Searching for Sharks and a Second Self

Twenty years ago, Pastoral Psychology published “The Extra Mile—Case History of a Homicide” (Moss, Pastoral Psychology 42:107–136, 1993, p.134). In that autobiographical vignette, I argued that pastoral theology has a responsibility to: “1) articulate contemporary ultimate concerns, 2) clarify healthy avenues for compensation, and 3) tell stories about the hopeful revelations of God’s providence in a broken world” (Moss, Pastoral Psychology 42:107–136, 1993, p.134). This story illustrates all three of these points by recording a psychological fragmentation and restoration resulting from the death of a dear friend—“a friend who sticks closer than a brother” (Prov. 18:24). Aristotle referred to this type of friend as “a second self.” In the Celtic church such a person was anam cara, a Gaelic expression for “soul friend.” A few years ago I lost such a friend to cancer. During my grieving process I created a private tribute from our unfulfilled wish to go on one more adventure together—specifically, a shark hunt. The capture and release of sharks is a unique extreme sport. It is also the vehicle by which I finally resolved my grief: I reunited with my second self by means of an image in the eye of a requiem shark, a reflection of anam cara. The interrelated layers of this occurrence—particularly its coincidences—evidence Providence, as well as provide an example of a “Contact with the Dead Experience” described by Andrew Greeley and myself some 20 years ago in the Journal of Religion and Health (Moss, Journal of Religion and Health 29:261–283, 1990).     

Is Nanotechnology Giving Rise to New Ethical Problems?

In this paper I focus on the question of whether nanotechnology is giving rise to new ethical problems rather than merely to new instances of old ethical problems. Firstly, I demonstrate how important it is to make a general distinction between new ethical problems and new instances of old problems. Secondly, I propose one possible way of interpreting the distinction and offer a definition of a “new ethical problem”. Thirdly, I examine whether there is good reason to claim that nanotechnology is giving or will give rise to new ethical problems. My conclusion is that there are no new ethical problems in nanotechnology but merely new occurrences of certain well-known types of ethical problems. Fourthly, I consider three arguments by van de Poel (NanoEthics 2:25–28, 2008) which contradict my conclusion. I argue that my negative conclusion is consistent with the claim that certain ethical issues arising in nanotechnology may require new normative standards or new analytical tools. I conclude that it is likely that a number of ethical issues arising in nanotechnology will have a considerable impact on our ethical theories and values – and that ethical reflection on nanotechnology will be one of the mother lodes of future ethical research – in spite of the fact that no ethical problem in nanoethics will actually be “new”.     

Rule Consequentialism and the Problem of Partial Acceptance

Most plausible moral theories must address problems of partial acceptance or partial compliance. The aim of this paper is to examine some proposed ways of dealing with partial acceptance problems as well as to introduce a new Rule Utilitarian suggestion. Here I survey three forms of Rule Utilitarianism, each of which represents a distinct approach to solving partial acceptance issues. I examine Fixed Rate, Variable Rate, and Optimum Rate Rule Utilitarianism, and argue that a new approach, Maximizing Expectation Rate Rule Utilitarianism, better solves partial acceptance problems.     

Oppy,infinity, and the neoclassical concept of God

In this article I concentrate on three issues. First, Graham Oppy’s treatment of the relationship between the concept of infinity and Zeno’s paradoxes lay bare several porblems that must be dealt with if the concept of infinity is to do any intellectual work in philosophy of religion. Here I will expand on some insightful remarks by Oppy in an effort ot adequately respond to these problems. Second, I will do the same regarding Oppy’s treatment of Kant’s first antinomy in the first critique, which deals in part with the question of whether the world had a beginning in time or if time extends infinitely into the past. And third, my examination of these two issues will inform what I have to say regarding a key topic in philosophy of religion: the question regarding the proper relationship between the infinite and the finite in the concept of God.     

Some Reflections on Erikson’s Ninth Stage of Life: Introduction to the Panel on Aging

In my introduction to these three papers on the experience of aging, I begin with my observations on aging in the 9th Stage of Life (a stage added by Erik Erickson in 1984, when he himself was nearing death) by talking about my own aging, 87-year-old husband whose end of life included changes in himself that no one who knew him, including himself, would have predicted. Following these thoughts I review the excellent essays that follow, which take the perspectives of aging from both personal and professional perspectives.     

On the Christian in Christian bioethics.

What is Christian about Christian bioethics? And is an authentically Christian bioethics a practical possibility in the world in which we find ourselves? In my essay I argue that personhood and the personal are so fundamental to the Christian understanding of our humanity that body, soul, and spirit are probably best understood as the components of a triune (as opposed to dual) aspect theory of personhood. To confess to a Christian bioethics is to admit that Christians cannot pretend fully to understand either cures or their meaning. However effective and "knowledge-based" contemporary medical interventions are, a Christian must humbly and honestly confess a lack of complete knowledge on both levels. At the same time, a Christian bioethicist must express a total personal commitment to Christian Faith.     

Theological Reflections

[In January 1960 a meeting at the premises of the London Society of Analytical Psychology was convened to discuss the relation of analytical psychology to theology. It was given the provocative title "Who shall have the last word: psychologist or theologian?"; the aim was to stimulate debate. Kenneth Lambert was to open and Victor White was to be one of the discussants. So as to forward the discussion, Lambert sent Victor White a number of questions and his answers to them were to follow. To the great regret of everybody Fr. White could not be present at the meeting owing to ill health, but at my request he sent me his replies and agreed to allow their publication. They raise a number of interesting issues and it is hoped that they may promote further discussion in these pages. Editor .]     

“I Hope That I Have Not Upset Youexcl;” Reclaiming a Pastoral Voice: Theoretical Exploration Upon a Practical Case

Pastoral care is enhanced by a diversity of pastoral perspectives. This paper presents a case that contains salient pastoral care issues. Conversing with this case, I examine four different pastoral orientations in order to discuss how each uniquely interprets and evaluates the human predicament. The chosen perspectives are psychoanalysis, existential theology, process theology, and Asian theology. I conclude that the inclusion of different perspectives, rather than overwhelm the pastoral caregiver, widen the lens through which we interpret and respond to the particular needs of others.     

At the Point of Death—A Case Study

In 1979 Pastoral Psychology published my first autobiographical case study: the story of a near-fatal automobile accident, collateral damage of a high speed police chase in downtown Chicago. Providence was evident in my survival of that collision, as well as in the present case study: a massive heart attack during a psychotherapy session in 2001. By comparing these two crises, I find that I must call into focus a psychological propensity: if a near-fatal experience occurs from the “outside in” (e.g. automobile accident), guilt may well surface as the emotion of conflict; but if a near-fatal experience occurs from the “inside out” (e.g. heart attack), the emotion of conflict may emerge as shame. In the former the body is assaulted; in the latter it revolts.     

(Inadvertently) Instructing Missionaries in (Public University) World Religions Courses: Examining a Pedagogical Dilemma,its Dimensions,and a Course Section Solution

In this article, I explore an ethical and pedagogical dilemma that I encounter each semester in my world religions courses: namely, that a great number of students enroll in the courses as part of their missionary training programs, and come to class understanding successful learning to mean gathering enough information about the world's religious “traditions” so as to effectively seduce people out of them. How should we teach world religions – in public university religious studies courses – with this student constituency? What are/ought to be our student learning goals? What can and should we expect to accomplish? How can we maximize student learning, while also maintaining our disciplinary integrity? In response to these questions, I propose a world religions course module, the goal of which is for students to examine – as objects of inquiry – the lenses through which they understand religion(s). With a recognition of their own lenses, I argue, missionary students become more aware of the biases and presumptions about others that they bring to the table, and they learn to see the ways in which these presumptions inform what they see and know about others, and also what they do not so easily see.     

A REPLY TO ANNE KULL,EDUARDO CRUZ,AND MICHAEL DeLASHMUTT

In my reply to the essays by Anne Kull, Eduardo Cruz, and Michael DeLashmutt, I turn first to Cruz's charge that my use of “the sacred” is at odds with a growing religious studies mainstream that understands religion in secular terms. I suggest that this latter approach has its own problems, deriving partly from its neglect of the political, constructed nature of the category of “religion.” Second, in relation to Cruz's suggestion that my lack of attention to explanation compromises my claim to be social scientific, I defend a broader understanding of the human sciences and explore the relationships between understanding, critique, and history, and between sociology and theology. Third, reflecting on DeLashmutt's suggestion that I neglect the way that technical invention provides a glimpse of divine creativity, and the myth making that goes on around technology in vehicles such as science fiction, I argue that such issues have to be approached in a radically historical way. I conclude by identifying three challenges: to explore more deeply how technological objects form part of human being‐in‐the‐world, to show how my approach might offer practical resources for assessing technological and environmental developments, and to expand my analysis to include non‐Western religious traditions.     

Propositional unity: what’s the problem, who has it and who solves it?

At least since Russell’s influential discussion in The Principles of Mathematics, many philosophers have held there is a problem that they call the problem of the unity of the proposition. In a recent paper, I argued that there is no single problem that alone deserves the epithet the problem of the unity of the proposition. I there distinguished three problems or questions, each of which had some right to be called a problem regarding the unity of the proposition; and I showed how the account of propositions formulated in my book The Nature and Structure of Content [2007 Oxford University Press] solves each of these problems. In the present paper, I take up two of these problems/questions yet again. For I want to consider other accounts of propositions and compare their solutions to these problems, or lack thereof, to mine. I argue that my account provides the best solutions to the unity problems.     

Differential Diagnosis in Older Adults: Dementia,Depression, and Delirium

Research shows that misdiagnosis can have particularly damaging consequences in older adults. It is frequently difficult, however, to determine whether observed symptoms are due to aging or to a medical condition. The author examines three common disorders that can be particularly challenging to diagnose in older adults: dementia, depression, and delirium. Three general questions are discussed for each: What are the age-related differences in the disorder's presentation? What medical issues need to be ruled out? What assessment methods are particularly useful in the diagnostic process?     

Who Do We Treat First When Resources Are Scarce?

In a health service with limited resources we must make decisions about who to treat first. In this paper I develop a version of the restoration argument according to which those whose need for resources is a consequence of their voluntary choices should receive lower priority when it comes to health care. I then consider three possible problems for this argument based on those that have been raised against other theories of this type: that we don't know in a particular case that the illness is self‐inflicted, that it seems that all illness is self‐inflicted in the sense used in my argument, and finally that this type of approach incorporates an unacceptable moralising element if it is to avoid giving those like fire‐fighters a lower priority for treatment. I argue that the position outlined here has the resources to respond to each of these objections.     

In Defence of Direct Realism

In her careful consideration of my book, The Problem of Perception (henceforth, PP), Susanna Siegel highlights what she takes to be a number of shortcomings in the work. First, she suggests that a sense-datum theorist has two options–what she calls the "complex sense-data option" and the "two-factor option"–that survive the argument of my book unscathed. I consider these two options in the first two sections of this reply. Secondly, she criticizes my suggestion that there are three and only three basic and independent sources of perceptual consciousness: an issue I take up in my third section. Thirdly, she expresses reservations about my response to the argument from hallucination. In particular, she argues that the phenomenological considerations on which I put so much weight cannot settle the fundamental issue here. I address this criticism in the fourth section of this reply. Finally, she spends a certain amount of time discussing the notion of a "veridicality-rele-vant property", a topic to which I devote the concluding section of this reply.     

Reply to Barbara Pfeffer Billauer's "On Judaism and genes

The response of Barbara Pfeffer Billauer to my article "If I Am Only My Genes, What Am I? Genetic Essentialism and a Jewish Response" highlights the conflict between a sociological understanding of religion and the resistance to such analysis from within a faith tradition. Ms. Billauer makes three main points; the first strangely credits to me, and then attacks, an argument the article takes great pains to refute, but does so to emphasize the faith's prescient guidance in matters scientific. The second attempts to rebut my critical analysis of the tensions inhernet in Jewish views of the body with an insistence that Judaism so perfectly balances the relation between the sacred and profane that there is not now, and never was, the slightest tension between corporeality and divinity in the Jewish corpus. The third uses my article as vehicle for her to expound on an interesting but tangential formulation of three Jewish terms. In all, the need to defend her interpretation of Judaism's solutions to the problems the article raises results in un-self-critical and ahistorical theorizing, making the utility of her arguments in a discussion of the sociology of religion unsatisfactory.     

Two assessments, by and for the assessor

In this article, I describe 2 assessment experiences, 1 in graduate school and the other more recently, which taught me important personal lessons. Both of the experiences helped me grow as a psychologist and helped me in my own personal life as well. Both experiences dealt with highly personal central issues in my life; the first concerning the development of empathy and the second, important issues centering around aging and death.     

Irrelevant Cultural Influences on Belief

Recent work in psychology on ‘cultural cognition’ suggests that our cultural background drives our attitudes towards a range of politically contentious issues in science such as global warming. This work is part of a more general attempt to investigate the ways in which our wants, wishes and desires impact on our assessments of information, events and theories. Put crudely, the idea is that we confirm our assessments of the evidence for and against scientific theories with clear political relevance to our pre‐existing political beliefs and convictions. In this article, I explore the epistemological consequences of cultural cognition. What does it mean for the rationality of our beliefs about issues such as global warming? I argue for an unsettling conclusion. Not only are those on the ‘political right’ who reject the scientific consensus on issues like global warming unjustified in doing so, some of those on the ‘political left’ who accept the consensus are also unjustified in doing so. I finish by addressing the practical implications of my conclusions.