Metacognition and proofreading: the roles of aging,motivation, and interest

The current study examined younger and older adults’ error detection accuracy, prediction calibration, and postdiction calibration on a proofreading task, to determine if age-related differences would be present in this type of common error detection task. Participants were given text passages, and were first asked to predict the percentage of errors they would detect in the passage. They then read the passage and circled errors (which varied in complexity and locality), and made postdictions regarding their performance, before repeating this with another passage and answering a comprehension test of both passages. There were no age-related differences in error detection accuracy, text comprehension, or metacognitive calibration, though participants in both age groups were overconfident overall in their metacognitive judgments. Both groups gave similar ratings of motivation to complete the task. The older adults rated the passages as more interesting than younger adults did, although this level of interest did not appear to influence error-detection performance. The age equivalence in both proofreading ability and calibration suggests that the ability to proofread text passages and the associated metacognitive monitoring used in judging one’s own performance are maintained in aging. These age-related similarities persisted when younger adults completed the proofreading tasks on a computer screen, rather than with paper and pencil. The findings provide novel insights regarding the influence that cognitive aging may have on metacognitive accuracy and text processing in an everyday task.     

The hypercorrection effect in younger and older adults

ABSTRACT

The hypercorrection effect, which refers to the finding that errors committed with high confidence are more likely to be corrected than are low confidence errors, has been replicated many times, and with both young adults and children. In the present study, we contrasted older with younger adults. Participants answered general-information questions, made confidence ratings about their answers, were given corrective feedback, and then were retested on questions that they had gotten wrong. While younger adults showed the hypercorrection effect, older adults, despite higher overall accuracy on the general-information questions and excellent basic metacognitive ability, showed a diminished hypercorrection effect. Indeed, the correspondence between their confidence in their errors and the probability of correction was not significantly greater than zero, showing, for the first time, that a particular participant population is selectively impaired on this error correction task. These results potentially offer leverage both on the mechanisms underlying the hypercorrection effect and on reasons for older adults’ memory impairments, as well as on memory functions that are spared.     

Age-related differences in metacognition for memory capacity and selectivity

ABSTRACT

Background: We compared two types of metacognitive monitoring in younger and older adults: metacognitive accuracy for their overall memory performance and their ability to selectively remember high-value information. Method: Participants studied words paired with point values and were asked to maximise their point score. In Experiment 1, they predicted how many words they would remember while in Experiment 2, they predicted how many points they would earn. Results: In Experiment 1, while younger adults were accurate in their predictions, older adults were overconfident in the number of words they would recall throughout the task. In Experiment 2, however, both younger and older adults were equally accurate when predicting the amount of points they would earn after some task experience. Conclusions: While younger adults may have higher metacognitive accuracy for their capacity, older adults can accurately assess their ability to selectively remember information, suggesting potentially separate metacognitive mechanisms that are differentially affected by aging.     

Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments

People tend to hold overly favorable views of their abilities in many social and intellectual domains. The authors suggest that this overestimation occurs, in part, because people who are unskilled in these domains suffer a dual burden: Not only do these people reach erroneous conclusions and make unfortunate choices, but their incompetence robs them of the metacognitive ability to realize it. Across 4 studies, the authors found that participants scoring in the bottom quartile on tests of humor, grammar, and logic grossly overestimated their test performance and ability. Although their test scores put them in the 12th percentile, they estimated themselves to be in the 62nd. Several analyses linked this miscalibration to deficits in metacognitive skill, or the capacity to distinguish accuracy from error. Paradoxically, improving the skills of participants, and thus increasing their metacognitive competence, helped them recognize the limitations of their abilities.     

Consciousness is slower than you think

In easy serial choice reaction time tasks (CRT tasks) young adults can very rapidly "correct" nearly all their errors by making the responses that they should have made (error-correcting responses). They are much less accurate at signalling their errors by making the same, deliberate, response to each (error-signalling responses), and they poorly remember errors that they have not signalled or corrected. When instructed to ignore errors they nevertheless involuntarily register them because the response immediately following them (responses following unacknowledged errors) are unusually slow, and they sometimes make involuntary error correction responses. Errors that are neither signalled nor remembered are registered at some level because responses following unacknowledged errors are slowed. Old age does not impair the accuracy of error correction or reduce the proportion of errors that are acknowledged because they are followed by unusually slow responses, but it does reduce the accuracy of error signalling and of recall of errors. Groups of 40 young adults (mean age 20.1 years, SD 1.1) and 40 older adults (mean 71.2 years, SD 5.1) signalled and recalled their errors increasingly accurately as intervals between each response and the next signal were increased from 150 ms to 1000 ms. Error signalling and recall improved as response-signal interval (RSI) durations increased, reaching asymptote at RSIs of 800 ms for the young and 1000 ms for the older adults. Thus processes necessary for conscious and deliberate choice or error-signalling responses and for subsequent recall of errors require more than 150 ms to complete, are slowed by old age, and may be interrupted by onset of new signals occurring earlier than 800 to 1000 ms after completion of an incorrect response.     

Metacognition in Humans and Animals

ABSTRACT— It has long been assumed that metacognition—thinking about one's own thoughts—is a uniquely human ability. Yet a decade of research suggests that, like humans, other animals can differentiate between what they know and what they do not know. They opt out of difficult trials; they avoid tests they are unlikely to answer correctly; and they make riskier "bets" when their memories are accurate than they do when their memories are inaccurate. These feats are simultaneously impressive and, by human standards, somewhat limited; new evidence suggests, however, that animals can generalize metacognitive judgments to new contexts and seek more information when they are unsure. Metacognition is intriguing, in part, because of parallels with self-reflection and conscious awareness. Consciousness appears to be consistent with, but not required by, the abilities animals have demonstrated thus far.     

Transfer of metacognitive skills and hint seeking in monkeys

Metacognition is knowledge that can be expressed as confidence judgments about what one knows (monitoring) and by strategies for learning what one does not know (control). Although there is a substantial literature on cognitive processes in animals, little is known about their metacognitive abilities. Here we show that rhesus macaques, trained previously to make retrospective confidence judgments about their performance on perceptual tasks, transferred that ability immediately to a new perceptual task and to a working memory task. We also show that monkeys can learn to request "hints" when they are given problems that they would otherwise have to solve by trial and error. This study demonstrates, for the first time, that nonhuman primates share with humans the ability to monitor and transfer their metacognitive ability both within and between different cognitive tasks, and to seek new knowledge on a need-to-know basis.     

Updating misconceptions: Effects of age and confidence

Young adults are more likely to correct an initial higher confidence error than a lower confidence error (Butterfield & Metcalfe, 2001). This hypercorrection effect has never been investigated among older adults, although features of the standard paradigm (free recall, metacognitive judgments) and prior evidence of age-related error resolution deficits (see Clare & Jones, 2008) suggest that they may not show this effect. In Study 1, we used free recall and a 7-point confidence scale; in Study 2, we used multiple-choice questions, and participants indicated how many alternatives they had narrowed their options down to prior to answering. In both studies, younger and older adults showed a hypercorrection effect, and this effect was equivalent between groups in Study 2 when free recall and explicit confidence ratings were not required. These results are consistent with our previous work (Cyr & Anderson, 2012) showing that older adults can successfully resolve learning errors when the learning context provides sufficient support.     

Age-related schema reliance of judgments of learning in predicting source memory

Source memory refers to mental processes of encoding and making attributions to the origin of information. We investigated schematic effects on source attributions of younger and older adults for different schema-based types of items, and their schema-utilization of judgments of learning (JOLs) in estimating source memory. Participants studied statements presented by two speakers either as a doctor or a lawyer: those in the schema-after-encoding condition were informed their occupation only before retrieving, while those of schema-before-encoding were presented the schematic information prior to study. Immediately after learning every item, they made judgments of the likelihood for it to be correctly attributed to the original source later. In the test, they fulfilled a task of source attributing. The results showed a two-edged effect of schemas: schema reliance improved source memory for schema-consistent items while impaired that for schema-inconsistent items, even with schematic information presented prior to encoding. Compared with younger adults, older adults benefited more from schema-based compensatory mechanisms. Both younger and older adults could make JOLs based on before-encoding schematic information, and the schema-based JOLs were more accurate in predicting source memory than JOLs made without schema support. However, even in the schema-after-encoding condition, older adults were able to make metacognitive judgments as accurately as younger adults did, though they did have great impairments in source memory itself.     

Older adults' use of metacognitive knowledge in source monitoring: spared monitoring but impaired control

While episodic memory declines with age, metacognitive monitoring is spared. The current study explored whether older adults can use their preserved metacognitive knowledge to make source guesses in the absence of source memory. Through repetition, words from two sources (italic vs. bold text type) differed in memorability. There were no age differences in monitoring this difference despite an age difference in memory. Older adults used their metacognitive knowledge to make source guesses but showed a deficit in varying their source guessing based on word recognition. Therefore, older adults may not fully benefit from metacognitive knowledge about sources in source monitoring.     

Metacognition of emotional face recognition

While humans are adept at recognizing emotional states conveyed by facial expressions, the current literature suggests that they lack accurate metacognitions about their performance in this domain. This finding comes from global trait-based questionnaires that assess the extent to which an individual perceives him or herself as empathic, as compared to other people. Those who rate themselves as empathically accurate are no better than others at recognizing emotions. Metacognition of emotion recognition can also be assessed using relative measures that evaluate how well a person thinks s/he has understood the emotion in a particular facial display as compared to other displays. While this is the most common method of metacognitive assessment of people's judgments of learning or their feelings of knowing, this kind of metacognition--"relative meta-accuracy"--has not been studied within the domain of emotion. As well as asking for global metacognitive judgments, we asked people to provide relative, trial-by-trial prospective and retrospective judgments concerning whether they would be right or wrong in recognizing the expressions conveyed in particular facial displays. Our question was: Do people know when they will be correct in knowing what expression is conveyed, and do they know when they do not know? Although we, like others, found that global meta-accuracy was unpredictive of performance, relative meta-accuracy, given by the correlation between participants' trial-by-trial metacognitive judgments and performance on each item, were highly accurate both on the Mind in the Eyes task (Experiment 1) and on the Ekman Emotional Expression Multimorph task (in Experiment 2).     

What does a man do after he makes an error? an analysis of response programming

When people make errors during continuous tasks they temporarily pause and then slow down. One line of explanation has been that they monitor feedback to detect errors, that they may make incidental responses when errors occur (e.g. they may swear) and that they may pause to analyse their errors. In all these cases they may be assumed to act as single channel information processing systems of limited capacity, and to be unable to recognise any new signal until these processes have been completed.

Analysis of response after errors shows that this cannot be the case. Responses after errors are inaccurate, but are not slow when they require the subject to make the response which he should have made on the previous trial (i.e. to make an error correction response). Subjects thus must recognise new signals as soon as they occur. The present results require a new model of error detection and correction, and a model for response programming and priming.     

The role of prior knowledge in error correction for younger and older adults

Previous work has demonstrated that, when given feedback, younger adults are more likely to correct high-confidence errors compared with low-confidence errors, a finding termed the hypercorrection effect. Research examining the hypercorrection effect in both older and younger adults has demonstrated that the relationship between confidence and error correction was stronger for younger adults compared with older adults. However, recent work suggests that error correction is largely related to prior knowledge, while confidence may primarily serve as a proxy for prior knowledge. Prior knowledge generally remains stable or increases with age; thus, the current experiment explored how both confidence and prior knowledge contributed to error correction in younger and older adults. Participants answered general knowledge questions, rated how confident they were that their response was correct, received correct answer feedback, and rated their prior knowledge of the correct response. Overall, confidence was related to error correction for younger adults, but this relationship was much smaller for older adults. However, prior knowledge was strongly related to error correction for both younger and older adults. Confidence alone played little unique role in error correction after controlling for the role of prior knowledge. These data demonstrate that prior knowledge largely predicts error correction and suggests that both older and younger adults can use their prior knowledge to effectively correct errors in memory.     

Causal attributions and strategy use in relation to memory performance differences in younger and older adults

A metacognitive hypothesis to explain age differences in adult memory is explored here–that younger and older adults differ in beliefs about memory and strategic processing. The motivational beliefs that adults make for their own memory performances were examined across tests of recall, recognition, face–name learning, and appointment-keeping. Forty-eight older and 48 younger community-living adults were required to report the factors they believed influenced their performance and the memory strategies used for each task. A final questionnaire required subjects to rank order the importance of a list of causal factors. There were significantly more younger adults as compared to older adults who attributed performance to controllable factors (i.e. strategy use), although age differences in beliefs on a more familiar memory task were smaller than on other tasks. Moreover, within age groups, attributions to controllable factors were associated with increased memory performance compared to when memory was attributed to uncontrollable factors (i.e. ability, age). Believing that memory is uncontrollable may undermine the efficient use of effort in cognition, consistent with current metacognitive theory.     

Everyday cognitive failures and memory problems in Parkinson's patients without dementia

There is growing evidence that Parkinson’s disease patients without dementia exhibit cognitive deficits in some executive, memory and selective attention tasks. However, the impact of these deficits on their everyday cognitive functioning remains largely unknown. This issue was explored using self-report questionnaires. Twenty-four Parkinson’s patients and 24 age-matched controls rated how frequently they make particular cognitive errors, such as forgetting what they were about to say. In addition, a partner or significant other also rated each participant’s propensity for making cognitive errors. Rather than simply rating themselves as making more of all types of errors, these results indicate that PD patients make more of specific types of error. Further analysis suggests that some of these errors are related to attentional processes (being more distractible) whereas others are related to retrieval processes (being unable to recall important details from the previous day).     

Are errors detected before they occur? Early error sensations revealed by metacognitive judgments on the timing of error awareness

Errors in choice tasks are not only detected fast and reliably, participants often report that they knew that an error occurred already before a response was produced. These early error sensations stand in contrast with evidence suggesting that the earliest neural correlates of error awareness emerge around 300 ms after erroneous responses. The present study aimed to investigate whether anecdotal evidence for early error sensations can be corroborated in a controlled study in which participants provide metacognitive judgments on the subjective timing of error awareness. In Experiment 1, participants had to report whether they became aware of their errors before or after the response. In Experiment 2, we measured confidence in these metacognitive judgments. Our data show that participants report early error sensations with high confidence in the majority of error trials across paradigms and experiments. These results provide first evidence for early error sensations, informing theories of error awareness.     

Nurses' behaviors and visual scanning patterns may reduce patient identification errors

Patient identification (ID) errors occurring during the medication administration process can be fatal. The aim of this study is to determine whether differences in nurses' behaviors and visual scanning patterns during the medication administration process influence their capacities to identify patient ID errors. Nurse participants (n = 20) administered medications to 3 patients in a simulated clinical setting, with 1 patient having an embedded ID error. Error-identifying nurses tended to complete more process steps in a similar amount of time than non-error-identifying nurses and tended to scan information across artifacts (e.g., ID band, patient chart, medication label) rather than fixating on several pieces of information on a single artifact before fixating on another artifact. Non-error-indentifying nurses tended to increase their durations of off-topic conversations-a type of process interruption-over the course of the trials; the difference between groups was significant in the trial with the embedded ID error. Error-identifying nurses tended to have their most fixations in a row on the patient's chart, whereas non-error-identifying nurses did not tend to have a single artifact on which they consistently fixated. Finally, error-identifying nurses tended to have predictable eye fixation sequences across artifacts, whereas non-error-identifying nurses tended to have seemingly random eye fixation sequences. This finding has implications for nurse training and the design of tools and technologies that support nurses as they complete the medication administration process.     

Metacognition for strategy selection during arithmetic problem-solving in young and older adults

We examined participants’ strategy choices and metacognitive judgments during arithmetic problem-solving. Metacognitive judgments were collected either prospectively or retrospectively. We tested whether metacognitive judgments are related to strategy choices on the current problems and on the immediately following problems, and age-related differences in relations between metacognition and strategy choices. Data showed that both young and older adults were able to make accurate retrospective, but not prospective, judgments. Moreover, the accuracy of retrospective judgments was comparable in young and older adults when participants had to select and execute the better strategy. Metacognitive accuracy was even higher in older adults when participants had to only select the better strategy. Finally, low-confidence judgments on current items were more frequently followed by better strategy selection on immediately succeeding items than high-confidence judgments in both young and older adults. Implications of these findings to further our understanding of age-related differences and similarities in adults’ metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive regulation for strategy selection in the context of arithmetic problem solving are discussed.     

Self-regulation in error management training: emotion control and metacognition as mediators of performance effects

In error management training, participants are explicitly encouraged to make errors and learn from them. Error management training has frequently been shown to lead to better performance than conventional trainings that adopt an error avoidant approach. The present study investigated self-regulatory processes mediating this effect. Fifty-five volunteer students learned a computer program under 1 of 3 conditions: error avoidant training, error management training, or error management training supplemented with a metacognitive module. As predicted, both forms of error management training led to better transfer performance than did error avoidant training (d = 0.75). Mediation hypotheses were fully supported: Emotion control and metacognitive activity (from verbal protocols) mediated performance differences. These findings highlight the potential of promoting self-regulatory processing during training.     

Retrospective and prospective metacognitive judgments in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta)

A growing body of research suggests that some non-human animals are capable of making accurate metacognitive judgments. In previous studies, non-human animals have made either retrospective or prospective judgments (about how they did on a test or how they will do on a test, respectively). These two types of judgments are dissociable in humans. The current study tested the abilities of two rhesus macaque monkeys to make both retrospective and prospective judgments about their performance on the same memory task. Both monkeys had been trained previously to make retrospective confidence judgments. Both monkeys successfully demonstrated transfer of retrospective metacognitive judgments to the new memory task. Furthermore, both monkeys transferred their retrospective judgments to the prospective task (one, immediately, and one, following the elimination of a response bias). This study is the first to demonstrate both retrospective and prospective monitoring abilities in the same monkeys and on the same task, suggesting a greater level of flexibility in animals’ metacognitive monitoring abilities than has been reported previously.