How Scientific Is Scientific Essentialism?

Scientific essentialism holds that: (1) each scientific kind is associated with the same set of properties in every possible world; and (2) every individual member of a scientific kind belongs to that kind in every possible world in which it exists. Recently, Ellis (Scientific essentialism, 2001; The philosophy of nature 2002) has provided the most sustained defense of scientific essentialism, though he does not clearly distinguish these two claims. In this paper, I argue that both claims face a number of formidable difficulties. The necessities of scientific essentialism are not adequately distinguished from semantic necessities, they have not been shown to be necessities in the strictest sense, they must be relativized to context, and they must either be confined to a subset of scientific properties without warrant or their connection to causal powers must be revoked. Moreover, upon closer examination (1) turns out to be a trivial thesis that can be satisfied by non-kinds, and (2) is inapplicable to some of the most fundamental kinds in the basic sciences.     

Can Alternative Scientific Theories Challenge Scientific Rationality?

Axiomathes - One of the reasons for relativistic attitudes toward science is the impossibility of justifying scientists’ decisions in the face of alternative theories. According to this...     

What is Scientific Progress? Lessons from Scientific Practice

Alexander Bird argues for an epistemic account of scientific progress, whereas Darrell Rowbottom argues for a semantic account. Both appeal to intuitions about hypothetical cases in support of their accounts. Since the methodological significance of such appeals to intuition is unclear, I think that a new approach might be fruitful at this stage in the debate. So I propose to abandon appeals to intuition and look at scientific practice instead. I discuss two cases that illustrate the way in which scientists make judgments about progress. As far as scientists are concerned, progress is made when scientific discoveries contribute to the increase of scientific knowledge of the following sorts: empirical, theoretical, practical, and methodological. I then propose to articulate an account of progress that does justice to this broad conception of progress employed by scientists. I discuss one way of doing so, namely, by expanding our notion of scientific knowledge to include both know-that and know-how.     

Scientific Self-Regulation—So Good, How Can it Fail?

To be a functional alternative to government regulation, self-regulation of science must be credible to both scientists and the public, accountable, ethical, and effective. According to some, serious problems continue in research ethics in the United States despite a rich history of proposed self-regulatory standards and oversight devices. Successful efforts at self-regulation in stem cell research contrast with unsuccessful efforts in research ethics, particularly conflicts of interest. Part of the cause for a lack of success in self-regulation is fragmented, disconnected oversight, and failure to embody genuine scientific and public consensus. To be accountable, credible and effective, self-regulation must be inclusive and multidisciplinary, publicly engaged, sufficiently disinterested, operationally integrated with institutional goals, and must implement a genuine consensus among scientists and the public. The mechanisms of self-regulation must be sufficiently broad in their oversight, and interconnected with other institutional forces and actors, that they do not create fragmented solutions.

Trends in the Scientific Study of Religion, Spirituality, and Health: 1965–2000

The present study examined the degree to which interest in religion, spirituality, and health has changed in psychology and the behavioral sciences over the past few decades. To accomplish this, searches were conducted on the PsycINFO database between the years 1965 and 2000. Three basic searches were conducted combining the word “health” with the following search terms: 1. (religion OR religious OR religiosity) NOT (spiritual OR spirituality); 2. (spiritual OR spirituality) NOT (religion OR religious OR religiosity); and 3. (religion OR religious OR religiosity) AND (spiritual OR spirituality). The rate per 100,000 articles was then calculated for each of the three search-terms: religion, spirituality, religion and spirituality. A significant upward trend across years was found for the rate of articles dealing with spirituality, r(34) = .95, p<.001, and religion and spirituality, r(34) = .86, p<.001. A significant downward trend was found for articles that only addressed religion, r(34) = −.64, p<.001. The consequences of these trends are discussed.Dr. Andrew J. Weaver is a United Methodist minister and clinical psychologist. He is the Associate Publisher of Zion’s Herald, an independent religious journal founded in 1823 and is co-author of numerous professional and popular articles and eleven books. His recent book titles include Counseling Survivors of Traumatic Events and Reflections on Grief and Spiritual Growth.Dr. Kenneth I. Pargament is professor of clinical psychology at Bowling Green State University. Dr. Pargament has published over 100 articles on the meanings of religion and spirituality, the vital role of religion in coping with stress and trauma, perceptions of sacredness in life, and psychospiritual treatment. He is author of The Psychology of Religion and Coping: Theory, Research, Practice.Dr. Kevin J. Flannelly has been the Associate Director of Research at The Health Care Chaplaincy since 2001. Dr. Flannelly has published more than 100 studies in various areas of psychology and he has worked in the field of religion, spirituality and health since 1996. He recently published a review and analysis of the methodological quality of research on religion and health in the Southern Medical Journal.Julia Oppenheimer is a Ph.D. student at the University of Oregon, studying child development and clinical practice in the Clinical Psychology program. She has conducted research on the etiology and treatment of anxiety disorders, as well as publishing a number of studies on religion and mental health. Her current research on the development of children’s self-perceptions of personality is funded by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Award. Correspondence to Dr. Kevin J. Flannelly, kflannelly@healthcarechaplaincy.org.     

Realism,Reliabilism, and the ‘Strong Programme’ in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge

In this essay, I respond to Tim Lewens’s proposal that realists and Strong Programme theorists can find common ground in reliabilism. I agree with Lewens, but point to difficulties in his argument. Chief among these is his assumption that reliabilism is incompatible with the Strong Programme’s principle of symmetry. I argue that the two are, in fact, compatible, and that Lewens misses this fact because he wrongly supposes that reliabilism entails naturalism. The Strong Programme can fully accommodate a reliabilism which has been freed from its inessential ties to naturalism. Unlike naturalistic epistemologists, the Strong Programme’s sociologistic reliabilist insists that all scientific facts are the product of both natural and social causal phenomena. Anticipating objections, I draw on Wittgenstein’s rule‐following considerations to explain how the sociologistic reliabilist can account for standard intuitions about the objective elements of knowledge. I also explain how the Strong Programme theorist can distinguish between a belief’s seeming reliable and its being reliable.

?Ich setzte

?den Fuß in die Luft,

?und sie trug.

?(Hilde Domin)     

Scientific Research–Who Should Govern?

I argue that the title question needs to be taken seriously because there are important questions about how the scientific agenda should be set. Natural answers to the question – declarations of the proper autonomy of science or expressions of faith in market forces – are found inadequate. Instead, I propose a form of democracy with respect to scientific research that will avoid the obvious dangers of a tyranny of ignorance. I conclude with some modest proposals about how the ideal of a democratic science might be implemented and with a response to common objections.

Is Scientific Theory-Commitment Doxastic or Practical?

Associated with Bayesianism is the claim that insofar as thereis anything like scientific theory-commitment, it is not a doxastic commitment to the truth of the theory or any proposition involving the theory, but is rather an essentiallypractical commitment to behaving in accordance with a theory. While there are a number of a priori reasons to think that this should be true, there is stronga posteriori reason to think that it is not in fact true of current scientific practice.After outlining a feature that distinguishes doxastic from practical commitment, I presentempirical evidence that suggests that, like perhaps all other theoretical commitment,scientific theory-commitment is doxastic.     

How General is Generalized Scientific Essentialism?

I look at a recent argument offered in defense of a doctrine which I will call generalized scientific essentialism. This is the doctrine according to which, not only are some facts about substance composition metaphysically necessary, but, in addition, some facts about substance behavior are metaphysically necessary. More specifically, so goes the argument, not only is water necessarily composed of H₂O and salt is necessarily composed of NaCl, but, in addition, salt necessarily dissolves in water. If this argument is sound, and if the statement that necessarily salt dissolves in water is a statement of a law of nature, then one conclusion of the argument is that there is at least one metaphysically necessary law of nature. My paper examines the extent to which this kind of argument could be generalized to provide a case for a full-blown scientific essentialism: the doctrine according to which all of the laws of nature are necessary. Or, in terms of dispositions, it is the doctrine according to which natural kinds have all of their powers, capacities and propensities as a matter of necessity.     

Making the Myth–Ritualist Theory Scientific

The Divyatattva, a Hindu treatise on ordeals, uses folk etymologies and other rhetorical devices to structure its rituals. This paper suggests that such forms of repetition, and particularly ‘exhaustion,’ or the enumeration of an entire paradigm class, may naturalise or, in Saussure's term, ‘relatively motivate’ rituals and diminish the appearance of their arbitrariness. Ordeals and other rituals may respond to situations of uncertainty by using rhetorical devices to promote confidence in their outcomes. This contribution of poetic form to the pragmatic function of ritual is neglected in J. L. Austin's influential theory of ‘performative utterances.’     

Kotarbiński As A Scientific Realist

Tadeusz Kotarbiski is widely recognized as a major philosopher of theLvov–Warsaw school. His reism, which is a contribution to semantics andontology, is still discussed and debated, and his most original creation, praxiology,has grown into an entire research field. However, Kotarbiski's philosophy ofscience has not received much attention by later commentators. This paper attemptsto correct this situation by considering the hypothesis that Kotarbiski succeededalready in 1929 in formulating a position that can be regarded as an early version ofscientific realism. Unlike most other ``scientific philosophers' before the mid-thirties,he was able to combine ontological realism (by defending a form of physicalism andnominalism) and semantical realism (by defending the classical correspondence theoryof truth). He was also a critical epistemological realist. Further, in spite of theinstrumentalist flavour of his reductionist programme in eliminating terms apparentlyreferring to abstract entities, Kotarbiski accepted theories as statements with truth values and theoretical entities as long as they can be understood as physical bodies.     

What is Wrong with Husserl's Scientific Anti-Realism?

It is widely thought that focusing on highly skilled movements while performing them hinders their execution. Once you have developed the ability to tee off in golf, play an arpeggio on the piano, or perform a pirouette in ballet, attention to what your body is doing is thought to lead to inaccuracies, blunders, and sometimes even utter paralysis. Here I re-examine this view and argue that it lacks support when taken as a general thesis. Although bodily awareness may often interfere with well-developed rote skills, like climbing stairs, I suggest that it is typically not detrimental to the skills of expert athletes, performing artists, and other individuals who endeavor to achieve excellence. Along the way, I present a critical analysis of some philosophical theories and behavioral studies on the relationship between attention and bodily movement, an explanation of why attention may be beneficial at the highest level of performance and an error theory that explains why many have thought the contrary. Though tentative, I present my view as a challenge to the widespread starting assumption in research on highly skilled movement that at the pinnacle of skill attention to one's movement is detrimental.     

Sharing in or Benefiting from Scientific Advancement?

The intellectual property regimes we have currently in place are heavily under attack. One of the points of criticism is the interaction between two elements of article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the widely discussed issue of being able to benefit from scientific progress and the less argued for position of having a right to take part in scientific enterprises. To shine light on the question if we should balance the two elements or prioritize one of them, an exploration will be offered on how benefiting from scientific progress and the ability to participate in the advancement of science relate to securing human capabilities. A different perspective to the question will be gained by identifying the problem as an issue of misrecognition, especially the failure to recognize many willing collaboration partners in scientific research as peers. Lastly, I will argue that cooperative justice requires that if we have an innovation incentive system that disproportionally benefits one particular group, a certain duty to counterbalance this advantage exists when we are relying on mutual cooperation for the recognition of intellectual property rights.     

Must the Scientific Realist be a Rationalist?

Marc Alspector-Kelly claims that Bas van Fraassen’s primary challenge to the scientific realist is for the realist to find a way to justify the use of some mode of inference that takes him from the world of observables to knowledge of the world of unobservables without thereby abandoning empiricism. It is argued that any effort to justify such an “inferential wand” must appeal either to synthetic a priori or synthetic a posteriori knowledge. This disjunction turns into a dilemma for the empirically-minded realist as either disjunct leads to unwanted consequences. In this paper, I split the horns of this dilemma by arguing that the realist can justify one particular such mode of inference – abduction – without committing himself to rationalism. The realist may justify this mode of inference by appealing to the analytic a priori axioms of the probability calculus. I show that Peter Lipton’s tripartite defense of abduction constitutes such a method of justification.     

Naturalisms: Scientific? Religious? Theological?

Is nature all there is? Or, is there more? If nature is the only reality, is it ultimate or sacred? Differing answers to these questions determine the different brands of naturalism on the religious shelf. What virtually all of today’s naturalists agree on is this: science provides the means for revealing reality, the sole reality which is material, physical, and cosmic. Naturalists also agree that supranaturalism should be rejected. What naturalists differ on whether nature is divine or not. This article sorts out the issues and differing positions taken on each issue. The author contends that a post-Newtonian worldview remains open to a concept of God wherein divine action in nature’s world influences creativity and transformation.     

Scientific Jury Selection: Does It Work?

This article describes different methodologies used to predict the likely disposition of jurors in order to guide the exercise of peremptory challenges. The actual use of these methodologies in 27 telephone surveys, 9 focus groups, and 2 studies of jurors after the case was decided is examined. It is concluded that the efficacy of scientific jury selection depends, in part, on the type of case.