providing support for predictions from Festinger's dissonance theory.     

The relationship between cognitive dissonance and helping behavior

An experiment was conducted to study the relationship between cognitive dissonance and helping behavior. A counterattitudinal procedure was employed to arouse dissonance. For half of the participants, an experimental confederate entered the room and elicited an opportunity for them to offer help. In this situation, fewer subjects in the dissonance condition offered help than subjects in the no‐dissonance condition. The least helping occurred among dissonance subjects with the highest level of commitment to the counterattitudinal task. Those with a medium level of commitment offered significantly more help. Despite the fact that results in line with Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory (subjects' attitudinal change) were obtained in the no‐helping situation, in helping situations, dissonance subjects who offered help presented significantly less attitude change than those who did not offer it. This was considered to be a result of helpfulness reducing dissonance arousal.     

Dissonance and self-perception: An integrative view of each theory's proper domain of application

The literature concerning the controversy between dissonance and selfperception theories is reviewed. It is proposed that the two theories be regarded not as “competing” formulations but as complementary ones and, furthermore, that each theory is applicable only to its own specialized domain. Self-perception theory, it is suggested, accurately characterizes attitude change phenomena in the context of attitude-congruent behavior and dissonance theory attitude change in the context of attitude-discrepant behavior. Attitude-congruent is defined as any position within an individual's latitude of acceptance; attitude-discrepant as any position in the latitude of rejection. An experimental test of these notions produced confirming evidence. Subjects who were given an opportunity to misattribute any potential dissonance arousal to an external stimulus did not change their attitudes, relative to low choice subjects, if they were committed to endorsing a position in their latitude of rejection. If the commitment concerned a position in the latitude of acceptance, however, these subjects did exhibit attitude change relative to low choice subjects.     

Do amnesics exhibit cognitive dissonance reduction? The role of explicit memory and attention in attitude change

In two studies, we investigated the roles of explicit memory and attentional resources in the process of behavior-induced attitude change. Although most theories of attitude change (cognitive dissonance and self-perception theories) assume an important role for both mechanisms, we propose that behavior-induced attitude change can be a relatively automatic process that does not require explicit memory for, or consciously controlled processing of, the discrepancy between attitude and behavior. Using a free-choice paradigm, we found that both amnesics and normal participants under cognitive load showed as much attitude change as did control participants.     

Salience of initial attitude,magnitude of incentive,and attitude change in a forced compliance paradigm

To examine the application of interpersonal simulation findings to cognitive dissonance and incentive theories of attitude change in the forced compliance paradigm, 60 Ss were paid 50 cents or $2.50 to write counterattitudinal essays with salient or nonsalient initial attitudes. Findings showed that the larger incentive yielded greater change for salient pretest attitudes but that the smaller incentive led to more change of nonsalient pretest attitudes. Measures of error in attitude recall and a correlational analysis between pretest, posttest, and recalled attitudes were also consistent with Bem's (1967) hypothesis of isomorphism between the attributions of Ss and observers. It is proposed that remaining simulation data reported in the cognitive dissonance/self-perception controversy may identify additional parameters of attitude changes in forced compliance experiments.     

The effect of combined arousal states on attitude change

An experiment was devised in which subjects either were given a choice or were given no choice to listen to a counter-attitudinal communication. For half the subjects (Interrupt condition) the tape of the communication broke during the concluding sentence of the speech. The other half of the subjects (No Interrupt condition) heard the speech in its entirety. A recall measure indicated that subjects in the Interrupt condition recalled significantly more arguments made in the communication than subjects who heard the complete speech. This was interpreted as being a Zeigarnik effect caused by arousal created by the interruption. The choice manipulation should have created dissonance and motivated attitude change. Consistent with dissonance theory, measures of attitude change showed that greater attitude change toward the position of the speech occurred in the Choice condition than in the No Choice condition. In addition, an interaction in which significantly greater change occurred in the Choice-Interrupt condition than any of the other conditions was obtained. Since both the choice and interruption manipulations were hypothesized to be arousing, it was speculated that, in the Choice-Interrupt condition, the arousal created by the cognitive inconsistency and by the interrupted task may have combined to yield the increased attitude change. The conditions under which arousal states might combine were discussed.     

Dissonance theory revised again: Comment on the paper by Fazio,Zanna, and Cooper

Fazio, Zanna, and Cooper (Dissonance and self-perception: An integrative view on each theory's proper domain of application. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1977, 13, 464–479) specified mutually exclusive domains of application for dissonance and self-perception theory and used a misattribution-of-arousal procedure to distinguish between dissonance reduction and self-perception processes. Because their proposed limitations of the domains of the two theories and their use of the misattribution procedure are not directly derivable from earlier statements of either theory, it may be best to regard their analysis as a new theory, rather than as a conciliation of the parent theories. New analyses based on the Fazio et al. results indicate that their data provide an insufficient basis for preferring their theory to earlier versions of dissonance and self-perception theories. Dissonance and self-perception: An integrative view of each theory's proper domain of application. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1977, 13, 464–479.     

Cognitive dissonance as a function of self-esteem and logical inconsistency

An experiment was conducted to test the importance of self-esteem in the arousal of cognitive dissonance. Recently, Aronson (1969) suggested that the reason an attitude-discrepant speech can arouse dissonance is that it is an indecent act committed by an individual who likes to think of himself as a good and decent person. Looking at counterattitudinal behavior as a discrepancy with one's self-concept rather than as a logical discrepancy between behavioral and attitudinal cognitions differs from Festinger and Carlsnuth's (1959) original notion In the experiment reported, subjects volunteered to take a personality inventory and received either neutral, very favorable, or very unfavorable feedback In this way, subjects' level of self-esteem was raised or lowered Following this procedure, subjects were induced to record a speech that was known to be discrepant with their private beliefs. They were offered either a small or a large inducement for their statements. It was predicted that, regardless of their level of self-esteem, subjects would manifest the inverse relationship between incentive magnitude and attitude change predicted by dissonance theory The major analysis of the results, and the concomitant internal analysis, generally supported the prediction With one qualification, the results were held to be consistent with Festinger and Carlsmith's version of dissonance arousal and inconsistent with the self-esteem analysis     

On the relationship of data to theory: A reply to Ronis and Greenwald

Ronis and Greenwald (Dissonance theory revised again: Comment on the paper by Fazio, Zanna, and Cooper. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 15, 1979, 62–69) question our integrative formulation of dissonance and self-perception processes. We argue that our formulation provides an explanation of both the full range of results in the literature and our own experimental data, while neither dissonance nor self-perception theory can singly explain the existing data.     

Physiological arousal, dissonance, and attitude change: evidence for a dissonance-arousal link and a "don't remind me" effect

Two experiments replicated and extended research by Croyle and Cooper (1983) indicating that cognitive dissonance involves physiological arousal. In Experiment 1, subjects wrote counterattitudinal essays under conditions of high or low choice, and, to assess arousal effects owing to effort, with or without a list of arguments provided by the experimenter. In high-choice conditions only, and regardless of effort, subjects showed both arousal (heightened galvanic skin response) and attitude change. Arousal, however, did not decline following attitude change. The more effortful task (no arguments provided) produced increased arousal but not greater attitude change. In Experiment 2, the opportunity to change one's attitude following a freely chosen counterattitudinal essay was manipulated. As in Experiment 1, arousal increased following the essay but did not decline following a postessay attitude change opportunity. When subjects were not given an attitude change opportunity, however, arousal did decline. Thus, dissonance seems to create arousal, but attitude change sustains rather than reduces the arousal. It is suggested that if dissonance is a drive state, drive reduction typically may be accomplished through gradual cognitive change or forgetting.     

Forced compliance: Commitment to compliance and commitment to activity

It is argued that the standard manipulation of free choice in a forced compliance situation has fostered confusion between the two different types of choices offered to subjects, namely commitment or non-commitment to compliance with the experimenter and choice of counter-attitudinal activity per se. From a theoretical viewpoint, the two choices have very different implications. The former is a prerequisite to dissonance arousal; the latter may bring about consonant cognitions which reduce the dissonance ratio. Two experiments which separated these two choices confirmed the above predictions, derived from a radical conception of the dissonance theory (Beauvois and Joule, 1981, 1994). The results are inconsistent with the reinterpretation of dissonance effects in self-perception terms.     

Pills and attitude change: misattribution of arousal or excuses for negative actions?

Two experiments evaluated the competing interpretations of cognitive dissonance and impression management theories regarding the pill and misattribution studies of attitude change in the forced compliance situation. Attitude change was eliminated when subjects were told about the tension side effects of taking a placebo, replicating the usual effect. Attitude change was also eliminated, however, when subjects took the pill following counterattitudinal behavior. In one condition of the second experiment, subjects were given instructions about tension side effects but were also told that the drug would not affect their moral judgment or behavior. These instructions eliminated attitude change in a standard pill condition. The typical finding of attitude change was manifested in the misattribution/no-excuse condition. The primary and secondary data from both studies provided more support for the impression management interpretation of the standard misattribution manipulations than for a theory of misattribution of dissonance-produced arousal.     

Criterion Development and Validity of the CQT in Field Application

Two experiments evaluated the competing interpretations of cognitive dissonance and impression management theories regarding the pill and misattribution studies of attitude change in the forced compliance situation. Attitude change was eliminated when subjects were told about the tension side effects of taking a placebo, replicating the usual effect. Attitude change was also eliminated, however, when subjects took the pill following counterattitudinal behavior. In one condition of the second experiment, subjects were given instructions about tension side effects but were also told that the drug would not affect their moral judgment or behavior. These instructions eliminated attitude change in a standard pill condition. The typical finding of attitude change was manifested in the misattribution/no-excuse condition. The primary and secondary data from both studies provided more support for the impression management interpretation of the standard misattribution manipulations than for a theory of misattribution of dissonance-produced arousal.     

The Motivations for and Outcomes of Employee Referrals

Research on employee referrals demonstrates positive outcomes for the recruited individual and the organization. However, little research addressed employees who make employment referrals, also known as employee recommenders. To address this gap in knowledge, we developed a conceptual model and present the theoretical basis for addressing the motivation of, and organizational outcomes associated with, employees who make employment recommendations. The model is based on the theories of word-of-mouth communication, cognitive dissonance, self-perception, and attitude change through self-persuasion. Partial support for the model was found in an experimental design simulating an employee referral situation. Results showed an increase in normative commitment of recommenders.     

The effect of self-attribute relevance on how self-esteem moderates attitude change in dissonance processes

An experiment was conducted to examine the conditions under which self-esteem operates as an expectancy, as a resource, or does not influence cognitive dissonance processes. Based on the self-standards model of dissonance (Stone & Cooper, 2001), it was predicted that following a high-choice counter-attitudinal behavior: (a) priming positive self-attributes that were relevant to the discrepant behavior would cause participants with high self-esteem to report more attitude change as compared to participants with low self-esteem, (b) priming positive self-attributes that were irrelevant to the behavior would cause participants with high self-esteem to report less attitude change as compared to participants with low self-esteem, and (c) priming neutral self-attributes would eliminate self-esteem moderation of attitude change. The results of the attitude change measure supported the predictions. The discussion explores different processes by which the accessibility of cognitions about the self mediate dissonance arousal and reduction.     

Belief discrepant behavior and the bogus pipeline: Impression management or arousal attribution

Based on recent studies impression management theorists conclude that following belief discrepant behavior, persons will feign attitude change on paper measures, but report their “true” beliefs when attached to a lie detector (the bogus pipeline). A dissonance arousal explanation of these bogus pipeline results suggests that subjects may attribute their arousal to the bogus pipeline equipment instead of to dissonance and therefore may not be motivated to change their attitudes. The present study examined these competing interpretations and yielded results which support the dissonance arousal attribution explanation. Subjects who were attached to a (bogus pipeline) lie detector exhibited attitude change if given the opportunity to get accustomed to the equipment (which made attribution of arousal to the equipment less plausible), but showed no attitude change if no habituation experience was provided.     

Dissonance and importance: attitude change effects of personal relevance and race of the beneficiary of a counterattitudinal advocacy

The authors asked or instructed White college students to write an essay advocating a large tuition hike to increase scholarships for either students in general or Black students (yielding low or high racial symbolism, respectively) that would take effect in the near or far future (yielding high or low personal relevance, respectively). Especially when high-choice participants wrote highly compliant (i.e., unqualified) essays, attitude change was greater when the advocacy had either high (vs. low) personal relevance or high (vs. low) racial symbolism. Yet there was no attitude change when both symbolism and relevance were high. They may increase dissonance by making the dissonant elements more important and numerous. The coupling of relevance and symbolism, however, may link the attitude so strongly to personal values and self-concept that attitude change becomes untenable as a mode of dissonance reduction.     

Payment and value: The generation of an evaluation standard and its effect on value

Three studies explored the relationship between the reward that individuals receive for engaging in an activity and the value that they subsequently place on that activity. In Experiments 1 and 2, subjects engaged in an activity more when they had previously received a moderate amount of reward than when they had received either a small or a large reward. Experiment 3 indicated that the shape of this function was determined, in part, by the value the activity had before the reward was give. These results, coupled with those of previous studies in the effort justification paradigm, suggest that reward and cost can influence activity value similarly, through the operation of simple comparison processes as predicted by personal comparison theory. Implications for social judgment, associative, self-perception, and dissonance perspectives were discussed.     

The reinstatement of dissonance and psychological discomfort following failed affirmations

The research in this article examined the consequences of a failed attempt to reduce dissonance through a self‐affirmation strategy. It was hypothesized that disconfirming participants' affirmations would reinstate psychological discomfort and dissonance motivation. In Experiment 1, high‐dissonance participants who affirmed on a self‐relevant value scale and received disconforming feedback about their affirmations expressed greater psychological discomfort (Elliot & Devine, 1994) than either affirmation‐only participants or low‐dissonance/affirmation disconformed participants. In Experiment 2, disconfirmation of an affirmation resulted in increased attitude change. The results of both experiments suggested that a failed attempt to reduce dissonance reinstates psychological discomfort and dissonance motivation. We discuss how the reduction of psychological discomfort may play a role in the success of affirmations in reducing dissonance‐produced attitude change. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Some conditions to produce a dissonance and an incentive effect in a ‘forced-compliance’ situationx

Dissonance theory and incentive theory call for different predictions concerning the relation of reward and attitude change after a person has performed some counter-attitudinal behavior. According to dissonance theory a negative, and according to incentive theory a positive relationship is expected. An experiment was conducted in West Germany testing the interactions of choice versus no choice and public versus anonymus (private) essay-writing. A dissonance effect was predicted for the choice/public condition and an incentive effect for the no choice/anonymus condition. The results support these predictions.