Researching the need for multicultural perspectives in counsellor training: A critique of Bimrose & Bayne

The paper by Bimrose & Bayne (1995) on evaluating counsellor training with reference to multicultural frameworks is critiqued. Suggestions are made for promoting greater rigour within the authors' existing paradigm and for replacing their research design with alternative research techniques that possess stronger formative potential for course improvement in counsellor training.     

Is A Purely First Person Account Of Human Action Defensible?

There are two perspectives available from which to understand an agent's intention in acting. The first is the perspective of the acting agent: what did she take to be her end, and the means necessary to achieve that end? The other is a third person perspective that is attentive to causal or conceptual relations: was some causal outcome of the agent's action sufficiently close, or so conceptually related, to what the agent did that it should be considered part of her intention? Recent goods based views in ethics are divided as to whether only the first person perspective, or a mix of both perspectives, are necessary to understand intention and action. But resolution of the issue is necessary if goods based views are to be able to deploy to principle of double effect; for that principle requires an account of how to distinguish what is genuinely a matter of intention in human action from what is not. I argue that the pure first person account is better than the mixed account.     

Philosophy Makes No Progress,So What Is the Point of It?

Philosophy makes no progress. It fails to do so in the way science and mathematics make progress. By “no progress” is meant that there is no successive advance of a well‐established body of knowledge—no views are definitively established or definitively refuted. Yet philosophers often talk and act as if the subject makes progress, and that its point and value lies in its doing so, while in fact they also approach the subject in ways that clearly contradict any claim to progress. This article presents evidence for, and a theoretical explanation of, the view that philosophy makes no progress, concluding with an account of what philosophy is and what the point and value of it is. Philosophy should not be shy about being what it is, nor should it pretend to be what it is not. What it is should be reflected in philosophizing and the way it is taught.     

Science, Ethics and War: A Pacifist’s Perspective

This article considers the ethical aspects of the question: should a scientist engage in war-related research, particularly use-inspired or applied research directed at the development of the means for the better waging of war? Because scientists are simultaneously professionals, citizens of a particular country, and human beings, they are subject to conflicting moral and practical demands. There are three major philosophical views concerning the morality of war that are relevant to this discussion: realism, just war theory and pacifism. In addition, the requirements of professional codes of ethics and common morality contribute to an ethical analysis of the involvement of scientists and engineers in war-related research and technology. Because modern total warfare, which is facilitated by the work of scientists and engineers, results in the inevitable killing of innocents, it follows that most, if not all, war-related research should be considered at least as morally suspect and probably as morally prohibited.     

A Leaky Sort of Thing? The divisiveness of Michael Dummett

A note by the Editor: In the October issue o/New Blackfriars appeared an article by Professor Michael Dummett, 'A Remarkable Consensus'. In it the author discussed what he saw to be problems arising when Catholic theologians and seminary teachers publicly align themselves with the so-called 'liberal consensus': in other words, adopt opinions which, in the author's view, 'imply that, from the very earliest times, the Catholic Church, claiming to have a mission from God to safeguard divinely revealed truth, has taught and insisted on the acceptance of falsehoods'. He believed this to have happened on a wide-spread scale. He concluded that 'the divergence that now obtains between what the Catholic Church purports to believe and what large or important sections of it in fact believe ought …to be tolerated no longer: not if there is to be a rationale for belonging to that Church; not if there is to be any hope of reunion with the other half of Christendom; not if the Catholic Church is not to be a laughing-stock in the eyes of the world.' Here Professor Nicholas Lash reacts to Professor Dummett's article, and particularly to what he had to say about modern theologians and seminary teachers. In the next article Professor Dummett answers him.     

On language and the passage of time

Conclusion In short, the situation regarding language and the passage of time is this. A person may consistently hold either of the two views concerning time's special treatment in our ordinary language, LP and LNP, provided that that person holds the appropriate view from among several semantical views available. Each of these different semantical views, in turn, can be consistently maintained in such a way that it is not susceptible to arguments from the other side, provided that these arguments do not appeal to metaphysical considerations. But of course advocates of either The Linguistic Argument For SPT or The Linguistic Argument Against SPT may not appeal to metaphysical claims in defense of either LNP or LP, since these allegedly linguistic theses are to be used in arguments designed to prove just such metaphysical claims. Moreover, if the different parties to the dispute between LP and LNP do appeal to metaphysical considerations, then they may be able to develop non-circular, non-question-begging arguments for their respective linguistic theses. What those metaphysical considerations might be, and what arguments might be developed from them, are important topics to be considered, but I will not consider them here. The point of this paper has been to show that those who wish to debate the question of whether time passes cannot settle the debate merely by discussing linguistic matters.     

Maxwell and materialism

In a recent article, Grover Maxwell presents a case for a kind of mind-brain identity theory which he claims precludes materialism. His case is based on some views about meaning which I find plausible. However, I will argue that, by adopting certain assumptions about the nature of sensory experience, and extending some of Maxwell's views about meaning in a plausible way, the issue of a materialistic identity theory is reopened. Ultimately, I will agree that such a theory is not true, but more is needed to show this than Maxwell gives us. But the question of materialism is not thereby closed, because it has become axiomatic these days that materialism does not require an identity theory. So I will go on to consider if all forms of materialism have been ruled out by Maxwell's theory, as extended by me. I will end with a tentative affirmative answer but also with a proposal which, if it can be worked out, would reverse the decision.     

On Kantians and Pragmatists: Kenneth Baynes's Habermas

In this article I lay out Kenneth Baynes's interpretation of Habermas's social and political philosophy, and develop three lines of criticism. The first concerns the question of whether, and if so in what respect, Habermas's political theory counts as a critical social theory. I argue that it is not clear in what sense Habermas's political theory is a ‘critical’ social theory, and that Baynes's interpretation throws little light on this issue. The second related issue is to what extent it can be fairly claimed that on Habermas's account of democracy, political legitimacy rests on a “core morality”. While there is a possible reconstruction of Habermas along these lines, I argue that it conflicts with the central tenets of Habemras's political theory. Finally, I question whether Baynes is right to align Habermas's ideal of public reason so closely with Rawls's.     

The Religious Function of Jaina Philosophy:AnekāntavādaReconsidered

This paper considers the socio-religious rationale for the Jaina theory of the non-one-sided nature of reality (anekāntavāda). In doing so it rejects the received view thatanekāntavāda's exclusive function is to promote non-violence at the intellectual level. Instead it advances a model which emphasizes the way in whichanekāntavādasustains a real connection between karmic matter and the soul (jīva) and so maintains the rationale for identity defining ascetic practice. The social and religious dangers of one-sided (ekānta) views for the Jaina tradition are demonstrated by a consideration of the Digambara teacher Kundakunda's idiosyncratic use of the two truths model of reality.     

Career-learning space: New-dots thinking for careers education

For more than 20 years, both careers education and guidance have drawn much of their rationale from the DOTS analysis which analyses practice for coverage of decision learning (D), opportunity awareness (O), transition learning (T), and self awareness (S). Its assumptions are rooted in theory, unifying the aims of careers education and careers guidance as enabling choice. More recent theory and practice engage a wider range of thinking: they acknowledge the complexity of contemporary career planning, and accommodate interactions which occur in the social and community life of the 'choosing person'. The practical implications are for more progressive career learning, in conditions which enable 'due process' to establish viable bases for both choice and change of mind. This thinking more sharply differentiates careers education from guidance, setting out a strong rationale for the former. It does not replace DOTS, but extends it into a new-DOTS re-conceptualisation termed 'career-learning space'. The effectiveness of career learning is determined by its transferable outcomes. New-DOTS thinking resonates with the conditions for transferable learning. There are possibilities here for building a strong consensus between practice, theory and policy.     

Contested terms and philosophical debates

There are two standard theoretical responses to putative errors in ordinary thinking about some given target property: eliminativism or revisionism. Roughly, eliminativism is the denial that the target property exists, and revisionism is the view that the property exists, but that people tend to have false beliefs about it. Recently, Shaun Nichols has proposed a third option: discretionism. Discretionism is the idea that some terms have multiple reference conventions, so that it may be true to say with eliminativists that the property does not exist, and true to say with revisionists (and others) that the property does exist. This article explores the viability of discretionism, and argues that it faces serious difficulties. Even if the difficulties faced by discretionism can be overcome, it is unclear that discretionism secures anything beyond what is already available to standard revisionist views. The article concludes with some reflections about Nichols’ account of the bare retributive norm.     

Describing our “humanness”: Can genetic science alter what it means to be “human”?

Over the past several decades, geneticists have succeeded in identifying the genetic mutations associated with disease. New strategies for treatment, including gene transfer and gene therapy, are under development. Although genetic science has been welcomed for its potential to predict and treat disease, interventions may become ethically objectionable if they threaten to alter characteristics that are distinctively human. Before we can determine whether or not a genetic technique carries this risk, we must clarify what it means to be “human”. This paper inquires how “humanness” has been defined within various academic fields. The views of several legal theoreists, scientists, bioethicists, psychologists, philosophers and anthropologists whose works seem to best reflect how “humanness” is understood in their respective fields of study are considered. Our survey attempts to chart a path for a more detailed study on the meaning of “humanness” in the future. We assess four traits commonly identified in the literature as defining what it means to be human: cognition, biological or physiological composition, social interaction with other “human” beings, and spirituality. The nature of the relationship between these characteristics, in our view, is symbiotic: genetic intervention which alters one of them could have repercussions on one or more of the others. In conclusion, we offer guidance to those participating in genetic research and treatment regarding the parameters within which they may proceed without threatening the preservation of what is distinctively human.     

On the relation between representations constructed from text comprehension and transitive inference production

Deductive inference production from texts is a process considered to involve either the construction of an integrated mental model or the step-by-step coordination of propositional representations of the sentences. These alternative hypotheses were tested in 3 experiments using a set inclusion task paradigm in which participants had to recall the premises and to evaluate transitive inferences. Contrary to what is known about linear ordering relations, order of recalls and reaction times provide evidence that the encoding of set inclusion relations does not result in an integrated representation. These results suggest that the mental models theory needs to take account of the nature of the relation to be represented if it is to become a general theory of reasoning.     

Contractualism as Restricted Constructivism

Metaethics is often dominated by both realist views according to which moral claims are made true by either non-natural or natural properties and by non-cognitivist views according to which these claims express desire-like attitudes. It is sometimes suggested that constructivism is a fourth alternative, but it has remained opaque just how it differs from the other views. To solve this problem, this article first describes a clear constructivist theory based on Crispin Wright’s anti-realism. It then outlines an argumentative strategy that can be used to argue against constructivist views about practical reasons. The rest of the article explains how the outlined constructivist metaethical framework, reasons, and contractualism in normative ethics can still be used to create a new viable metaethical constructivist position about right and wrong.     

Prospects for an Inclusive Theory of Justice: The Case of Non‐Human Animals

In this article, I argue that there are three widely accepted views within contemporary theorising about justice that present barriers to accepting that non‐human animals possess direct entitlements of justice. These views are (1) that the basis of entitlements of justice is either contribution to a cooperative scheme for mutual advantage or the capacity to so contribute; (2) political liberalism, that is, the view that requirements for coercive state action can be justified only by appeal to the ideal of citizens as free and equal and the principles of justice that are entailed by that ideal; and (3) that the principles of justice apply directly to the institutions of what John Rawls calls the ‘basic structure of society’, and not to the conduct of individuals. I then consider several attempts to ground direct entitlements of justice for animals via modest revisions to one or more of these widely accepted views, and argue that they fail, and that, more generally, any such attempt must fail. I claim that any theory that can include direct entitlements for animals must reject (1) and at least one of (2) and (3), and that there are reasons to think that those who are inclined to endorse direct entitlements for animals are unlikely to be satisfied with any view that does not reject all three of the widely accepted views. I conclude by briefly noting some of the important implications of rejecting all of these views.     

Bias in Conditional Inference: Implications for Mental Models and Mental Logic

Three experiments are reported in which subjects are given the opportunity to make any of the four inferences associated with conditional statements: modus ponens (MP), denial of the antecedent (DA), affirmation of the consequent (AC), and modus tollens (MT). The primary purpose of the research was to establish the generality and robustness of polarity biases that may be occasioned by systematic rotation of negative components in the conditional rules. In Experiments 1 & 2, three forms of conditionals were used: “if (not) p then (not) q”, “(not) p only if (not) q” and “(not) q if (not) p”. Experiment 1 used a conclusion evaluation task, whereas Experiment 2 used a conclusion production task. In Experiment 3, thematic conditionals were presented with and without a preceding scenario.

The biases investigated were (a) affirmative premise bias—the tendency to draw more inferences from affirmative premises and (b) negative conclusion bias—the tendency to draw more inferences with negative conclusions. The suggestive evidence for affirmative premise bias in the literature was not supported: very little evidence was found for it in the current experiments. Robust findings of negative conclusion bias were, however, found across the three experiments, although the bias was mostly restricted to DA and MT inferences. This suggests that the bias is best regarded as a difficulty with double negation.

The results are discussed with respect to both the mental logic and mental model accounts of propositional reasoning. Neither theory as currently formulated can explain all of our findings, although a plausible revision of each is considered.     

Guidance and New Education for Schools

A rationale for broad-based school reform is detailed, including a brief examination of the old guidance as separate from the teaching model for school practice. Instead it is now clear that the general curriculum of schools must include psychological growth as a direct object of classroom instruction. To accomplish such “new education,” goals will require a major role shift and commitment on the part of school guidance. There are currently in place a few examples of guidance education in the curriculum at both the elementary and secondary level. These efforts serve only as exemplars of what is possible, namely that an effective guidance role can alter both classroom teaching strategies as well as broaden the curriculum content. It is most strongly suggested that guidance theory and practice take the lead in seeking school reforms.     

The value of practical usefulness

Some moral theories, such as objective forms of consequentialism, seem to fail to be practically useful: they are of little to no help in trying to decide what to do. Even if we do not think this constitutes a fatal flaw in such theories, we may nonetheless agree that being practically useful does make a moral theory a better theory, or so some have suggested. In this paper, I assess whether the uncontroversial respect in which a moral theory can be claimed to be better if it is practically useful can provide a ground worth taking into account for believing one theory rather than another. I argue that this is not the case. The upshot is that if there is a sound objection to theories such as objective consequentialism that is based on considerations of practical usefulness, the objection requires that it is established that the truth about what we morally ought to do cannot be epistemically inaccessible to us. The value of practical usefulness has no bearing on the issue.     

Mindful Journeys

Abstract

Becoming mindful involves the cultivation of present-moment-attention, a type of awareness that helps us to tune in to our present experience and accept it for what it is, gently, and without judgment. Perhaps because client's issues commonly include elements of rumination, worrying, self-judgment or lack of awareness, mindfulness practices have been considered for their use in mental health interventions. This article offers a rationale for fostering non-judgmental awareness, reviews the ways mindfulness has been applied as an intervention, and applies mindfulness concepts to counseling practice with case examples.     

Does the autistic child have a metarepresentational deficit?

This study examines the claim that autistic children lack a “theory of mind” because of an inability to metarepresent. We argue that if autistic children have a “metarepresentational” deficit in Leslie's (1987, 1988) sense of the term, then they should have difficulty not only with mental representations such as false beliefs, but also with external representations such as photographs. Autistic children's understanding of photographic representations was tested using Zaitchik's (1990) task. This task is modelled on the false belief task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985: Wimmer & Perner, 1983) but involves “false” photographs where a photographic representation does not conform with the current state of the real world. Like Zaitchik (1990) we found that normal 3 and 4-year-olds found this task as difficult as the false belief task. In sharp contrast, however, the autistic children in our study passed the photograph task but failed the false belief task. As both tasks require the ability to decouple, this evidence challenges the view that autistic children lack “metarepresentational” ability in Leslie's sense. However, the results leave open the question of whether autistic children have a metarepresentational ability in the different sense of the term intended by Pylyshyn (1978), that is, representing the relationship between a representation and what it represents.