Introduction to the special issue on comparative cognition

Prior research has shown that nonhumans show an extreme preference for variable‐ over fixed‐delays to reinforcement. This well‐established preference for variability occurs because a reinforcer's strength or “value” decreases according to a curvilinear function as its delay increases. The purpose of the present experiments was to investigate whether this preference for variability occurs with human participants making hypothetical choices. In three experiments, participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk made choices between variable and fixed monetary rewards. In a variable‐delay procedure, participants repeatedly chose between a reward delivered either immediately or after a delay (with equal probability) and a reward after a fixed delay (Experiments 1 and 2). In a double‐reward procedure, participants made choices between an alternative consisting of two rewards, one delivered immediately and one after a delay, and a second alternative consisting of a single reward delivered after a delay (Experiments 1 and 3). Finally, all participants completed a standard delay‐discounting task. Although we observed both curvilinear discounting and magnitude effects in the standard discounting task, we found no consistent evidence of a preference for variability—as predicted by two prominent models of curvilinear discounting (i.e., a simple hyperbola and a hyperboloid)—in our variable‐delay and double‐reward procedures. This failure to observe a preference for variability may be attributed to the hypothetical, rule‐governed nature of choices in the present study. In such contexts, participants may adopt relatively simple strategies for making more complex choices.     

Evidence for a magnitude effect in temporal discounting with pigeons

A magnitude effect in human intertemporal choice is well established-larger rewards or outcomes are discounted over time at a lower rate than are smaller rewards. However, many recent studies have failed to find a corresponding effect in nonhuman animals. Here we report a magnitude effect in temporal discounting for pigeons' choices involving a tradeoff between reward delay and amount. Pigeons chose between a small reward (1-s access to food) after a 2-s delay, and a large reward (4.5-s access to food) after a 28-s delay. Across conditions, the delays to the small and large rewards were increased or decreased, respectively. Temporal discounting functions obtained through a value-estimation procedure showed clear evidence of a magnitude effect: The value of the large reward decreased more slowly with increasing delay than the value of the small reward. We linked this result to a nonlinear relationship between choice and the delays associated with the small and large rewards. The nonlinearity was contrary to the generalized matching law but was predicted by the contextual choice model. Our results confirm the existence of a magnitude effect in nonhuman temporal discounting, showing that this adaptation is not unique to humans.     

Choice with delayed and probabilistic reinforcers: effects of variability, time between trials, and conditioned reinforcers.

In a discrete-trials procedure with pigeons, a response on a green key led to a 4-s delay (during which green houselights were lit) and then a reinforcer might or might not be delivered. A response on a red key led to a delay of adjustable duration (during which red houselights were lit) and then a certain reinforcer. The delay was adjusted so as to estimate an indifference point--a duration for which the two alternatives were equally preferred. Once the green key was chosen, a subject had to continue to respond on the green key until a reinforcer was delivered. Each response on the green key, plus the 4-s delay that followed every response, was called one "link" of the green-key schedule. Subjects showed much greater preference for the green key when the number of links before reinforcement was variable (averaging four) than when it was fixed (always exactly four). These findings are consistent with the view that probabilistic reinforcers are analogous to reinforcers delivered after variable delays. When successive links were separated by 4-s or 8-s "interlink intervals" with white houselights, preference for the probabilistic alternative decreased somewhat for 2 subjects but was unaffected for the other 2 subjects. When the interlink intervals had the same green houselights that were present during the 4-s delays, preference for the green key decreased substantially for all subjects. These results provided mixed support for the view that preference for a probabilistic reinforcer is inversely related to the duration of conditioned reinforcers that precede the delivery of food.     

Subjective value of risky foods for individual domestic chicks: a hierarchical Bayesian model

For animals to decide which prey to attack, the gain and delay of the food item must be integrated in a value function. However, the subjective value is not obtained by expected profitability when it is accompanied by risk. To estimate the subjective value, we examined choices in a cross-shaped maze with two colored feeders in domestic chicks. When tested by a reversal in food amount or delay, chicks changed choices similarly in both conditions (experiment 1). We therefore examined risk sensitivity for amount and delay (experiment 2) by supplying one feeder with food of fixed profitability and the alternative feeder with high- or low-profitability food at equal probability. Profitability varied in amount (groups 1 and 2 at high and low variance) or in delay (group 3). To find the equilibrium, the amount (groups 1 and 2) or delay (group 3) of the food in the fixed feeder was adjusted in a total of 18 blocks. The Markov chain Monte Carlo method was applied to a hierarchical Bayesian model to estimate the subjective value. Chicks undervalued the variable feeder in group 1 and were indifferent in group 2 but overvalued the variable feeder in group 3 at a population level. Re-examination without the titration procedure (experiment 3) suggested that the subjective value was not absolute for each option. When the delay was varied, the variable option was often given a paradoxically high value depending on fixed alternative. Therefore, the basic assumption of the uniquely determined value function might be questioned.     

Delay of gratification in children: The effects of training under fixed,decreasing and increasing delay of reward

The effect of fixed, gradually decreasing, or increasing delay of reward in discimination learning on later delay of gratification was investigated. In discrimination training, employing a correction procedure, a candy reward was delivered either after 0, 10, 20, 40 or 60 sec fixed delay; or after 60 sec in the first block of trials and decreased in successive block; or reward was immediate in the first block of trials and delay was gradually increased to 60 sec. In the delay of gratification tests, subjects could press a button immediately to receive a small reward (one candy or a cheap toy) or delay pressing and receive an increasingly larger reward (more candy or a better toy).Learning was not significantly affected by either fixed or decreasing delays. Increasing delays resulted in faster learning than decreasing delays. The increasing delay group demonstrated superior delay of gratification on both tests. Fixed delay groups did not differ significantly among themselves, nor from the decreasing delay group. The effectiveness of exposure to increasing delays in facilitating delay of gratification was interpreted as due to either the acquisition of coping responses or the extinction of frustration.     

Token reinforcement, choice, and self-control in pigeons.

Pigeons were exposed to self-control procedures that involved illumination of light-emitting diodes (LEDs) as a form of token reinforcement. In a discrete-trials arrangement, subjects chose between one and three LEDs; each LED was exchangeable for 2-s access to food during distinct posttrial exchange periods. In Experiment 1, subjects generally preferred the immediate presentation of a single LED over the delayed presentation of three LEDs, but differences in the delay to the exchange period between the two options prevented a clear assessment of the relative influence of LED delay and exchange-period delay as determinants of choice. In Experiment 2, in which delays to the exchange period from either alternative were equal in most conditions, all subjects preferred the delayed three LEDs more often than in Experiment-1. In Experiment 3, subjects preferred the option that resulted in a greater amount of food more often if the choices also produced LEDs than if they did not. In Experiment 4, preference for the delayed three LEDs was obtained when delays to the exchange period were equal, but reversed in favor of an immediate single LED when the latter choice also resulted in quicker access to exchange periods. The overall pattern of results suggests that (a) delay to the exchange period is a more critical determinant of choice than is delay to token presentation; (b) tokens may function as conditioned reinforcers, although their discriminative properties may be responsible for the self-control that occurs under token reinforcer arrangements; and (c) previously reported differences in the self-control choices of humans and pigeons may have resulted at least in part from the procedural conventions of using token reinforcers with human subjects and food reinforcers with pigeon subjects.     

Tests of an indifference rule in variable‐delay and double‐reward choice procedures with humans

Four hundred and fifty participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk across 3 experiments to test the predictions of a hyperbolic discounting equation in accounting for human choices involving variable delays or multiple rewards (Mazur, 1984, 1986). In Experiment 1, participants made hypothetical choices between 2 monetary alternatives, 1 consisting of a fixed delay and another consisting of 2 delays of equal probability (i.e., a variable‐delay procedure). In Experiment 2, participants made hypothetical monetary choices between a single, immediate reward and 2 rewards, 1 immediate and 1 delayed (i.e., a double‐reward procedure). Experiment 3 also used a double‐reward procedure, but with 2 delayed rewards. Participants in all 3 experiments also completed a standard delay‐discounting task. Finally, 3 reward amounts were tested in each type of task ($100, $1000, and $5000). In the double‐reward conditions (Experiments 2 and 3), the results were in good qualitative and quantitative agreement with Mazur's model (1984, 1986). In contrast, when participants made choices involving variable delays (Experiment 1), there was relatively poor qualitative and quantitative agreement with this model. These results, along with our previous findings, suggest the structure of questions in hypothetical tasks with humans can be a strong determinant of the choice pattern.     

Subjective probability and delay.

Human subjects indicated their preference between a hypothetical $1,000 reward available with various probabilities or delays and a certain reward of variable amount available immediately. The function relating the amount of the certain-immediate reward subjectively equivalent to the delayed $1,000 reward had the same general shape (hyperbolic) as the function found by Mazur (1987) to describe pigeons' delay discounting. The function relating the certain-immediate amount of money subjectively equivalent to the probabilistic $1,000 reward was also hyperbolic, provided that the stated probability was transformed to odds against winning. In a second experiment, when human subjects chose between a delayed $1,000 reward and a probabilistic $1,000 reward, delay was proportional to the same odds-against transformation of the probability to which it was subjectively equivalent.     

Responding of pigeons under variable-interval schedules of unsignaled, briefly signaled, and completely signaled delays to reinforcement

In Experiment 1, three pigeons' key pecking was maintained under a variable-interval 60-s schedule of food reinforcement. A 1-s unsignaled nonresetting delay to reinforcement was then added. Rates decreased and stabilized at values below those observed under immediate-reinforcement conditions. A brief stimulus change (key lit red for 0.5 s) was then arranged to follow immediately the peck that began the delay. Response rates quickly returned to baseline levels. Subsequently, rates near baseline levels were maintained with briefly signaled delays of 3 and 9 s. When a 27-s briefly signaled delay was instituted, response rates decreased to low levels. In Experiment 2, four pigeons' responding was first maintained under a multiple variable-interval 60-s (green key) variable-interval 60-s (red key) schedule. Response rates in both components fell to low levels when a 3-s unsignaled delay was added. In the first component delays were then briefly signaled in the same manner as Experiment 1, and in the second component they were signaled with a change in key color that remained until food was delivered. Response rates increased to near baseline levels in both components, and remained near baseline when the delays in both components were lengthened to 9 s. When delays were lengthened to 27 s, response rates fell to low levels in the briefly signaled delay component for three of four pigeons while remaining at or near baseline in the completely signaled delay component. In Experiment 3, low response rates under a 9-s unsignaled delay to reinforcement (tandem variable-interval 60 s fixed-time 9 s) increased when the delay was briefly signaled. The role of the brief stimulus as conditioned reinforcement may be a function of its temporal relation to food, and thus may be related to the eliciting function of the stimulus.     

Relative sensitivity to reinforcer amount and delay in a self-control choice situation.

Rats were exposed to concurrent-chains schedules in which a single variable-interval schedule arranged entry into one of two terminal-link delay periods (fixed-interval schedules). The shorter delay ended with the delivery of a single food pellet; the longer day ended with a larger number of food pellets (two under some conditions and six under others). In Experiment 1, the terminal-link delays were selected so that under all conditions the ratio of delays would exactly equal the ratio of the number of pellets. But the absolute duration of the delays differed across conditions. In one condition, for example, rats chose between one pellet delayed 5 s and six pellets delayed 30 s; in another condition rats chose between one pellet delayed 10 s and six pellets delayed 60 s. The generalized matching law predicts indifference between the two alternatives, assuming that the sensitivity parameters for amount and delay of reinforcement are equal. The rats' choices were, in fact, close to indifference except when the choice was between one pellet delayed 5 s and six pellets delayed 30 s. That deviation from indifference suggests that the sensitivities to amount and delay differ from each other depending on the durations of the delays. In Experiment 2, rats chose between one pellet following a 5-s delay and six pellets following a delay that was systematically increased over sessions to find a point of indifference. Indifference was achieved when the delay to the six pellets was approximately 55 s. These results are consistent with the possibility that the relative sensitivities to amount and delay differ as a function of the delays.     

Monkey memory: same/different concept learning, serial probe acquisition, and probe delay effects

Three rhesus monkeys were trained and tested in a same/different task with six successive sets of 70 item pairs to an 88% accuracy on each set. Their poor initial transfer performance (55% correct) with novel stimuli improved dramatically to 85% correct following daily item changes in the training stimuli. They acquired a serial-probe-recognition (SPR) task with variable (1-6) item list lengths. This SPR acquisition, although gradual, was more rapid for the monkeys than for pigeons similarly trained. Testing with a fixed list length of four items at different delays between the last list item and the probe test item revealed changes in the serial-position function: a recency effect (last items remembered well) for 0-s delay, recency and primacy effects (first and last list items remembered well) for 1-, 2-, and 10-s delays, and only a primacy effect for the longest 30-s delay. These results are compared with similar ones from pigeons and are discussed in relation to theories of memory processing.     

Effects of previous delay of reward,generalized effort,and deprivation on impulsiveness

Two experiments investigated the effects of learning and motivational variables upon rats' degree of impulsiveness (choice of a small, immediate reward versus a large, delayed reward). In Experiment 1, food was presented in one of four ways for 24 sessions: fixed-ratio lever pressing requirement, continuous-reinforcement lever-pressing requirement, long intervals between free food presentations, or short intervals between free food presentations. Exposure to the long intervals produced less subsequent impulsiveness in 48 choice trials than did the short intervals, there being no effect of the instrumental requirement. In Experiment 2, there were 48 choice trials in which two hunger levels were combined factorially with two delays of reward for the self-control alternative. Hunger level did not affect implusiveness when there was a short delay, but high hunger increased the impulsiveness when there was a long delay. These results indicate that impulsiveness is affected by prior learning and current motivation. Implications for Baum, Rachlin, and Green's matching formula and for frustration theory are discussed.     

Response rate correlates with indifference points in a delay‐discounting procedure

To study how effort affects reward value, we replicated Fortes, Vasconcelos and Machado's (2015) study using an adjusting‐delay task. Nine pigeons chose between a standard alternative that gave access to 4 s of food, after a 10 s delay, and an adjusting‐delay alternative that gave access to 12 s of food after a delay that changed dynamically with the pigeons' choices, decreasing when they preferred the standard alternative, and increasing when they preferred the adjusting alternative. The delay value at which preference stabilized defined the indifference point, a measure of reward value. To manipulate effort across phases, we varied the response rate required during the delay of the standard alternative. Results showed that a) the indifference point increased in the higher‐response‐rate phases, suggesting that reward value decreased with effort, and b) in the higher‐response‐rate phases, response rate in the standard alternative was linearly related to the indifference point. We advance several conceptions of how effort may change perceived delay or amount and thereby affect reward value.     

The Modulation of Operant Variation by the Probability, Magnitude, and Delay of Reinforcement

Recent studies have demonstrated that the expectation of reward delivery has an inverse relationship with operant behavioral variation (e.g., Stahlman, Roberts, & Blaisdell, 2010). Research thus far has largely focused on one aspect of reinforcement – the likelihood of food delivery. In two experiments with pigeons, we examined the effect of two other aspects of reinforcement: the magnitude of the reward and the temporal delay between the operant response and outcome delivery. In the first experiment, we found that a large reward magnitude resulted in reduced spatiotemporal variation in pigeons’ pecking behavior. In the second experiment, we found that a 4-s delay between response-dependent trial termination and reward delivery increased variation in behavior. These results indicate that multiple dimensions of the reinforcer modulate operant response variation.     

Food priming and short-term retention in the delayed alternation task

The delayed alternation task, with rats as subjects, was used to assess the effects of a priming food reward on subsequent retention of a reinforced target location in a T maze. Subjects received a pretrial feeding, followed by a forced-choice rewarded entry into one goal box of the maze (the “cuing” run). Following a delay interval (5–60 s), the subjects were allowed to choose either goal, with reward available only in the one not entered on the cuing run. Priming significantly reduced such alternation after 30- and 60-s delays (Experiment 1), whereas administering the reward following the cuing run had no effect on choice behavior (Experiment 2). In the third study, prefeeding had a decremental effect when the following cuing run was reinforced, but no decrement occurred when reinforcement was omitted on the cuing run. The results suggest that food reward enhances retention of spatial information, but priming reduces this effect.     

Delay or rate of food delivery as determiners of response rate

Pigeons were confronted with two keys: a green food key and a white changeover key. Food became available for a peck to the green key after variable intervals of time (mean = 113 seconds). A single peck on the changeover key changed the color of the food key to red for a fixed period of time during which the timing of the variable-interval schedule in green was suspended and the switching option eliminated and after which the conditions associated with green were reinstated. In Experiment 1 a single food presentation was obtainable during each red-key period after a minimum delay timed from the switch. This delay and the duration of the red-key period were held constant during a condition but varied between conditions (delay = 2.5, 7.5, 15, or 30 seconds; red-period duration = 30, 60, 120, 240, or 480 seconds). In Experiment 2 additional food presentations were scheduled during a 240-second red-key period with the delay to the first food delivery held constant at 30 seconds, and the delays to later food deliveries varied over conditions. Considering the data from both experiments, the rate of switching to red was a decreasing function of the delay to the first food, the delay to the second food, and perhaps the delay to the third food after a switch. There was no clear evidence that the rate of food in the red-key period made an independent contribution. The ordering of response rates among conditions was consistent with the view that each food presentation after a response adds an incremental effect to the rate of the response and that each food presentation's contribution is a decreasing function of its delay timed from the response.     

PREFERENCE REVERSALS DUE TO MYOPIC DISCOUNTING OF DELAYED REWARD

Abstract— A basic stationarity axiom of economic theory assumes stable preference between two deferred goods separated by a fixed time. To test this assumption, we offered subjects choices between delayed rewards, while manipulating the delays to those rewards. Preferences typically reversed with changes in delay, as predicted by hyperbolic discounting models of impulsiveness. Of 36 subjects, 34 reversed preference from a larger, later reward to a smaller, earlier reward as the delays to both rewards decreased. We conclude that the stationarity axiom is not appropriate in models of human choice.     

Effects of signaled versus unsignaled delay of reinforcement on choice

Pigeons chose between 5-s and 15-s delay-of-reinforcement alternatives. The first key peck to satisfy the choice schedule began a delay timer, and food was delivered at the end of the interval. Key pecks during the delay interval were measured, but had no scheduled effect. In Experiment 1, signal conditions and choice schedules were varied across conditions. During unsignaled conditions, no stimulus change signaled the beginning of a delay interval. During differential and nondifferential signal conditions, offset of the choice stimuli and onset of a delay stimulus signaled the beginning of a delay interval. During differential signal conditions, different stimuli were correlated with the 5-s and 15-s delays, whereas the same stimulus appeared during both delay durations during nondifferential signal conditions. Pigeons showed similar, extreme levels of preference for the 5-s delay alternative during unsignaled and differentially signaled conditions. Preference levels were reliably lower with nondifferential signals. Experiment 2 assessed preference with two pairs of unsignaled delays in which the ratio of delays was held constant but the absolute duration was increased fourfold. No effect of absolute duration was found. The results highlight the importance of delayed primary reinforcement effects and challenge models of choice that focus solely on conditioned reinforcement.     

ISOLATING BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS OF INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE: NICOTINE EFFECT ON DELAY DISCOUNTING AND AMOUNT SENSITIVITY

Many drugs of abuse produce changes in impulsive choice, that is, choice for a smaller—sooner reinforcer over a larger—later reinforcer. Because the alternatives differ in both delay and amount, it is not clear whether these drug effects are due to the differences in reinforcer delay or amount. To isolate the effects of delay, we used a titrating delay procedure. In phase 1, 9 rats made discrete choices between variable delays (1 or 19 s, equal probability of each) and a delay to a single food pellet. The computer titrated the delay to a single food pellet until the rats were indifferent between the two options. This indifference delay was used as the starting value for the titrating delay for all future sessions. We next evaluated the acute effects of nicotine (subcutaneous 1.0, 0.3, 0.1, and 0.03 mg/kg) on choice. If nicotine increases delay discounting, it should have increased preference for the variable delay. Instead, nicotine had very little effect on choice. In a second phase, the titrated delay alternative produced three food pellets instead of one, which was again produced by the variable delay (1 s or 19 s) alternative. Under this procedure, nicotine increased preference for the one pellet alternative. Nicotine‐induced changes in impulsive choice are therefore likely due to differences in reinforcer amount rather than differences in reinforcer delay. In addition, it may be necessary to include an amount sensitivity parameter in any mathematical model of choice when the alternatives differ in reinforcer amount.     

RISKY CHOICE IN PIGEONS: PREFERENCE FOR AMOUNT VARIABILITY USING A TOKEN-REINFORCEMENT SYSTEM

Pigeons were given repeated choices between variable and fixed numbers of token reinforcers (stimulus lamps arrayed above the response keys), with each earned token exchangeable for food. The number of tokens provided by the fixed‐amount option remained constant within blocks of sessions, but varied parametrically across phases, assuming values of 2, 4, 6, or 8 tokens per choice. The number of tokens provided by the variable‐amount option varied between 0 and 12 tokens per choice, arranged according to an exponential or rectangular distribution. In general, the pigeons strongly preferred the variable option when the fixed option provided equal or greater numbers of tokens than the variable amount. Preference for the variable amount decreased only when the alternatives provided widely disparate amounts favoring the fixed amount. When tokens were removed from the experimental context, preference for the variable option was reduced or eliminated, suggesting that the token presentation played a key role in maintaining risk‐prone choice patterns. Choice latencies varied inversely with preferences, suggesting that local analyses may provide useful ancillary measures of reinforcer value. Overall, the results indicate that systematic risk sensitivity can be attained with respect to reinforcer amount, and that tokens may be critical in the development of such preferences.