Henry More and Nicolas Malebranche's Critiques of Spinoza

Henry More and Nicolas Malebranche, each in his own way, drew a distinction between two kinds of extension, the one indivisible and the other divisible. Spinoza also drew a comparable distinction, explaining that, insofar as extended substance was conceived intellectually, it would be grasped as indivisible, whereas, when it was instead depicted in the imagination, it would be seen as divisible. But, whereas for Spinoza these were just different views on one and the same extended substance, More and Malebranche's two kinds of extension were supposed to be really distinct from one another. Consequently, neither of them could identify Spinoza's substance with both of his own non‐identical kinds; and so they faced a choice over which one they would associate it with. The intriguing thing is that here they diverged. More felt that Spinoza's substance was actually divisible, and consequently material. Malebranche felt that it was actually indivisible, and consequently ideal and divine. In each case, they felt that the other kind of extension—whichever that might be—was simply absent from Spinoza's system. This article explores this divergence between More and Malebranche's interpretations of Spinoza's metaphysics, and it seeks an explanation for it in their own respective epistemologies.     

The content and structure of laypeople's concept of pleasure

Five studies were conducted to map the content and structure of laypeople's conceptions of pleasure. Instances of the pleasure concept collected in Study 1 consisted predominantly of objects, events or persons described as sources of pleasure. Content analysis suggested that the pleasure category, like emotional response categories, might be formed at an implicit level where various pleasure antecedents are grouped based on common phenomenological qualities of the affective experience. Studies 2 and 3a showed that the pleasure category possesses a graded structure and fuzzy boundaries. Results further revealed that, either when explicitly presented with labels (Study 3b) or left to their own implicit categories during a sorting task (Study 4), laypeople represented pleasure as a hierarchical concept in which differentiated pleasure types (i.e., intellectual, emotional, social and physical) were subsumed under a higher level unitary form of pleasure. In this structure, unitary and differentiated pleasures shared a set of common affective qualities but were also distinguishable by unique and distinctive affective characteristics (Study 5). Ties to prior theories of pleasure and implications for decision making and behavioural research are discussed.     

The Trinitarian Metaphysics of Jonathan Edwards and Nicolas Malebranche

This paper explores both the striking similarities and also the differences between Jonathan Edwards and Nicolas Malebranche's philosophical views on the Holy Trinity and, in particular, the ways in which they both gave important roles to specific Persons of the Trinity in the various different branches of their respective metaphysical systems—ontological, epistemological and ethical. It is shown that Edwards and Malebranche were in very close agreement on ontological questions pertaining to the Trinity, both with respect to the internal, triune nature of the divine substance (characterising the Three Persons as the divine power, as the consubstantial idea of God which was generated as He eternally reflected on Himself, and as the mutual love which proceeded between the Father and this idea), and also with respect to the various roles these Three Persons played in the creation of the world. In epistemology, Malebranche postulated an illuminating union between the mind of man and the divine Word, insisting on an absolutely direct involvement of the Second Person in all human cognition, both intellectual and sensible. On this point Edwards did differ, endorsing instead an empiricist epistemology which left no room for such a direct union with the Word. However, when it came to ethics, Edwards and Malebranche both gave the Third Person an utterly central role, postulating much the same kind of union as Malebranche alone had postulated in the epistemological case, only now between the will of man and the Holy Spirit.     

Application of the concept of simple structure to Alexander's data

A battery of 20 tests originally analyzed by Alexander (1) was reworked according to the principle of simple structure. His results were sustained in general. Both analyses yielded five factors in the first-order domain. Of these, three factors in the re-analysis (v,X andF) have almost exactly the same loadings as the corresponding factors in the original work, and were interpreted in the same way. The loading pattern of a fourth factor,Z, left uninterpreted in the original study, happened to be more clear in the re-analysis, and an interpretation was attempted. It appears to be a factor of perceptual synthesis, and seems to play an important role in intellectual processes. A fifth factor, not present in Alexander's results, appeared in the new analysis: the reasoning factor, involved in inductive and deductive thinking. All four cognitive factors are related to a general factor that can be thought of as representing abstraction and education of relations and correlates, these processes being, therefore, the essential feature underlying intellectual behavior, at least in that sector surveyed by the tests of the present battery.The analysis of the data was done in the Psychometric Laboratory of The University of Chicago, under a fellowship from The University of Madrid (Junta de Relaciones Culturales). The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor L. L. Thurstone, whose advice as a scientist and kindness as a friend, have been the principal stimulus for this work.     

Connectionist representation,semantic compositionality,and the instability of concept structure

Summary In the present paper connectionist approaches to the problem of internal representation and the nature of concepts are discussed. In the first part the concept of representation that underlies connectionist modeling is made explicit. It is argued that the connectionist view of representation relies on a correlational theory of semantic content- i.e., the covariation between internal and external states is taken as the basis for ascribing meaning to internal states. The problems and virtues of such a correlational approach to internal representation are addressed. The second part of the paper is concerned with whether connectionism is capable of accounting for the apparent productivity and systematicity of language and thought. There is an evaluation of the recent arguments of Fodor and Pylyshyn, who claim that systematicity can only be explained if one conceives of mental representations as structured symbols composed of context-free constituents. There is a review of empirical evidence that strongly suggests that concepts are not fixed memory structures and that the meaning of constituent symbols varies, depending on the context in which they are embedded. On the basis of this review it is concluded that the meaning of a complex expression is not computed from the context-free meanings of the constituents, and that strong compositionality, as endorsed by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), seems implausible as a process theory for the comprehension of complex concepts. Instead, the hypothesis is endorsed that constraint satisfaction in distributed connectionist networks may allow for an alternative account of weak compositionality compatible with the context sensitivity of meaning. In the final section, it is argued that neither mere implementation of a language of thought in connectionist networks nor radical elimination of symbol systems seems to be a fruitful research strategy, but that it might be more useful to discuss how connectionist systems can develop the capacity to use external symbol systems like language or logic without instantiating symbol systems themselves.     

Classifying types of concept and conceptual structure: Some taxonomies

Abstract

The study of concepts can advance further by clarifying the meanings of basic terms such as “prototype” and by constructing a large-scale primary taxonomy of concept types. This paper presents the latter, based on concept structure, two secondary concept taxonomies and one of conceptual structures. The primary taxonomy organises much data and several previous taxonomies into a single framework. It suggests that many concept types exist, and that type determines how a concept is learned, is used and how it develops. As well as enumerating and interrelating some major types, the taxonomy predicts that many individuals' concepts will consist of mixes of information types. The present study suggests that the field will progress faster by ceasing to look for the single way anything is done. A better strategy is to enumerate concept types, ways each can be learned and developmental patterns, and then see what variables affect these and how common each is.     

Sequence and structure in the concept development of children with emotional and behavioral difficulties

We investigated the order of acquisition of concepts and cognitive processes in children with emotional and behavioral difficulties and the extent to which these children show similarity to ordinary children in sequence and structure of development. Similarity in developmental sequence was strongly supported by scalogram analyses and has clear implications for organizing teaching, but similarity in structure was less clear. Cognitive processes however, and the nature of the children's reasoning were clarified by the method of exploration used. This was particularly fruitful for providing insight into the difficulties children may have. The findings thus contribute to understanding with a view toward furthering concept development in children with emotional and behavioral difficulties.     

Features of graded category structure: Generalizing the family resemblance and polymorphous concept models

Many real-world categories contain graded structure: certain category members are rated as more typical or representative of the category than others. Research has shown that this graded structure can be well predicted by the degree of commonality across the feature sets of category members. We demonstrate that two prominent feature-based models of graded structure, the family resemblance (Rosch & Mervis, 1975) and polymorphous concept models (Hampton, 1979), can be generalized via the contrast model (Tversky, 1977) to include both common and distinctive feature information, and apply the models to the prediction of typicality in 11 semantic categories. The results indicate that both types of feature information play a role in the prediction of typicality, with common features weighted more heavily for within-category predictions, and distinctive features weighted more heavily for contrast-category predictions. The same pattern of results was found in additional analyses employing rated goodness and exemplar generation frequency. It is suggested that these findings provide insight into the processes underlying category formation and representation.     

Beard's concept of neurasthenia and Freud's concept of the actual neuroses

Beard's concept of neurasthenia and Freud's concept of the actual neuroses are described and evaluated critically. Despite differences in the content of their theories, especially in the role of sexual factors and sexual mechanisms, there are important formal and logical similarities. Both Beard and Freud incorrectly identified the causes of the neuroses being studied; both used inadequate methods of assessing the strengths of the causal factors; and the central theoretical concepts of both were equally vacuous. Freud adopted the same method of study as did Beard, but does not seem to have been influenced directly by him.     

The generalized polymorphous concept account of graded structure in abstract categories

Abstract categories present with graded structure. The extent to which feature commonality between exemplars and category provides a satisfying account of this graded structure varies from one abstract category to the other (Hampton, 1981). We investigate whether the incorporation of features that exemplars share with external categories yields an improved account of abstract categories' graded structures. In doing so, we follow the suggestion that abstract categories are relational in nature (Goldstone, 1996; Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, 2005). The generalized polymorphous concept model, which incorporates both types of features, is found to improve the account of typicality and category membership in three of seven studied abstract categories. These three categories are found to be the most abstract, suggesting that it is appropriate to think of abstract categories as varying along a continuum of abstractness/interrelatedness rather than as a distinct type of category altogether.     

Metamorphosis and the aesthetics of loss: I. Mourning Daphne--the Apollo and Daphne paintings of Nicolas Poussin

The myth of Apollo and Daphne, as told in Ovid’s Metamorphoses, is viewed through the self‐referential eye of the seicento painter, Nicolas Poussin. Collectively, the tree‐metaphoric myths are argued to metaphorically represent, mourn, and negate unbearable realities, including the developmental challenges of adolescence and adulthood – in particular, loss. Examined in the context of their aesthetic precedents and a close reading of Ovid ’s text, the two Apollo and Daphne paintings that bracket Poussin’s oeuvre are interpreted as conveying the conflict and ambiguity inherent to Ovid, as well as connotations more personal to the artist. The poetic and aesthetic reworking of the regressive, magical experience of metamorphosis restores it to the symbolic world of metaphor: for reparation, remembrance, and return.     

Age and gender invariance of self‐concept factor structure: An investigation of a newly developed Chinese self‐concept instrument

A new instrument, the Chinese Adolescent Self‐Esteem Scales (CASES), was developed to measure the self‐concepts of the young people in Hong Kong in seven aspects: social, academic, appearance, moral, family, physical/sport, and general self‐esteem. LISREL procedures were utilized to test the extent of factorial invariance for age and gender based on the responses to CASES of 551 Hong Kong adolescents. It was found that CASES possesses the necessary invariance properties for between‐group measurement in terms of the number and pattern of the underlying factors, item factor loadings, and inter‐factor relations, but not in terms of item uniqueness. Implications of these findings are discussed in terms of the use of CASES and of empirical support for the equivalence of self‐concept factor structure for age and gender groups for both Western and non‐Western adolescents.