On the base-free measure of change proposed by Tucker,Damarin and Messick

Tucker, Damarin and Messick proposed a base-free measure of change which involves the computation of residual scores that are uncorrelated with true scores on the pretest. The present note discusses this change measure and demonstrates that, because of an incorrect derivation by the authors, properties they attribute to (the coefficient for the regression of true scores from the second testing on true scores from the first testing) are, in fact, properties ofb, the ordinary regression coefficient. A correct derivation of the initial position—change correlation in terms of is obtained, and Tucker et al.'s discussion of the law of initial values is reconsidered.The preparation of this paper was supported by the Learning Research and Development Center supported in part as a research and development center by funds from the National Institute of Education.     

Kelley's formula as a basis for the assessment of reliable change

In the literature on the measurement of change,reliable change is usually determined by means of a confidence interval around an observed value of a statistic that estimates thetrue change. In recent literature on the efficacy of psychotherapies, attention has been particularly directed at the improvement of the estimation of the true change. Reliable Change Indices, incorporating thereliability-weighted measure of individual change, also known as Kelley's formula, have been proposed. According to current practice, these indices are defined as the ratio of such an estimator and an intuitively appealing criterion and then regarded as standard normally distributed statistics. However, because the authors fail to adopt an adequate standard error of the estimator, the statistical properties of their indices are unclear. In this article, it is shown that this can lead to paradoxical conclusions. The adjusted standard error is derived.     

Why Don't People Change? What Stops Them from Changing? An Integrative Commentary on the Special Issue on Resistance

This commentary discusses the four papers from the vantage point of a cognitive-developmental view. Psychotherapeutic change involving changes in core cognitive structures is seen as threatening an individual's personal sense of identity as well as security and safety needs. Core cognitive constructs are laid down early via the principle of covariation of events and form the basis of our tacit knowledge base. Subsequent changes in this tacit knowledge is difficult because the core cognitive constructs act like a mental filter to screen in confirming data and screen out disconfirming data. Ambiguous stimuli tend to be interpreted on the basis of preexisting cognitive constructs, even when the match between event and interpretation is not ideal. Several suggestions are given for increasing the probability of changes occurring in core cognitive constructs.     

Beidler’s taste equation: A correction

Beidler derived an equation relating the magnitude of neural response to a gustatory stimulus with the concentration of that stimulus. In the derivation, he assumed the amount of stimulating substance removed from the solution by the receptors was small enough not to change the stimulus concentration appreciably. An equation without this assumption is derived, and is evaluated in the light of existing data. The hypothesis for a dissociation reaction in taste inception under some circumstances is given support.     

Untangling the Theory of Planned Behavior's auxiliary assumptions and theoretical assumptions: Implications for predictive and intervention studies

It has been asserted that the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) is better at behavioral prediction than it is behavioral change. However, the performance of a theory depends not only on the theoretical propositions, but the auxiliary assumptions attached to the theory. It is because of such auxiliary assumptions, which are required to bridge the gap between nonobservational terms at the level of theory and the observational terms at the level of the empirical hypothesis, that we believe critiques of the TPB's utility are misguided. We argue that a failure to separate theoretical assumptions from auxiliary assumptions leads to this false assumption. We suggest the importance of distinguishing between the auxiliary assumptions required for prediction studies and the auxiliary assumptions required for intervention studies. We believe that in attaching sound auxiliary assumptions to intervention studies, the TPB is equally effective at facilitating behavior change as it is behavior prediction.     

On the identification of clinically significant client changes: Reinterpretation of Jacobson's cut scores

Cut points or cut scores play a central role in Jacobson's popular method of identifying clinically significant changes in psychotherapy. When pre- and posttherapy scores of a client are on different sides of one of these cut scores, the change is considered clinically significant, provided that it is also reliable (i.e., not due to measurement errors). This article critically examines the meanings and implications of these cut scores. Contrary to popular beliefs, they are generallynot the test scores for which the probability of belonging to the Functional population is equal to the probability of belonging to the Dysfunctional population. When the Functional population distribution is above that of the Dysfunctional population, persons scoring above these cut scores can, in fact, have much greater probabilities of belonging to the Dysfunctional than to the Functional population. Goals of Jacobson's method can be attained only with Bayesian methods. Bayesian modifications of Jacobson's cut scores are proposed, although their use is limited by the availability of relevant base rates. Bayesian methods (a) can provide information about the probability that an individual belongs to each population, given his (her) score, and (b) are expected to yield total misdiagnosis rates that are many times lower than those of Jacobson's method. Users of Jacobson's method are cautioned against interpreting ratios of likelihoods as if they were ratios of posterior probabilities.     

An Externalist Account of Introspective Knowledge

The Content Skeptic argues that a subject could not have introspective knowledge of a thought whose content is individuated widely. This claim is incorrect, relying on the tacit assumption that introspective knowledge differs significantly from other species of knowledge. The paper proposes a reliabilist model for understanding introspective knowledge according to which introspective knowledge is simply another species of knowledge, and according to which claims to introspective knowledge are not, as suggested by the Content Skeptic, defeated by the mere possibility of error. This way of understanding introspective knowledge affords a robust theory of privileged access consistent with semantic externalism.     

UNDERDETERMINATION AND THE ARGUMENT FROM INDIRECT CONFIRMATION

In this paper I criticize one of the most convincing recent attempts to resist the underdetermination thesis, Laudan’s argument from indirect confirmation. Laudan highlights and rejects a tacit assumption of the underdetermination theorist, namely that theories can be confirmed only by empirical evidence that follows from them. He shows that once we accept that theories can also be confirmed indirectly, by evidence not entailed by them, the skeptical conclusion does not follow. I agree that Laudan is right to reject this assumption, but I argue that his explanation of how the rejection of this assumption blocks the skeptical conclusion is flawed. I conclude that the argument from indirect confirmation is not effective against the underdetermination thesis.     

Shame and Shamelessness

What is the relation between shame and shamelessness? It may seem obvious: shamelessness is simply the absence of shame. But on reflection, it becomes clear that the story is considerably more complicated. Michelle Mason's intriguing "On Shamelessness" prompts such reflection (albeit unintentionally). Mason argues that we should be mindful of the "moral importance of shame" and "unapologetic in its defense" (403), and she does so via an examination of shamelessness and an argument to the effect that shamelessness is (with some exceptions) a moral fault. The tacit assumption is that insofar as shamelessness is a moral fault, the value of shame is vindicated. I challenge that assumption.     

Examining the reliability of ADAS-Cog change scores

The purpose of this study was to estimate and examine ways to improve the reliability of change scores on the Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale, Cognitive Subtest (ADAS-Cog). The sample, provided by the Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative, included individuals with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) (n = 153) and individuals with mild cognitive impairment (MCI) (n = 352). All participants were administered the ADAS-Cog at baseline and 1 year, and change scores were calculated as the difference in scores over the 1-year period. Three types of change score reliabilities were estimated using multivariate generalizability. Two methods to increase change score reliability were evaluated: reweighting the subtests of the scale and adding more subtests. Reliability of ADAS-Cog change scores over 1 year was low for both the AD sample (ranging from .53 to .64) and the MCI sample (.39 to .61). Reweighting the change scores from the AD sample improved reliability (.68 to .76), but lengthening provided no useful improvement for either sample. The MCI change scores had low reliability, even with reweighting and adding additional subtests. The ADAS-Cog scores had low reliability for measuring change. Researchers using the ADAS-Cog should estimate and report reliability for their use of the change scores. The ADAS-Cog change scores are not recommended for assessment of meaningful clinical change.     

健康行为改变中的社会认知因素：HAPA模型述评

HAPA是健康行为领域研究的新取向。认为改变健康行为需要两个分离的过程:动机和意志。首先,基于自我信念的基础上形成改变的意图;随意,行为改变才会被计划、引发并维持。HAPA认为,动机阶段引起行为意图,而意志阶段则产生实际行为。以自我效能为代表的社会认知因素在两个阶段起重要作用,对于健康行为的采纳、引发和维持的产生重要的预测作用。     

An experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with confirmed proposals

We suggest an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of cooperation in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players’ willingness to cooperate and as signals pursuing individualistic objectives like publicizing one’s bargaining abilities or eliciting those of the opponent.     

Questions versus statements: challenging an assumption about semantic illusions

In previous semantic-illusion research the tacit assumption has been that questions and statements-to-be-verified of similar semantic content lead to a similar proportion of semantic illusions. This assumption was made despite the fact that questions are thought to have different processing demands from those of statements. This paper presents empirical evidence that questions tend to lead to more semantic illusions than do statements-to-be-verified. Two experiments were carried out to provide a direct comparison between the semantic-illusion rates for statements and for questions. In Experiment 1, open-ended questions led to significantly more semantic illusions than did true/false statements. Experiment 2 replicated this effect using multiple-choice response options in the question condition. It is concluded that the syntactic form of a sentence affects the way in which semantic information is processed, and the implications of the findings are discussed.     

Social-Cognitive Factors in Changing Health-Related Behaviors

Changing health-related behaviors requires two separate processes that involve motivation and volition, respectively. First, an intention to change is developed, in part on the basis of self-beliefs. Second, the change must be planned, initiated, and maintained, and relapses must be managed; self-regulation plays a critical role in these processes. Social-cognition models of health behavior change address these two processes. One such model, the health action process approach, is explicitly based on the assumption that two distinct phases need to be studied longitudinally, one phase that leads to a behavioral intention and another that leads to the actual behavior. Particular social-cognitive variables may play different roles in the two stages; perceived self-efficacy is the only predictor that seems to be equally important in the two phases.     

Questions versus statements: Challenging an assumption about semantic illusions

In previous semantic-illusion research the tacit assumption has been that questions and statements-to-be-verified of similar semantic content lead to a similar proportion of semantic illusions. This assumption was made despite the fact that questions are thought to have different processing demands from those of statements. This paper presents empirical evidence that questions tend to lead to more semantic illusions than do statements-to-be-verified. Two experiments were carried out to provide a direct comparison between the semantic-illusion rates for statements and for questions. In Experiment 1, open-ended questions led to significantly more semantic illusions than did true/false statements. Experiment 2 replicated this effect using multiple-choice response options in the question condition. It is concluded that the syntactic form of a sentence affects the way in which semantic information is processed, and the implications of the findings are discussed.     

Everyday conceptions of object fall: explicit and tacit understanding during middle childhood

Adults make erroneous predictions about object fall despite recognizing when observed displays are correct or incorrect. Prediction requires explicit engagement with conceptual knowledge, whereas recognition can be achieved through tacit processing. Therefore, it has been suggested that the greater challenge imposed by explicit engagement leads to elements of conceptual understanding being omitted from prediction that are included in recognition. Acknowledging that research with children provides a significant context for exploring this "omission hypothesis" further, this article reports two studies with 6- to 10-year-olds, each of which used prediction and recognition tasks. Study 1 (N=137) focused on understanding of direction of fall, and Study 2 (N=133) addressed speed. Although performance on the recognition tasks was generally superior to performance on the prediction tasks, qualitative differences also emerged. These differences argue against interpreting explicit level understanding purely in terms of omission of tacit constructs, and the article outlines alternative models that may account for the data.     

Constraints Children Place on Word Meanings

This paper views lexical acquisition as a problem of induction: Children must figure out the meaning of a given term, given the large number of possible meanings any term could have. If children had to consider, evaluate, and rule out an unlimited number of hypotheses about each word in order to figure out its meaning, learning word meanings would be hopeless. Children must, therefore, be limited in the kinds of hypotheses they consider as possible word meanings. This paper considers three possible constraints on word meanings: (1) The whole object assumption which leads children to interpret novel terms as labels for objects—not parts, substances, or other properties of objects: (2) The taxonomic assumption which leads children to consider labels as referring to objects of like kind, rather than to objects that are thematically related: and (3) The mutual exclusivity assumption which leads children to expect each object to have only one label. Some of the evidence for these constraints is reviewed.