A mile in moccasins: how situational experience diminishes dispositionism in social inference

In four studies, this article investigates the impact of situational experience on social inference. Participants without firsthand experience of a situation made more extreme and erroneous inferences about the personalities of people behaving in that situation than did participants with firsthand experience. Firsthand experience, thus, appears to diminish dispositionism in social inference because it informs people about the situational constraints that guide behavior. Across all studies, participants also displayed holier-than-thou biases, overpredicting how generously they would act relative to predictions about their peers and also relative to how they actually acted when the situation came.     

Do situational expectations produce situational inferenes? The role of future expectations in directing inferential goals

Little is known about the conditions that lead observers to adopt different inferential goals in the context of their everyday lives. Four studies examined whether future expectations created situational inferential goals. In 2 quasiexperimental studies, students made more situational inferences for targets in their expected future careers. In 2 experiments, situational expectations were manipulated, and participants made more situational inferences when they expected to be in the same situation as the target. This tendency was stronger when observers devoted minimal cognitive effort to their inferences, suggesting that when observers have situational expectations, making situational inferences is less effortful than making dispositional inferences.     

The role of preschoolers' social understanding in evaluating the informativeness of causal interventions

Preschoolers use information from interventions, namely intentional actions, to make causal inferences. We asked whether children consider some interventions to be more informative than others based on two components of an actor’s knowledge state: whether an actor possesses causal knowledge, and whether an actor is allowed to use their knowledge in a given situation. Three- and four-year-olds saw a novel toy that activated in the presence of certain objects. Two actors, one knowledgeable about the toy and one ignorant, each tried to activate the toy with an object. In Experiment 1, either the actors chose objects or the child chose for them. In Experiment 2, the actors chose objects blindfolded. Objects were always placed on the toy simultaneously, and thus were equally associated with the effect. Preschoolers’ causal inferences favored the knowledgeable actor’s object only when he was allowed to choose it (Experiment 1). Thus, children consider both personal and situational constraints on knowledge when evaluating the informativeness of causal interventions.     

Causal attribution and dispositional inference: Evidence of inconsistent judgments

Two experiments examined whether individuals who ascribe the disparity in the performances of two actors to situational constraints adequately adjust their dispositional inferences to reflect their own perceptions of causality. Using the quiz-game format of L. D. Ross, T. M. Amabile, and J. L. Steinmetz (1977, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 485–494), the effects of the subjects' awareness of the role-determined, self-presentation advantage of the questioner on their dispositional inferences concerning the quiz-game participants are noted. It is hypothesized that subjects who indicated full awareness of the determining force of the situation would nevertheless draw more favorable dispositional inferences about the questioner than about the contestant. The prediction is confirmed. Although the situationally aware subjects rate the questioner and contestant more similarly than do the other subjects, they still rate the questioner higher in knowledge, memory, and education. The results of Experiment 2 indicate that increasing the salience of the subjects' assessment of the situational advantage of the questioner does not eliminate the disparity. It is proposed that the fudamental attribution error represents more a failure to adjust trait inferences for causal attributions than a misperception of causality. Implications concerning the relationship between knowledge of causality and social judgment and the utility of the distinction between “perceived causality” and “higher order causal inferences” are discussed.     

What do you want? How perceivers use cues to make goal inferences about others

Variables influencing inferences about a stranger's goal during an unsolicited social interaction were explored. Experiment 1 developed a procedure for identifying cues. Experiments 2 and 3 assessed the relative importance of various cues (space, time, characteristics of oneself, characteristics of the stranger, and the stranger's behavior) for goal judgments. Results indicated that situational context cues informed goal judgments in ways that were consistent with diagnosticity ratings and typicality ratings of those cues. Stranger characteristics and stranger behaviors affected goal judgments more than would be expected from these quantitative measures of their informativeness. Nonetheless, the results are consistent with a mental model view that assumes perceivers monitor situational cues present during interactions and that goal inferences are guided by the informativeness of these cues.     

Generalized and specific expectancies: Sequential mediators of interpersonal behavior1

Two experiments confirmed sequential mediation of social interaction by investigating the effects of generalized expectancies on specific expectancies and the effects of specific expectancies on performance. Both experiments used a simulated tutoring task in which the subject took the role of tutor while a confederate took the role of student. In Experiment 1 subjects combined generalized expectancies about the effectiveness of certain tutoring responses with specific situational information to produce specific expectancies about the results of the tutoring responses under the experimental circumstances. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and showed that specific expectancies of the relative effectiveness of different responses influenced which response was performed more. Results were discussed in terms of cognitive motivation theory and social learning theory.     

主题关系在4~5岁儿童不同属性归纳推理发展中的作用

为探讨主题关系在儿童归纳推理中的作用,采用经典的三角归纳范式,设计了主题关系和知觉相似冲突、主题关系和分类学关系冲突两种情形,来考察4~5岁儿童在内在属性和情境性属性任务中的归纳推理。结果显示：当主题关系和知觉相似冲突时,从4.5岁开始儿童主要基于主题关系对情境性属性进行归纳推理,而对于内在属性的推论,4~5岁儿童在基于主题关系和基于知觉相似上没有显著差异。当主题关系和分类学关系冲突时,从4.5岁开始儿童主要基于主题关系对情境性属性进行归纳推理,从5岁开始儿童主要基于分类学关系对内在属性进行归纳推理。两个实验结果均发现5岁和5.5岁儿童能够依据不同的属性使用不同的关系推理,表现出归纳灵活性     

Inferences from disclosures about the truth and falsity of expert testimony

Participants acting as mock jurors made inferences about whether a person was a suspect in a murder based on an expert's testimony about the presence of objects at the crime scene and the disclosure that the testimony was true or false. Experiment 1 showed that participants made more correct inferences, and made inferences more quickly, when the truth or falsity of the expert's testimony was disclosed immediately after the testimony rather than when the disclosure was delayed. Experiment 2 showed no advantage for prior disclosure over immediate disclosure. Experiment 3 showed that the pattern of inferences when there was no disclosure mirrored the pattern when it was disclosed that the expert's testimony was true rather than false. Participants made more correct inferences from true conjunctions than disjunctions, and from false disjunctions than conjunctions. We discuss the implications for theories of the mental representations and cognitive processes that underlie human reasoning.     

Social dominance orientation and group context in implicit group prejudice

We tested the joint influence of individual difference and situational factors on implicit group prejudice. Participants in Experiments 1 and 2 were briefly shown in-group or out-group pronouns prior to evaluating good or bad trait adjectives. Under standard conditions (Experiment 1), there was no difference between participants with high and low social dominance orientation (SDO), but when the intergroup context was made more salient (Experiment 2), high-SDO participants alone showed implicit group prejudice. Implications for the malleability and consensuality of implicit prejudice are discussed.     

Smart and easy: Co-occurring activation of spontaneous trait inferences and spontaneous situational inferences

Social perceivers have been shown to draw spontaneous trait inferences (STI’s) about the behavior of an actor as well as spontaneous situational inferences (SSI’s) about the situation the actor is in. In two studies, we examined inferences about behaviors that allow for both an STI and an SSI. In Experiment 1, using a probe recognition paradigm, we found activation of both STI’s and SSI’s. In Experiment 2, using a relearning paradigm, we again found activation of both STI’s and SSI’s, regardless of temporarily activated processing goals. Results are discussed in light of three-stage models of the process of social inference.     

The effect of knowledge and context in the elicitation of inferences in class-inclusion reasoning

Abstract

Two experiments were carried out with adult subjects to investigate the conditions of production of inferences in a problem-solving task involving reasoning about class inclusion. We tested the hypothesis that the production of appropriate inferences is facilitated whenever pieces of information are stored in memory that can be matched at least in part with the conclusion resulting from the inference. In Experiment 1, problems involving the same inferential pattern but belonging to three different domains were compared. The inclusion relations were of the type “is a kind of” (semantic domain), “more than” (being 8 years old is being more than 7 years old: logico-mathematical domain) or “what I have received on a given day is a part of what I have in the evening” (possession domain). In the semantic domain, the critical inference may be facilitated by the semantic network of concepts stored in memory. In the logico-mathematical domain, there is no information that corresponds to the critical inference, so that inferences have to be elaborated merely by use of general knowledge about the meaning of the relation. The possession domain is an intermediate case, since the inference corresponds to knowledge about relations in the possession domain. The results clearly support a memory-cueing hypothesis: There is a marked order of difficulty ranging from the logico-mathematical domain (most difficult) to the semantic domain (least difficult). In Experiment 2, equivalent problems using the same conceptual information were compared: The critical inference involved scanning a series of numbers either in direct order (more than 7 is 8, 9, 10) or in reverse order (8, 9, 10 is more than 7). The number of correct solutions was higher and the response latency much shorter for those problems in which the critical inference was of the type “more than 7 is 8, 9 or 10″.     

Causal learning across domains

Five studies investigated (a) children's ability to use the dependent and independent probabilities of events to make causal inferences and (b) the interaction between such inferences and domain-specific knowledge. In Experiment 1, preschoolers used patterns of dependence and independence to make accurate causal inferences in the domains of biology and psychology. Experiment 2 replicated the results in the domain of biology with a more complex pattern of conditional dependencies. In Experiment 3, children used evidence about patterns of dependence and independence to craft novel interventions across domains. In Experiments 4 and 5, children's sensitivity to patterns of dependence was pitted against their domain-specific knowledge. Children used conditional probabilities to make accurate causal inferences even when asked to violate domain boundaries.     

A fuzzy trace analysis of categorical inferences and instantial associations as a function of retention interval

Two experiments on children's inferences and associative memory provided a test of predictions from fuzzy-trace theory. Specifically, it was expected that gist-based false recognitions would increase with age and that false recognitions would be uncorrelated with verbatim memory. In Experiment 1, children in Grades 1 through 5 heard lists of category labels, clustered instances from categories, and individual instances. On an immediate test, children indicated whether or not they had previously heard a series of individually presented test words. This list consisted of old words, new words, or words that were categorically or semantically related to the studied word clusters. Children made more false recognition errors for instances than for categories. Verbatim memory and inferences were unrelated. In Experiment 2, the effect of a test delay on categorical inferences and associated instances was examined with children in Grades 1 to 6. With delay, false recognition of associated instances declined for children at all grade levels. In contrast, categorical inferences increased with delay for older children. Verbatim memory and inferences were uncorrelated under immediate and 1-day delay conditions, but there were some low but significant correlations across grades under the 7-day delay. The results of the two experiments are interpreted as supporting fuzzy-trace theory.     

Children's understanding of natural language hierarchies

Three experiments examined young children's ability to evaluate the relationship between concepts as one of inclusion. In Experiment 1, the same group of 4-to 7-year-old children were given three tasks: one in which they made judgments about whether “all” or “some” members of a category were included in another category, and two tasks in which they made inferences based on knowledge of inclusion relations. The majority of children succeeded on at least one of the tasks, thereby implying that they could evaluate inclusion relations. Two further experiments provided more evidence for this hypothesis: Experiment 2 confirmed that nursery children could answer quantitative questions about conceptual interrelationts; Experiment 3 demonstrated that nursery schoolers could solve certain inference problems involving the construction and evaluation of hierarchies.     

The automatic and co-occurring activation of multiple social inferences

People make a variety of automatic inferences when observing others' actions. These include inferences about stable dispositions as well as transitory goal states and social situations. However, models of social inference have rarely considered whether different types of automatic inferences can co-occur. We present three experiments in which participants were incidentally exposed to texts depicting behaviors that afforded inferences about actors' traits and the social situations these actors were experiencing. Results from lexical decision and probe-recognition tasks revealed heightened activation of both trait and situational inferences; furthermore, this co-occurring activation was spontaneous, unconscious, and independent of processing resources or specific impression-formation goals. A fourth experiment extended these findings by showing that when participants were asked to make deliberate attributional judgments of the same set of behaviors, typical goal-directed biases reflecting the selection of either trait or situational interpretations emerged. Implications for social inference processes are discussed.     

The dispositional inference strikes back: situational focus and dispositional suppression in causal attribution

The authors propose that correction of dispositional inferences involves the examination of situational constraints and the suppression of dispositional inferences. They hypothesized that suppression would result in dispositional rebound. In Study 1, participants saw a video of either a free or a forced speaker. Participants shown a forced speaker later made stronger dispositional inferences about a 2nd, free speaker than control participants did. Study 2 provided evidence for higher rebound among participants who reported trying harder to suppress dispositional inferences during the 1st video. In Study 3, participants were asked to focus on situational constraints or to avoid thinking about the speaker's characteristics. Only the latter instructions led to a dispositional rebound. These data support the view that the correction of dispositional inferences involves 2 processes that lead to distinct consequences in subsequent attribution work.     

The goal structure of situations

An empirical method for analysing the goal structure within and between persons in different social situations is described. The method involves establishing the main goals of occupants of situational roles and then finding out how the different goals inter-relate in terms of degree and type/direction of conflict and compatibility. Principal components analyses were carried out on ratings of importance of goals of those in different situational roles. Criteria of high factor loadings combined with high mean importance ratings were used to produce the main higher order goals for each of the roles. The goals for the six roles studied were, in each case except one: social acceptance/developing relationships, own well being and achieving a specific situational task goal. However, the precise nature of these goals is rather different in the different situations. Inter-relationship of goals was studied using ratings of conflict or compatibility between pairs of goals within and across roles of each situation. The results were used to describe the goal structures of the different situations. The situation with the most conflict between goals was, as expected, the complaint. Ways were suggested in which knowledge of the goal structure, particularly the points of conflict, could help with skilful handling of potentially difficult social situations.