How good is good luck? The role of counterfactual thinking in the perception of lucky and unlucky events

Spontaneous references to ‘luck’ (e.g. in the mass media) frequently occur in connection with narrow escapes from accidents. The hypothesis that lucky events are not always positive, to the same degree as unlucky events are negative, was tested by asking Norwegian and Polish students to describe incidents of good and bad luck from their own lives, These stories were subsequently evaluated by the narrators and by a group of judges. Ratings showed unlucky events to be uniformly negative whereas lucky events varied widely in attractiveness. Both were characterized by the idea that the outcome could easily have been a dramatically different one. In a parallel set of studies, pleasant and unpleasant experiences from students' everyday life were collected (without specific reference to luck) and evaluated along the same dimensions. The results confirm that unlucky and unpleasant events have more in common than lucky and pleasant ones. Pleasant and unpleasant events can be imagined to have opposite alternative outcomes, but these are felt with less immediacy than in the case of luck. It is concluded that luck attributions typically occur in situations that could easily have taken a worse turn. How lucky depends upon how easily and how much worse.     

Good luck and bad luck: how to tell the difference

Good luck implies comparison with a worse counterfactual outcome, whereas bad luck implies upward comparisons. People will accordingly describe themselves as particularly lucky after recollecting situations where they avoided something negative, and as particularly unlucky after recollecting episodes in which they missed something positive (Study 1). Upward and downward comparisons can be created by the way a situation develops, and are accentuated by the way a story is told. Good luck stories typically change for the better only in the last stage, whereas bad luck stories show a more steady downward progression (Study 2). This is also reflected in phrases believed to be characteristic of good luck versus bad luck stories, with good luck stories involving surprise and reference to close counterfactuals, whereas bad luck stories focus on initial normal events (Study 3). Good and bad luck imply different orders of events (negative–positive versus positive–negative), so by rearranging the narrative sequence, the same set of outcomes can form the basis for a good luck story as well as a bad luck story (Study 4). The final experiment (Study 5) shows that negative outcome expectations are typical for chance‐determined and uncontrolled situations. Under such circumstances, factual outcomes do not have to be exceptionally good to be considered as lucky. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of superstitious thinking on psychosocial stress responses and perceived task performance

Previous research on superstitious belief, a subset of paranormal belief (Irwin, 1993 ), has suggested that people tend to invoke luck‐related superstitions in stressful situations as an attempt to gain an illusion of control over outcomes. Based on this, the current study examined whether luck‐related superstition, in the form of a “lucky” pen, could influence the psychological response to a psychosocial stressor. Participants (N = 114), aged between 17 and 59 years (M = 22.98, SD = 4.57) from James Cook University Singapore, were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: (a) no‐stress with no lucky pen; (b) no‐stress with a lucky pen; (c) stress with no lucky pen or; (d) stress with a lucky pen. The results revealed that participants provided with a lucky pen experienced lower state anxiety when exposed to the stressor. Further, participants provided with a lucky pen perceived their performance to be better than those without it. However, superstitious belief did not significantly change following exposure to stress. Taken together, the present findings add some support to the suggestion that belief in transferable luck may facilitate coping with a stressor. However, further research is needed to fully understand the mechanisms behind the potential benefits of superstitious belief.     

Dispositional optimism and luck attributions: Implications for philosophical theories of luck

We conducted two studies to determine whether there is a relationship between dispositional optimism and the attribution of good or bad luck to ambiguous luck scenarios. Study 1 presented five scenarios that contained both a lucky and an unlucky component, thereby making them ambiguous in regard to being an overall case of good or bad luck. Participants rated each scenario in toto on a four-point Likert scale and then completed an optimism questionnaire. The results showed a significant correlation between optimism and assignments of luck: more optimistic people rated the characters in the ambiguous scenarios as more lucky while more pessimistic people rated the same characters in the same scenarios as more unlucky. Study 2 separated the good and bad luck components of the study 1 scenarios and presented the components individually to a new group of participants. Participants rated the luckiness of each component on the same four-point scale and then completed the optimism questionnaire. We found that the luckiness of the bad luck component could be significantly predicted by their level of optimism. We discuss how these findings pose problems for philosophical accounts that treat luck as an objective property.     

Sex differences in the contexts of extreme jealousy

Research on sex differences in jealousy using continuous measures sometimes reveals that women report more intense jealousy than men in response to both sexual and emotional infidelity. Two studies tested whether these findings might have stemmed from sex differences in the interpretation of the upper anchor of the jealousy scales (e.g., “extremely jealous”). In Study 1, women and men offered different types of exemplars when describing situations in which they felt extremely jealous. A significantly greater proportion of women than men reported feeling extreme jealousy in the context of romantic relationships. Additional results demonstrated that women and men confuse the terms “jealousy” and “envy,” although this confusion cannot account for the sex differences in the contexts of extreme jealousy. Study 2 demonstrated that the sex difference in the intensity of reported jealousy disappears if the upper anchor of the scale is modified to include specific contextual information (e.g., “as jealous as you could feel in a romantic relationship”).     

On the counterfactual nature of envy: “It could have been me”

We examined whether counterfactual thinking influences the experience of envy. Counterfactual thinking refers to comparing the situation as it is to what it could have been, and these thought processes have been shown to lead to a variety of emotions. We predicted that for envy the counterfactual thought “it could have been me” would be important. In four studies we found a clear link between such counterfactual thoughts and the intensity of envy. Furthermore, Studies 3 and 4 revealed that a manipulation known to affect the extent of counterfactual thinking (the perception of being close to obtaining the desired outcome oneself), had an effect on the intensity of envy via counterfactual thoughts. This relationship between counterfactual thinking and the experience of envy allows for new predictions concerning situations under which envy is likely be more intense.     

The lottery of life and moral desert: An empirical investigation

As John Rawls makes clear in A Theory of Justice, there is a popular and influential strand of political thought for which brute luck – that is, being lucky (or unlucky) in the so-called “lottery of life” – ought to have no place in a theory of distributive justice. Yet the debate about luck, desert, and fairness in contemporary political philosophy has recently been rekindled by a handful of philosophers who claim that desert should play a bigger role in theories of distributive justice. In the present paper, we present the results of our attempts to fill in some of the missing empirical details of this debate. Our findings provide some preliminary evidence that, contrary to what most contemporary political philosophers have assumed, people are not as worried by natural luck as previously thought. Instead, people’s worries seem to be focused exclusively on inequalities generated by social luck.     

No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology

Current epistemological orthodoxy has it that knowledge is incompatible with luck. More precisely: Knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck (of a certain, interesting kind). This is often treated as a truism which is not even in need of argumentative support. In this paper, I argue that there is lucky knowledge. In the first part, I use an intuitive and not very developed notion of luck to show that there are cases of knowledge which are “lucky” in that sense. In the second part, I look at philosophical conceptions of luck (modal and probabilistic ones) and come to the conclusion that knowledge can be lucky in those senses, too. I also turns out that a probabilistic notion of luck can help us see in what ways a particular piece of knowledge or belief can be lucky or not lucky.     

Hazards mean luck: Counterfactual thinking in reports of dangerous situations and careless behavior

It has been shown (Teigen, 1995) that experiences of "luck" in daily life are dependent upon the existence a worse and close hypothetical (counterfactual) outcome, rather than upon a positive evaluation of what actually happened. The present investigation focuses on the inverse relationship, namely whether a situation with a negative outcome close at hand will be perceived as lucky. To test this hypothesis, students were asked to describe dangerous situations (Experiment 1) and examples of careless behavior (Experiment 3) from their own lives, which subsequently were rated by the actors and by peer groups for good and bad luck, attractiveness, and for closeness and attractiveness of the counterfactual outcome. Dangerous situations and episodes involving careless behavior were generally regarded as more lucky than unlucky. Furthermore, degree of good luck was positively correlated with degree of dangerousness and with degree of carelessness. Luck was related to closeness, aversiveness, and (in Experiment 2) to estimated probability of the counterfactual outcome. It is concluded that luck is primarily determined by negative outcomes that did not happen, and thus a frequent by-product of risk taking and risk exposure.     

More gratitude,less materialism: The mediating role of life satisfaction

An empirical relationship has been documented between gratitude and materialism, such that stronger feelings of gratitude are associated with lower materialism. Building on Fredrickson's (1998, 2001) theory that positive emotions ‘broaden’ and ‘build’ we sought to expand upon this finding by (1) examining satisfaction with life as a potential mechanism for this relationship, and (2) exploring the causal direction of this relationship through experimental means. Study 1 (n = 131) demonstrated that satisfaction with life mediated the relationship between gratitude and materialism. Study 2 (n = 171) showed that that experimentally induced gratitude resulted in higher satisfaction with life and lower materialism in a high gratitude condition compared to an envy (low gratitude) condition. Implications and directions for future research were discussed.     

To Have and to Hold: Thoughts on Admiration/Envy: Commentary on Paper by Joye Weisel-Barth

Using the author's definition of “envy,” I try to separate out fleeting feelings of envy that lead to “admiration” from very disturbing feelings of envy that have to remain hidden because they are so shameful. I try to explore the reasons why it is so unlikely that analysts will feel envy of their patients no matter how rich and famous they may be. Instead, I try to show that this really is a paper on “admiration” and quote the relevant literature on how to distinguish these two affects. A careful reading of the case material shows that the analyst's admiration of her patient's artwork served a very positive role in the treatment of a severely narcissistic man whose self-esteem had plummeted after suffering several losses. It seemed that by being a “container” and “self-object” for a long period, the analyst was able to rescue pieces of the patient's self that he felt were falling through a “colander.” The case is also used as an example of some of the work that started in the 1970s about how to work with narcissistic and nonclassical cases in a noninterpretative manner.     

Luck and Decision

abstract Much recent work on moral responsibility and on distributive justice has addressed the concept of luck. Very little attention has been given to the relation of luck to rationality. How does luck bear on our choices? Can beliefs about luck lead to unwise decisions? These questions have particular relevance for understanding gambling behaviour, and for public policy on gambling. In this paper I argue that no one is reliably lucky, and that projecting luck can undermine rational decision‐making. I give various examples to show the conceptual connection between luck and unpredictability. I present an a posteriori conception of projectibility, and argue that because lucky events are rationally unexpected, regularity statements about luck fail to satisfy the conditions of projectibility. I reject the claim that ‘lucky’ is a dispositional term, and thus projectible, on the ground that a dispositional interpretation leads to contradiction. I then defend my claim that luck is not projectible against three objections. I conclude with some thoughts about rational responses to luck, using gambling as an illustration.     

How Interesting is the “Boring Problem” for Luck Egalitarianism?

Imagine a two‐person distributive case in which Ernest's choices yield X and Bertie's choices yield X + Y, producing an income gap between them of Y. Neither Ernest nor Bertie is responsible for this gap of Y, since neither of them has any control over what the other agent chooses. This is what Susan Hurley calls the “Boring Problem” for luck egalitarianism. Contrary to Hurley's relatively dismissive treatment of it, it is contended that the Boring Problem poses a deep problem for standard luck egalitarianism. To counter it, luck egalitarianism needs to be recast as a baseline‐relative theory. This new version of luck egalitarianism is then put to work against some significant problems that have been encountered by luck egalitarianism: Saul Smilansky's “Paradox of the Baseline,” the “Partiality Worry,” and the “Pluralism Worry.” But baseline‐relative luck egalitarianism is not without problems of its own.     

Envy divides the two faces of narcissism

In this article, we test psychodynamic assumptions about envy and narcissism by examining malicious envy in the context of narcissistic grandiosity and vulnerability. In Study 1, students (N = 192) and community adults (N = 161) completed trait measures of narcissism, envy, and schadenfreude. In Study 2 (N = 121), participants relived an episode of envy, and cognitive‐affective components of envy were examined in the context of both self‐ and informant reports of their envy and narcissism. In Study 3 (N = 69), narcissism was linked to reports of envy covertly induced in the laboratory. Vulnerable narcissism was strongly and consistently related to dispositional envy and schadenfreude (Studies 1–2), as well as to all cognitive‐affective components of envy (Study 2). Furthermore, it facilitated envy and schadenfreude toward a high‐status peer (Study 3). Grandiose narcissism was slightly negatively related to dispositional envy (Studies 1–2), and it did not predict informant reports of envy or cognitive‐affective components of the emotion (Study 2). Finally, it did not exacerbate envy, hostility, or resentment toward a high‐status peer (Study 3). The results suggest envy is a central emotion in the lives of those with narcissistic vulnerability and imply that envy should be reconsidered as a symptom accompanying grandiose features in the diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder.     

Envy Across Adulthood: The What and the Who

Two studies assessed envy across adulthood. Study 1 (n = 987) examined subjects’ experiences of feeling envy. Study 2 (n = 843) examined being the target of another's envy. Envy primarily occurred between same-gender and similarly aged others. Fewer older adults reported envy incidents. Envy was reported in both distant and close relationships. Both studies found that the likelihood of envying certain domains shifted across the life span: scholastic success, social success, looks, and romantic success were less envied with age, whereas money was more envied with age. Envy in some domains (luck, overall better life) was fairly consistent across the life span.     

The unique consequences of feeling lucky: Implications for consumer behavior

Cognitive priming procedures were used to identify the unique effects that luck-related concepts have on consumer behavior. The effects of these concepts could theoretically influence behavior through the elicitation of positive affect or via temporary changes in participants' self representations of how lucky they feel. An initial experiment showed that priming Asian consumers with lucky numbers independently influenced both their perceptions of personal luck and the positive affect they reported experiencing. Subsequent experiments, however, showed that the effect of these primes on consumer behavior was mediated by momentary changes in how lucky people felt (i.e. changes in the self concept) rather than by the positive affect they were experiencing at the time. Exposing consumers to lucky numbers influenced their estimates of how likely they were to win a lottery (Experiment 2), their willingness to participate in such a lottery (Experiment 4), their evaluations of different promotional strategies (Experiment 3), and also the amount of money they were willing to invest in different financial options (Experiment 4). The effect of luck on behavior was also moderated by a person's regulatory focus.     

What,and Where,Luck is: A Response to Jennifer Lackey

In ‘What Luck Is Not’, Lackey presents counterexamples to the two most prominent accounts of luck: the absence of control account and the modal account. I offer an account of luck that conjoins absence of control to a modal condition. I then show that Lackey's counterexamples mislocate the luck: the agents in her cases are lucky, but the luck precedes the event upon which Lackey focuses, and that event is itself only fortunate, not lucky. Finally I offer an account of fortune. Fortune is luck-involving, and therefore easily confused with luck, but it is not itself lucky.     

The reward value of near-miss situations

Svartdal, F. (2011). The reward value of near‐miss situations. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology52, 209–217. What is a “positive” outcome? Clearly, obtaining something attractive is regarded as positive, but so is avoiding something negative. The present paper compared these two types of situations in scenario‐type evaluations. Participants rated positive (P), avoiding negative (AN), and negative (N) outcomes in terms of luck (Experiment 1) and overall positive/negative evaluations (Experiments 2 and 3). The results demonstrated that evaluations of P and AN outcomes were judged as equally positive, but the emotional basis for these evaluations was very different: The feeling of relief was the dominating emotion in AN situations, whereas joy was the dominating emotion in P situations. Overall, these results indicate that avoidance‐induced reward value may be important as a motivating factor in cognition and action.     

Subject‐Involving Luck

In recent years, philosophers have tended to think of luck as being a relation between an event (taken in the broadest sense of the term) and a subject; to give an account of luck is to fill in the right‐hand side of the following biconditional: an event e is lucky for a subject S if and only if ____. We can call such accounts of luck subject‐relative accounts of luck, since they attempt to spell out what it is for an event to be lucky relative to a subject. This essay argues that we should understand subject‐relative luck as a secondary phenomenon. What is of philosophical interest is giving an account of subject‐involving luck, i.e., filling in the right‐hand side of this biconditional: it is a matter of luck that S ?s iff ____. The essay argues that one of the upshots of focusing on subject‐involving luck is that lack of control accounts of luck (LCALs) become more attractive. In particular, a range of counterexamples to LCALs of subject‐relative luck do not apply to LCALs of subject‐involving luck.