How is the question ‘Is Existence a Predicate?’ relevant to the ontological argument?

It is often said that the ontological argument fails because it wrongly treats existence as a first-level property or predicate. This has proved a controversial claim, and efforts to evaluate it are complicated by the fact that the words ‘existence is not a property/predicate’ have been used by philosophers to make at least three different negative claims: (a) one about a first-level phenomenon possessed by objects like horses, stones, you and me; (b) another about the logical form of assertions of existence; and (c) still another about a second-level phenomenon possessed by concepts when they are instantiated. I argue that only the last of these claims, originally voiced by Kant, is both plausible and relevant to the ontological argument. And I try to show that the relevance of the Kantian version comes from its providing the underlying justification for a different, and far less controversial, criticism of the ontological argument.     

Rowe’s new evidential argument from evil: Problems and prospects

This paper examines an evidential argument from evil recently defended by William Rowe, one that differs significantly from the kind of evidential argument Rowe has become renowned for defending. After providing a brief outline of Rowe’s new argument, I contest its seemingly uncontestable premise that our world is not the best world God could have created. I then engage in a lengthier discussion of the other key premise in Rowe’s argument, viz., the Leibnizian premise that any world created by God must be the best world God can create. In particular, I discuss the criticisms raised against this premise by William Wainwright as well as Rowe’s attempt to meet these criticisms. The Wainwright-Rowe exchange, I argue, highlights some insuperable difficulties in Rowe’s challenge to theism.     

How is God-talk logically possible? A sketch for an argument on the logic of ‘God’

In this paper I want to argue for the optimal way to characterise the logical and semantical behaviour of the singular term ‘God’ used in religious language. The relevance of this enterprise to logical theory is the main focus as well. Doing this presupposes to outline the two rivaling approaches of well-definition of singular terms: Kripke’s (“rigid designators”) and Hintikka’s (“world-lines”). ‘God’ as a “rigid designator” is purified from all real-life-language-games of identification and only spells out a metaphysical tag, which favours the view of “anything goes”. Instead, ‘God’ as a “world-line,” plus two ways of quantification, is much more flexible to theological traditions, teachings of the church, religious practices and personal feelings. Thus, it provides a sufficiently well-defined singular term for the purposes of logical theory. The whole sketch is based on Jaakko Hintikka’s logical ideas, mainly on his responses to different authors in PJH. I have systematically omitted direct references to his texts because I have modified considerably his ideas for my own purposes.     

On ‘what is said to be’

I wish to thank Arnold Koslow and David Rosenthal for helpful comments.     

How (not) to think of the ‘dead-donor’ rule

Although much has been written on the dead-donor rule (DDR) in the last twenty-five years, scant attention has been paid to how it should be formulated, what its rationale is, and why it was accepted. The DDR can be formulated in terms of either a Don’t Kill rule or a Death Requirement, the former being historically rooted in absolutist ethics and the latter in a prudential policy aimed at securing trust in the transplant enterprise. I contend that the moral core of the rule is the Don’t Kill rule, not the Death Requirement. This, I show, is how the DDR was understood by the transplanters of the 1960s, who sought to conform their practices to their ethics—unlike today’s critics of the DDR, who rethink their ethics in a question-begging fashion to accommodate their practices. A better discussion of the ethics of killing is needed to move the debate forward.     

Archetypes and the ‘Impoverished Genome’ argument: updates from evolutionary genetics

Throughout his career, Jung felt the psyche had ‘ancestral layers’ that contained elements of an individual’s species history, and clinical experience has shown that this idea can be an aid to psychological healing and emotional well-being. Thus, some later thinkers have attempted to link such theoretical constructs to the genome, as Jung had little knowledge of genetics in his day. But in the early 2000s, genome studies suggested that the genome might contain too little content to be capable of encoding symbolic information. This opinion gave rise to an oft-repeated ‘impoverished genome’ argument, i.e. that the genome could not provide a significant contribution to the collective unconscious, prompting theorists to propose other sources for it, or to argue that it doesn’t exist. Today, however, developments in evolutionary neurogenetics calls the impoverished genome argument into question for a number of independent reasons. These developments re-open the idea that the genome may be worth reconsidering as the biological substrate for the collective unconscious.     

The second epistemic way revisited: Reply to Professor Beard's, ‘Professor Lucas on omniscience’

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Why ‘Appeals to Intuitions’ might not be so bad

Abstract

There has been lively recent debate over the value of appeals to intuitions in philosophy. Some, especially ‘experimental philosophers’, have argued that such appeals can carry little or no evidential weight, and that standard analytic philosophy is consequently methodologically bankrupt. Various defences of intuitions, and analytic philosophy, have also been offered. In this paper I review the case against intuitions, in particular the claims that intuitions vary with culture, and are built by natural selection, and argue that much of their force depends on assuming that the required sense of intuition is of a kind of human universal. In opposition to this view I argue that there is reason to regard intuitions of professional philosophers as parochial developmental achievements (so that cultural variation among non-professionals is irrelevant) and also the product of a training process that warrants ascribing some evidential weight to them. The argument made here is not anti-naturalistic, nor does it grant intuitions any special or trumping evidential status. Unlike some defences of analytic philosophy it does not depend on denying that philosophers appeal to intuitions at all.     

Kaiho Seiryō on ‘What it is to be a Human Being’

Kaiho Seiryō (1755–1817) is probably the first Japanese thinker to proclaim the contractual nature of human relationships. I examine in this paper the view of human beings that led him to this conclusion. Giving up previous definitions of humans, Seiryō focuses on the faculty of practical reason. While this leads him to recognize a hierarchy of humans, some having more humanity than others, it also allows him to develop the most modern understanding of social relationship available in his time. His radical reinterpretation of what it is to be a human being is all the more remarkable because it was done with the concepts and ideas provided by the Chinese Classics. Establishing new connections, giving new life to ideas that were never exploited, Seiryō showed it was possible to make sense of modernity without using foreign concepts.     

Islamic piety against the family: from ‘traditional’ to ‘pure’ Islam

One might suppose that a foundational element of proper Muslim behaviour is respect for one’s parents. However, it is not unusual in the contemporary Islamic world, both in Muslim-majority countries and in the diaspora, for young people to be much more ‘Islamic’ in behaviour, dress and lifestyle than their parents. As this may suggest, modernist Islamic piety is not infrequently directed by young people against their parents, as a mode of resistance to parental authority. However, wearing the hijab, becoming a follower of a Sufi shaykh, or marrying a ‘good’ Muslim spouse from another ethnic group to one’s own, are different kinds of resistance from, for example, joining an inner-city youth gang, or rejecting one’s parents’ Asian cultural background for a more globalised identity. I discuss some of the ways in which Islamic piety can be deployed in resistance to parental authority through case studies from my Economic and Social Research Council-funded field research in Bangladesh and the UK, and consider in what ways these forms of behaviour resemble, and differ from, more familiar forms of resistance.     

How not to be a metaethical naturalist –Jesse Prinz on the emotional construction of morals

This paper is an analysis of the performance of one reading of Charles Taylor's general criticisms of naturalist accounts of morality (excluding the issue of moral realism) when measured against a specific naturalist account, in this case J.L. Mackie's moral theory. It is argued that Taylor's criticisms, read in this way, fail to find purchase, despite his singling out of Mackie's theory as a prime example of a theory that exhibits the flaws Taylor believes are inherent in this kind of approach to moral theory. This points the supporter of Taylor's position towards an alternative reading of his challenge to naturalist accounts of morality.     

‘Would it not be better to get someone out workin?’: ‘Safe prejudice’ against Polish workers

One recurring criticism of immigrant groups is their alleged failure to be employed and contribute to the host society. Here we examine how speakers mobilise a criticism that has attracted less research attention: that through their economic activity immigrant groups usurp others’ employment entitlements. Discourse analysis of data from seven focus group discussions about pre-Brexit Polish immigration into the UK, involving 31 UK nationals, shows that participants accomplish exclusionary outcomes in two divergent ways. The first attributes qualities to Polish workers but also makes explicit the consequences of these attributions for UK nationals, rendering speakers’ investment in such claims visible. The second relies on the production of category pairs, within which claims can be made for the category that excludes Polish workers. This use of categories comprises ‘safe prejudice’, a form of prejudice not previously identified but which is less open to challenge than other forms of prejudiced talk.     

Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Might’? How (not) to Resolve the Conflict between Act and Motive Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism has often been understood as a theory that concerns itself first and foremost with the rightness of actions; but many other things (e.g., moral rules, motives, laws, etc.) are also properly subject to moral evaluation, and utilitarians have long understood that the theory must be able to provide an account of these as well. In a landmark article from 1976, Robert Adams argues that traditional act utilitarianism faces a particular problem in this regard. He argues that a on a sensible utilitarian account of the rightness of an agent’s motives, right motives will sometimes conflict with right actions, leaving the theory internally incoherent. The puzzle Adams raises has received a good deal of attention but few proposed solutions. Fred Feldman, however, has offered a solution that seems to be gaining adherents. In this paper I argue that Feldman’s approach cannot succeed. At bottom, it relies on a version of the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’—and subsequently an account of an agent’s alternatives—that is far too restrictive to be plausible. Despite the failure of this solution, however, I argue that the conflict Adams develops is not as theoretically troubling as he suggests. While traditional act utilitarianism may fail for other reasons, it will not fail due to the conflict between acts and motives.     

Attention all ‘drivers’: You could be to blame,no matter your behaviour or the level of vehicle automation

Vehicle crashes are one of the leading causes of human deaths worldwide, with crashes predominately attributed to failures of human drivers. Whilst increasing vehicle automation is argued to reduce road crashes via decreased driver involvement, automation also raises concerns around driver blame and stakeholder responsibility. This study examines blame for crash scenarios across four different forms of driver distraction behaviours (phone, sleep, work and driving under the influence), and across four levels of vehicle automation (no automation [manual], partially automated, highly automated, fully automated), using a mixed (qualitative and quantitative) methods approach. Participants (n = 205) were randomised into one of the four levels of vehicle automation and were presented with vignette crash scenarios involving a pedestrian being hit by a vehicle. Results revealed that scenarios varying driver behavior at the time of the crash, had no significant impact on participants’ blame attribution or selected course of action. The qualitative analysis revealed that despite semantic distinction between some driver behaviours, drivers were deemed responsible for the crash. As automation increased, attribution of blame towards the driver decreased, but did not disappear. Blame simultaneously increased towards other stakeholders including the manufacturer and the government, as level of automation increased. These findings mirror that of previous research and further highlight the need for legal frameworks for crashes with automated vehicles, irrespective of driver behaviours.     

On Failing to be Cartesian: Reconsidering the ‘Impurity’ of Descartes’s Meditation

Abstract

This paper begins from the observation that in the Meditations, Descartes never achieves the ‘pure’, thoroughly decontextualized kind of thinking he famously promoted. Some commentators have used this observation to promote pure inquiry more diligently and to criticize Descartes for failing to achieve it. Other commentators have simply called for greater historical fairness and urged that we renew our efforts to understand how Descartes’s inquiry actually does operate. This paper, although sympathetic with this second group of commentators, argues that in revisiting the tensions between what Descartes actually accomplished and what he said he was trying to accomplish, we should see a contemporary lesson, not just better historical understanding. It is argued that in spite of the strong presence in his writings of the imagery of the ‘Cartesian’ ideal of a perfectly presuppositionless philosophical standpoint, not only does Descartes himself never become a Cartesian, but his own practice provides perhaps the best evidence against the very possibility of the Cartesian ‘project of pure inquiry’ to which he aspired.     

A response to William Meredith-Owen’s ‘Alchemical dragons: Winnicott’s reaching towards the objective psyche’

This paper was presented as a response to Meredith-Owen’s paper at the inaugural joint conference of The Society of Analytical Psychology and the West Midlands Institute of Psychotherapy in autumn 2020. The author considers the constraints on the personal mother’s capacity to facilitate the integration of both the shadow and the unrepressed unconscious. Such a difficult task requires the involvement of an enabling cultural matrix mediated by socio-political systems and structures. The improvement of this cultural matrix relies on alchemical-like processes which would help understanding develop beyond one’s own point of view.     

Adorno and Schelling: How to ‘Turn Philosophical Thought Towards the Non-Identical’

This paper explores the relationship between Adorno and Schelling. It argues that Adorno resorted to Schellingian motifs (whether he acknowledged them or not, or acknowledged them only partially) to counteract the influence of Hegelian thought. In defending this thesis, I examine the various stages in the development of Adorno’s thought, beginning with two texts from the 1930s and concluding with Negative Dialectics and ‘Skoteinos’. This allows us to see that Adorno’s concern to discover a way of thinking that is capable of doing justice to the ‘non-identical’ was present throughout his philosophical career.