Logical Truth and Tarskian Logical Truth

This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence. I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing. I stress the point that since the hypothesis that Tarski's definitions are extensionally correct is deeply entrenched, the burden of proof is still on the shoulders of Tarski's critics, who have not lifted the burden. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Quine and Logical Truth

It is a consequence of Quine’s confirmation holism that the logical laws are in principle revisable. Some have worried this is at odds with another dictum in Quine, viz., that any translation which construes speakers as systematically illogical is ipso facto inadequate. In this paper, I try to formulate exactly what the problem is here, and offer a solution to it by (1) disambiguating the term ‘logic,’ and (2) appealing to a Quinean understanding of ‘necessity.’ The result is that the different theses in Quine’s philosophy of logic are to be situated within different contexts of inquiry.

---

Further Remarks on Truth and Contradiction

We address an issue recently discussed by Graham Priest: whether the very nature of truth (understood as in correspondence theories) rules out true contradictions, and hence whether a correspondence-theoretic notion of truth rules against dialetheism. We argue that, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, objections from within the correspondence theory do not stand in the way of dialetheism. We close by highlighting, but not attempting to resolve, two further challenges for dialetheism which arise out of familiar philosophical theorizing about truth.     

Remarks on Bolzano's Conception of Necessary Truth

This essay presents a new interpretation of Bolzano's account of necessary truth as set out in §182 of the Theory of Science. According to this interpretation, Bolzano's conception is closely related to that of Leibniz, with some important differences. In the first place, Bolzano's conception of necessary truth embraces not only what Leibniz called metaphysical or brute necessities but also moral necessities (truths grounded in God's choice of the best among all metaphysical possibilities). Second, in marked contrast to Leibniz, Bolzano maintains that there is still plenty of room for contingency even on this broader conception of necessity.     

Alienation from Nature and Early German Romanticism

In this article I ask how fruitful the concept of alienation can be for thinking critically about the nature and causes of the contemporary environmental crisis. The concept of alienation enables us to claim that modern human beings have become alienated or estranged from nature and need to become reconciled with it. Yet reconciliation has often been understood—notably by Hegel and Marx—as the state of being ‘at-home-with-oneself-in-the-world’, in the name of which we are entitled, perhaps even obliged, to overcome anything in nature that is alien to the human mind. This approach to alienation derives ultimately from the German Idealist philosopher J. G. Fichte. I explore an alternative conception of alienation and reconciliation to be found in the work of the Early German Romantics, especially Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis. The Romantics think of reconciliation as including a dimension of alienation, in the form of an awareness that nature is greater than and exceeds the understanding of human beings, insofar as we are merely limited parts of the all-encompassing whole that is nature. I argue that this is a more fruitful approach to alienation and reconciliation than that pursued by Fichte, Hegel, and Marx.     

Actuality, Necessity, and Logical Truth

The traditional view that all logical truths are metaphysically necessary has come under attack in recent years. The contrary claim is prominent in David Kaplan’s work on demonstratives, and Edward Zalta has argued that logical truths that are not necessary appear in modal languages supplemented only with some device for making reference to the actual world (and thus independently of whether demonstratives like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ are present). If this latter claim can be sustained, it strikes close to the heart of the traditional view. I begin this paper by discussing and refuting Zalta’s argument in the context of a language for propositional modal logic with an actuality connective (section 1). This involves showing that his argument in favor of real world validity his preferred explication of logical truth, is fallacious. Next (section 2) I argue for an alternative explication of logical truth called general validity. Since the rule of necessitation preserves general validity, the argument of section 2 provides a reason for affirming the traditional view. Finally (section 3) I show that the intuitive idea behind the discredited notion of real world validity finds legitimate expression in an object language connective for deep necessity. Earlier versions of this paper were read at the universities of Graz, Maribor, and Salzburg, and at a workshop on the philosophy of logic at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) in Mexico City. My thanks to those present at these events for many helpful suggestions. Thanks are also due to an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies.     

Remarks on Compositionality and Weak Axiomatic Theories of Truth

The paper draws attention to an important, but apparently neglected distinction relating to axiomatic theories of truth, viz. the distinction between weakly and strongly truth-compositional theories of truth. The paper argues that the distinction might be helpful in classifying weak axiomatic theories of truth and examines some of them with respect to it.     

Some Remarks on For-me-ness and Empathy

Abstract

My discussion of Self and Other takes issue with two distinct theses defended by Zahavi. The first concerns Zahavi's argument for the first-personal character of experience and its related thought experiment. My second remark is about Zahavi’s restriction of empathy to direct perception.     

Alethic Pluralism,Logical Validity,and Natural Truth

Philosophia - Alethic pluralism holds that there are many ways of being true. The view has been accused of being unable to do justice to the traditional account of logical validity, understood as...     

基因与人性:影响人性的若干基因

人类行为既受到遗传因素的影响,同时也受到环境(文化)因素的影响。近年来逐渐引起众多学科领域关注的行为遗传学研究从行为的基因关联出发,系统研究了行为的遗传因素及其基因基础,取得了令人瞩目的成绩。该文系统总结了八种人类重要行为的基因基础及其与环境因素的关系,并从基因与人性的关系角度进行了讨论。     

宪政经济学:一个应当科学对待的研究领域

对经济转轨的渐进改革和休克震荡途径之争已经深入到宪政经济学的层面,但是,无论是基本理论还是政策分析的应用,宪政经济学的领域中都存在一些重大的显示的和隐含的分歧。本文试图在理论和应用两个层面上梳理争论各方对若干重要概念的分歧之处,同时提出自己的粗浅理解,目的在于为进一步的深入系统研究廓清地基。     

Beyond the Boundaries of Current Human Nature: Some Theological and Ethical Reflections on Transhumanism

Following a brief overview of the emerging transhumanist vision, Childs turns to a theological and ethical assessment. He recommends that there take place a community‐wide conversation over the prospects of a post‐human future that includes both nerds and theologians along with all stakeholders in a healthy human future. Christians should be guided by the eschatological values that inform love's commitment to the common good. How does the common commitment to justice take concrete shape in public policies governing the mounting advances in science and technology? How does the commitment to life and healing speak to the ethical distinction between the uses of biomedical technology for therapy versus for enhancement?     

理论自觉的必要性及其意涵

从很多方面看,中国环境社会学在最近的几年中确实取得了快速发展.例如,最近三年是20世纪80年代以来环境社会学者发表论文数量增长最为迅速的时期.根据2009年5月对中国期刊网的电子期刊的不完全检索,发表于1980-1989年的文献只有6篇,发表于1990-1999年的文献有30篇,2000年以后发表的文献有152篇.     

Some Remarks on Ultrafilter and Normality Logics

The paper presents the main ideas of Ultrafilter Logic (UL), as introduced by Veloso and others. A new proposal, Normality Logic (NL), is outlined for expanding the expressive power of UL. The system NL appears to offer a simpler solution to the problem of expressive power than the sorting strategy of Carnielli and Veloso. Interpretations of NL are discussed and an important point of contact to Hansson's notion of non-prioritized belief revision is observed. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.