Descartes's Regulae, mathematics, and modern psychology: "the Noblest example of all" in Light of Turing's (1936) On computable Numbers

There are surprisingly strong connections between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of mathematics. One particular important example can be seen in the Regulae (1628) of Descartes. In "the noblest example of all," he used his new abstract understanding of numbers to demonstrate how the brain can be considered as a symbol machine and how the intellect's algebraic reasoning can be mirrored as operations on this machine. Even though his attempt failed, it is illuminating to explore it because Descartes launched 2 traditions--mechanistic philosophy of mind and abstract mathematics--that would diverge until A. Turing (1936) approached symbolic reasoning in a similar "symbol machine-existence proof" way. Descrates's and Turing's thought experiments, which mark the beginning of modern psychology and cognitive science, respectively, indicate how important the development of mathematics has been for the constitution of the science of mind.     

On Imagination: Reconciling Knowledge and Life,or What Does “Gregory Bateson” Stand for?

This article presents a reading of Gregory Bateson's oeuvre, focusing on his interest in the representational gap between map and territory, and its importance in the development of his redefinition of the concept of "mind," his new discipline called "ecology of ideas," and a methodology congruent to it based on the logics of metaphor. Inquiries on three initial stories from different domains allow the use of homologies between form and content in the article. This reading of Bateson's oeuvre stresses his questioning (like Derrida's) of the metaphysics of presence on which Western philosophy has been mostly based, and of the central role of imagination as a balancing factor for a family therapy that he both contributed to and saw with reservations.     

论周敦颐的人生哲学

周敦颐的人生哲学思想主要有两部分 :第一 ,政治人生 :“政事精绝 ,宦业过人” ;第二 ,人生态度 :“孔颜之乐”与“吟风弄月”。周子人生哲学思想的影响 :一是周子把政治建于其人生理念的基础之上 ,视其为人生延伸的一个领域 ,从而保持了在政坛险恶与污浊包围中的清白和高尚 ,成为中国古代儒家学者从政的典范。二是周敦颐揭示出 ,在人生过程中 ,保持一个快乐的人生态度是非常重要的 ,而这种“乐”决非源于现实之物质性功利 ,而只能来自于人们心灵对仁义道德获取后产生的愉悦。     

Paul Gray's narrowing scope: a "developmental lag" in his theory and technique

A cental thesis of Paul Gray's work is that a "developmental lag" pervades modern psychoanalysis in its failure to assimilate and apply knowledge gained about the role of the unconscious ego in intrapsychic life. But Gray himself, it is proposed, has become a victim of a new "developmental lag," of his own construction. As he somewhat single-mindedly pursued the ramifications of his "developmental lag" concept, Gray may have foreclosed on some noteworthy ideas developing around him. The most important example is his claim--herein refuted--that proper interpretive technique can avoid being infused with transference. He also seems to have rejected the theoretical importance of the internalization of the analyst and the clinical usefulness of countertransference. While emphasizing defense analysis, he ignores defenses such as splitting, denial, and disavowal as substantive problems for his technique of close-process attention. Gray's "undoing" of the rapprochement between "ego analysis" and "id analysis" by viewing the matter as an either-or proposition undermines the very real value of his contribution to the field.     

Sellars and the "Myth of the Given"

Sellars is well known for his critique of the "myth of the given" in his "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind". That text does not make it unambiguous just how he understands the "myth". Here I take it that whatever else may be involved, his critique is incompatible with the view that there is a nonconceptual mode of "presentation" or "givenness" of particulars that is the heart of sense perception and what is most distinctive of perception as a type of cognition. A critical examination of Sellars' arguments, particularly those directed at the Theory of Appearing, results in the conclusion that he has failed to eliminate the above view of perception. Moreover, though Sellars is clearly opposed to the view that perceptual experience cannot provide justification for beliefs about perceived objects, I argue that Sellars has failed to shake the intuitive plausibility of that view.     

Speaking Your Mind: Large Inarticulateness Constitutional and Circumstantial

When someone is asked to speak his mind, it is sometimes possible for him to furnish what his utterance appears to have omitted. In such cases we might say that he had a mind to speak. Sometimes, however, the opposite is true. Asked to speak his mind, our speaker finds that he has no mind to speak. When it is possible to speak one's mind and when not is largely determined by the kinds of beings we are and by the kinds of resources we are able to draw upon. In either case, not speaking one's mind is leaving something out whose articulation would or could matter for the purposes for which one was speaking in the first place. Inarticulation is no fleetingly contingent and peripheral phenomenon in human thinking and discourse. It is a substantial and dominant commonplace. In Part One I attempt to say something about what it is about the human agent that makes inarticulateness so rife. In Part Two, I consider various strategies for making the unarticulated explicit, and certain constraints on such processes. I shall suggest, among other things, that standard treatments of enthymematic reconstruction are fundamentally misconceived.     

The kidnapping of W. S. Gilbert

Gilbert's probable screen memory of having been kidnapped, along with his persistent preoccupations with babyhood, remembering and forgetting, stress the intensity of his struggle against remembering the painful experiences from his childhood. His creative efforts function as an obsessional defense; they divert his attention from the experiences themselves to a fascination with the process of remembering and forgetting, while the painful affects are reversed into playful, good-natured humor. The results are some of his most treasured anecdotes. Watson (1918) quotes Gilbert's story of the amateur burglar who badly bungled an attempted robbery and ended up being arrested and jailed under the most humiliating circumstances. For years afterward, every time he though of the incident, he felt wretchedly uncomfortable, and he tried vainly to drive the occurrence from his mind. The story concludes with a statement which, remarks Watson, only Gilbert could have written: "Gradually one detail after another slipped from my recollection, and one lovely morning last May I found to my intense delight that I had absolutely forgotten all about it" (p. 94).     

No I,No Problems: The Quintessence of Buddhist Psychology of Awakening

If psychology is viewed as the science of human mind, the Buddha could unarguably be termed as the finest depth psychologist humanity has seen. Not only did he penetrate deep into the hidden recesses of human mind and uncovered the machinations of the latent tendencies, he also found the way out of their stranglehold on mankind. As a compassionate teacher, he focused his entire teaching primarily on the later practical aspect. He often mentioned that he taught only two things: there is unhappiness (dukkha) and there is a way out of this unhappiness. The root cause of this unhappiness, he identified as the primeval ignorance avijja, which creates the notion of ‘I’ as an individual entity, the doer, the feeler and the thinker. This in turn gives rise to the concepts of ‘I and mine’, ‘thee and thine’ from which originate craving (raga) and aversion (dosa). The Buddha’s penetrative insight into the nature of human reality revealed that what we call ‘I’ or a ‘being’ is only a concatenation of the five impermanent aggregates, viz. the body, consciousness, intellect, feelings and volitional mental formations, which work interdependently, changing from moment to moment in accordance with the law of cause and effect. By a systematic cultivation of the mindfulness of these aggregates anyone can progressively uproot the ego and purify the mind by extinguishing this fire of defilements continuously burning within it. As the mind gets progressively purified, it awakens from the illusion of ‘personality’ and naturally abides in loving kindness (maîtri), compassion (karuna), altruistic joy (mudita) and equanimity (upekkha) to increasing degree. ‘No I, No problems’, as one contemporary Master puts it.     

Courting the Enemy: McMahan on the Unity of Mind

Abstract

Jeff McMahan has recently developed the embodied mind theory of identity in place of the other standing theories, which he examines and consequently rejects. This paper examines the performance of his theory on cases of commissurotomy or the split-brain syndrome. Available experimental data concerning these cases seem to suggest that a single mind can divide into two independent streams in ways that are incompatible with our intuitive notion of mind. This phenomenon poses unique problems for McMahan's theory that we are essentially minds. I attempt to use his considered response to these cases as a weapon against his own embodied mind theory by highlighting some of the tensions in McMahan's response. In particular, I argue that in reaching his conclusion McMahan admits to something quite contrary to the very spirit of his own theory and that it is a powerful point in its support that one of the theories McMahan rejects can deal very well with these cases.     

Inventing Freud

Written to commemorate the 150th anniversary of Freud's birth, this paper construes Nina Coltart's statement that "if Freud did not exist it would be necessary to invent him," with its implicit comparison of Freud to God, to refer to (a) the things that Freud taught that are incontrovertibly true; (b) the unavoidable subjectivity in all judgments of Freud; and (c) the resemblances between psychoanalysis and religion. This last comparison is likewise seen to have both positive and negative aspects. Freud's ideas have inspired many people, yet he unscientifically arrogated sovereign authority over psychoanalysis. Freud's admirers are reminded of his extreme difficulty in admitting he was wrong and changing his mind when he should have known better, while his detractors are encouraged to consider the evidence supporting many of Freud's core tenets and to recognize that his discovery of psychoanalysis is indeed one of the supreme achievements in human history.     

Was Wittgenstein an Anti-Realist?

William Child has said that Wittgenstein is an anti-realist with respect to a person's dreams, recent thoughts that he has consciously entertained and other things. I discuss Wittgenstein's comments about these matters in order to show that they do not commit him to an anti-realist view or a realist view. He wished to discredit the idea that when a person reports his dream or his thoughts, or past intentions, the person is reading off the contents of his mind or memory. Reporting what one dreamt or recently thought is not like reporting what one has just read. The language is different, and the criterion of truth is different.
The anti-realist is able to explain why the reports of thoughts, for instance, are "guaranteed" to be true (PI II, 222) by stipulating that the character and existence of the past thought is constituted by an inclination to assert that one had that past thought so the assertion could not be false. This could not be Wittgenstein's view. What does "guarantee" the truth of such an assertion is the fact that the person himself is the principle authority on what he dreamt, thought, and intended, something which "stands fast" for us.
I next consider Crispin Wright's account of Wittgenstein's ideas about intentions and point out that his assumption that person always makes a judgement as to whether his action conforms to his intention is clearly false. And he is wrong in attributing to Wittgenstein the idea that an intention does not have a determinate content prior to its author's judgement about whether the action conforms to the intention, an idea that is obscure. If this were accurate, it would be a mystery why we do anything, or, at least, why our actions ever conform to our intentions.     

Berkeley on Inconceivability and Impossibility

Contrary to a popular reading of his modal epistemology, Berkeley does not hold that inconceivability entails impossibility, and he cannot therefore argue the impossibility of mind‐independent matter by appealing to facts about what we cannot conceive. Berkeley is explicit about this constraint on his metaphysical argumentation, and, I argue, does respect it in practice. Popular mythology about the ‘master argument’ notwithstanding, the only passages in which he might plausibly seem to employ the principle that inconceivability entails impossibility are those that argue for the inseparability of primary from secondary qualities. However, an alternative reading of these texts is available that is both consistent with Berkeley's express modal epistemology and credible in its own right.     

The cabinet of Dr. Lacan

Conclusion Obscurity is not the worst failing, and it is philistinism to pretend that it is. In a series of brilliant essays written over the last fifteen years Stanley Cavell has consistently argued that more important than the question whether obscurity could have been avoided is whether it affects our confidence in the author.Confidence raises the issue of intention, and I would have thought that the primary commitment of a psychoanalytic writer was to pass on, and (if he can) to refine while passing on, a particular way of exploring the mind. Indeed this is how Lacan himself proposes that his work should be judged. The aim of my teaching, he writes, has been and still is the training of analysts.For decades now Lacan has been insisting that the nature of this commitment has been systematically obscured, particularly in North America. Training has become routinized, and analysis itself has become distorted into a process of crude social adaptation. There is much here to agree with. Yet two questions must be raised. Has Lacan devised a more effective method of training analysts? And, would one expect this from his writings?Neither question gets a favourable answer. All reports of his training methods, over which he has now brought about three distinct secessions within the French psychoanalytic movement, are horrifying.¹³ It is now, I am told, possible to become a Lacanian analyst after a very few months of Lacanian analysis. And what pedagogic contribution could we expect from a form of prose that has two salient characteristics: it exhibits the application of theory to particular cases as quite arbitrary, and it forces the adherents it gains into pastiche.¹⁴ Lacan's ideas and Lacan's style, yoked in an indissoluble union, represent an invasive tyranny. And it is by a hideous irony that this tyranny should find its recruits among groups that have nothing in common except the sense that they lack a theory worthy of their cause or calling: feminists, cinéastes, professors of literature.Lacan himself offers several justifications for his obscurity, about which he has no false modesty. At times he says that he is the voice, the messenger, the porte-parole, of the unconscious itself. Lacan's claim stirs in my mind the retort Freud made to a similar assult upon his credulity and by someone who had learned from Lacan. It is not the unconscious mind I look out for in your paintings, Freud said to Salvador Dali, it is the conscious.This article originally appeared as a review (The New York Review of Books, January 25, 1979) of the three books listed under References.     

Is there a problem with mathematical psychology in the eighteenth century? A fresh look at Kant's old argument

Common opinion ascribes to Immanuel Kant the view that psychology cannot become a science properly so called, because it cannot be mathematized. It is equally common to claim that this reflects the state of the art of his times; that the quantification of the mind was not achieved during the eighteenth century, while it was so during the nineteenth century; or that Kant's so-called "impossibility claim" was refuted by nineteenth-century developments, which in turn opened one path for psychology to become properly scientific. These opinions are often connected, but they are misguided nevertheless. In Part I, I show how the issue of a quantification of the mind was discussed before Kant, and I analyze the philosophical considerations both of pessimistic and optimistic authors. This debate reveals a certain progress, although it remains ultimately undecided. In Part II, I present actual examples of measuring the mind in the eighteenth century and analyze their presuppositions. Although these examples are limited in certain ways, the common view that there was no such measurement is wrong. In Part III, I show how Kant's notorious " impossibility claim" has to be viewed against its historical background. He not only accepts actual examples of a quantitative treatment of the mind, but also takes steps toward an explanation of their possibility. Thus, he does not advance the claim that the mind as such cannot be mathematized. His claim is directed against certain philosophical assumptions about the mind, assumptions shared by a then-dominating, strongly introspectionist conception of psychology. This conception did and could not provide an explanation of the possibility of quantifying the mind. In concluding, I reflect on how this case study helps to improve the dispute over when and why psychology became a science.     

On the syndrome of the "spare limb": one case

We describe a case of a brain-damaged patient who had a peculiar bodily illusion which could not be labelled an hallucination but seemed somatognosically and phenomenologically similar to the phantom limb without amputation. The patient, who showed left hemiplegia, felt a third upper limb (without seeing it) which he himself defined as "spare." The spare limb was not deformed; it could be moved and controlled by the patient, and there was no sensation of pain. The patient did not show psychopathological or cognitive disorders. A possible interpretation of the phenomenon is as a "phantom movement" of the paralysed limb: the mental representation of the movement of the limb was dissociated from the bodily representation of his own limb and so was still present in his consciousness despite the paralysis.     

THE MIND AND THE 'SHEN-MING'a IN XUNZI

In Plan 21 of the Xunzi , the essay Dubs titles "The Removal of Prejudices"¹ and Watson calls "Dispelling Obsession"², there is a sentence one's eyes slide over rather easily until one tries to fit it into its context and that of the Xunzi generally. Dubs translates it "The mind is the ruler of the body and the master of the spirit" (p. 269); Watson shows a slight discomfort with the second clause when he gives "The mind is the ruler of the body and the master of its god-like intelligence" [whatever that is] (p. 129) Koester³ raises a few more doubts with his "Das Herz nimmt im Koerper die Stelle des Herrschers ein, es ist der Gebieter ueber die shen-ming (Geister, die im Koerper wohnen)" (p. 277). Interestingly enough, the commentatorial tradition seems to have felt no difficulties: Yang Liang's comment is merely a paraphrase of the sentence following, and Wang Xian-jian and Liang Qi-xiong simply quote him⁴.     

Malthus's Essay on Population: the facts of "super-growth" and the rhetoric of scientific persuasion

For the Malthusian theory of population to be accepted as "scientific," it was essential that the theory be established on wide empirical evidence. A close examination of the "facts" provided by Malthus, however, shows that many of his crucial facts are based on distortions of the available evidence. Malthus was probably aware of much of this weakness, but for rhetorical reasons he persisted with the sandy empirical foundations from which he began.     

论马一浮"六艺之学"视野中的易学研究

作为现代新儒家早期思想的代表人物,马一浮先生提出了以儒家"六艺之学"统摄天下诸学的主张.这是马先生的一个创举,体现着他对传统儒学有意识地改造和发扬.作为"六艺之学"的一个分支,易学研究在马一浮先生的学术研究中无疑具有着"本体论"地位和作用,它所体现的"心之本体",不仅是"六艺"所自出的本原,也是"六艺之学"共同的目的和归宿.     

Gall's psychophysiological concept of function: the rise and decline of "internal essence".

Gall did not employ the term "function" to refer to adaptive mental processes or to observable behavior. To the contrary, he and the phrenologists took a traditional concept of function regarding the contribution or duties of a part within the overall "animal economy" and argued that the "faculties" of the soul are among the functions of the nervous system. In particular, he brought this psychophysiological use of the term into his Enlightenment perspective when he aligned it with internal essence, juxtaposed it to its external sign, and argued that the cerebral organs are the material instruments through which the internal faculties manifest themselves in behavior and in the shape of the skull. Gall did not believe that the faculties are a product of the organs but that the organs, being material incarnations of the internal functions, contain the power to express the faculties externally. Purely psychological uses of function are infrequent among the works of Gall and his followers. It was not until the functionalists at the turn of the century that the word was applied to the adaptive utility of mental processes in relation to the environment and not until the advent of behaviorism that it was employed to refer to the end or adaptive utility of a particular behavior.