Confusion,concentration, and other emotions of interest: commentary on Rozin and Cohen (2003)

P. Rozin and A. B. Cohen's (2003) method of sending students out to observe each other in familiar circumstances undoubtedly exaggerated the apparent prevalence of confusion, concentration, and worry. The expressions they observed probably ranged from regulatory feedback and communicative signals to expressions of the "intellectual emotions" described by C. Darwin (1872/1965). Appraisal theories can easily accommodate these affective states; there is no need to postulate new "basic emotions" unless one adheres to a rigid categorical view of emotion. Finally, Rozin and Cohen have made a valuable contribution by reminding us of the importance of emotions related to interest.     

Now you see it,now you don't--the confusing case of confusion as an emotion: commentary on Rozin and Cohen (2003)

P. Rozin and A. B. Cohen (2003) contend that confusion is an emotion because it is valenced, it has a distinct facial expression, and it has a distinct internal state. On the basis of these criteria, they call for further study of this unstudied stateand challenge emotion researchers to consider "confusion" to be an emotion. The author agrees with Rozin and Cohen (2003) that confusion is an affective state, is valenced, has an (internal) object, may be expressed facially, and that laypersons may, under certain circumstances, consider it an emotion. However, its expression is likely to be an expressive component of emotions for which goal obstruction is central. Further, confusion may also not be as commonly considered an emotion by laypersons, as Rozin and Cohen contend. Finally, confusion is not unstudied, only most of the time it is not emotion researchers who do the researching.     

An ostrich on a rock: commentary on Christie and Barresi (2002)

There are problems with both the theoretical logic and the interpretation of data in Christie and Barresi's (2002) interesting article. The general pattern of results (described as Orwellian) is easily incorporated into an information-processing framework compatible with Dennett's analysis. In particular, different aspects of the illusory motion event are queried at different times and these aspects (line extent and manner of appearance) are not in conflict, so no revision of conscious content is necessary. Second, too much interpretive weight is placed on an anomalous pair of data points (described as Stalinesque) that do not seem fully interpretable within the author's framework and are probably susceptible to one of several alternative interpretations proposed here, though further investigation is necessary.     

Putting phonetic context effects into context: a commentary on Fowler (2006)

On the basis of a review of the literature and three new experiments, Fowler (2006) concludes that a contrast account for phonetic context effects is not tenable and is inferior to a gestural account. We believe that this conclusion is premature and that it is based on a restricted set of assumptions about a general perceptual account. Here, we briefly address the criticisms of Fowler (2006), with the intent of clarifying what a general auditory and learning approach to speech perception entails.     

Two arguments for a pre-reflective core self: commentary on Praetorius (2009)

Contra Praetorius (2009), I present two brief arguments which support the existence within the human brain of a pre-reflective core self.     

Simulation (mostly) rules: A commentary

I consider three issues: children's attribution of belief‐based emotions, the contribution of language input to children's developing theory of mind, and the default settings we assume in our dealings with the world. I ask whether the proposals made by Mitchell, Currie and Ziegler can help throw light on each issue ( Mitchell, Currie, & Ziegler, 2009 ).     

Form perception at birth: Cohen and Younger (1984) revisited

Cohen (1988; Cohen & Younger, 1984) has suggested that there is a shift in the perception of form sometime after 6 weeks of age. Prior to this age infants can remember the specific orientations of line segments, but cannot process and remember the angular relations that line segments can make. Experiment 1 used simple line stimuli with newborn infants to test this suggestion. Following habituation to a simple two-line angle the newborns dishabituated to a change of orientation but not to a change in angle, confirming Cohen and Younger's suggestion that orientation is a powerful cue in early shape perception. In Experiments 2 and 3 newborns were familiarized either to an acute or to an obtuse angle that changed its orientation over trials. On subsequent test trials the babies gave strong novelty preferences to a different angle. Alternative interpretations of the results are discussed, but these experimental findings are compatible with the suggestion that newborns can quickly learn to process angular relations, and that rudimentary form perception may not be dependent on a lengthy period of learning and/or maturation for its development.     

Towards a broader scope of biomechanics in developmental studies: a commentary on Jensen (2005)

In this article, we discuss where biomechanical analysis can contribute to our understanding of motor development, and more particularly in what ways biomechanics can contribute to (1) explaining the universal sequence in motor milestones; (2) explaining variations in developmental sequence between individuals; (3) understanding the impact of context on the actions of an individual; and (4) understanding, preventing, and managing chronic disabilities. In our view, biomechanics is concerned with the dynamics of the musculo‐skeletal system (MSS) and thus provides insights in the way motion is affected by the activation of muscles and the mechanical interaction between the MSS and the environment. Biomechanical analysis is important in understanding the development of actions that depend on the perceptual‐motor loop although it cannot provide a full account of the changes in the behaviour. The contributions and limitations of specific biomechanical analyses such as the inverse and forward dynamical models are discussed in the light of the article of Jensen (2005). Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Non-monotonicity and Informal Reasoning: Comment on Ferguson (2003)

In this paper, it is argued that Ferguson’s (2003, Argumentation 17, 335–346) recent proposal to reconcile monotonic logic with defeasibility has three counterintuitive consequences. First, the conclusions that can be derived from his new rule of inference are vacuous, a point that as already made against default logics when there are conflicting defaults. Second, his proposal requires a procedural “hack” to the break the symmetry between the disjuncts of the tautological conclusions to which his proposal leads. Third, Ferguson’s proposal amounts to arguing that all everyday inferences are sound by definition. It is concluded that the informal logic response to defeasibility, that an account of the context in which inferences are sound or unsound is required, still stands. It is also observed that another possible response is given by Bayesian probability theory (Oaksford and Chater, in press, Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK; Hahn and Oaksford, in press, Synthese).     

The three faces of Eve: Strategic displays of positive,negative, and neutral emotions in negotiations

In a series of laboratory experiments, we tested the influence of strategically displaying positive, negative, and neutral emotions on negotiation outcomes. In Experiment 1, a face-to-face dispute simulation, negotiators who displayed positive emotion, in contrast to negative or neutral emotions, were more likely to incorporate a future business relationship in the negotiated contract. In Experiment 2, an ultimatum setting, managers strategically displaying positive emotion were more likely to close a deal. This effect was mediated by negotiators’ willingness to pay more to a negotiator strategically displaying positive versus negative emotions. In Experiment 3, display of positive emotion was a more effective strategy for gaining concessions from the other party in a distributive setting. Negotiators made more extreme demands when facing a negotiator strategically displaying negative, rather than positive or neutral, emotions. Implications for strategic display of emotion in negotiations are discussed.     

Implicit change identification: a replication of Fernandez-Duque and Thornton (2003)

Using a simple change detection task involving vertical and horizontal stimuli, I. M. Thornton and D. Fernandez-Duque (2000) showed that the implicit detection of a change in the orientation of an item influences performance in a subsequent orientation judgment task. However, S. R. Mitroff, D. J. Simons, and S. L. Franconeri (2002) were not able to replicate this finding after correcting for confounds and thus attributed Thornton and Fernandez-Duque's results to methodological artifacts. Because Mitroff et al.'s failure to replicate might in turn have stemmed from several methodological differences between their study and those of Thornton and Fernandez-Duque (2000) and Fernandez-Duque and Thornton, the current authors set out to conduct a further replication in which they corrected all known methodological biases identified so far. The results suggest that implicit change detection indeed occurs: People's conscious decisions about the orientation of an item appear to be influenced by previous undetected changes in the orientation of other items in the display. Implications of this finding in light of current theories of visual awareness are discussed.     

Predicting without modeling: a critique of Trabasso and Bartolone (2003)

T. Trabasso and J. Bartolone (2003) used a computational model of narrative text comprehension to account for empirical findings. The authors show that the same predictions are obtained without running the model. This is caused by the model's computational setup, which leaves most of the model's input unchanged.     

Synchronistic mind‐matter correlations in therapeutic practice: a commentary on Connolly (2015)

This commentary adds some ideas and refinements to the inspiring discussion in a recent paper by Connolly ( 2015 ) that makes use of a dual‐aspect framework developed by us earlier. One key point is that exceptional experiences (of which synchronicities are a special case) cannot in general be identified with experiences of non‐categorial or acategorial mental states. In fact, most exceptional experiences reported in the literature are experiences of categorial states. Conversely, there are non‐categorial and acategorial states whose experience is not exceptional. Moreover, the psychodynamics of a synchronistic experience contain a subtle mesh of interacting processes pertaining to categorial, non‐categorial and acategorial domains. We outline how this mesh may be addressed in particular cases of synchronicity described by Connolly.