A comparison of the ecclesiological doctrine of Vatican II with Faith and Order's convergence text The Church: Towards a Common Vision

Faith and Order's important new convergence text on ecclesiology was published in 2013, 50 years after the discussions in 1963, at the second session of Vatican II, which produced the council's Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, Lumen gentium, the following year. After acknowledging some of the pitfalls in comparing a conciliar teaching with an ecumenical convergence text, this article summarises the content of the new ecumenical text on ecclesiology, indicates points of agreement with Vatican II's teaching and proposes that The Church: Towards a Common Vision might be seen as reflecting a hierarchy of ecclesiological truths which provides a promising framework for seeking greater agreement about still divisive issues.     

Vision Using Routines: A Functional Account of Vision

This paper presents the case for a functional account of vision. A variety of studies have consistently revealed “change blindness” or insensitivity to changes in the visual scene during an eye movement. These studies indicate that only a small part of the information in the scene is represented in the brain from moment to moment. It is still unclear, however, exactly what is included in visual representations. This paper reviews experiments using an extended visuo-motor task, showing that display changes affect performance differently depending on the observer's place in the task. These effects are revealed by increases in fixation duration following a change. Different task-dependent increases suggest that the visual system represents only the information that is necessary for the immediate visual task. This allows a principled exploration of the stimulus properties that are included in the internal visual representation. The task specificity also has a more general implication that vision should be conceptualized as an active process executing special purpose “routines” that compute only the currently necessary information. Evidence for this view and its implications for visual representations are discussed. Comparison of the change blindness phenomenon and fixation durations shows that conscious report does not reveal the extent of the representations computed by the routines.     

Understanding and Essence

Modal epistemology has been dominated by a focus on establishing an account either of how we have modal knowledge or how we have justified beliefs about modality. One component of this focus has been that necessity and possibility are basic access points for modal reasoning. For example, knowing that P is necessary plays a role in deducing that P is essential, and knowing that both P and ¬P are possible plays a role in knowing that P is accidental. Chalmers (2002) and Williamson (2007) provide two good examples of contrasting views in modal epistemology that focus on providing an account of modal knowledge where necessity and possibility are basic access points for modal knowledge, and Yablo (1993) provides a good account of how we have justified beliefs about modality. In contrast to this tradition I argue for and outline a modal epistemology based on objectual understanding and essence, rather than knowledge or justification and necessity and possibility. The account employs a non-modal conception of essence and takes objectual understanding of essence, rather than knowledge of essence to be basic in modal reasoning. I begin by articulating Kvanvig’s (2003) account of objectual understanding, on which objectual understanding of Φ is not equivalent to propositional knowledge of Φ. I then argue that an epistemology of essence that uses property variation-in-imagination is better construed as a model that delivers objectual understanding of essence rather than knowledge of essence. I argue that this is so, since the latter and not the former runs into a version of the Meno paradox. I show how this account can be applied to two issues in modal epistemology: the Benacerraf problem for modality, and the architecture of modal knowledge.