LANGAGE ET PENSÉE

This paper is devoted to some issues which are to be first examined in order to approach the problem of the relations between language and thought in a positive way. The term “thought” arouses distrust in the psychologists who are attached to the scientific method, because it evokes philosophical presuppositions. However, when the problem is posed in terms of what does happen in the subject or what sort of cultural reality does correspond to a system of concepts, an objective analysis is possible and has been realized in some well-known works. Then, the author emphasizes the fact that any attempt at defiring the influence of language on the development of thought, for instance, demands that both terms should not be dealt with as global entities. Discussing the priority of thought over language, or vice versa, is greatly sterilized as long as these terms are treated so. For instance, intelligence does not necessarily correspond to the same abilities before language — or independently from it — as after language — or when intelligence is informed by it. All the same, language is not a whole: a subject who has low abilities in mere grammatical forms can nevertheless use language in an efficient way. Deaf children offer great opportunities for the study of the role of language in mental development, because, by studying them, one avoids wrong explanations based only on correlations which result from the studies in normal children. The collaboration between linguists and psychologists is discussed. The difficulties which psychologists sometimes meet with the works of linguists are outlined; the author eventually suggests some issues on which the cooperation of the linguist could particularly help the psychologist.     

The contemporary development of a Neo‐Confucian epistemology

Until recently epistemology in the Western sense was never a central issue in Chinese philosophy. Contemporary Chinese neo‐Confucian philosophers, however, realize that in order to reconstruct some of the important traditional philosophical insights and make them meaningful in the present time, certain methodological and epistemological considerations are indispensable. The present paper undertakes to examine some of these efforts. Since most neo‐Confucian philosophers today have been influenced by Hsiung Shih‐li, in one way or another, his epistemological theory is presented first. Then the further development of a neo‐Confucian epistemological system in Mou Tsung‐san's thought is discussed. Hsiung Shih‐li has made an important distinction between what he calls the hsing‐ehih and the liang‐chih. The former may be translated as the original wisdom and is what we rely upon to grasp ontological reality; the latter may be translated as the measuring wisdom and includes both our commonsensical and scientific ways of understanding which postulate a real, external world. A dialectical relation holds between the two. Mou Tsung‐san further develops a comprehensive epistemological system which confirms the basic insights of Hsiung Shih‐li. He has attempted a synthesis of the philosophical insights which he learns from Kant in the West and the Confucian tradition in China.     

Can Compositionality Solve the Thought-or-Language Problem?

Abstract

Jerry Fodor has claimed to have a solution to the traditional problem of what comes first, thought or language. Compositionality, he says, will give us the answer, for at least one must be compositional, and if only one of them is, that is the one that has underived semantic content. He argues that natural languages are not compositional, and therefore that the content of language is derived from the content of thought. I will argue that the idea that language is not compositional conflicts with his productivity and systematicity arguments for the existence of a language of thought. I will also show that Fodor’s solution to the problem fails, as his main argument is circular. Finally, I suggest that Fodor’s argument against the compositionality of language is not decisive, and that we can still attribute at least some degree of compositionality to language.     

Does language shape thought? Mandarin and English speakers' conceptions of time

Does the language you speak affect how you think about the world? This question is taken up in three experiments. English and Mandarin talk about time differently--English predominantly talks about time as if it were horizontal, while Mandarin also commonly describes time as vertical. This difference between the two languages is reflected in the way their speakers think about time. In one study, Mandarin speakers tended to think about time vertically even when they were thinking for English (Mandarin speakers were faster to confirm that March comes earlier than April if they had just seen a vertical array of objects than if they had just seen a horizontal array, and the reverse was true for English speakers). Another study showed that the extent to which Mandarin-English bilinguals think about time vertically is related to how old they were when they first began to learn English. In another experiment native English speakers were taught to talk about time using vertical spatial terms in a way similar to Mandarin. On a subsequent test, this group of English speakers showed the same bias to think about time vertically as was observed with Mandarin speakers. It is concluded that (1) language is a powerful tool in shaping thought about abstract domains and (2) one's native language plays an important role in shaping habitual thought (e.g., how one tends to think about time) but does not entirely determine one's thinking in the strong Whorfian sense.     

Amalgamation of future time orientation,epistemological beliefs,achievement goals and study strategies: Empirical evidence established

Background Recently research evidence emphasizes two main lines of inquiry, namely the relations between future time perspective (FTP), achievement goals (mastery, performance‐approach, and performance‐avoidance) and study processing strategies, and the relations between epistemological beliefs, achievement goals and study processing strategies. To date, however, there have been very few attempts made to amalgamate these two strands of inquiry within one study and how they in totality determine the success of academic learning. Aims This study proposed and tested a conceptual model of relationships among FTP, epistemological beliefs, achievement goals (mastery, performance‐approach, and performance‐avoidance), study processing strategies and academic performance. Sample Two hundred and seventy‐five tertiary second‐year students (167 females, 108 males) enrolled in a university in the Pacific participated in this study. Method Likert‐scale inventories were used to elicit relevant data from students; for example, the epistemological questionnaire (EQ; Schommer, 1990 ) and the Zimbardo time perspective inventory ( Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999 ). Academic performance was collated from students' course and final exam marks in the course educational psychology. LISREL 8.72 and SPSS 15 was used to test and evaluate the conceptual model proposed. Results Latent variables procedures supported the conceptual model in general, although not all hypothesized paths were significant. MANOVA indicated no gender differences in the five theoretical frameworks or academic performance. Discussion The determinants of academic performance from our findings are deep and surface processing strategies. Furthermore, the established supports the mediating roles of deep processing strategies, mastery goals, and performance‐approach and performance‐avoidance goals.     

THE NEED FOR TRUE CONTROVERSIES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS: THE DEBATES ON MELANIE KLEIN AND JACQUES LACAN IN THE RÍO DE LA PLATA

Controversies are part of the process of scientific knowing. In psychoanalysis, the diversity of theoretical, technical and epistemological positions makes the debate particularly necessary and by the same token difficult. In this paper, the author examines the function of controversies and the obstacles to their development, taking as examples the debates held in the Rao de la Plata (Buenos Aires and Montevideo) during the nineteen seventies, when the dominant Kleinian ideas came into contact with Lacanian thought. The author examines different examples of argumentative discourses, using concepts taken from the theory of argumentation. The major difficulties encountered did not hinge on characteristics pertaining to psychoanalytic theories (i.e. the lack of commensurability between them), but on the defensive strategies aimed at keeping each theory's premises safe from the opposing party's arguments. A true debate implies the construction of a shared argumentative field that makes it possible to lay out the different positions and see some interaction between them and is guided by the search for the best argument. When this occurs, controversies promote the discipline's development, even when they fail to reach any consensus.     

Rhetoric and nomenclature in Lavoisier's chemical language

Implicit in the theoretical chemical writings of Antoine Laurent Lavoisier is a theory of language that is not in complete harmony with the philosopher of language whom he takes as his explicit authority, Condillac. Lavoisier's reform of the nomenclature of chemistry leads to his dividing scientific language into two sets with different properties: a denotative artificial nomenclature and connotative natural language. This division supposedly permits knowledge to be stored in the nomenclature while the natural language retains the rhetorical tools necessary for creative thought and argument. The consequences of this reform of scientific language are, however, the opposite of what Lavoisier had intended.     

Language and modeling word problems in mathematics among bilinguals

The study was conducted to determine whether the language of math word problems would affect how Filipino-English bilingual problem solvers would model the structure of these word problems. Modeling the problem structure was studied using the problem-completion paradigm, which involves presenting problems without the question. The paradigm assumes that problem solvers can infer the appropriate question of a word problem if they correctly grasp its problem structure. Arithmetic word problems in Filipino and English were given to bilingual students, some of whom had Filipino as a first language and others who had English as a first language. The problem-completion data and solution data showed similar results. The language of the problem had no effect on problem-structure modeling. The results were discussed in relation to a more circumscribed view about the role of language in word problem solving among bilinguals. In particular, the results of the present study showed that linguistic factors do not affect the more mathematically abstract components of word problem solving, although they may affect the other components such as those related to reading comprehension and understanding.     

To Think Human out of the Machine Paradigm: <Emphasis Type="Italic">Homo Ex Machina</Emphasis>

This article attempts to show that the metaphorical conception of human being as a machine takes a very specific epistemological standpoint. To make short the complex task of considering the implication of this paradigm for psychological and behavioral sciences, three important mismatches between the machine and the living human will be considered. Experience, agency and plasticity of human being are excluded in the scientific models and research activities when they are situated in the machine paradigm. For this reason, I claim that the machine paradigm does not offer the relevant frame for integrating results from various domains or approaches within human sciences, even if it can sometimes produce relevant scientific knowledge in certain domain at the scale of detailed investigation. Due to the importance of overcoming the fragmentation of scientific knowledge to solve the crisis in psychology, an “organic paradigm” should be elaborated which provides a new epistemological framework.     

Zu Einem Methodologischen Interpretationskonstruktionismus

Interpretari necesse est (Interpretation is necessary). This slogan is summarizing the methodological and epistemological essay concentrating on what can be called a transcendental interpretationism and a methodological interpretationism. This approach is combining a pragmatic interpretive approach with a constitutional quasi Kantian but more pluralistic and flexible epistemology. It takes up the assets of Nietzsches radical interpretationism without ending up in an interpretationist idealism. Though a basic fundamental insight is a statement of the interpretation-impragnatedness of any knowledge and experience whatsoever, there is nevertheless a possibility to combine a kind of critical realism with this interpretationist approach. Though we are always obliged to use interpretation-dependent epistemological schemata and concepts as well as theories (we have no non-interpretive concepts, theories and ways of gaining and constructing knowledge), we have still, for practical reasons, to presuppose an external independent world which can however only be described in interpretation-dependent terms. Even this epistemological model is certainly an interpretive one. If we distinguish between different levels of more or less variable interpretations (we cannot, by our very biological constitution, change primary interpretations built in to our biological constitution and make-up of sense-organs etc.), we can analyse and define truth as a relation between different levels and types of interpretations. The ideal of truth makes some sense of a concept of correspondence, though in the last analysis it is a combination of coherence-theoretical and pragmatic-constructivist ideas. — The model of an epistemological interpretationism has the advantage (by contradistinction, e.g., with critical rationalism) to be consistently applied to itself: The interpretive epistemology is certainly but an interpretational model itself. — The sketched interpretationism has certain similarities with Nelson Goodman's constructive interpretive pluralism and Hilary Putnam's internal realism, although there are slight, but decisive differences to be carefully observed. The differences have to do with the mentioned practical realism and the presupposition of one world in which we live. The similarities are greater with respect to internal realism. A decisive difference is only that you cannot, according to methodological and transcendental interpretationism, compel somebody towards the uniqueness of language use. There are always degrees of freedom and variation to change the usage of signs. There is no socially intended uniqueness and compulsory usage of signs and their meanings. Even within the language community the rules are always only conventionally realized and actualized. There is no real correspondence between signs and signs (or interpretive constructs, for that matter). Any correspondence whatsoever can only refer to interpretational constructs itself. Any classification, verification, selection and identification of facts, even any thinking of data and facts as such is in the last analysis dependent on interpretations. Even the conception of an epistemological subject is but an interpretational construct on a higher level.     

Argumentation,epistemology and the sociology of language

Both the sociology of knowledge and the philosophy of science are centrally concerned with the succession of scientific beliefs. In case studies of scientific debates, however, the emphasis tends to be placed on the outcome of disputes. This paper proposes that attention should instead be focused on the process of debate: that is, on scientific argumentation. It is shown how such a focus circumvents many traditional epistemological problems concerning the truth-status of scientific knowledge. By reference to the consensus conception of truth, it is claimed that scientific arguments can be studied naturalistically whilst still honouring the orientation towards truth exhibited by scientists. Finally, the paper offers a brief résumé of recent studies indicating how this naturalistic study of scientific argumentation can be developed through the sociology of language.     

西方心理学中的现代主义、后现代主义及其超越

当代西方心理学中存在着现代主义取向和后现代主义取向的对立和冲突。冯特以来的西方心理学流派大多属于现代主义的范畴。现代主义的特征是：(1)重视科学的价值,强调科学的方法;(2)信奉经验主义;(3)个体的中心地位。后现代主义取向的核心是社会建构主义,其主要特征为：(1)批判的倾向,对现代心理学的理论基础进行解构;(2)把社会建构论作为认识论的基础;(3)促进心理学实践的四个转变。尽管两种倾向形成鲜明的对照,但两者也存在着一些共同的方面,从而构成了超越两者的基础。两种取向的超越需要以科学实在论作为元理论的基础,并需要双方互补、合作和开放的态度。     

Pierre Duhem's the aim and structure of physical theory: A book against conventionalism

I reject the widely held view that Duhem's 1906 book La Théorie physique is a statement of instrumentalistic conventionalism, motivated by the scientific crisis at the end of the nineteenth century. By considering Duhem's historical context I show that his epistemological views were already formed before the crisis occured; that he consistently supported general thermodynamics against the new atomism; and that he rejected the epistemological views of the latter's philosophical supporters. In particular I show that Duhem rejected Poincaré's account of scientific language, Le Roy's view that laws are definitions, and the conventionalist's use of simplicity as the criterion of theory choice. Duhem regarded most theory choices as decidable on empirical grounds, but made historical context the main determining factor in scientific change.     

Reply to Comments

We will respond to our commentators individually, but the order of our responses follows naturally from the issues they bring up. Judea Pearl describes SEM's unfortunate retreat from the clear causal semantics articulated by Sewall Wright (1921) and later by Haavelmo (1943) to the algebraic interpretation preferred more recently by econometricians. We agree with Pearl about the history and also the problem, namely that the algebraic interpretation is suitable for estimation but expressively too weak to even distinguish among competing causal claims. Here we try to elaborate on the distinction between the semantics of a causal SEM and the epistemological connections between statistical data, background knowledge, and causal structure. We argue that many modern critics of SEM make their hay by conflating this distinction. Having tried to make it clear, we then turn to the assumptions that give the epistemological issues their structure, namely the Causal Independence and Faithfulness assumptions. Jim Woodward questions these assumptions at length, especially the Causal Independence assumption, and we spend the second part of our response defending it. Phil Wood seems to accept the fundamental assumptions upon which TETRAD rests, and even the utility of tools like it, but he brings out a wide array of subtle difficulties that we have not had time to discuss, some of which we now cover. Kwok-fai Ting questions the utility of any specification search done by computer, and we attempt to address his concerns last.     

对心理理论两成分认知模型的验证

Tager-Flusberg 和 Sullivan（2000）从主体信息加工的角度出发首次提出了一个心理理论模型,认为心理理论包括两个成分：一个是社会知觉成分,一个是社会认知成分。本研究设计了一个适合儿童特点的测查社会知觉成分的任务,将对心理理论两成分模型作进一步的验证,并对语言和心理理论两个成分的关系进行了初步探讨。被试为90名3~5岁的儿童,男女各半。结果表明心理理论的认知成分同语言相关密切,而知觉成分同语言没有表现出明显的相关。这个结果为该认知模型提供了进一步的证据     

Lehrer on consciousness

Keith Lehrer distinguishes three kinds of questions about consciousness: scientific questions, metaphysical questions, and epistemological questions. He leaves the scientific questions to the scientists. He articulates and answers the peculiar epistemological questions posed by consciousness. And he boldly contends that no metaphysical questions about consciousness remain, once the epistemological questions have been answered. This is an astonishing claim. What happened to the metaphysical questions? Were they pseudo-questions? Were they epistemological questions masquerading as metaphysical ones? And isn??t it possible that Lehrer??s epistemological account of consciousness raises metaphysical questions of its own? I will argue that Lehrer??s account of consciousness does leave a metaphysical remainder. To deal with this remainder, Lehrer could try to expand his explanatory framework??but this would involve to a substantial revision of his current views. I end with a speculative proposal that might allow Lehrer acknowledge all the points raised in this paper, but without forcing him to revise his account of consciousness in a substantial way.     

The mobile frontiers of Piaget’s psychology. From academic tourism to interdisciplinary collaboration / Las fronteras móviles de la psicología de Piaget. Del turismo académico a la colaboración interdisciplinaria

Jean Piaget’s (1896–1980) interdisciplinarity was related to his psychology in several ways. First, he was a simple tourist of other fields: an interested outsider. But as he became increasingly involved in the professionalization of the discipline, he moved through different contexts that constrained the possibilities for successful action in new and different ways. To make these clear, we adopt a little-known aspect of his later epistemological framework: the open hierarchy of levels. This then affords new perspectives of his life, his work, his theory and his location in the history of both Swiss psychology and French psychology. It also outlines his reasoning regarding the necessity of a disciplined approach to interdisciplinary collaboration, institutionalized in the founding of his International Centre for Genetic Epistemology. We therefore come not only to a fuller understanding of how Piaget thought scientific knowledge develops, but also of how the boundaries of scientific disciplines are pushed back.     

Epistemological Restraint—Revisited

THOMAS NAGEL has argued that 'true liberalism' excludes appeals to conceptions of the good in political argument. According to Nagel, liberalism's impartiality is grounded not in skepticism but, rather, in its commitment to 'epistemological restraint.' As he puts it, 'We accept a kind of epistemological division between the private and the public domains: in certain contexts I am constrained to consider my beliefs merely as beliefs rather than as truths, however convinced I may be that they are true , and that I know it.' Nagel's notion of epistemological restraint has been roundly criticized by perfectionist liberals and advocates of liberal neutrality alike. In fact, even Nagel has come to reject the epistemological argument—in part, because of the epistemological asymmetry that it presupposes. In this paper, I offer an answer to Nagel's critics, one that makes the notion of epistemological asymmetry coherent. In so doing, I show how to defend liberal neutrality without embracing skepticism. I structure the paper in the following way: Section II lays out the critique of epistemological restraint; Section III defends the coherence of this notion; and Section IV considers an objection to the analysis developed in Section III.     

Max Webers Wertfreiheitspostulat und die naturalistische Begründung von Normen

Max Weber's postulate of value-neutrality and the naturalistic justification of norms. The relationship between facts and values is an essential problem in philosophy, political science and sociology. Usually it is held that there is a wide gap between what is and what ought to be, the nature of which, however, is far from clear. My purpose is to elucidate this relationship by analyzing some well-known articles of Max Weber. I first present Weber's postulate of ‘value-neutrality’ and outline the reasons he gave for it. Then I proceed by examining Weber's scientific methodology, arguing that its presuppositions contradict the existence of a hiatus irrationalis between facts and values. This conclusion is supported by some historical examples which show that facts are constituted by values and values by facts. I propose that Weber's epistemological justification of value-neutrality be discarded in favor of a pragmatic one that can also be derived from his arguments. I conclude by sketching the outline of a naturalistic approach in philosophy and related disciplines. This approach admits the continuity of facts and values and provides a realistic view of every-day normative disputes. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.