Between reasoning

In two experiments we investigated three-term reasoning with spatial relational assertions using the preposition between as compared to projective prepositions (such as to the left of). For each kind of assertion we distinguish the referent expression (i.e., the grammatical subject) from the relatum expression (i.e., the internal argument of the preposition; e.g., [The hedgehog]_{referent_expression} is to the left of [the frog]_{relatum_expression}; [the snake]_{referent_expression} is between [the donkey and the deer]_{relatum_expression}). Previous research has shown that integrating premises with projective prepositions is easier (a) when the relatum expression of the second premise denotes an element already given by the first premise (relatum = given), and (b) when the term denoting a given element precedes the term denoting a new element (given–new). Experiment 1 extended this finding to second premises with the preposition between. In Experiment 2, between figured in the first premise. In this case, participants built an initial preferred model already from the first premise, although such a premise is indeterminate with respect to the array that it describes. Since there is no need left for integrating the second premise, this premise is instead used to verify the initial model and to modify it when necessary. A further investigation of conclusion evaluation times showed that conclusions were evaluated faster when they first mentioned the element that was included most recently into the mental model of the premises. The use of premises with between permitted the separation of recency of model inclusion from recency of appearance of an element in a premise.     

Word order variation in spatial descriptions with adverbs

Previous research has shown that in a three-term spatial reasoning task, the second premise of a German premise pair is especially easy to comprehend if (1) the prepositional object rather than the grammatical subject denotes the given entity, and if (2) the term denoting the given entity precedes the term denoting the new entity. Accordingly, the second premise is easiest to comprehend with noncanonical word order--that is, with the prepositional object in preverbal position denoting the given entity (e.g., To the right of the given object is the new subject). This finding is explained in terms of contextual licensing of noncanonical word order. Here, we discuss and tested two alternative accounts of contextual licensing, given-new and partially ordered set relations (Poset). The given-new account claims that noncanonical word order is licensed by the term denoting the given entity preceding the term denoting the new entity. On the Poset account, noncanonical word order is licensed if the preverbal constituent introduces a new entity that stands in a transitive, irreflexive, and asymmetric relation to a given entity. Comprehension times for second premises with spatial adverbs in four different word orders support both accounts of contextual licensing; Poset licensing was stronger than given-new licensing.     

Processing controlled PROs in Spanish

Two experiments were carried out to investigate the processing of the empty category PRO and the time-course of this in Spanish. Eye movements were recorded while participants read sentences in which a matrix clause was followed by a subordinate infinitival clause, so that the subject or the object of the main clause could act as controller of PRO, and therefore as implicit grammatical subject of the infinitive. In Experiment 1, verb control information was manipulated: The matrix clause contained either subject-control verbs like prometer ('promise') or object-control verbs like forzar ('force'). In Experiment 2, the preposition that headed adverbial subordinate clauses was manipulated: Two different kinds of infinitival adverbial clauses were used, expressing purpose (preposition para) and reason (preposition por) and in which control information is primarily induced by the prepositions (para tends to trigger subject-control; por object-control). Experiment 1 showed that readers make immediate use of verb control information to recover the antecedent of the empty category PRO in Spanish obligatory control constructions. The data obtained in Experiment 2 suggest that during the processing of the empty category PRO in purpose vs. reason adverbial subordinate infinitival clauses the control information induced by the prepositions por vs. para is not initially used as a constraint to guide the selection of the nominal antecedent of PRO. In addition, both experiments showed that PRO antecedent selection is a very fast process and that, together with verb control information, recency played an important role. The results are discussed in terms of current psycholinguistic hypotheses about empty categories and in relation to formal linguistic hypotheses about PRO control. We argue that obligatory control ties (which are co-referential ties) are processed fast because they are launched from the same lexical platform that launches all fast syntactic connections (complements, as opposed to modifiers). In short, that such lexically-specified co-referential ties are regulated by linguistic form.     

Prescribed spatial prepositions influence how we think about time

Prepositions combine with nouns flexibly when describing concrete locative relations (e.g. at/on/in the school) but are rigidly prescribed when paired with abstract concepts (e.g. at risk; on Wednesday; in trouble). In the former case they do linguistic work based on their discrete semantic qualities, and in the latter they appear to serve a primarily grammatical function. We used the abstract concept of time as a test case to see if specific grammatically prescribed prepositions retain semantic content. Using ambiguous questions designed to interrogate one’s meaningful representation of temporal relations, we found that the semantics of prescribed prepositions modulate how we think about time. Although prescribed preposition use is unlikely to be based on a core representational organization shared between space and time, results demonstrate that the semantics of particular locative prepositions do constrain how we think about paired temporal concepts.     

Activation of end-terms in syllogistic reasoning

We report five experiments showing that the activation of the end-terms of a syllogism is determined by their position in the composite model of the premises. We show that it is not determined by the position of the terms in the rule being applied (Ford, 1994), by the syntactic role of the terms in the premises (Polk & Newell, 1995; Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1990), by the type of conclusion (Chater & Oaksford, 1999), or by the terms from the source premise (Stenning & Yule, 1997). In our first experiment we found that after reading a categorical premise, the most active term is the last term in the premise. In Experiments 2, 3, and 4 we demonstrated that this pattern of activity is due to the position of the concepts in the model of the premises, regardless of the delay after reading the premises (150 or 2000 msec) or the quantity of the quantifiers (universal or existential). The fifth experiment showed that the pattern switches around after participants evaluate a conclusion. We propose that the last element in the model maintains a higher level of activity during the comprehension process because it is generally used to attach the incoming information. After this process, the first term becomes more active because it is the concept to which the whole representation is referred. These results are predicted by the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), but not by the verbal reasoning theory (Polk & Newell, 1995), the graphical methods theory (Yule & Stenning, 1992), the attachment-heuristic theory (Chater & Oaksford, 1999), or the mental rules theory (Ford, 1994).     

How to eliminate illusions in quantified reasoning

The mental model theory postulates that reasoners build models of situations described in premises. These models normally make explicit only what is true according to the premises. The theory has an unexpected consequence. It predicts the existence ofillusions in inferences: Certain inferences should have compelling but erroneous conclusions. Previous studies have corroborated the existence of such illusions. The present study reports the first effective antidote to them. For example, most people incorrectly answer “yes” to the following problem:Only one of the following statements is true . . . /At least some of the plastic beads are not red. /None of the plastic beads are red. /Is it possible that none of the red beads are plastic? In two experiments, we progressively eliminated this fallacy and others by using instructions designed to overcome the bias toward truth. The difference between the illusory and the control problems disappeared when the participants were instructed to work out both the case in which the first premise was true and the second premise was false and the case in which the second premise was true and the first premise was false.     

Effects of directionality in deductive reasoning: II. Premise integration and conclusion evaluation

Previous research (Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2000) has shown an inherent directionality between the two terms linked in premises of typical deductive reasoning tasks. With three experiments we investigated the effect of inherent directionality on the time to integrate two premises and for the derivation of a conclusion. We varied figure (i.e., order of terms in the premises) and direction of inference (i.e., order of terms in the conclusion) in deduction tasks from various domains (propositional reasoning, syllogisms, spatial, temporal, and linear order reasoning). Effects of figure on premise reading times varied with the directionality of the relations. Effects of direction of inference reflected the same directionality for a subset of relations. We propose that two factors are jointly responsible for a large part of observed directionality effects in premise integration: the inherent directionality of relational statements and a general advantage for a given-new order of terms in the second premise. Difficulty of deriving a conclusion is affected by the directionality or relations if and only if the relation is semantically asymmetric, so that the directionality must be preserved in the integrated mental model.     

Illusions in modal reasoning

According to the mental model theory, models represent what is true, but not what is false. One unexpected consequence is that certain inferences should have compelling, but invalid, conclusions. Three experiments corroborated the occurrence of such illusions in reasoning about possibilities. When problems had the heading "Only one of the premises is true," the participants considered the truth of each premise in turn, but neglected the fact that when one premise is true, the others are false. When two-premise problems had the heading "One of the premises is true and one is false," the participants still neglected the falsity of one of the premises. As predicted, however, the illusions were reduced when reasoners were told to check their conclusions against the constraint that only one of the premises was true. We discuss alternative explanations for illusory inferences and their implications for current theories of reasoning.     

音乐训练促进诗句韵律整合加工的神经过程

本研究采用ERP技术, 考察音乐训练组和对照组完成诗句押韵判断任务时, 在绝句末对韵律信息(含声调和韵母两个维度)的整合加工过程。结果发现, 在100~300 ms, 仅音乐训练组在声调/韵母合适条件下, 对韵母/声调的一致性进行深入分析, 并诱发了更大的正波; 在韵母违反条件下, 声调违反相比声调合适诱发了更小的正波。在300~750 ms, 两组被试均在绝句末对诗句内出现的韵母和声调违反进行整合分析并诱发了广泛分布的负波。不过, 对照组仅在声调/韵母合适条件下进行, 而音乐训练组则在声调/韵母违反条件下完成此过程。综上, 音乐训练组和对照组均会在诗句末完成押韵信息的整合加工, 但是音乐训练组对韵律信息(尤其是声调)的加工更敏感和快速, 并且对不同类型的违反有更精细的差异性反应     

Negative recency and event-dependence

In a two-choice situation with event-probabilities of 0.67 and 0.33, recency effects were studied as a function of (a) event-dependence and (b) fore-knowledge of event-probabilities. The following conclusions are drawn: (1) Belief in some kind of event-dependence is a necessary condition for the occurrence of negative recency; (2) Foreknowledge of the event-probabilities does not affect recency phenomena; (3) The behaviour of subjects in the two-choice situation, is less irrational than some writers have claimed.     

Phonological short-term store and the nature of the recency effect: Evidence from neuropsychology

The recency effect in immediate recall of lists of unrelated words was investigated in P.V., a left hemisphere-damaged patient, who had a grossly reduced auditory verbal span, attributed to a selective impairment of a phonological short-term store. No recency effect was evident in free recall of auditorily presented material. When the patient was instructed to recall the final items of the list first, the recency performance remained defective, even though P.V. was able to adopt a recall from end order. In the case of visual presentation, P.V.'s free recall performance was within the normal range and a clear recency occurred in the recall from end condition. These results are consistent with the view that the standard recency effect in immediate free recall of auditorily presented material represents the output of a phonological short-term store to which ordinal retrieval strategies, in P.V.'s case unimpaired, are applied. Finally, the contributions of the phonological short-term store and the process of rehearsal to the recency effect and to immediate memory span performance are discussed.     

Suppression of valid inferences and knowledge structures: the curious effect of producing alternative antecedents on reasoning with causal conditionals

These studies looked at the difficulty that reasoners have in accepting conditional ("If P then Q") major premises that are not necessarily true empirically, as a basis for deductive reasoning. Preliminary results have shown that when reasoners are asked to produce possible alternate antecedents to the major premise ("If A then Q"), they paradoxically tend to deny the modus ponens (MP) inference ("If P is true, then Q is true"). Three studies further explored these results. The first study gave university students paper-and-pencil tests in which instructions to "suppose that the major premise is true" was followed by a request to determine the next number in a sequence, to retrieve information unrelated to the premises, or to retrieve a possible case of "If A then Q." Relative to a control group, reasoners asked to produce an alternative antecedent showed a significant tendency to deny the MP inference, whereas no such tendency was observed for the two other tasks used. A second study compared performance on a condition in which reasoners were asked to produce an alternative antecedent with that when they were given an explicit alternative. Premises used in this study were such that the latter alternative antecedent was also spontaneously produced by over 70% of reasoners. Results showed that the tendency to refuse the MP premise could not be accounted for by the specific nature of the alternative produced. A third study found that the tendency to refuse the MP inference after producing an alternative antecedent was affected by the number of "disabling conditions" (i.e., conditions that allow "P to be true" and "Q to be false") available for the major premise. These results are interpreted as being consistent with a model that supposes that logical reasoning requires selective inhibition of real-world knowledge.     

Dissociation of short- and long-term face memory: evidence from long-term recency effects in temporal lobe epilepsy

We tested whether memory deficits in temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) are better described by a single- or dual-store memory model. To this aim, we analyzed the influence of TLE and proactive interference (PI) on immediate and 24-h long-term recency effects during face recognition in 16 healthy participants and 18 right and 21 left non-surgical TLE patients. PI in healthy participants or TLE erased the long-term recency effect, but left the immediate recency effect unaffected. Although the immediate recency effect was still visible in right TLE patients, the number of detected recency items during immediate recognition was decreased in right TLE compared to left TLE. Right TLE was also related to decreased detection of pre-recency items during delayed recognition compared to left TLE, and decreased detection of pre-recency items during immediate recognition under PI. The results show that the temporal lobes are necessary for the long-term recency effect, but not for the immediate recency effect, and thus speak for a dissociation of short- and long-term memory for faces. Right TLE is related to more severe long-term memory deficits than left TLE and is also related to additional short-term memory deficits for faces.     

THE ACQUISITION OF PREPOSITIONAL MOTOR RESPONSES IN HANDICAPPED CHILDREN1

The acquisition of prepositional motor responses in three handicapped preschool children was analyzed for three pairs of prepositions. Generalization of prepositional knowledge at each stage of acquisition was assessed by a series of probe trials. In addition, an analysis of the control of prepositional responses when objects of the preposition (OP) and direct objects (DO) were relevant cues was conducted. The effect of this object-cue procedure, as well as a specially devised prompting technique on acquisition, was also determined. Results indicated substantial control by OPs whenever this cue was relevant, but this did not affect acquisition of prepositional concepts when these cues were eliminated. Analysis of the probe data and the prompting technique suggested various ways in which instructional programs for teaching prepositional knowledge to handicapped children could be constructed in a simple and efficient manner.     

Tense,Aspect, and Temporal Reasoning

We report two experiments on temporal reasoning with problems, such as: John has cleaned the house. John is taking a shower. John is going to read the paper. Mary always does the dishes when John cleans the house. Mary always drinks her coffee when John reads the paper. What for Mary is the relation between doing the dishes and drinking coffee? The experiments showed that problems such as this one, which require one mental model, elicited correct answers more often than did those requiring multiple models (e.g. with the second premise modified to “John has taken a shower”, so that the order between the events in the first two premises is not fixed). These multiple-model problems, in turn, elicited more correct answers than did multiple-model problems with no valid answers (e.g. with the second premise modified to “John has taken a shower”, and the fifth premise modified to “Mary always drinks her coffee when John takes a shower”). One-model problems were also solved more quickly than multiple-model problems, which were solved more quickly than problems with no valid answers. These results corroborated the predictions of the mental model theory of reasoning.     

Developmental differences in judgments of recency and frequency: Quantitative or qualitative?

The basis of young children's performance of judgments of recency and frequency was investigated using a modified version of Huppert and Piercy's [Huppert, F.A., & Piercy, M. (1978). The role of trace strength in recency and frequency judgements by amnesic and control subjects. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 30, 347–354] paradigm. Children aged 4 and 6 years viewed pictures of nameable objects presented either once or three times on either of two consecutive days. At test, children judged how recently (“today” versus “yesterday”) or frequently (once versus three times) each picture had been presented. Developmental improvements in performance were observed for judgments of recency and frequency. Evidence for responding based on episode-specific information was found for both age groups, showing that young children do not confuse recency of presentation with frequency of presentation. There was no evidence for a qualitative shift from reliance on trace strength to reliance on episode specific information across this age range.     

Reasoning from uncertain premises: Effects of expertise and conversational context

Four experiments investigated uncertainty about a premise in a deductive argument as a function of the expertise of the speaker and of the conversational context. The procedure mimicked everyday reasoning in that participants were not told that the premises were to be treated as certain. The results showed that the perceived likelihood of a conclusion was greater when the major or the minor premise was uttered by an expert rather than a novice (Experiment 1). The results also showed that uncertainty about the conclusion was higher when the major premise was uttered by a novice and an alternative premise by an expert, compared to when the major premise was uttered by an expert and the alternative by a novice (Experiment 2). Similarly, the believability of a conclusion was considerably lower when the minor premise was uttered by a novice and denied by an expert, as opposed to when an expert uttered the minor premise and a novice denied it (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 showed that the nature of the uncertainty induced by a denial of the minor premise depended on whether or not the context was a conversation. These results pose difficult problems for current theories of reasoning, as current theories are based on the results of experiments in which the premises are treated as certain. Our discussion of the results emphasises the importance of pragmatics in reasoning, namely, the role of general knowledge about the world in assessing the probability of a premise uttered by an expert or a novice and the role of interpretations of the premise based on pragmatic inferences in revising these initial probabilities.     

Priming in deduction: a spatial arrangement task

The mental model theory assumes that people reason by manipulating mental representations of states of the word, called "mental models." In the present study we used a new deduction task based on diagrammatic premises. We show that a premise can prime other premises that induce similar mental models in a way analogous to the case of words with related meanings, which prime one another. We present three experiments. In Experiment 1 we used an evaluation task. In Experiment 2, a construction task was used. The priming effect was obtained in both cases. In a third experiment we show that the priming effect was still present when partcipants were instructed to ignore a prime displayed before the premises. In all three experiments we compared determinate and indeterminate problems and found faster responses in the former.     

Le rôle joué par les événements stressants sur la transmission intergénérationnelle de l’attachement

Associations between maternal internal working models (IWM) (adult attachment projective: AAP) [George, C., West, M., Pettem, O., 1997. Adult attachment projective: protocol and classification scoring system. Manuscrit non publié. Mills College, Californie], preschool child attachment (separation–reunion procedure) [Cassidy, J., Marvin, R. S., 1992. Attachment organization in preschool children: procedures and coding manual. Manuscrit non publié. MacArthur Working Group on Attachment; Dev Psychol 24 (1988) 415–526] and stressful life-events were examined in 119 dyads. A convergence for transmission similar to what has been reported in the literature [Psychol Bull 117(3) (1995) 387–403] was found (76% for security, kappa = 0.53; p < 0.001). Moreover, unresolved mothers with disorganized–controlling children reported more stressful life-events (F [3, 106] = 4.70; p < 0.01). The present study therefore indicates the importance of including contextual factors [van IJzendoorn, M.H., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M.J., 1997. Intergenerational transmission of attachment: a move to the contextual level. In: Atkinson et, L., Zucker, K.J. (Eds.), Attachment and Psychopathology. The Gilford Press, New York, pp. 135–170] to better understand attachment transmission and offer support for the validity of the AAP.