The Logical Structure of Just War Theory

A survey of just war theory literature reveals the existence of quite different lists of principles. This apparent arbitrariness raises a number of questions: What is the relation between ad bellum and in bello principles? Why are there so many of the former and so few of the latter? What order is there among the various principles? To answer these questions, I first draw on some recent work by Jeff McMahan to show that ad bellum and in bello principles are not, as often portrayed, independent—the justice of conduct in war largely presupposes the justice of the recourse to war. Undermining this independence claim is one important step toward revealing the unified logical structure of just war theory. I then argue that we can see the dependence of the jus in bello upon the jus ad bellum, not just in the content of certain principles, but also in the structure of the two sets of principles: I construct a one-to-one mapping between ad bellum and in bello principles. In doing so, I argue also that the shared structure successfully finds place for the questions central to the evaluation of the morality of war: what is a sufficient provocation to use force, what objectives may be sought by force, why or for what ends, who has authority to decide to use force, and when or in what circumstances? Despite variations in expression, the theory allows for a coherent and comprehensive evaluation of morality in warfare.     

The Logical Structure of Classical Genetics

We present a reconstruction of so-called classical, formal or Mendelian genetics using a notation which we believe is more legible than that of earlier accounts, and lends itself easily to computer implementation, for instance in PROLOG. By drawing from, and emending, earlier work of Balzer and Dawe (1986,1997), the present account presents the three most important lines of development of classical genetics: the so-called Mendel's laws, linkage genetics and gene mapping, in the form of a theory-net. This shows that the set theoretic representation format used in the structuralist approach to the philosophy of science also applies to the domain of genetic theories. There construction is intended to lend more clarity to theme thodological, philosophical and didactical discussions of the foundations of genetics, and on the other hand to defend a formally, logically minded view of theories which seems to have become contested through the work of Feyerabend, Kuhn and Kitcher. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Racialization of International Trade

Despite their less vulnerable economic status, white individuals' attitudes toward overseas trade in the United States may have become more protectionist than those of economically disadvantaged minorities. We present results from five different studies examining two different ways in which trade may have become racialized. First, we examine the extent to which a person's racial identity is associated with levels of trade support. Second, we examine whether the predominant racial identity of a potential trading-partner country influences people's willingness to trade with that country. Using various surveys and multiple survey experiments conducted over the past 12 years, we find that white individuals have become less supportive of trade than minorities and that whites are more likely than minorities to favor trade with highly similar countries. We suggest that minority support for trade is due to four well-documented differences in the psychological predispositions of whites and minorities in the United States. Minorities have lower levels of racial prejudice, are lower in social dominance, and express less nationalism than whites. At the same time, there is evidence of rising ingroup racial consciousness among whites. Each of these characteristics has been independently linked to trade support in a direction encouraging greater support for trade among minorities. As the United States grows ever closer to becoming a “majority minority” nation, the racialization of trade attitudes may stimulate shifts in the likely future of America's trade relationships.     

论前期维特根斯坦的逻辑真理观

维特根斯坦在其早期代表作《逻辑哲学论》中深入探讨了逻辑真理的理解问题.然而当今学界流行的看法是,维特根斯坦有着最狭隘的逻辑真理观逻辑真理即重言式.本文试图澄明维氏使用重言式概念的原初含义,并从其以逻辑为基础的世界观、真值函项理论及优范式理论等角度分别加以阐述,说明维氏所理解的逻辑真理乃穷尽可能的必然,而对逻辑真理的这种理解同样可推广到谓词逻辑,并指出用穷尽可能来定义逻辑必然并不会导致恶性循环.     

A Logical Theory of Localization

A central problem in applying logical knowledge representation formalisms to traditional robotics is that the treatment of belief change is categorical in the former, while probabilistic in the latter. A typical example is the fundamental capability of localization where a robot uses its noisy sensors to situate itself in a dynamic world. Domain designers are then left with the rather unfortunate task of abstracting probabilistic sensors in terms of categorical ones, or more drastically, completely abandoning the inner workings of sensors to black-box probabilistic tools and then interpreting their outputs in an abstract way. Building on a first-principles approach by Bacchus, Halpern and Levesque, and a recent continuous extension to it by Belle and Levesque, we provide an axiomatization that shows how localization can be realized wrt a basic action theory, thereby demonstrating how such capabilities can be enabled in a single logical framework. We then show how the framework can also enable localization for multiple agents, where an agent can appeal to the sensing already performed by another agent and the knowledge of their relative positions to localize itself.     

Logical Cornestones of Judaic Argumentation Theory

In this paper, the four Judaic inference rules: qal wa- ? omer, gezerah ? awah, heqe ?, binyan ’av are considered from the logical point of view and the pragmatic limits of applying these rules are symbolic-logically explicated. According to the Talmudic sages, on the one hand, after applying some inference rules we cannot apply other inference rules. These rules are weak. On the other hand, there are rules after which we can apply any other. These rules are strong. This means that Judaic inference rules have different pragmatic meanings and this fact differs Judaic logic from other ones. The Judaic argumentation theory built up on Judaic logic also contains pragmatic limits for proofs as competitive communication when different Rabbis claim different opinions in respect to the same subject. In order to define these limits we build up a special kind of syllogistics, the so-called Judaic pragmatic-syllogistics, where it is defined whose opinion should be choosen in a dispute.     

Horst Wessel: Contributions to the Theory of Logical Consequence,Non-Traditional Theory of Predication and Logical Theory of Terms

The present work takes the decease of Horst Wessel as an opportunity to present and honour his work (and that of his group), which has not received the attention it deserves. The focus will be on works which might not be sufficiently well-known. Wessel was, as we aim to show, familiar with the international debate concerning logical and philosophical issues and strived to solve them by considering theories of logical consequence, a non-traditional theory of predication and the theory of logical terms, all of which he developed in joint work with Alexander Sinowjew. Wessel had to significantly refine these theories in order to formulate his criticism towards alternative logics and to apply the theories to a treatment of intensional contexts. He was vehemently opposed to approaches which revised fundamental laws of classical logic. Questions concerning the history of Philosophy are addressed in Wessel’s criticism of the Kantian antinomies of pure reason, in Wessel’s contributions to the problem of universals and his analyses of fatalism, tychism and antifatalism.     

道教哲学的思想主题与逻辑建构

本文力求在吸收已有道教研究成果的基础上,尝试以现代哲学观念,对道教的价值关怀予以分析说明以建立符合现代学科要求的道教哲学形态。由于目前的工作仅是初步提出自己对道教哲学的一种理解,希望能够对此正处于建设中的学科的进展有所推动。     

The Logical Structure of Linguistic Commitment III Brandomian Scorekeeping and Incompatibility

Curiously, though he provides in Making It Explicit (MIE) elaborate accounts of various representational idioms, of anaphora and deixis, and of quantification, Robert Brandom nowhere attempts to lay out how his understanding of content and his view of the role of logical idioms combine in even the simplest cases of what he calls paradigmatic logical vocabulary. That is, Brandom has a philosophical account of content as updating potential – as inferential potential understood in the sense of commitment or entitlement preservation – and says that the point of logical vocabulary is to make available the expressive resources to make explicit such semantic structures as arise from discursive scorekeeping practice. Thus, one would expect an account of the updating or inferential potential of sentences involving logical vocabulary, an account which is such as to assign to those sentences the inferential significance necessary for this expressive job. In short, one would expect a semantics of logical vocabulary – &, , – in terms of the difference an assertion of a sentence involving it makes to the atomic score of a linguistic agent, and a completeness proof for the logic generated by this semantics. Despite this, no such semantics is given in MIE. It is in the current paper.     

Definability and the Structure of Logical Paradoxes

Graham Priest 2002 argues that all logical paradoxes that include set-theoretic paradoxes and semantic paradoxes share a common structure, the Inclosure Schema, so they should be treated as one family. Through a discussion of Berry's Paradox and the semantic notion ‘definable’, I argue that (i) the Inclosure Schema is not fine-grained enough to capture the essential features of semantic paradoxes, and (ii) the traditional separation of the two groups of logical paradoxes should be retained.     

The illusory nature of Implicit Personality Theory: Logical and empirical considerations

Mirels (1976) demonstrated that derivations from Implicit Personality Theory were compromised by marked absolute discrepancies between subjects’ estimates of the coendorsement of personality items and the empirical relations between the items. Arguments presented by Jackson, Chan, and Strieker (1979) in a recent critique of this demonstration were shown to be based on an arbitrary and severely restrictive view of implicit theory. Logical and empirical considerations were brought to bear in the present paper to indicate that (a) empirical conditional probabilities of test item coendorsement are an appropriate comparison standard for estimates of those probabilities, (b) large absolute discrepancies between estimated and empirical coendorsement must be regarded as seriously impugning the accuracy of IPT, and (c) exclusive reliance on the correlational correspondence between estimated and empirical coendorsement results in an overly sanguine view of the accuracy of IPT. Moreover, it was shown that subjects fail to discriminate between highly asymmetrical conditional probabilities, a finding directly at variance with the assertion that the presumably veridical postulates of implicit theory are inductively extracted from experience. Also discussed were the relation between IPT and everyday social judgments, and the influence of IPT on behavioral ratings.     

The Causal Structure of Evolutionary Theory

One contentious debate in the philosophy of biology is that between the statisticalists and causalists. The former understand core evolutionary concepts like fitness and selection to be mere statistical summaries of underlying causal processes. In this view, evolutionary changes cannot be causally explained by selection or fitness. The causalist side, on the other hand, holds that populations can change in response to selection—one can cite fitness differences or driftability in causal explanations of evolutionary change. But, on the causalist side, it is often not clear how, precisely, one should understand these causes. Thus, much more could be said about what sort of causes fitness and driftability are. In this paper, I borrow Dretske's distinction between structuring and triggering causes and I suggest that fitness and driftability are structuring causes of evolution.     

逻辑学视野下的中药药性理论

逻辑学是研究思维、思维的规定和规律的科学,中国古代文化虽未能孕育出系统的逻辑学体系,但逻辑的思维已经渗透到古人思想的方方面面.中药药性理论作为中医学理论的重要组成部分,其思维结晶中也蕴含着丰富的逻辑内涵,对其深入解析将有利于理解中医中药理论的逻辑特点.     

On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth: The Fundamental Problem and a New Perspective

The present article purports to show that the protocol sentence debate, pursued by some leading members of the Vienna Circle in the mid-1930s, was essentially a controversy over the explanation and the real significance of the concept of truth. It is further shown that the fundamental issue underlying the discussions about the concept of truth was the relationship between form and content, as well as between logic/language and the world. R. Carnap was the philosopher who most explicitly and systematically attempted to come to grips with this problem. It is shown that the form-content distinction pervades the three most important phases of Carnap's philosophical development: the structuralist (in Der logische Aufbau der Welt), the syntactical and the semantical. His final semantical stance is essentially determined by the concept of linguistic frameworks. The article purports to demonstrate that this concept cannot be dispensed with in philosophy, but that Carnap failed to work out its ontological implications. Finally, the concept of an internal ontology is briefly delineated. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Network Structure of Childhood Psychopathology in International Adoptees

International adoptees are at an increased risk of emotional and behavioral problems, especially those who are adopted at an older age. We took a new approach in our study of the network structure and predictability of emotional and behavioral problems in internationally adopted children in Finland. Our sample was from the on-going adoption study and comprised 778 internationally adopted children (387 boys and 391 girls, mean age 10.5 (SD 3.4) years). Networks were estimated using Gaussian graphical models and lasso regularization for all the children, and separately for those who were adopted at different ages. The results showed that anxiety/depressive symptoms, social problems, and aggressiveness were the most central symptom domains. Somatic symptoms were the least central and had the weakest effect on the other domains. Similarly, aggressiveness, social problems, and attention problems were high in terms of predictability (73–65%), whereas internalizing problems were relatively low (28–56%). There were clear but local age-group differences in network structure, symptom centrality, and predictability. According to our findings, network models provide important additional information about the centrality and predictability of specific symptom domains, and thus may facilitate targeted interventions among international adoptees.