Vocational choice: A decision making perspective

We propose a model of vocational choice that can be used for analyzing and guiding the decision processes underlying career and job choices. Our model is based on research in behavioral decision making (BDM), in particular the choice goals framework developed by Bettman, Luce, and Payne (1998). The basic model involves two major processes. First, the selection of a decision strategy according to four choice goals: maximizing decision accuracy, minimizing cognitive effort, minimizing negative emotion, and maximizing justifiability of the decision. Second, the construction of situation-specific preferences, which can reflect irrelevant task and context factors such as the evaluation mode. This basic model is extended to account for social influences and the long decision time typical of most career and job decisions. We review research on vocational choice in light of this model, discuss normative implications for counseling, and outline a research agenda for studying vocational choice from a behavioral decision making perspective.     

决策中的延迟选择行为

延迟选择(choice deferral)指个体在应该作出选择的时候却决定不作选择,包括推迟选择(如选择延迟选项)或拒绝在可选项中选择一个选项。本文首先探讨了影响延迟选择行为的认知因素和情绪因素;随后讨论了当在决策情景中引入延迟选项时,延迟选项对决策者随后情绪体验和决策行为的影响;最后对未来研究进行了展望。     

Inaction inertia

Inaction inertia occurs when bypassing an initial action opportunity has the effect of decreasing the likelihood that subsequent similar action opportunities will be taken. This overview of the inaction inertia literature demonstrates the impact of inaction inertia on decision making. Based on research on the causes of inaction inertia, we show that it is a multi-determined phenomenon, explained by both valuation and regret considerations. Moreover, we demonstrate how a sour grapes explanation of inaction inertia might integrate these two accounts. Furthermore, we explain when inaction inertia is most likely to occur and how it can be prevented. We conclude that the inaction inertia literature does not only add to our understanding of this intriguing phenomenon, but also contributes to related social psychological phenomena, such as the sunk cost effect, sequential decision making, decision avoidance (e.g., choice deferral, status quo bias, decisional conflict), and procrastination.     

不确定性容忍度、损益概率及延迟风险对延迟选择的影响

研究通过两个实验考查了不确定性容忍度及相关变量对延迟选择的影响,其中实验1采用2（不确定性容忍度：高/低）×2（概率水平：高/中）被试间实验设计;研究2将实验任务设定在有延迟风险情景下中等概率水平,采用单因素（不确定性容忍度：高/低）被试间实验设计.实验1结果表明：不确定性容忍度与概率水平存在交互作用：中等概率时,低容忍度个体比高容忍度个体更偏好延迟选择,高概率时,两者的延迟选择无显著差异,都偏好于选择决策.实验2结果表明：在有延迟风险中等概率时,高、低容忍度个体的决策偏好无显著差异,都偏好选择决策.结论：不确定性容忍度对延迟选择存在影响且受概率水平和延迟风险的调节.     

MDFT account of decision making under time pressure

In this paper, decision making under time pressure for multiattribute choice alternatives in a risky environment is investigated. A model, multiattribute decision field theory (MDFT), is introduced that describes both the dynamic and the stochastic nature of decision making and accounts for the observed changes in choice probabilities, including preference reversals as a function of time limit. An experiment in which five different time limits were imposed on the decision maker is presented to test the predictions of the model. It is shown that MDFT is able to account for the complex decision behavior observed in the data. Furthermore, MDFT is compared with the predictions of decision field theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Roe, Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001).     

Comparing perceptual and preferential decision making

Perceptual and preferential decision making have been studied largely in isolation. Perceptual decisions are considered to be at a non–deliberative cognitive level and have an outside criterion that defines the quality of decisions. Preferential decisions are considered to be at a higher cognitive level and the quality of decisions depend on the decision maker’s subjective goals. Besides these crucial differences, both types of decisions also have in common that uncertain information about the choice situation has to be processed before a decision can be made. The present work aims to acknowledge the commonalities of both types of decision making to lay bare the crucial differences. For this aim we examine perceptual and preferential decisions with a novel choice paradigm that uses the identical stimulus material for both types of decisions. This paradigm allows us to model the decisions and response times of both types of decisions with the same sequential sampling model, the drift diffusion model. The results illustrate that the different incentive structure in both types of tasks changes people’s behavior so that they process information more efficiently and respond more cautiously in the perceptual as compared to the preferential task. These findings set out a perspective for further integration of perceptual and preferential decision making in a single ramework.     

The lack of dominance and choice deferral: Choosing to defer to cope with the feeling of being out of control

The present study aimed to explore whether emotional dominance can also account for choice deferral. This research manipulated emotional dominance through the difference in attractiveness among current alternatives in Experiment 1 and the readability of fonts for describing current options in Experiment 2, to investigate the role of dominance in choice deferral. The results revealed that increasingly submissive decision environments were related to more choice of deferral options. Mediation analyses indicated that dominance could mediate the effects of experimental manipulations on choice deferral, and that the actual choice of a deferral option was associated with more increase in dominance of retrospective emotion. The results indicate that dominance plays an important role in choice deferral and that choosing to defer can minimize the explicit confrontation of being out of control.     

Preference for oddity: uniqueness heuristic or hierarchical choice process?

Traditional economic theories assume decision makers in multialternative choice tasks "assign" a value to each option and then express rational preferences. Here, I report an apparent violation of such rationality in gray jays (Perisoreus canadensis). I tested the jays' preference in a quaternary choice task where three options were the same color and the fourth option was a different color. All options offered an identical food reward and so the strictly rational expectation was that subjects would choose the odd-colored option in 25% of choices. In clear disagreement, every subject chose the odd option more frequently than expected. I speculate as to how this surprising preference for oddity might have been ecologically rational: by using a unique-choice heuristic, the jays might have been able to bypass a deliberative phase of the decision process and devote more attention to scanning for predators. Alternatively, it is conceivable that the jays did not prefer oddity per se. Instead, they might have used a hierarchical process, assigning options to color categories and then choosing between categories. If so, their behavior matches expectation after all (on average, subjects chose the odd option 50% of the time). It should be straightforward to test these competing hypotheses. The current results can be viewed as a new example of how simple mechanisms sometimes produce economically puzzling yet ecologically rational decision making.     

Single-process versus multiple-strategy models of decision making: Evidence from an information intrusion paradigm

When decision makers are confronted with different problems and situations, do they use a uniform mechanism as assumed by single-process models (SPMs) or do they choose adaptively from a set of available decision strategies as multiple-strategy models (MSMs) imply? Both frameworks of decision making have gathered a lot of support, but only rarely have they been contrasted with each other. Employing an information intrusion paradigm for multi-attribute decisions from givens, SPM and MSM predictions on information search, decision outcomes, attention, and confidence judgments were derived and tested against each other in two experiments. The results consistently support the SPM view: Participants seemingly using a “take-the-best” (TTB) strategy do not ignore TTB-irrelevant information as MSMs would predict, but adapt the amount of information searched, choose alternative choice options, and show varying confidence judgments contingent on the quality of the “irrelevant” information. The uniformity of these findings underlines the adequacy of the novel information intrusion paradigm and comprehensively promotes the notion of a uniform decision making mechanism as assumed by single-process models.     

The response dynamics of preferential choice

The ubiquity of psychological process models requires an increased degree of sophistication in the methods and metrics that we use to evaluate them. We contribute to this venture by capitalizing on recent work in cognitive science analyzing response dynamics, which shows that the bearing information processing dynamics have on intended action is also revealed in the motor system. This decidedly “embodied” view suggests that researchers are missing out on potential dependent variables with which to evaluate their models—those associated with the motor response that produces a choice. The current work develops a method for collecting and analyzing such data in the domain of decision making. We first validate this method using widely normed stimuli from the International Affective Picture System (Experiment 1), and demonstrate that curvature in response trajectories provides a metric of the competition between choice options. We next extend the method to risky decision making (Experiment 2) and develop predictions for three popular classes of process model. The data provided by response dynamics demonstrate that choices contrary to the maxim of risk seeking in losses and risk aversion in gains may be the product of at least one “online” preference reversal, and can thus begin to discriminate amongst the candidate models. Finally, we incorporate attentional data collected via eye-tracking (Experiment 3) to develop a formal computational model of joint information sampling and preference accumulation. In sum, we validate response dynamics for use in preferential choice tasks and demonstrate the unique conclusions afforded by response dynamics over and above traditional methods.     

Decision by sampling: The role of the decision environment in risky choice

Decision by sampling (DbS) is a theory about how our environment shapes the decisions that we make. Here, I review the application of DbS to risky decision making. According to classical theories of risky decision making, people make stable transformations between outcomes and probabilities and their subjective counterparts using fixed psychoeconomic functions. DbS offers a quite different account. In DbS, the subjective value of an outcome or probability is derived from a series of binary, ordinal comparisons with a sample of other outcomes or probabilities from the decision environment. In this way, the distribution of attribute values in the environment determines the subjective valuations of outcomes and probabilities. I show how DbS interacts with the real-world distributions of gains, losses, and probabilities to produce the classical psychoeconomic functions. I extend DbS to account for preferences in benchmark data sets. Finally, in a challenge to the classical notion of stable subjective valuations, I review evidence that manipulating the distribution of attribute values in the environment changes our subjective valuations just as DbS predicts.     

Goal-directed decision making as probabilistic inference: a computational framework and potential neural correlates

Recent work has given rise to the view that reward-based decision making is governed by two key controllers: a habit system, which stores stimulus-response associations shaped by past reward, and a goal-oriented system that selects actions based on their anticipated outcomes. The current literature provides a rich body of computational theory addressing habit formation, centering on temporal-difference learning mechanisms. Less progress has been made toward formalizing the processes involved in goal-directed decision making. We draw on recent work in cognitive neuroscience, animal conditioning, cognitive and developmental psychology, and machine learning to outline a new theory of goal-directed decision making. Our basic proposal is that the brain, within an identifiable network of cortical and subcortical structures, implements a probabilistic generative model of reward, and that goal-directed decision making is effected through Bayesian inversion of this model. We present a set of simulations implementing the account, which address benchmark behavioral and neuroscientific findings, and give rise to a set of testable predictions. We also discuss the relationship between the proposed framework and other models of decision making, including recent models of perceptual choice, to which our theory bears a direct connection.     

Working Hard to Take the Easy Way Out: How the Need for Cognitive Closure Shapes Strategic Effort Investment to Ease Future Decision Making

Consumers make countless decisions each day that force them to determine the amount of effort they are willing to invest into the decision process. Due to their desire for immediate resolution and propensity to seize upon available options, individuals high in the need for cognitive closure make decisions that are traditionally associated with reduced effort investment. Counter to this traditional perspective, this research demonstrates that those seeking closure strategically invest effort into the decision process, so long as the initial effort investment is expected to simplify similar decisions in the future. Three experiments demonstrate that those motivated by closure put forth greater effort when they expect to repeat the decision (Experiment 1) and in contexts where a justifiable choice option is not readily available (Experiment 2). Furthermore, this effort investment is shown to payoff in terms of streamlining subsequent decision making (Experiment 3). These findings detail the strategic use of effort by those seeking closure to ease future decision making and thus provide a conceptual framework for when and why those seeking closure allocate effort in decision making.     

Erroneous choice and foregone gains in hoarding gray jays (Perisoreus canadensis)

Under the conventional assumption that natural selection favors choice behavior that maximizes some fitness-related currency, a forager making repeated binary choices should consistently choose the more valuable option. Under the alternative assumption that natural selection favors choice behavior that minimizes costly errors, erroneous choice is not only expected but is expected to be common when the cost of errors is low. This cost depends on the potential rate of return: the higher this rate, the smaller the cost of choosing the less valuable option. When this rate is very high, a forager may err frequently and yet forego no appreciable fitness gain. Errors should thus be more common when interruptions to foraging are shorter. Our experimental results supported this prediction: gray jays chose the less valuable option more frequently when subjected to shorter interruptions (experimentally imposed delays to access to food rewards). This tendency is consistent with the idea that an adaptive decision-making process may routinely produce errors, not because errors are in some way adaptive but because their fitness cost is minimal, particularly when delays are short. From a proximate perspective, this tendency to commit errors more frequently following shorter delays may be due to constraints on the jays’ information-processing capacity. In general, choice behavior should be viewed as the joint byproduct of adaptive decision making and cognitive constraints. Received: 8 June 2000 / Accepted after revision: 21 October 2000     

Rapid decisions from experience

In many everyday decisions, people quickly integrate noisy samples of information to form a preference among alternatives that offer uncertain rewards. Here, we investigated this decision process using the Flash Gambling Task (FGT), in which participants made a series of choices between a certain payoff and an uncertain alternative that produced a normal distribution of payoffs. For each choice, participants experienced the distribution of payoffs via rapid samples updated every 50 ms. We show that people can make these rapid decisions from experience and that the decision process is consistent with a sequential sampling process. Results also reveal a dissociation between these preferential decisions and equivalent perceptual decisions where participants had to determine which alternatives contained more dots on average. To account for this dissociation, we developed a sequential sampling rank-dependent utility model, which showed that participants in the FGT attended more to larger potential payoffs than participants in the perceptual task despite being given equivalent information. We discuss the implications of these findings in terms of computational models of preferential choice and a more complete understanding of experience-based decision making.     

偶然情绪对延迟选择的影响机制

本研究旨在探讨偶然情绪对延迟选择的影响及影响机制。本研究包括两个实验, 在被试进行决策前, 分别采用图片和短片诱发其与当前决策任务无关的偶然情绪, 然后要求被试完成选择任务, 并从决策结果和决策过程两个角度考察偶然情绪对延迟选择的影响及影响机制。结果发现, 当可选项中不存在1个优势选项时, 与正性情绪相比, 个体在负性情绪下会更倾向于延迟选择, 而个体对决策信息的加工深度在偶然情绪对延迟选择的影响中具有中介作用。这可能是因为相比于正性情绪, 个体在负性情绪下会采用更深入的加工策略, 增加了决策难度, 进而提高了个体的延迟选择倾向。     

Banking on a bad bet. Probability matching in risky choice is linked to expectation generation

Probability matching is the tendency to match choice probabilities to outcome probabilities in a binary prediction task. This tendency is a long-standing puzzle in the study of decision making under risk and uncertainty, because always predicting the more probable outcome across a series of trials (maximizing) would yield greater predictive accuracy and payoffs. In three experiments, we tied the predominance of probability matching over maximizing to a generally adaptive cognitive operation that generates expectations regarding the aggregate outcomes of an upcoming sequence of events. Under conditions designed to diminish the generation or perceived applicability of such expectations, we found that the frequency of probability-matching behavior dropped substantially and maximizing became the norm.     

Attention in risky choice

Previous research on the processes involved in risky decisions has rarely linked process data to choice directly. We used a simple measure based on the relative amount of attentional deployment to different components (gains/losses and their probabilities) of a risky gamble during the choice process, and we related this measure to the actual choice. In an experiment we recorded the decisions, decision times, and eye movements of 80 participants who made decisions on 11 choice problems. We used the number of eye fixations and fixation transitions to trace the deployment of attention during the choice process and obtained the following main results. First, different components of a gamble attracted different amounts of attention depending on participants' actual choice. This was reflected in both the number of fixations and the fixation transitions. Second, the last-fixated gamble but not the last-fixated reason predicted participants' choices. Third, a comparison of data obtained with eye tracking and data obtained with verbal protocols from a previous study showed a large degree of convergence regarding the process of risky choice. Together these findings tend to support dimensional decision strategies such as the priority heuristic.