Can priming your self lead to punishing others?

Previous research has shown that priming the individual self can increase the accessibility of individual self-cognitions. In turn, we hypothesized that blame for immoral behaviors also would increase, leading to higher assignments of punishment, but that the size of this effect would depend on whether the behaviors violated perfect or imperfect duties. To test these hypotheses, participants assigned yearly bonus penalties to employees who had performed dishonest, disloyal, unfriendly, or uncharitable acts. As expected, the individual prime increased punishments, and this effect was accentuated for violations of perfect duties relative to violations of imperfect duties.     

Attitudes toward Women in Northern Ireland

ABSTRACT

Previous research has shown that priming the individual self can increase the accessibility of individual self-cognitions. In turn, we hypothesized that blame for immoral behaviors also would increase, leading to higher assignments of punishment, but that the size of this effect would depend on whether the behaviors violated perfect or imperfect duties. To test these hypotheses, participants assigned yearly bonus penalties to employees who had performed dishonest, disloyal, unfriendly, or uncharitable acts. As expected, the individual prime increased punishments, and this effect was accentuated for violations of perfect duties relative to violations of imperfect duties.     

Generalizing Kant's Distinction between Perfect and Imperfect Duties to Trust in Different Situations

Based on previous research that violations of perfect duties cause stronger correspondent inferences than violations of imperfect ones, the authors performed four experiments to generalize this effect to trust. In Experiment 1, abstract violations of perfect duties resulted in less trust than violations of imperfect ones for specific trust scenarios. In Experiments 2 and 3, the authors experimented with different levels of abstractness of the duty violations and obtained similar effects. Experiment 4 was concerned with generalizing further—from duty violations in one situation to trust in a different situation. Although mostly consistent with the findings from Experiments 1–3, the data also demonstrated partial generalization for violations of both perfect and imperfect duties.     

When violations of perfect duties do not cause strong trait attributions

It is well documented that violations of perfect duties (duties that can never be violated by moral agents) cause strong trait attributions. Brown, Trafimow, and Gregory (2005) found an exception to this general principle when the violation is performed under extreme circumstances. In the present research, we hypothesized that extreme circumstances are not necessary to weaken the attributional effect of violations of perfect duties provided that the violations were performed to help another person. Two experiments were performed in which target people violated perfect or imperfect duties for an unspecified reason or to help a third party. As expected, perfect duty violations did not result in strong trait attributions when they were performed to help someone, although they did result in strong trait attributions otherwise. Thus, the data support that the motive to help is sufficient to eliminate correspondent inferences to perfect duty violations.     

Subsistence Needs,Human Rights,and Imperfect Duties

I address the usefulness of thinking about a human right to subsistence within conceptions of human rights grounded in ordinary moral reasoning. I argue that that natural rights should be understood as rights in rem, with their dynamism constrained by the requirements of justification and their scope constrained by the distinction between perfect and imperfect duty. I then suggest that many of the most pressing demands which the moral significance of subsistence needs create are plausibly imperfect duties, and so cannot correlate to a natural right to subsistence. This restricts the helpfulness of a human right to subsistence in our reasoning about what we owe to others.     

Intentionality Attributions About Perfect and Imperfect Duty Violations

Abstract

Intentionality attributions were explored by drawing on the distinction between perfect and imperfect moral duties. Previous research has shown that perfect duty violations carry greater attributional weight than imperfect duty violations (Trafimow & Trafimow, 1999 Trafimow, D. and Trafimow, S. 1999. Mapping imperfect and perfect duties on to hierarchically and partially restrictive trait dimensions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25: 686–695. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Trafimow, Bromgard, Finlay, & Ketelaar, 2005 Trafimow, D., Bromgard, I. K., Finlay, K. A. and Ketelaar, T. 2005. The role of affect in determining the attributional weight of immoral behaviors. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31: 935–948. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). In Studies 1 and 2, the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties was replicated with intentionality judgments, and perfect duty violations received higher intentionality attributions than imperfect duty violations. In Study 3 this effect was reversed by manipulating information about an agent's mental intentions or plans to perform a behavior. That is, participants attributed less intentionality to perfect duty violations compared to imperfect duty violations when a mental intention to perform the behavior was absent.     

Positive morality and the realization of freedom in Kant's moral philosophy

This paper argues that recent accounts of Kantian virtue as “strengthened” inner freedom apply much more clearly to the avoidance of violations of perfect duties than to the fulfillment of imperfect duties, leaving us with the question of how inadequate commitment to morally required ends impacts the exercise of inner freedom. The question is answered through the development of a model of inner freedom that emphasizes the relationship between moral self‐governance and participation in an ethical community.     

Giving Up the Goods: Rethinking the Human Right to Subsistence,Institutional Justice,and Imperfect Duties

Either a person's claim to subsistence goods is held against institutions equipped to distribute social benefits and burdens fairly or it is made regardless of such a social scheme. If the former, then one's claim is not best understood as based on principles setting out a subsistence goods entitlement, but rather on principles of equitable social distribution — a fair share. If, however, the claim is not against a given social scheme, no plausible principle exists defining what counts as a reasonable burden for any of the available agents to secure subsistence. No justifiable principle exists implying generalised perfect duties any agent could clearly follow or clearly breach that secure subsistence conditions for others. At best we can justify rescue duties under very specific conditions, or general but imperfect duties to improve arrangements. Neither of these obviously correlates with human rights standards. Attempts in the literature to overcome the dilemma by claiming basic rights can correlate with imperfect duties or can generate duties to work towards institutions that ‘perfect’ our imperfect duties, are faulty. I then show how the dilemma can be avoided by accounts of human rights focusing on minimum respectful treatment rather than goods or interests.     

Friendship, Justice, and Aristotle: Some Reasons to Be Sceptical

It is sometimes held that modern institutionally-focussed conceptions of social justice are lacking in one essential respect: they ignore the importance of civic friendship or solidarity. It is also, typically simultaneously, held that Aristotle’s thought provides a fertile ground for elucidating an account of civic friendship. I argue, first, that Aristotle is no help on this score: he has no conception of distinctively civic friendship. I then go on to argue that the Kantian distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is more useful than talk of civic friendship in capturing the non-institutional demands of social justice.     

Musings about beauty

In this essay, I explore how cognitive science could illuminate the concept of beauty. Two results from the extensive literature on aesthetics guide my discussion. As the term “beauty” is overextended in general usage, I choose as my starting point the notion of “perfect form.” Aesthetic theorists are in reasonable agreement about the criteria for perfect form. What do these criteria imply for mental representations that are experienced as beautiful? Complexity theory can be used to specify constraints on mental representations abstractly formulated as vectors in a high‐dimensional space. A central feature of the proposed model is that perfect form depends both on features of the objects or events perceived and on the nature of the encoding strategies or model of the observer. A simple example illustrates the proposed calculations. A number of interesting implications that arise as a consequence of reformulating beauty in this way are noted.     

Confining Pogge’s Analysis of Global Poverty to Genuinely Negative Duties

Thomas Pogge has argued that typical citizens of affluent nations participate in an unjust global order that harms the global poor. This supports his conclusion that there are widespread negative institutional duties to reform the global order. I defend Pogge’s negative duty approach, but argue that his formulation of these duties is ambiguous between two possible readings, only one of which is properly confined to genuinely negative duties. I argue that this ambiguity leads him to shift illicitly between negative and positive duties, and ultimately to overstate the extent of the negative ones. I also argue that recognition of this ambiguity makes it possible to draw a meaningful distinction between the relevant positive and negative duties, and that Pogge’s analysis can therefore be revised in a way that reveals substantial negative institutional duties to the global poor, albeit less extensive ones than Pogge asserts. In order to demonstrate this, I discuss two aspects of the global order that Pogge has criticized: the system of intellectual property rights in pharmaceuticals and the rights of de facto rulers to dispose of a nation’s natural resources. In each case, although I do not specify the relevant negative institutional duties precisely, I try to identify intelligible questions whose answers would reveal genuinely negative duties and show that their likely answers are distinct from the conclusions asserted by Pogge and suggested by his analysis.     

The Duty to Object

We have the duty to object to things that people say. If you report something that I take to be false, unwarranted, or harmful, I may be required to say as much. In this paper, I explore how to best understand the distinctively epistemic dimension of this duty. I begin by highlighting two central features of this duty that distinguish it from others, such as believing in accordance with the evidence or promise-keeping. In particular, I argue that whether we are obligated to object is directly influenced not only by what other relevant members of the conversational context or community do, but also by the social status of the agent in question. I then show that these features are shared by the duty to be charitable, and the similarities between these two duties point to a potentially deeper explanation: while promise-keeping is regarded as a classic perfect duty, charity is an imperfect one. I then argue that the duty to object can be modeled on a particular conception of imperfect duties, one that takes the duty to belong to communities and other collectives, rather than to individuals. I conclude by showing that this framework provides us with reason for accepting that there are imperfect epistemic duties in general.     

Adolescent Strategies for Coping With Cultural Diversity

This investigation tested H. L. K. Coleman's (1995b) hypotheses that the strategies adolescents use to cope with cultural diversity will be organized in a sequential manner and that adolescents will use different strategies depending on the situation. To test these hypotheses, the authors had 398 adolescents rate the likelihood of using 6 strategies for coping with cultural diversity: Separation, Assimilation, Acculturation, Alternation, Integration, and Fusion. The authors make suggestions for future research, and implications for counseling are suggested.     

Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and decision making

Three studies test eight hypotheses about (1) how judgment differs between people who ascribe greater vs. less moral relevance to choices, (2) how moral judgment is subject to task constraints that shift evaluative focus (to moral rules vs. to consequences), and (3) how differences in the propensity to rely on intuitive reactions affect judgment. In Study 1, judgments were affected by rated agreement with moral rules proscribing harm, whether the dilemma under consideration made moral rules versus consequences of choice salient, and by thinking styles (intuitive vs. deliberative). In Studies 2 and 3, participants evaluated policy decisions to knowingly do harm to a resource to mitigate greater harm or to merely allow the greater harm to happen. When evaluated in isolation, approval for decisions to harm was affected by endorsement of moral rules and by thinking style. When both choices were evaluated simultaneously, total harm -- but not the do/allow distinction -- influenced rated approval. These studies suggest that moral rules play an important, but context-sensitive role in moral cognition, and offer an account of when emotional reactions to perceived moral violations receive less weight than consideration of costs and benefits in moral judgment and decision making.     

Avoiding Vice and Pursuing Virtue: Kant on Perfect Duties and ‘Prudential latitude’

To fulfill a perfect duty an agent must avoid vice, yet when an agent refrains from acting on a prohibited maxim she still must do something. I argue that the setting of morally required ends ought to consistently inform an agent's judgment regarding what is to be done beyond compliance with perfect, negative duties. Kant's assertion of a puzzling version of latitude of choice within his discussion of perfect duties motivates and complicates the case I make for a more expansive interpretation of the duty to pursue virtue.     

Exploring the set-theoretical structure of objects by additive trees

Arrangements of feature sets that have been proposed to represent qualitative and quantitative variation among objects are shown to generate identical sets of set-symmetric distances. The set-symmetric distances for these feature arrangements can be represented by path lengths in an additive linear tree. Imperfect versions of these feature arrangements are proposed, which also are indistinguishable by the set-symmetric distance model. The distances for the imperfect versions can be represented by path lengths in an additive imperfectly linear tree. When dissimilarities are defined by the more general contrast model and a constant may be added to proximity data, then for both the perfect and imperfect arrangements an additive tree analysis obtains a perfect fit with an imperfectly linear tree. However, in the case of the contrast model also the distinction between the perfect and imperfect arrangements disappears in that also for the perfect arrangements the resulting tree need no longer be linear.The author is grateful to Mathieu Koppen for detailed comments on an earlier version of this article.     

The Effects of Experimentally Induced Rumination, Positive Reappraisal, Acceptance, and Distancing When Thinking About a Stressful Event on Affect States in Adolescents

The current study compares the effects of experimentally induced rumination, positive reappraisal, distancing, and acceptance on affect states in adolescents aged 13–18. Participants (N = 160) were instructed to think about a recent stressful event. Next, they received specific instructions on how to think about that event in each condition. Manipulation checks revealed that the manipulations were successful, except for acceptance. The two most reported events were “a fight” and “death of loved one”. Results showed that positive reappraisal (i.e., thinking about the benefits and personal growth) caused a significantly larger increase in positive affect and decrease in negative affect compared to rumination, distancing, and acceptance. Current findings implicate that positive reappraisal seems an adequate coping strategy in the short-term, and therefore could be applied in interventions for youth experiencing difficulties managing negative affect. Future research should focus on long-term effects of these cognitive strategies and on more intensive training of acceptance.     

The Constitutive Approach to Kantian Rigorism

Critics often charge that Kantian ethics is implausibly rigoristic: that Kantianism recognizes a set of perfect duties, encapsulated in rules such as ‘don’t lie,’ ‘keep one’s promises,’ etc., and that these rules apply without exception. Though a number of Kantians have plausibly argued that Kantianism can acknowledge exceptions to perfect duties, this acknowledgment alone does not indicate how and when such exceptions ought to be made. This article critiques a recent attempt to motivate how such exceptions are to be made, namely, the constitutive approach developed by Tamar Schapiro. I argue that the constitutive approach is vulnerable to the objection that it is too permissive, justifying many morally dubious exceptions to perfect duties. I conclude by briefly outlining an alternative ‘fine print’ approach to the rigorism objection that appears to avoid the objection leveled at Schapiro’s approach, focusing on how modifying the constituents of agents’ maxims can change the deontic status of an act of a generally impermissible kind.     

A step away from impaired well-being: a latent growth curve analysis of an intervention with activity trackers among employees

ABSTRACT

The present study evaluated the effectiveness of a workplace intervention combining activity trackers (behavioural approach) with an online coach (cognitive approach) in order to increase employees’ number of steps and improve their impaired well-being (i.e., emotional strain and negative affect). To analyse the intervention’s effectiveness, the study applied latent growth curve modelling. Moreover, we tested whether work-related and personal resources (i.e., job control and self-efficacy) moderated the intervention’s effectiveness and whether an increase in number of steps was associated with an improvement in impaired well-being. During the intervention, data were collected at six measurement points from 108 mainly low active employees. The results revealed that employees increased their number of steps until the second intervention week; this increase was not moderated by job control or self-efficacy. Moreover, the intervention was effective in decreasing emotional strain and negative affect over the course of the intervention. Further analyses showed that the increase in number of steps was related to the decrease in negative affect, whereas no such association was found for the increase in number of steps and the decrease in emotional strain. In conclusion, the findings showed that our intervention was effective in improving physical activity and impaired well-being among employees.     

Abusive supervision and family undermining as displaced aggression

This study focuses on factors that contribute to abusive supervision, one form of nonphysical aggression, and the results of such abuse on subordinates and their family members. Using a "kick the dog" metaphor (As Marcus-Newhall, Pedersen, Carlson, and Miller (2000) state, this is a "commonly used anecdote to illustrate displaced aggression. . .a man is berated by his boss but does not retaliate because he fears losing his job. Hours later, when he arrives home to the greeting barks of his dog he responds by kicking it," p. 670), the authors investigated whether abusive supervision may be the result of a supervisor's displeasure with his or her organization. Using a sample of 210 supervisors, their subordinates, and the subordinates' family members or partners, the authors hypothesized that supervisors' reports of psychological contract violations, moderated by hostile attribution bias, would be associated with subordinates' perceptions of abusive supervision. In turn, the authors hypothesized that abused subordinates' family members would report sustained negative affect and negative evaluations directed toward them in the home. The hypotheses were supported.