Bandura's theory of self-efficacy: A set of common sense theorems

Bandura's (1977) theory of self-efficacy is translated into non-technical language and is shown to consist of logically necessary rather than empirically testable statements. As an alternative to the dominant empiricist view, it is argued that valid theories in psychology are explications of conceptual relationship imbedded in ordinary language (common sense). This conceptual network is anterior to both observation and theorizing. The analogy between the tasks of pre-Euclidean geometry and contemporary psychology is explored. The tasks are seen as involving explication of our implicit concepts of respectively space and people. One consequence of the stated view is that much psychological research is pointless since it attempts to verify logically necessary statements by empirical methods.     

Psychology and "ordinary language"—a critique of Smedslund

This article takes up methodological issues of the kind raised by Jan Smedslund in earlier issues of this journal, concerning the status of psychological enquiry as a discipline. Arguments are presented which aim to show that Smedslund has failed to establish the thesis that all generally valid theoretical statements in psychology are explications of conceptual relationships embedded in ordinary language, i.e., analytic statements. Some specific examples of what Smedslund takes to be "ordinary language theorems" are examined. Doubts are expressed concerning the validity of the proof procedure Smedslund employs in the "demonstration" of a number of his alleged theorems. Finally, it is argued that the results produced by the situation-bound and culture-bound empirical research of the psychologist need not be viewed as "arbitrary" in Smedslund's sense of that term.     

Common sense and psychological phenomena: A reply to Smedslund

Smedslund's argument that psycho-social reality is revealed by common sense is shown to be based on a confusion between logical inference and psychological induction. Common sense has no privileged access to psychological reality and is affected profoundly by reasoning errors. Its structure is loose, allowing for post hoc "explanations" of everything and clear-cut predictions of nothing.     

The long past and short history of the vocabulary of Anglophone psychology

How do particular words come to be part of the vocabulary of Anglophone psychology? The present study sampled 600 words with psychological senses from the Oxford English Dictionary, which not only gives the number of senses for each word but also the date and author for the earliest known occurrence of each sense. Analogous information for the same words was taken from PsycINFO. One can distinguish between words for which their psychological sense is the first to occur in the history of the written language (primary psychological words) and words for which their psychological sense only emerges after one or more other senses have become established in the written language (secondary psychological words). To use a distinction made famous by Ebbinghaus, secondary psychological words have both a past and a history in psychology, while primary psychological words only have a history. Secondary psychological words have more connections to other words and occur more frequently in PsycINFO than do primary psychological words. For secondary psychological words, it is possible to trace a process of metaphoric polysemy that provides a basis for the eventual occurrence of the psychological sense of a word. Some primary psychological words are now developing secondary, nonpsychological senses, showing that they are subject to the same metaphoric process as are any other words.     

Forms of Our Life: Wittgenstein and the Later Heidegger

The paper argues that an internal debate within Wittgensteinian philosophy leads to issues associated rather with the later philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Rush Rhees's identification of the limitations of the notion of a “language game” to illuminate the relation between language and reality leads to his discussion of what is involved in the “reality” of language: “anything that is said has sense‐if living has sense, not otherwise.” But what is it for living to have sense? Peter Winch provides an interpretation and application of Rhees's argument in his discussion of the “reality” of Zande witchcraft and magic in “Understanding a Primitive Society”. There he argues that such sense is provided by a language game concerned with the ineradicable contingency of human life, such as (he claims) Zande witchcraft to be. I argue, however, that Winch's account fails to answer the question why Zande witchcraft can find no application within our lives. I suggest that answering this requires us to raise the question of why Zande witchcraft “fits” with their other practices but cannot with ours, a question of “sense” which cannot be answered by reference to another language game. I use Joseph Epes Brown's account of Native American cultures (in Epes Brown 2001) as an exemplification of a form of coherence that constitutes what we may call a “world”. I then discuss what is involved in this, relating this coherence to a relation to the temporal, which provides an internal connection between the senses of the “real” embodied in the different linguistic practices of these cultures. I relate this to the later Heidegger's account of the “History of Being”, of the historical worlds of Western culture and increasingly of the planet. I conclude with an indication of concerns and issues this approach raises, ones characteristic of “Continental” rather than Wittgensteinian philosophy.     

Naming our concerns about neuroscience: a review of Bennett and Hacker's philosophical foundations of neuroscience

Bennett and Hacker use conceptual analysis to appraise the theoretical language of modern cognitive neuroscientists, and conclude that neuroscientific theory is largely dualistic despite the fact that neuroscientists equate mind with the operations of the brain. The central error of cognitive neuroscientists is to commit the mereological fallacy, the tendency to ascribe to the brain psychological concepts that only make sense when ascribed to whole animals. The authors review how the mereological fallacy is committed in theories of memory, perception, thinking, imagery, belief, consciousness, and other psychological processes studied by neuroscientists, and the consequences that fallacious reasoning have for our understanding of how the brain participates in cognition and behavior. Several behavior-analytic concepts may themselves be nonsense based on thorough conceptual analyses in which the criteria for sense and nonsense are found in the ways the concepts are used in ordinary language. Nevertheless, the authors' nondualistic approach and their consistent focus on behavioral criteria for the application of psychological concepts make Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience an important contribution to cognitive neuroscience.     

Common sense and psychological theories: The historical nature of logical necessity

The importance of common sense for psychological theories is construed as a limiting condition that must be transcended if a particular psychological theory is expected to have generalizability across cultures and over history. Discussion on the pages of this journal, initiated by Jan Smedslund in 1978, has brought the common-sensical nature of the majority of psychological theories into psychologists' focus of attention. Smedslund has attempted to explicate 'theorems' of common sense that underlie thinking and activities of human beings in a culture—and that are shared by laypersons as well as by psychologists. This article approaches the issue of common sense in psychological theorizing from a developmental perspective. This perspective emphasizes the process of emergence of qualitatively new cognitive phenomena in the course of cultural history. It is argued that the 'logical necessity' based on the 'theorems' of common sense is itself 'historical necessity', as it results from the history of human cultures. Smedslund's 'theorems' of common sense can only be formal, but not substantive, analogues of theorems in geometry, since the latter are ahistorical, whereas the former constitute products of the history of cultures and individuals.     

Psychology between science and common sense: William James and the problems of psychological language in the Principles

The suspicion that language can become an obstacle to human knowledge is not new in the Western intellectual tradition. Following the empiricist legacy, many authors have suggested the perils and pitfalls of common sense language for science. Applied to psychology, this leads to the issue of the reliability of psychological language for scientific psychology. William James, in his Principles of Psychology, was one of the first psychologists to address this problem explicitly. The goal of this paper is to situate his position and contrast it with contemporary debates over the status of folk psychology. The results indicate that James conceived of common sense psychology in a very complex manner, and pointed to a kind of illusion that remains ignored in the current literature, with negative consequences for psychology. I conclude by suggesting the relevance of James for contemporary debates in theoretical and philosophical psychology.     

Analytical Dispositionalism and Practical Reason

The paper examines the plausibility of analytical dispositionalism about practical reason, according to which the following claims are conceptual truths about common sense ethical discourse: i) Ethics: agents have reasons to act in some ways rather than others, and ii) Metaphysical Modesty: there is no such thing as a response independent normative reality. By elucidating two uncontroversial assumptions which are fundamental to the common sense commitment to ethics, I argue that common sense ethical discourse is most plausibly construed as committed to the denial of metaphysical modesty, and thereby as committed to the existence of a response independent normative reality.     

The imagination: cognitive, pre-cognitive, and meta-cognitive aspects

This article is an attempt to situate imagination within consciousness complete with its own pre-cognitive, cognitive, and meta-cognitive domains. In the first sections we briefly review traditional philosophical and psychological conceptions of the imagination. The majority have viewed perception and imagination as separate faculties, performing distinct functions. A return to a phenomenological account of the imagination suggests that divisions between perception and imagination are transcended by precognitive factors of sense of reality and non-reality where perception and imagination play an indivisible role. In fact, both imagination and perception define sense of reality jointly according to what is possible and not possible. Absorption in a possible world depends on the strengths of alternative possibilities, and the relationship between core and marginal consciousness. The model may offer a parsimonious account of different states and levels of imaginal consciousness, and of how "believed-in imaginings" develop and become under some circumstances "lived-in experiences."     

Music as a way of knowing: tentative steps towards extending the boundaries of traditional music philosophy

Based on Howard Gardner's theory of Multiple Intelligences and Ray Jackendoff s theory of a Universal Musical Grammar this article proposes that music be regarded as a way of knowing by which man endeavours to make sense of, interpret and articulate—by means of a system of sound symbols—an aspect of reality which cannot be expressed in any other way. The four main points of this hypothesis are: (1) Music refers to a reality that is neither solely a product of my imagination, my feelings or the constitution of my body, nor to a reality that can be explained solely in empirical terms. Rather, it includes both these dimensions, but at the same time is more than both of them put together. (2) The language of music is unique in that it is structured like no other language; it is structured in accordance with the reality it refers to. (3) Unlike mathematics (or even spoken language), the language of music, in its manifestation as culturally diverse musics, is semantically and ethically not a neutral language. (4) The emergence of art music can be explained particularly well by means of the model of music as a way of knowing.     

Ontological Commitment And Reconstructivism

Some forms of analytic reconstructivism take natural language (and common sense at large) to be ontologically opaque: ordinary sentences must be suitably rewritten or paraphrased before questions of ontological commitment may be raised. Other forms of reconstructivism take the commitment of ordinary language at face value, but regard it as metaphysically misleading: common-sense objects exist, but they are not what we normally think they are. This paper is an attempt to clarify and critically assess some common limits of these two reconstructivist strategies.     

Comments on Smedslund's "Revising explications of common sense through dialogue"

Smedslund's attempt to show that common sense is invariant is discussed. It is pointed out that he used a new definition of common sense as well as instructions which maximize invariance. Therefore, the findings demonstrate merely that the subjects utilized well known folk psychological concepts in their inferences. They cannot be generalized to other, real-life, situations and to the usual meaning of the term common sense. The use of dialogue to increase invariance may work in an artificial setting where little is at stake but may well increase and freeze differences of opinion in real-life settings. Still, Smedslund should be given credit for initiating work at a conceptual level which is badly needed, as illustrated here with an example from work on intrinsic motivation.     

Transcending common sense in psychological theorizing: A developmental perspective

The necessity for transcendence of any particular system of common sense in psychologists' theorizing is reiterated in the process of analyzing Smedslund's response to the author's previous (Valsiner, 1985) critical analysis of the role of common sense in psychology. It is emphasized that the ways of how personally unique construction of meaning in individuals' ontogenies proceed are directed by social canalization, which guarantees sufficient (but not absolute) similarity in persons' individual thinking and acting. Such similarity forms the basis for intelligibility of interpersonal communication. A developmental perspective can overcome two opposite traditions in non-developmental psychologies which either disregard common sense, or make it the criterion of adequacy of thinking towards which psychological theories should strive. In contrast, it is suggested that common sense be studied in conjunction with research on psychological phenomena for which it serves as their context, and that generalizations about psychological phenomena retain information about the common-sense frames of the phenomena.     

社会建构论与心理学理论的未来发展

社会建构论是当代西方心理学中的一股重要学术思潮。它认为知识不是一种科学发现,而是一种社会建构。知识的生产过程不是个体理性决定的,而是一种文化历史的过程,是社会协商和互动的结果。有关心理现象的分类、心理活动的形式方面的知识都是一定文化历史条件的产物。从社会建构论的视角看心理学的研究成果会有许多新的收获。从社会建构论的观点来看,理论不是经验事实的概括和抽象,而是一种社会建构。理论先于经验观察,也高于经验观察,这种观点将理论建构置于经验工作之首,为心理学理论的未来发展开辟了全新的视角。     

The sense of defect

The sense of defect, physical or psychological, is here regarded as a fantasy, a compromise formation, rather than an actual defect existing somewhere in the body, or in some psychological structure. It need not correlate with the reality to an external observer of physical or psychological disability. Psychoanalytic emphasis is directed to the motivations for the persistence of this sense of defect, rather than primarily to etiology (trauma) or genetic history. Accurate perception and evaluation, having been interdicted during childhood, is avoided with the magical hope that thereby one will be acceptable and what is wrong will disappear. The interaction between self and parents, real and fantasied, cannot be clearly known. The patient remains uncertain as to what is wrong, in whom it is located, and how it has come about. The sense of defect, physical or psychological, becomes the nidus around which much is crystallized. This is then offered up to a parent (and the superego) as an appeasement and seduction, aiming to help this parent feel better by agreeing that the child is indeed the cause of what is wrong. Dangerously destructive (and sexual) wishes are defended against and atoned for by emphasis on one's defectiveness.     

谁是最大的受害群体:群际受害者竞争

长期冲突的群体双方都致力于建构自己的最大受害者角色,他们认为自己比对方遭受了更多、更不公平、更不合理的伤害,这种现象称之为群际受害者竞争。群体通过强调冲突给自身造成的伤害后果的严重性与不公平性、伤害的处理方式等,努力声称内群体比对方遭受了更多的伤害。集体受害感、冲突责任归因、记忆的选择性、消除威胁的内在需要以及其他心理特点是群际受害者竞争的心理基础。通过构建"共同的受害者-侵犯者"认同以及增加群际接触等可以降低群际受害者竞争的水平,促进群际关系的和谐。今后的研究需要进一步完善群际受害者竞争的机制,深入探讨群际受害者竞争的其他影响因素,争取在干预策略上有所突破,关注非暴力冲突的群体情境中群际受害者竞争的特点,了解第三方群体对谁是最大受害者群体的认知和评价机制。     

Facilitating friendship formation in late life: Puzzles and challenges

Considerable evidence indicates that friendships contribute to the psychological well-being of older adults. Seeking ways to help lonely older adults form new friendships thus makes a good deal of sense, but as the disappointing results reported by Heller et al. (1991) indicate, translating this conceptually sound goal into a practical reality presents many challenges. This commentary seeks to build upon the authors' analysis of factors that may have undermined the success of their intervention by discussing the social contexts that may be most conducive to friendship formation in late life and by considering whether kin ties represent a more viable focus of intervention efforts than do peer ties.     

Making Decisions in Foreign Languages: Weaker Senses of Ownership Attenuate the Endowment Effect

Although the number of bilingual consumers is expanding, research on the impact of language on consumer decision making is scarce. The current research examines the endowment effect, which is a fundamental consumer decision‐making regularity, under native versus foreign language processing. I show that the endowment effect, which refers to higher valuation of a given product by sellers than buyers, is attenuated when sellers and buyers process information in a foreign language due to a decrease in sellers’ valuation of the product. I further document empirical evidence for the underlying mechanism of this finding. Thinking in a foreign language diminishes the impact of affective reactions on sellers’ judgment, which results in lowered sense of psychological ownership. This lowered sense of psychological ownership significantly decreases sellers’ valuation to a level comparable to the valuation of buyers. The implications of these results for theory and practice, and avenues for future research are discussed.