Jung and Lévy-Bruhl

Abstract: For his knowledge of ‘primitive’ peoples, C. G. Jung relied on the work of Lucien Lévy‐Bruhl (1857–1939), a French philosopher who in mid‐career became an armchair anthropologist. In a series of books from 1910 on, Lévy‐Bruhl asserted that ‘primitive’ peoples had been misunderstood by modern Westerners. Rather than thinking like moderns, just less rigorously, ‘primitives’ harbour a mentality of their own. ‘Primitive’ thinking is both ‘mystical’ and ‘prelogical’. By ‘mystical’, Lévy‐Bruhl meant that ‘primitive’ peoples experience the world as identical with themselves. Their relationship to the world, including to fellow human beings, is that of participation mystique. By ‘prelogical’, Lévy‐Bruhl meant that ‘primitive’ thinking is indifferent to contradictions. ‘Primitive’ peoples deem all things identical with one another yet somehow still distinct. A human is at once a tree and still a human being. Jung accepted unquestioningly Lévy‐Bruhl's depiction of the ‘primitive’ mind, even when Jung, unlike Lévy‐Bruhl, journeyed to the field to see ‘primitive’ peoples firsthand. But Jung altered Lévy‐Bruhl's conception of ‘primitive’ mentality in three key ways. First, he psychologized it. Whereas for Lévy‐Bruhl ‘primitive’ thinking is to be explained sociologically, for Jung it is to be explained psychologically: ‘primitive’ peoples think as they do because they live in a state of unconsciousness. Second, Jung universalized ‘primitive’ mentality. Whereas for Lévy‐Bruhl ‘primitive’ thinking is ever more being replaced by modern thinking, for Jung ‘primitive’ thinking is the initial psychological state of all human beings. Third, Jung appreciated ‘primitive’ thinking. Whereas for Lévy‐Bruhl ‘primitive’ thinking is false, for Jung it is true—once it is recognized as an expression not of how the world but of how the unconscious works. I consider, along with the criticisms of Lévy‐Bruhl's conception of ‘primitive’ thinking by his fellow anthropologists and philosophers, whether Jung in fact grasped all that Lévy‐Bruhl meant by ‘primitive’ thinking.     

Before Language and After

It has been assumed by some writers that Wittgenstein's talk of primitive reactions amounts to a theory of concept formation out of instinctive behaviour. Others have argued that Wittgenstein is thinking of reactions within language-games, which therefore belong to its structure not its origins . The author concurs, but argues that Wittgenstein also has in mind that it belongs to the grammars of certain concepts that the language-games in which they lie are themselves supplementary to natural behavioural forms. This provides a context in which the notion of pre-linguistic behaviour may be employed legitimately in philosophy whilst avoiding unjustified theorising.     

Enlivening thinking and speech in search of spiritual identity: the role of ‘speech formation’ in Steiner’s Waldorf education

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to clarify Steiner’s understanding of thinking and the way it influences the use of language in the classroom of 6–18 years old, and through that, to discuss how it eventually serves to capture one’s spiritual identity. First, the paper introduces Steiner’s notion of thinking, and then offers a general picture of what ‘speech formation’ is, and how it is actually used in a classroom. Secondly, the paper reviews Steiner’s view on child development and examines his understanding of embodied thinking in accordance with will, feeling and ‘I’ consciousness. Finally, it considers the role of ‘speech formation’ in relation to the development of thinking and speech, and to the genius of language which comes to work in the ‘space’ created through dialogue. (129 words)     

The ‘uncanny’, the sacred and the narcissism of culture: The development of the ego and the progress of civilization1

The report by a member of the Brazilian parliament that the rejection of physical deformity is natural and instinctive, and the Muslim reaction to the publication in the Western press of cartoons considered to be offensive to their religion, serve as an introduction to the examination of conflicts in human relations. The two episodes may be classified as representing the sense of the ‘uncanny’, attributed by Freud to the narcissism that remained from primitive cultures, in which the shadow cast by the body and the mirrored reflection of the latter probably generated the idea of soul‐which would be the narcissistic phenomenon causing the illusion of immortality. The presence of this illusion as a support for the beliefs of present‐day civilized peoples makes clear the inopportune influence of primitive mental states in areas where more developed ones should prevail. The persistence of the omnipotent thinking derived from these states provides the possibility of drawing a parallel between the development of the ego‐evolution from narcissism to object relation‐and the progress of civilization. In this context, the majority of social conflicts can be attributed to the deficient object relation resulting from the strength of primary narcissism, which generates a tendency to reject that which is different and to facilitate the emergence of destructive aggressiveness. The progress of civilization would then occur by means of a development of the ego compatible with object relations that lead to a drastic reduction in destructiveness.     

Mathematics and the Mystical in the Thought of Simone Weil

On Simone Weil’s “Pythagorean” view, mathematics has a mystical significance. In this paper, the nature of this significance and the coherence of Weil’s view are explored. To sharpen the discussion, consideration is given to both Rush Rhees’ criticism of Weil and Vance Morgan’s rebuttal of Rhees. It is argued here that while Morgan underestimates the force of Rhees’ criticism, Rhees’ take on Weil is, nevertheless, flawed for two reasons. First, Rhees fails to engage adequately with either the assumptions underlying Weil’s religious conception of philosophy or its dialectical method. Second, Rhees’ reading of Weil reflects an anti-Platonist conception of mathematics his justification of which is unsound and whose influence impedes recognition of the coherence of Weil’s position.     

Orientation,containment and the emergence of symbolic thinking

Orientation is viewed in this paper as an important dimension of containment for the development of thinking. Orientation refers to the particular positioning in space and time of mother and infant so they can find one another and then containment can take place. Bion's container–contained model for the development of thinking is based on the capacity of the mother's mind to function as a ‘home’ for the infant's primitive projections. Containment and orientation are explored in relation to an ancient Greek object called ‘σ?μβολον’ [symbolon], which I use here as a metaphor for the early negotiation between mother and infant to achieve a correct matching to each other's orientation. This is then mobilized and re‐enacted between analyst and patient in the psychoanalytic process. Orientation as part of the container–contained model enables us to view the development of thinking from a new perspective with greater integration of cognitive and emotional aspects. The clinical implication of the concept of orientation is explored in relation to the process of engagement/disengagement between analyst and patient and is illustrated by clinical material.     

Language,Behaviour, and Empathy. G.H. Mead’s and W.V.O. Quine’s Naturalized Theories of Meaning

ABSTRACT

The paper compares Mead’s and Quine’s behaviouristic theories of meaning and language, focusing in particular on Mead’s notion of sympathy and Quine’s notion of empathy. On the one hand, Quine seems to resort to an explanation similar to Mead’s notion of sympathy, referring to ‘empathy’ in order to justify the human ability to project ourselves into the witness’s position; on the other hand, Quine’s reference to the notion of empathy paves the way to a more insightful comparison between Mead’s behaviourism and an explanation of the emergence of the linguistic from pre-linguistic communication based on empathic identification processes. However, Mead is less ambiguous than Quine in his use of the notion of sympathy finds a fecund parallel in the current neuroscientific and neuro-phenomenological hypothesis on ‘empathy’. The article contends that the ambiguity in Quine’s account of empathy is due to the exigency of trying to elucidate the link between the rules of language in a cultural context and the natural, that is ‘instinctive’, basis of the process of learning a language. This is the reason why his epistemological behaviourism is particularly close to the non-reductionist naturalism of Mead. The working hypothesis proposed in the conclusion deals with the core notions of ‘gesture’ and ‘behaviour’.     

The End(s) of Philosophy: Rhetoric, Therapy and Wittgenstein's Pyrrhonism

In Culture and Value Wittgenstein remarks: ‘Thoughts that are at peace. That's what someone who philosophizes yearns for’. The desire for such conceptual tranquillity is a recurrent theme in Wittgenstein's work, and especially in his later ‘grammatical‐therapeutic’ philosophy. Some commentators (notably Rush Rhees and C. G. Luckhardt) have cautioned that emphasising this facet of Wittgenstein's work ‘trivialises’ philosophy – something which is at odds with Wittgenstein's own philosophical ‘seriousness’ (in particular his insistence that philosophy demands that one ‘Go the bloody hard way’). Drawing on a number of correlations between Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and that of the Pyrrhonian Sceptics, in this paper I defend a strong ‘therapeutic’ reading of Wittgenstein, and show how this can be maintained without ‘trivialising’ philosophy.     

THE PSYCHOANALYST OF THE FUTURE: WISE ENOUGH TO DARE TO BE MAD AT TIMES3

What sort of patients do we have in psychoanalysis now, at the beginning of the third millennium, and what sort will we have in the future? In the author's clinical experience, the patients who are currently seeking help from the psychoanalyst use primitive defence mechanisms alongside neurotic ones. Most of them do not explicitly request psychoanalytic treatment, but this does not mean that they would not want it if they knew what it was. She argues that is the psychoanalyst's task to identify the latent request behind the ‘non‐request’. To conduct a psychoanalysis with such patients, the psychoanalyst has to identify and interpret both primitive and neurotic psychic mechanisms; moreover, he has to use not only language that speaks to patients but also language that ‘touches’ them, because these patients are difficult to reach through verbal symbolism. This implies that the psychoanalyst must be attentive to the bodily manifestations and bodily phantasies accompanying his countertransference feelings. The author shows through clinical examples what she means by ‘language that can touch patients’. The psychoanalyst gradually builds up this language while, at the same time, daring to discover in himself his own mad aspects and giving himself enough psychical freedom to accept them.     

NOTES AND COMMENTS: DID WITTGENSTEIN REALLY DEFINE‘MEANING’?

43. Man kann für eine grosse Klasse von Fallen der Benützung des Wortes ‘Bedeutung’—wenn auch nicht für alle Fälle seiner Benützung—dieses Wort so erklären: Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache. 43. For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. ¹ 1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, Blackwell, 1967). Numbers without further identification are references to paragraphs in the Investigations.
     

How much is too much? Understanding the role and function of violence and its manifestation in the consulting room: intensive psychotherapy with a latency-aged boy

The aim of this article is to explore and lend meaning to the role and function of violence in children, in particular boys, who have had disturbing and traumatic early experiences. Psychoanalytic thinking about the role and function of violence, as well as its impact and management in the consulting room, will be central features of this exploration. In a research project involving a single case study, a number of clinical concepts emerged that have potential ramifications for child psychotherapists working with children exhibiting violent and challenging behaviour. The clinical concepts emerged via the application of grounded theory research methodology to clinical data and contribute to the thinking and theory of Meltzer’s use of ‘temperature and distance’ as a means of understanding and regulating emotional states in the therapeutic setting. ‘Time’ and ‘space’ were additional clinical concepts that emerged. These four concepts are considered crucial elements in providing the child psychotherapist with the means to apply transformative and modifying processes to the un-processed and raw externalisation of primitive, violent impulses.     

Wittgenstein and the Animal Origins of Linguistic Communication

Wittgenstein's notorious sample of a ‘complete primitive language’ (viz. the builders’ game of the Philosophical Investigations) is often thought to be closer in kind to animal forms of communication than human language. Indeed, it has been criticised on precisely these grounds. But such debates make little sense if we take seriously Wittgenstein's idea that language is a family resemblance concept. So, rather than argue that the builders’ game ‘really is a language’ (or not), I propose to turn the debate on its head and welcome the comparison. By changing our perspective in this way, I suggest that we can see that the learning of language is crucially dependent on forms of communication that are animal in nature. I then discuss how these lessons might shed light on empirical research into both the ontogenetic and phylogenetic origins of linguistic communication.     

Rush Rhees on Wittgenstein and “What Language Is”

Rush Rhees identified the question of “what language is” as central to Wittgenstein's philosophy, but believed he failed to follow up adequately the connections between the reality of discourse and our reality as persons. Integral to this is Rhees's elaboration of the distinction between such investigations into language and approaches to philosophy restricted to elucidating “the grammars of particular expressions.” The failure to fully acknowledge Rhees's contribution to the understanding of these issues has vitiated recent New Wittgensteinian discussion of both Wittgenstein and Rhees.     

Words that touch2

In this paper the author examines her own use of language as a psychoanalyst and asks: what is the best way to help analysands to find the words to express not only what they are thinking but also what they are feeling and experiencing? In common with other psychoanalysts, the author has observed that each of us simultaneously utilises both advanced psychic mechanisms that are accessible to symbolism and more archaic ones, which are less so. However, she draws a distinction between people who are able to tolerate the perception of their own heterogeneity, even if it is sometimes a source of suffering, and those whom she terms ‘heterogeneous patients’. Patients in the latter category, whose lack of internal cohesion causes them anxiety, are afraid of losing their sense of identity. The author asks how we can understand their language and how we should speak to them. She uses several clinical examples to demonstrate that ‘heterogeneous patients’ need to be touched with a language that does not confine itself to imparting thoughts verbally but also conveys feelings and the sensations that accompany those feelings. It is also an ‘incarnated’ language because the words pronounced by the analyst can awaken, or reawaken, bodily fantasies in the patient. These words may enable him to find an emotional meaning in forgotten sensory or bodily experiences, which may then become a starting point for his work of thinking and of symbolisation.     

Exploring Levinas: the ethical self in family therapy

From a systemic perspective, people are relational beings located in wider systems of interaction, conversation and meaning. As for social constructionists, the self is positioned and storied through language and dialogue. Yet is the self no more than the multiple conversations and relations it enters into? Systemic therapists informed by psychoanalytic thinking describe a reflective self, responsive to inner conversation about emotional experience ( Flaskas, 2005 ). Those working in mental health services contend with the biological and ‘cognitive‐mindful’ self. Perhaps the self can be defined in many ways or languages as a deconstructive both/and. In this paper the systemic, relational or dialogic self in family therapy is discussed from the perspective of the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. For Levinas ethical intersubjectivity is what makes subjectivity and thinking possible. The self is respons‐ibility to other or, as Derrida (1999) says, ‘consciousness is hospitality’ (p. 48). Yet for both Derrida and Levinas the relational self is also a separate and unique self. The ethical self is discussed in relation to family therapy practice.     

A Kleinian view of psychoanalytic couples therapy: Part 2

With extensive case material, Part 2 continues to explore the psychoanalytic treatment of couples. Since most couples enter treatment operating in a more primitive paranoid‐schizoid stance, the author contends that it is best to initially focus on each partner's pathological projections and have the other partner witness their struggle to overcome personal issues that contaminate the couple's unified psychology. With continuous working through, the couple can gradually find a more depressive, integrative footing within themselves and as a couple. Again, the value of ‘witnessing’ and working through individual defensive reactions against thinking, pathological projective identifications and the breakdown of the container‐contained function are all examined in the clinical presentations. All these clinical elements are part of the establishment of analytic contact first with each party as individuals and later as a unified couple.     

The Dialogical Nature of our Inner Lives

Abstract

Classically, we have treated talk of such things as meaning, understanding, and thinking, etc., as raising problems about mental states assumed to exist inside people's heads. And in our philosophical inquiries, we have sought determinate in-principle solutions to these problems. In the dialogical, relational-responsive view of language use presented here — influenced by Wittgenstein, Bakhtin, and Voloshinov — a very different view of such talk is presented. Our ‘inner lives’ are not hidden ‘inside’ us, but are ‘displayed’ out ‘in’ the unfolding, living encounters spontaneously occurring between us and the others around us as we live out our lives     

The notion of happiness in early Wittgenstein: towards a non-contentful account of happiness

This paper examines the notion of ‘happiness’ in the writings of the early Wittgenstein as a notion that does not involve any particular content or states of mind. The main question that the paper addresses is how we can retain a non-contentful account of happiness without turning happiness into an abstract notion, isolated from our concrete lives in language. The paper examines two pivotal components of the Wittgensteinian account of happiness: the ‘good exercise of the will’ and the ‘artistic way of seeing’. In both cases, I try to stress their non-contentful dimension, while simultaneously trying to understand them through language. The central concept for such a non-contentful aspect of language is the notion of ‘meaningfulness’. Thus the paper examines the pivotal components of the Wittgensteinian account of happiness in relation to the notion of ‘meaningfulness’: happiness is then explained as seeing a world against the background of possibilities of meaning.