Further clarification on the Hom, Mitchell, Lee, and Griffeth (2012) model: Reply to Bergman, Payne, and Boswell (2012) and Maertz (2012)

In this article, we reply to Bergman, Payne, and Boswell (2012) and Maertz (2012), who commented on our reconceptualization of the employee turnover criterion and proximal withdrawal states (Hom, Mitchell, Lee, & Griffeth, 2012). We agree with some points (e.g., anticipated destinations) but take issue with others (e.g., turnover intentions as the criterion). Nonetheless, our aim is to clarify our integrative formulation about mindsets for organizational participation and withdrawal. In our view, the current process of "article-commentaries-reply" advances our collective understanding of staying and leaving, which is of longstanding interest to scholars in industrial and organizational psychology, organizational behavior, and human resource management. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

An Exchange on Franz,Rowse, and Ballantine (2002)

Using a dynamical systems perspective on motor behavior, it was predicted that interlimb coordination of running and galloping would behave like coupled, nonlinear, limit-cycle oscillators, which show the properties of phase locking, entrainment, and structural stability. Female subjects ranging in age from 2.5 years to adult were filmed while running and galloping with and without a weight perturbation. Analysis of both temporal- and amplitude-phasing measures revealed that both gaits demonstrated oscillatory properties. Differences between gaits and across age were primarily a matter of degree. In general, children 4 years of age and below had slightly less stable phasing patterns, and all age groups showed slightly less stability in the gallop, particularly with amplitude phasing.     

陈铎散曲点评(之十五、之十六、之十七)

(十五)外三章(其一):北中品·朝天子·卜(注一) 睁着眼莽诌(注二),闭着眼瞎诌,那一个知休咎(注三)?流年月令费钻求(注四),就里多虚谬.四课三传(注五),张八李九(注六),一桩桩不应口.百中经枕头(注七),卦盒儿在手,花打算胡将就(注八).     

Some thoughts on essence placeholders, interactionism, and heritability: reply to Haslam (2011) and Turkheimer (2011)

In the target article (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011), we provided a social-cognitive framework which identified genetic essentialist biases and their implications. In their commentaries, Haslam (2011) and Turkheimer (2011) indicated their general agreement with this framework but highlighted some important points for consideration. Haslam suggested that neuroessentialism is a comparable kind of essentialist bias and identified similarities with the genetic essentialism framework. In response, we acknowledge similarities but also identify qualitative and quantitative differences between genetic essentialism and other kinds of essentialist biases. Turkheimer challenged us to extend our discussion to address the question of how should people respond to genetic etiological information, critiqued the use of heritability coefficients, and identified a new construct (1 - rMZ), which may be termed a free-will coefficient. In response, we emphasize the need to transform interactionist explanations from being empty platitudes to becoming the default conceptual framework; we wholeheartedly accept his critical view of heritability coefficient estimates (but acknowledge a more limited utility for them); and we are intrigued by his conceptual interest in identifying free-will coefficients yet warn against falling into pitfalls similar to those that were stumbled into in the past.     

(Re)assembling Natures,Cultures, and (Nano)technologies in Public Engagement

Abstract

Practices of ordering are powerful means of giving structure to people's lives and providing a sense of control. The analysis of three episodes from discussion groups on nanotechnology in Austria shows that citizens evaluate new technologies with regard to how they intersect with, support, or disturb existing orders. The concept of discursive assemblages serves as a lens for recognising the non-fixed character of the discursive process, while still allowing the analyst to identify how specific elements, such as conceptions of nature, culture, and technology, are (re)assembled at particular moments. Each of the three episodes represents a specific way of creating and negotiating assemblages: the first case demonstrates how discussants collectively discuss a nature–technology hybrid (nano-bamboo socks) against the backdrop of a highly valued ideal of keeping ‘the natural’ and ‘the technological’ separate; the second episode exemplifies a clash of two assemblages as participants argued for or against the application of nanotechnology in food products; and the third example illustrates the process of collective experimentation with different assemblages to make sense of a highly futuristic nanochip for brain enhancement. Together the episodes demonstrate that participants in public engagement settings do not address nanotechnology as a simple question of choice between acceptance and rejection but rather engage in processes of care regarding how a society might develop when technological innovations such as nanotechnology threaten to blur existing boundaries and orders, such as the distinction between nature and culture.     

Active masks and active inhibition: a comment on Lleras and Enns (2004) and on Verleger, Jaskowski, Aydemir, van der Lubbe, and Groen (2004)

Verleger, Jaskowski, Aydemir, van der Lubbe, and Groen and Lleras and Enns have argued that negative compatibility effects (NCEs) obtained with masked primes do not reflect self-inhibition processes in motor control. Instead, NCEs are assumed to reflect activation of the response opposite to the prime, triggered by the presence of prime/targetlike features in the mask. Thus, no NCEs should be elicited when masks do not contain such task-relevant features. In Experiments 1 and 3, the authors demonstrate that NCEs can be obtained when masks contain only irrelevant features. Experiment 2 demonstrates that positive compatibility effects (PCEs) will occur with such masks when masked primes are presented peripherally. These results are inconsistent with the mask-induced activation accounts but are in line with the self-inhibition hypothesis of the NCE. Although perceptual interactions and mask-induced motor activations may contribute to NCEs under certain conditions, they cannot provide a full explanation for these effects.     

Behavior,process, and scale: Comments on Shimp (2020), “Molecular (moment-to-moment) and molar (aggregate) analyses of behavior”

If we study the behavior of organisms, we must understand the ontological status of both “organism” and “behavior.” A living organism maintains itself alive by constantly interacting with the environment, taking in energy and discarding waste. Ontologically, an organism is a process. Its interactions with the environment, which constitute its behavior, are processes also, because the parts of any process are themselves processes. Processes serve functions, and the function of a process must be part of its identity. A process, by definition, extends in time. Time is the fundamental and universal measure of behavior. All processes have the property of scale. Activities of an organism have parts that are themselves activities on a smaller time scale. Scale varies continuously, and behavior may be studied on as large or as small a time scale as seems necessary. When researchers refer to the “structure” of behavior, they refer to smaller-scale activities. Attaching a switch to a lever or key is convenient, but one should never confuse operation of a switch with a unit of behavior. Shimp's (2020) “molecular” measures are small-scale measures. The molecular view based on discrete events has outlived its usefulness and should be replaced by a multiscale molar paradigm.     

(Neuro)predictions,Dangerousness, and Retributivism

Through the criminal justice system so-called dangerous offenders are, besides the offence that they are being convicted of and sentenced to, also punished for acts that they have not done but that they are believe to be likely to commit in the future. The aim of this paper is to critically discuss whether some adherents of retributivism give a plausible rationale for punishing offenders more harshly if they, all else being equal, by means of predictions are believed to be more dangerous than other offenders. While consequentialism has no problem, at least in principle, with this use of predictions most retributivists have been opponents of punishing offenders on the basis of predictions. How can an offender deserve to be punished for something that he has not done? But some retributivists like Anthony Duff and Stephen Morse have argued in favor of punishing offenders who are considered to be dangerous in the future more harshly than non-dangerous offenders. After having reconstructed their arguments in detail, it will be argued that both Duff’s and Morse’s attempts to give a retributivistic justification have several shortcomings.     

Anxiety,Learning, and Instruction (Book)

When witnesses at a trial offer testimony that is vivid, it may be more persuasive than the same testimony offered in a pallid manner. In this paper we elucidate three categories of variables (inferential, attentional/memorial, and affective) that are likely to mediate the effects of the vividness of testimony on jury judgments. These variables are then used to explain discrepant findings among mock juror experiments investigating vividness effects. Finally, we discuss the implications of vividness effects for the legal system.