Emotion recognition in stroke patients with left and right hemispheric lesion: results with a new instrument-the FEEL Test

The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of a stroke event on people's ability to recognize basic emotions. In particular, the hypothesis that right brain-damaged (RBD) patients would show less of emotion recognition ability compared with left brain-damaged (LBD) patients and healthy controls, was tested. To investigate this the FEEL Test (Facially Expressed Emotion Labeling) was used, a computer based psychometric test that assesses one's ability to recognize facially displayed basic emotions via a forced-choice paradigm. We examined 24 patients after a stroke event (13 RBD, 11 LBD) and compared them with a matched group of healthy controls (HC, n=29). Results showed that the stroke patients performed significantly worse in the FEEL Test than did HC (p<.001). This deficit was especially evident for negative emotions (fear, anger, sadness, and disgust). In contrast to other studies we did not find any significant differences between RBD and LBD patients in their ability to recognize emotions. These results indicate that a stroke event has a negative effect on the recognition of facially displayed emotions but suggest that this effect is apparently not dependent on the side of the brain damage.     

A Cross‐Cultural Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Trainees’ Emotion‐Recognition Ability

This study investigated the ability of non‐Hispanic White U.S. counseling psychology trainees and Japanese clinical psychology trainees to recognize facially expressed emotions. Researchers proposed that an in‐group advantage for emotion recognition would occur, women would have higher emotion‐recognition accuracy than men, and participants would vary in their emotion‐intensity ratings. Sixty White U.S. students and 60 Japanese students viewed photographs of non‐Hispanic White U.S. and Japanese individuals expressing emotions and completed a survey assessing emotion‐recognition ability and emotion‐intensity ratings. Two four‐way mixed‐factor analyses of variance were performed, examining effects of participant nationality/race, participant gender, poser nationality/race, and poser gender on emotion‐recognition accuracy scores and intensity ratings. Results did not support the in‐group advantage hypothesis, rather, U.S. participants had higher accuracy rates than Japanese trainees overall. No gender differences in accuracy were found. However, respondents varied in their intensity ratings across gender and nationality. Implications for training applied psychology students and for future research are presented.     

Measuring the speed of recognising facially expressed emotions

Faces provide identity- and emotion-related information—basic cues for mastering social interactions. Traditional models of face recognition suggest that following a very first initial stage the processing streams for facial identity and expression depart. In the present study we extended our previous multivariate investigations of face identity processing abilities to the speed of recognising facially expressed emotions. Analyses are based on a sample of N=151 young adults. First, we established a measurement model with a higher order factor for the speed of recognising facially expressed emotions (SRE). This model has acceptable fit without specifying emotion-specific relations between indicators. Next, we assessed whether SRE can be reliably distinguished from the speed of recognising facial identity (SRI) and found latent factors for SRE and SRI to be perfectly correlated. In contrast, SRE and SRI were both only moderately related to a latent factor for the speed of recognising non-face stimuli (SRNF). We conclude that the processing of facial stimuli—and not the processing of facially expressed basic emotions—is the critical component of SRE. These findings are at variance with suggestions of separate routes for processing facial identity and emotional facial expressions and suggest much more communality between these streams as far as the aspect of processing speed is concerned.     

Measuring the speed of recognising facially expressed emotions

Faces provide identity- and emotion-related information-basic cues for mastering social interactions. Traditional models of face recognition suggest that following a very first initial stage the processing streams for facial identity and expression depart. In the present study we extended our previous multivariate investigations of face identity processing abilities to the speed of recognising facially expressed emotions. Analyses are based on a sample of N=151 young adults. First, we established a measurement model with a higher order factor for the speed of recognising facially expressed emotions (SRE). This model has acceptable fit without specifying emotion-specific relations between indicators. Next, we assessed whether SRE can be reliably distinguished from the speed of recognising facial identity (SRI) and found latent factors for SRE and SRI to be perfectly correlated. In contrast, SRE and SRI were both only moderately related to a latent factor for the speed of recognising non-face stimuli (SRNF). We conclude that the processing of facial stimuli-and not the processing of facially expressed basic emotions-is the critical component of SRE. These findings are at variance with suggestions of separate routes for processing facial identity and emotional facial expressions and suggest much more communality between these streams as far as the aspect of processing speed is concerned.     

Perceived gaze direction and the processing of facial displays of emotion

There is good reason to believe that gaze direction and facial displays of emotion share an information value as signals of approach or avoidance. The combination of these cues in the analysis of social communication, however, has been a virtually neglected area of inquiry. Two studies were conducted to test the prediction that direct gaze would facilitate the processing of facially communicated approach-oriented emotions (e.g., anger and joy), whereas averted gaze would facilitate the processing of facially communicated avoidance-oriented emotions (e.g., fear and sadness). The results of both studies confirmed the central hypothesis and suggest that gaze direction and facial expression are combined in the processing of emotionally relevant facial information.     

Children’s Evaluation and Categorization of Transgender Children

Despite extant evidence of negative peer treatment of transgender adolescents and adults, little is known about how young children perceive transgender peers, particularly those who have socially transitioned or are living in line with their gender rather than sex at birth. Whereas children have been shown to be averse to gender nonconformity in peers, because many transgender children appear and behave in ways consistent with their expressed gender (but not their sex at birth), it is unclear how children evaluate these identities. In 2 studies, we investigated 5- to 10-year-old children’s (N_total = 113) preferences for transgender versus gender-“typical” peers who either shared their gender identity or did not. We also examined whether children categorized transgender peers by their sex or expressed gender, as it might inform their evaluations. Children preferred cisgender peers over transgender peers; however, they also liked peers of their own gender rather than the other gender (e.g., female participants preferred girls over boys), demonstrating that the oft-documented own-gender bias plays an important role even when children are reasoning about transgender peers. Children did not reliably categorize transgender peers by sex or gender; yet those who categorized transgender peers by their sex showed greater dislike of transgender peers. The current studies are the first to investigate cisgender children’s attitudes toward transgender children and suggest that perceptions of gender categorization and conformity play a role in children’s evaluations of transgender peers.     

Is guilt an emotion?

Abstract

When unequivocal examples of emotion adjectives occur in the linguistic context of “being” (e.g. being angry) they can be seen to refer to emotions as readily as when they occur in the linguistic context of “feeling” (e.g. feeling angry). This is not true of poor 'or non-examples of emotion words. A psycholinguistic analysis of this phenomenon is proposed, in the light of which it is suggested that words such as “abandoned” and “guilty” do not refer to emotions. The possibility that the word “guilty” has a distinct emotional sense meaning “feeling guilty” is discussed, and the implications of this proposal for theories of emotions are examined. Also discussed are the implications of the inclusion of poor or non-examples of emotions in lists of “basic” emotions. Data are presented indicating that many of the states that emotion theorists have included as emotions, and in some cases as “basic” emotions, are not generally rated as such, and that they fail to exhibit the patterns using the feel-be test that characterise unequivocal examples. It is suggested that a problem in delimiting the domain of theories of emotions may reside in a confusion between emotions on the one hand, and their typical causes and concomitants on the other.     

The experience of emotions in everyday life

Abstract

A total of 47 employed adults were asked to record, in structured diaries, details of four episodes of emotion from the set that we regard as basic (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust) and also to note occurrences of other emotions not in this set. Subjects experienced an average of about one episode of consciously recognised emotion a day, and in rating intensities they said that 11% of episodes were as intense as they could imagine. Anger was the most frequent of the basic emotions, and disgust the least frequent. There were no significant differences in rates or intensities of basic emotions as a function of gender. We predicted 69% of these emotions correctly from the goal-relevant events that elicited them: happiness was typically caused by achievements, sadness by losses, anger by frustration, and fear by threat, but the causation of disgust was more difficult to identify. In 31% of episodes pairs of basic emotions occurred in mixtures. Positive emotions tended to help plans, while negative ones tended to hinder them.     

Cultural Variations in the Sexual Marketplace: Gender Equality Correlates With More Sexual Activity

ABSTRACT

Sexual economics theory assumes that heterosexual communities can be analyzed as marketplaces in which men offer women resources such as love, respect, money, and commitment in exchange for sex. In response to economic, political, and other disadvantages, women collectively restrict their sexuality to maintain a low supply relative to male demand, thereby ensuring a high price. Hence, we tested the hypothesis that sexual norms and practices would be more restrictive in countries marked by gender inequality than in countries where the genders were more equal. An international online sex survey (N>317,000) yielded four measures of sexual activity, and 37 nations' means on all four measures were correlated with independent (World Economic Forum) ratings of gender equality. Consistent with predictions, relatively high gender equality was associated with more casual sex, more sex partners per capita, younger ages for first sex, and greater tolerance/approval of premarital sex.     

Infra-humanization: Ambivalent sexism and the attribution of primary and secondary emotions to women

Leyens and colleagues (e.g., Leyens et al., 2001) have observed that people are more likely to attribute uniquely human (secondary) emotions to the in-group than to the out-group. We examined whether males and females differentially attribute primary and secondary emotions to women. We hypothesized that individual differences in hostile sexism (HS) and benevolent sexism (BS), rather than participant sex, would predict the attribution of emotions to women. As expected, high BS individuals were more likely to attribute positive secondary emotions to women than low BS individuals. In contrast, high HS individuals were more likely to deny positive secondary emotions to women than low HS individuals. Participant sex was not related to the attribution of emotions to women after the effects of HS and BS were accounted for.     

Proud Americans and lucky Japanese: cultural differences in appraisal and corresponding emotion

Appraisal theories of emotion propose that the emotions people experience correspond to their appraisals of their situation. In other words, individual differences in emotional experiences reflect differing interpretations of the situation. We hypothesized that in similar situations, people in individualist and collectivist cultures experience different emotions because of culturally divergent causal attributions for success and failure (i.e., agency appraisals). In a test of this hypothesis, American and Japanese participants recalled a personal experience (Study 1) or imagined themselves to be in a situation (Study 2) in which they succeeded or failed, and then reported their agency appraisals and emotions. Supporting our hypothesis, cultural differences in emotions corresponded to differences in attributions. For example, in success situations, Americans reported stronger self-agency emotions (e.g., proud) than did Japanese, whereas Japanese reported a stronger situation-agency emotion (lucky). Also, cultural differences in attribution and emotion were largely explained by differences in self-enhancing motivation. When Japanese and Americans were induced to make the same attribution (Study 2), cultural differences in emotions became either nonsignificant or were markedly reduced.     

Is Xunzi a utilitarian? Revisiting a disagreement

ABSTRACT

In Chinese scholarship, Xunzi is often regarded as an eclectic Confucian master who accepted some form of utilitarian thoughts (e.g. Fung Yu-lan, Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan). This characteristic was also observed by some western scholars such as Benjamin I. Schwartz. In a recent study, I argued that the basic character of Xunzi’s philosophy is utilitarianism in a broad sense based on an examination on his intellectual criticism and political criticism. Xunzi asserts that humans are innately driven by self-interested desires, and he evaluates all intellectual works and political behaviours by their utility. However, he does not limit utility to only basic animal desires such as food and sex. In Xunzi’s view, humans also have innate emotions; hence, these emotions should also be accounted for in their utility. This is similar to John Stuart Mill’s redefinition of Bentham’s concept of utility. Are Xunzi’s and Mill’s concepts of utility exactly the same? This question has yet to be examined. This article is a comparative study between utilitarianism and Xunzi’s philosophy which especially explores the compatibility of these two philosophies.     

Sender repertoires of pure and blended facial expressions of emotion

Six actors attempted to communicate by facial expression seven assumedly basic emotions (pleasure, surprise, fear, hate, sorrow, disgust and interest), and all pairwise blends, e.g., fear+sorrow. One hundred and eighty-two subjects (divided into groups as to the six actors) judged pictures of these emotions by three methods: (1) mapping, placing the pictures on coordinate systems with denotated axes, (2) identification and (3) sorting similar emotions into the same pile, followed by multidimensional scaling and cluster analyses. Recognition of the emotions was fairly good, though not equally good for all emotions and their blends; also the actors' ability to express emotions varied. Emotions of opposite hedonic tone did not blend well. Interest seemed to lend poignancy to the basic emotion with which it was blended rather than to constitute an emotion in itself. Expressions seemed to be more easily identified if the actor did not try to feel the emotion too deeply.     

Gender differences in perceptions of emotionality: The case of close heterosexual relationships

Previous research suggests some support for the stereotype that women are the more emotional gender, but very little research has examined whether women are more emotional than men in the context of close relationships. We examined gender differences in reports of emotions experienced and expressed in close heterosexual relationships. A sample of 197 couples (at different stages of relationship involvement), most of whom were white and from middle-class backgrounds, responded to a list of 25 positive and negative emotions three times. Participants indicated how often they experienced the emotions, how often they expressed the emotions, and how often they believed their partner experienced the emotions (all in the past month). Women reported experiencing several emotions to a greater frequency than men, regardless of degree of relationship involvement. Further, women reported being more emotionally expressive than men in dating and more advanced (e.g., engaged) relationships, but not in marital relationships. Finally, women believed that they were generally more emotional than men, whereas men believed that women were more emotional in the experience of negative but not positive emotions. The results were generally consistent with the stereotype that females are the more emotional gender.     

Socialization of Discrete Negative Emotions: Gender Differences and Links with Psychological Distress

On the basis of Malatesta-Magai's model (Magai, 1996) of emotion socialization, parental contingent responses to expressed emotion in children were expected to facilitate (e.g., Reward, Magnify) or inhibit (e.g., Override, Neglect, Punish) the expression of various discrete emotions. In this study, retrospective reports of parental emotion socialization in childhood were reported by 322 young adult participants. Perceptions of 3 negative emotions—sadness, anger, and fear—were assessed. Using a retrospective, self-report measure, gender-based emotion socialization patterns were found across all 3 emotions, which suggests that the gender of both the parent and child influences the way in which different emotions are socialized. Young adults reported, in recalling their childhood, that mothers were more typically involved in socializing negative emotions than were fathers. For anger, mothers reportedly were the more active emotion socializing agents; they used Reward, Magnify, and Override more than did fathers. For sadness and fear, parents reportedly modified the way in which they socialized these emotions based on the gender of their child. For example, fathers reportedly rewarded girls and punished boys for expressing sadness and fear. A second aim of this study was to examine links between emotion socialization strategies and psychological distress. Perceptions of the parental emotion socializing responses of Punish and Neglect were positively correlated with psychological distress in young adults. Although certain aspects of the methodology limit conclusions, the findings of this study suggest that emotion socialization differs in girls and boys, and these differences are consistent with models that link specific parental emotion socialization approaches (e.g., punishment of negative emotions) to psychopathology—a question that deserves further exploration.     

Children Expressing Mixed Emotion in a Nonsocial Context

Abstract

Efforts to demonstrate children’s ability to report experiencing mixed emotions have typically used an allocentric approach, asking children to report on emotions of other individuals in response to stories or movie clips demonstrating social themes. In contrast, literature examining children’s personal experiencing and understanding of their own mixed emotions, typified as an egocentric approach, in nonsocial situations remains underdeveloped. The current study examined the development of children’s reported understanding and experience of mixed emotions egocentrically. By examining a nonsocial context, this investigation extends existing gender- and age-related research on expressing egocentric mixed emotion. Using a computerized game with a disappointing wins paradigm, egocentric mixed emotional experience was elicited in 142 children (80 boys, 62 girls) aged 6 to 12?years. Results revealed that age, but not gender, was a statistically significant predictor of expressing egocentric mixed emotion experience and understanding. When studying mixed emotion development in a nonsocial context, gender did not contribute to differences in child reports. A significant positive relationship between egocentric mixed emotion experiencing and understanding also emerged. These findings contribute to our understanding of children’s emotion development and offer future directions for examining the broad domain of nonsocial contexts in youth expression of mixed emotions.     

Cultural affordances and emotional experience: socially engaging and disengaging emotions in Japan and the United States

The authors hypothesized that whereas Japanese culture encourages socially engaging emotions (e.g., friendly feelings and guilt), North American culture fosters socially disengaging emotions (e.g., pride and anger). In two cross-cultural studies, the authors measured engaging and disengaging emotions repeatedly over different social situations and found support for this hypothesis. As predicted, Japanese showed a pervasive tendency to reportedly experience engaging emotions more strongly than they experienced disengaging emotions, but Americans showed a reversed tendency. Moreover, as also predicted, Japanese subjective well-being (i.e., the experience of general positive feelings) was more closely associated with the experience of engaging positive emotions than with that of disengaging emotions. Americans tended to show the reversed pattern. The established cultural differences in the patterns of emotion suggest the consistent and systematic cultural shaping of emotion over time.     

Social learning modulates the lateralization of emotional valence

Although neuropsychological studies of lateralization of emotion have emphasized valence (positive vs. negative) or type (basic vs. complex) dimensions, the interaction between the two dimensions has yet to be elucidated. The purpose of the current study was to test the hypothesis that recognition of basic emotions is processed preferentially by the right prefrontal cortex (PFC), whereas recognition of complex social emotions is processed preferentially by the left PFC. Experiment 1 assessed the ability of healthy controls and patients with right and left PFC lesions to recognize basic and complex emotions. Experiment 2 modeled the patient’s data of Experiment 1 on healthy participants under lateralized displays of the emotional stimuli. Both experiments support the Type as well as the Valence Hypotheses. However, our findings indicate that the Valence Hypothesis holds for basic but less so for complex emotions. It is suggested that, since social learning overrules the basic preference of valence in the hemispheres, the processing of complex emotions in the hemispheres is less affected by valence.     

Cultural influences on the relation between pleasant emotions and unpleasant emotions: Asian dialectic philosophies or individualism-collectivism?

The present study examined the hypothesis that Asian cultures' dialectical way of thinking influences emotion reports. A dialectical way of thinking sees emotions of the opposite valence (e.g., happy, sad) as compatible with each other. In contrast, Western philosophy considers these emotions to be in conflict with each other. We examined correlations between frequency estimates of pleasant emotions (FPE) and frequency estimates of unpleasant emotions (FUE) in Asian, non-Asian collectivistic, and Western cultures. As predicted, FPE-FUE correlations were less negative in Asian cultures than in other cultures. We also observed a tendency for the culture effect to be moderated by gender. The strongest negative correlation was obtained for women in non-Asian cultures.     

Culture,Emotion, and Well-being: Good Feelings in Japan and the United States

We tested the hypothesis that “good feelings”—the central element of subjective well-being—are associated with interdependence and interpersonal engagement of the self in Japan, but with independence and interpersonal disengagement of the self in the United States. Japanese and American college students (total N = 913) reported how frequently they experienced various emotional states in daily life. In support of the hypothesis, the reported frequency of general positive emotions (e.g. calm, elated) was most closely associated with the reported frequency of interpersonally engaged positive emotions (e.g. friendly feelings) in Japan, but with the reported frequency of interpersonally disengaged positive emotions (e.g. pride) in the United States. Further, for Americans the reported frequency of experience was considerably higher for positive emotions than for negative emotions, but for Japanese it was higher for engaged emotions than for disengaged emotions. Implications for cultural constructions of emotion in general and subjective well-being in particular are discussed.