Measures of national stereotypes as predictors of the latencies of inductive versus deductive stereotypic judgements

According to Taifel's accentuation theory, national stereotypes can be thought of as the correlation between trait dimensions and national affiliations, This correlation is high when the trait shows high homogeneity within and high distinctiveness between the national groups. The present study tested the hypothesis that a trait's distinctiveness would facilitate inductive stereotypic judgements (inferences from trait to nationality) whereas homogeneity would facilitate deductive stereotypic judgements (inferences from nationality to trait). The latencies of inductive and deductive stereotypic judgements of 48 German subjects were assessed for 39 traits and three foreign nationalities (English, French, Italian). Multiple regression analyses using latencies for both types of judgements us criterion variables and both distinctiveness and homogeneity as predictor variables were conducted. The stereotype measures of Katz and Braly and McCauley and Stitt served as additional predictor variables. As expected from accentuation theory, distinctiveness predicted inductive but not deductive latencies, whereas homogeneity predicted deductive but not inductive latencies. For the latencies of deductive stereotypic judgements, the stereotype measure of Katz and Braly as well as that of McCauley and Stitt also proved to be significant predictors. The results are discussed and recommendations are given with respect to the assessment of national stereotypes.     

Interfering with inferential, but not associative, processes underlying spontaneous trait inference

Three studies explore mental processes underlying spontaneous trait inferences about self-informants and the spontaneous trait transference characterizing third-party informants. Process differences are suggested in that instructions prompting a nontrait inference (truth or lie?) reduce self-informant trait-savings effects and lower self-informant trait judgments. For third-party informants, such instructions have no effect on these outcome variables. Results of a third study are inconsistent with cognitive load as an explanation for these effects. Taken together, these results indicate that inferences, and not merely associations, spontaneously form when processing information about self-informants. The results also show that the inferences and judgments that occur in spontaneous trait transference are not caused by the misidentification of third-party informants as self-informants.     

Effects of stereotypes on decision making and information-processing strategies

In two experiments we investigated the effects of stereotyping on (a) reactions to a behavioral transgression and (b) the recall of information bearing on it. Subjects read a case file describing a transgression committed by a target (in Experiment 1, a job-related infraction; in Experiment 2, a criminal act). In some cases, the target's transgression was stereotypic of the target's ethnic group (conveyed through his name), and in other cases it was not. After reading the case file, subjects judged the likelihood that the transgression would recur and recommended punishment for the offense. These judgment data supported the hypothesis that stereotypes function as judgmental heuristics. Specifically, subjects used a stereotype of the target to infer the reasons for his transgression, and then based their punishment decisions on the implications of these inferences, considering other relevant information only when a stereotype-based explanation of the behavior was not available. However, recall data suggested that once a stereotype-based impression of the crime and its determinants was formed, subjects reviewed other available information in an attempt to confirm the implications of this impression. This led to differential recall of presented information, depending on whether its implications were consistent with, inconsistent with, or irrelevant to those of the stereotype.     

What will Phil do next? : Spontaneously inferred traits influence predictions of behavior

Past research has shown that perceivers intentionally may make trait inferences about others and use this information to make predictions about these others' future behaviors. Other research has also shown that people can make trait inferences without intent—that is, spontaneously. However, one unexplored avenue is whether spontaneous trait inferences (STI), affect how perceivers predict others' will behavior. Three studies explored this issue. Results from Studies 1 and 2 showed that: (1) exposure to trait-implicative behaviors describing an actor influences subsequent behavior predictions made about the actor in a trait-consistent manner, and (2) predictions occurred regardless of behavior recall, implying that the behavior predictions were derived from prior trait inferences and not from behavior recall. Results from Study 3 bolstered this conclusion by showing that behavior predictions were similar regardless of whether subjects were explicitly instructed to make inferences or not, but that a manipulation known to interfere with inference generation (lie detection instructions) muted behavior predictions. Results from Study 3 also suggested that the prediction effects had both automatic and controlled components, and that reductions observed in the lie detection condition of Study 3 were caused by alterations in the automatic influence of trait knowledge to the behavior predictions. These results suggest that STI may be causal inferences about the actors' dispositions.     

Spontaneous goal inferences are often inferred faster than spontaneous trait inferences

We present four experiments in which participants were exposed to texts depicting behaviors that afforded inferences about actors' traits and goals. Results from a false recognition task with varying response deadlines revealed heightened activation of goal inferences already within a 350 ms response deadline. In contrast, trait inferences were made only when there was no response deadline, and when the behavior also implied a goal. These results indicate that spontaneous inferences on goals are often encoded more strongly in memory and are reactivated much more quickly in comparison with spontaneous trait inferences. Moreover, spontaneous trait inferences are often facilitated when an inference is first made on the goal of the behavior. These findings are discussed in light of recent developmental and neuroscientific evidence on social inferences, and current theories on impression formation.     

Perceived entitativity,stereotype formation,and the interchangeability of group members

The authors investigated the effects of perceived entitativity of a group on the processing of behavioral information about individual group members and the extent to which such information was transferred to other group members. The results of 3 experiments using a savings-in-relearning paradigm showed that trait inferences about a group member, based on that member's behavior, were stronger for low entitative groups and for collections of individuals. However, the transference of traits from 1 group member to other members of the group was stronger for high entitative groups. These results provide strong evidence that the perception of high entitativity involves the abstraction of a stereotype of the group and the transfer of that stereotype across all group members. Implications for group impression formation and stereotyping are discussed.     

Spontaneous Goal Inference (SGI)

When people learn about or observe the behaviors of others, they tend to make implicit inferences from these behaviors (e.g., Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008). Such inferences are an essential part of a person's ability to understand his/her environment and to prepare appropriate behavior within that environment. In the present paper, we review the conditions under which people are more likely to make implicit goal inferences versus implicit trait inferences. The distinction between these two ways of understanding the behavior we observe has important consequences for how we make predictions about future behavior, set expectations for our interaction partners, and how we choose to behave. It can determine when we stereotype. However, until now, the literature has focused on trait inference as the dominant way perceivers make sense of their environment, with little discussion of inferences concerning a person's goals.     

Contrast from social stereotypes in automatic behavior

The activation of social stereotypes can influence behavior outside of conscious awareness. It has been argued that while priming social stereotypes leads to behavioral assimilation, priming exemplars leads to behavioral contrast. Extending this theorizing, we argue that the activation of social stereotypes can also result in automatic behavioral contrast if a comparison of the self to the stereotyped group is provoked. This hypothesis is tested with speed and intellectual performance as behavioral measures. In a first study, we show that categorizing perceived others as outgroup members leads to behavioral contrast from their stereotype. The second study shows that subliminally priming the self during the activation of a stereotype to which the self does not belong leads to automatic behavioral contrast from the stereotype. These findings reverse previously found assimilation effects of social stereotype priming. Social comparison processes are discussed as a possible mediator of the results.     

Trait memory and behavior memory: the effects of alternative pathways on impression judgment response times

Carlston (1980a) and Lingle (1983) argued that remembered behaviors, previous trait inferences, or both may be accessed and used in making new trait inferences, depending on a variety of factors. In this article we relate this argument to a spreading activation model of memory and suggest factors that should affect the relative accessibility of inferences and behaviors during trait judgment processes. In our study we varied several of these factors and assessed accessibility, using response-time methods. The results of this study strongly support the model's prediction that prompting inference formation facilitates subsequent trait judgment response times, but only when relevant behavior memories have not been recently primed. We theorize that the inference manipulations used in this study strengthened the direct pathway to a relevant trait concept, but that the strength of this pathway was immaterial to judgment response times when a "proximal prime" directed retrieval efforts along an alternative "behavioral" route to the trait information. The results also suggest that the proximal behavior prime facilitated trait responses among subjects who had not been induced to make trait inferences, but slowed trait responses among subjects who had previously been induced to make trait inferences.     

Perceiving ingroup members who use stereotypes: implicit conformity and similarity

Previous studies have shown that people subtly conform more to ingroup members who use stereotype‐consistent rather than stereotype‐inconsistent information when describing an outgroup member (Castelli, Vanzetto, Sherman, & Arcuri, 2001 ). In the present article, we will address two important issues. First, we will examine whether this subtle conformity toward stereotypers is related to individuals' prejudice level (Study 1). Second, we will examine one of the processes that underlie the perception of ingroup members who use stereotype‐consistent information, hypothesizing that individuals implicitly feel more similar to such sources than to ingroup members who use stereotype‐inconsistent information (Study 2). Both hypotheses were confirmed and results are discussed in terms of the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes and their implications in the maintenance of social stereotypes. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

自发特质推理中的社会刻板效应

近来, 考察自发特质推理中的社会刻板效应, 成为自发特质推理研究的一个新趋势。在介绍自发特质推理及其研究范式的基础上, 概述了刻板印象与特质的概念联系, 并阐明了考察自发特质推理中的社会刻板效应的理论依据和方法。接着, 对自发特质推理中的职业、种族和性别刻板效应研究进行了回顾, 发现刻板印象对自发特质推理的影响主要通过它对自发特质推理的阻碍作用体现出来, 在高认知负荷下, 这种阻碍作用更为明显。最后, 从研究对象、研究方法、研究内容三个方面对该领域的研究进行了评价和展望。     

Cognitive representation of personal stereotypes

A production task analogue of the traditional multiple choice trait checklist method was used to investigate stereotypes. Subjects were asked to supply rather than to select the most characteristic attributes of specified social groups. In a departure from tradition, stability of the content of stereotypes was analysed for personal stereotypes held by individuals rather than for social stereotypes shared by a cultural group. In contrast to the widely held belief that social stereotypes are fixed and unchanging, personal stereotypes were found to be only moderately stable over time. Only about two-fifths of the most characteristic attributes were duplicated in sessions separated by one week, and only about one-fifth of the most Characteristic attributes were duplicated in sessions separated by one-month or two-month intervals. Findings also supported the notion that general attributes, most characteristic attributes, and least characteristic attributes of a social category are not totally redundant and are represented quasi-independently in memory. Only about half of the most characteristic responses had also occurred on free response protocols and over half of the least characteristic responses tended not to be polar opposites of the most characteristic responses. It was the case, however, that with a production analogue of the multiple-choice trait checklist, trait-adjectives were the most frequent class of person information and accounted for between 50 and 60 per cent of the responses. However, eleven other classes of person information also occurred. Empirical results were applied toward a reexamination of the concepts of stereotype (data structure for the most characteristic attributes of a social group) and stereotyping (rigid procedures for processing data structures) and to a conceptual analysis of how stereotypes and social categories are structurally related.     

The interplay of controlled and automatic processing in the expression of spontaneously inferred traits: A PDP analysis

Inferences made about actors influence subsequent processing about those actors. Three experiments conducted in the context of spontaneous trait inference (STI) making demonstrate that such influences occur can either occur via automatic processes or via controlled processes. Results from Experiment 1 demonstrated that processing goals manipulated prior to encoding actor behavior affected the extent to which STIs automatically influenced subsequent responses but did not alter the extent to which STIs influenced those responses via controlled processes. Results from Experiment 2 showed that the extent to which STIs affected subsequent responding via the action of controlled processes were more affected by a delay between exposure to an actor behavior and the response task than the extent to which STIs affected task performance via the action of automatic processes. Finally, results from Experiment 3 showed that participants' subjective experience of awareness of their trait inferences is related to estimates of the extent to which controlled processing is involved in the production of their future responses but not to estimates of the extent to which those responses are affected by automatic processing.     

Inference making and linking both require thinking: Spontaneous trait inference and spontaneous trait transference both rely on working memory capacity

Past research suggests that spontaneous trait inference (STI) and spontaneous trait transference (STT) may reflect different cognitive processes, the former being inferential and the latter associational. The present research was designed to explore whether either or both of these processes involve thinking that occupies cognitive capacity. Four studies suggest that reductions in available cognitive capacity reduce both STI and STT effects, both on measures of savings in relearning (which reflect the strength of trait associations with a person) and on trait ratings measures (which reflect the strength of trait inferences made about a person). Similar results were obtained using an individual difference measure of cognitive capacity. Although these results suggest that STI and STT are similar, in that both exhibit interference from reductions in cognitive capacity, other results, such as halo effects in trait ratings, support previous assertions that their underlying processes are distinct.     

Conditions and Consequences of Spontaneous Inference Generation: A Concurrent Protocol Approach

The significant role of inferences in brand evaluation is now widely recognized but the occurrence of spontaneous inferences is still open to question. This study provides evidence, based upon concurrent protocol analysis, for some of the conditions under which spontaneous inferences are likely to occur. The effects of prior knowledge, message type, and processing goal on the occurrence of spontaneous inferences were investigated. High knowledge subjects made spontaneous inferences for all message types. Low knowledge subjects drew an inference only when the message was presented in logical form. Inferential beliefs and brand attitudes were stronger and more favorable when high knowledge subjects generated spontaneous inferences from the logically structured message than those established by explicitly presented information. Protocol data revealed several different inference processes and these processes differed for high versus low knowledge subjects.