Exploring mental-state reasoning as a social-cognitive mechanism for social loafing in children

The authors explored mental-state reasoning ability among 72 preschoolers (ages 3-5 years) as a possible developmental mechanism for the well-known social loafing effect: diminished individual effort in a collaborative task. The authors expected that older children would outperform young children on standard mental-state reasoning tests and that they would display greater social loafing than younger children. In addition, we hypothesized that the ability to infer the mental states of others would be predictive of social loafing, but that the ability to reason about one's own knowledge would not. The authors gave children three standard false-belief tasks and participated in a within-subjects balloon inflation task that they performed both individually and as part of a group. Results indicated that 3-year-olds performed significantly below older preschoolers on mental-state reasoning tasks. Only 4- and 5-year-olds displayed diminished individual effort. Multiple regression analysis indicated that only the ability to reason about others' false beliefs accounted for a significant amount of variance in social loafing; age (in months) and own false-belief reasoning did not. The authors discussed theoretical and pedagogical implications.     

Early and late processes in syllogistic reasoning: evidence from eye-movements

An eye-movement monitoring experiment was carried out to examine the effects of the difficulty of the problem (simple versus complex problems) and the type of figure (figure 1 or figure 4) on the time course of processing categorical syllogisms. The results showed that the course of influence for these two factors is different. We found early processing effects for the figure but not for the difficulty of the syllogism and later processing effects for both the figure and the difficulty. These results lend support to the Model Theory (Johnson-Laird, P. N., Byrne, R. M. J. (1991). Deduction. Hillsdale, New Jersey: LEA.) as opposed to other theories of reasoning (Chater, N., Oaksford, M. (1999). The probability heuristics model of syllogistic reasoning. Cognitive Psychology, 38, 191-258; Rips, L. J. (1994). The psychology of proof. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Rips, L. J. (1994). The psychology of proof. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).     

Sociomoral reasoning in children and adolescents from two collectivistic cultures

This study compared the sociomoral reasoning of 7-, 9-, 12-, and 15-year-old children and adolescents of two collectivistic cultures in the 1990s: Spain (horizontal collectivism; N = 208) and Russia (vertical collectivism; N = 247). Participants reasoned about choices and moral justifications of a protagonist in a sociomoral dilemma where participants can focus on different moral and non-moral concerns (e.g., going with their best friend, going with a new classmate or trying to do something with both). Results support previous research in western societies: participants tend to choose the option “visiting the best friend”, and self-interest tends to decrease with age whereas altruism tends to increase. Moreover, Spanish participants tended to consider all parties involved in the dilemma (i.e., old friend and new classmate), whereas Russian participants did not. These results are discussed in light of their differences as horizontal and vertical collectivistic societies. Overall, the results open an avenue for new studies when comparing the effects of culture on children's and adolescents' development.     

Belief inhibition in children's reasoning: memory-based evidence

Adult reasoning has been shown as mediated by the inhibition of intuitive beliefs that are in conflict with logic. The current study introduces a classic procedure from the memory field to investigate belief inhibition in 12- to 17-year-old reasoners. A lexical decision task was used to probe the memory accessibility of beliefs that were cued during thinking on syllogistic reasoning problems. Results indicated an impaired memory access for words associated with misleading beliefs that were cued during reasoning if syllogisms had been solved correctly. This finding supports the claim that even for younger reasoners, correct reasoning is mediated by inhibitory processing as soon as intuitive beliefs conflict with logical considerations.     

Adaptive constructive processes: evidence from priming verbal reasoning with false memories

Previous research has demonstrated that false memories produced by the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm serve adaptive functions both in related memory tasks and in various cognitive processes. The present study investigated whether memory errors induced by associated words could influence performance on verbal reasoning tasks. Participants were asked to solve sentence-based verbal reasoning problems, half of which had been primed by the presentation of word lists where the critical lures were also the solutions to the problems. The results showed that when false memories were generated, problems were solved more often and significantly faster than those that were primed without false memories or those that were unprimed, and that there was no evidence that the effect of priming with false memories observed in experiments was due to testing effects. The findings extend false memory priming effects to verbal reasoning processes, providing evidence with adaptive constructive processes.     

Neuroanatomical distribution of five semantic components of verbs: evidence from fMRI

The Simulation Framework, also known as the Embodied Cognition Framework, maintains that conceptual knowledge is grounded in sensorimotor systems. To test several predictions that this theory makes about the neural substrates of verb meanings, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to scan subjects' brains while they made semantic judgments involving five classes of verbs-specifically, Running verbs (e.g., run, jog, walk), Speaking verbs (e.g., shout, mumble, whisper), Hitting verbs (e.g., hit, poke, jab), Cutting verbs (e.g., cut, slice, hack), and Change of State verbs (e.g., shatter, smash, crack). These classes were selected because they vary with respect to the presence or absence of five distinct semantic components-specifically, ACTION, MOTION, CONTACT, CHANGE OF STATE, and TOOL USE. Based on the Simulation Framework, we hypothesized that the ACTION component depends on the primary motor and premotor cortices, that the MOTION component depends on the posterolateral temporal cortex, that the CONTACT component depends on the intraparietal sulcus and inferior parietal lobule, that the CHANGE OF STATE component depends on the ventral temporal cortex, and that the TOOL USE component depends on a distributed network of temporal, parietal, and frontal regions. Virtually all of the predictions were confirmed. Taken together, these findings support the Simulation Framework and extend our understanding of the neuroanatomical distribution of different aspects of verb meaning.     

Collective rationality in interactive decisions: evidence for team reasoning

Decision theory and game theory rest on a fundamental assumption that players seek to maximize their individual utilities, but in some interactive decisions it seems intuitively reasonable to aim to maximize the utility of the group of players as a whole. Such team reasoning requires collective preferences and a distinctive mode of reasoning from preferences to decisions. Findings from two experiments provide evidence for collective preferences and team reasoning. In lifelike vignettes (Experiment 1) and abstract games (Experiment 2) with certain structural properties, most players preferred team-reasoning strategies to strategies supporting unique Nash equilibria, although individually rational players should choose equilibrium strategies. These findings suggest that team reasoning predicts strategy choices more powerfully than orthodox game theory in some games.     

Cross-cultural similarities and differences in person-body reasoning: experimental evidence from the United Kingdom and Brazilian Amazon

We report the results of a cross-cultural investigation of person-body reasoning in the United Kingdom and northern Brazilian Amazon (Marajó Island). The study provides evidence that directly bears upon divergent theoretical claims in cognitive psychology and anthropology, respectively, on the cognitive origins and cross-cultural incidence of mind-body dualism. In a novel reasoning task, we found that participants across the two sample populations parsed a wide range of capacities similarly in terms of the capacities' perceived anchoring to bodily function. Patterns of reasoning concerning the respective roles of physical and biological properties in sustaining various capacities did vary between sample populations, however. Further, the data challenge prior ad-hoc categorizations in the empirical literature on the developmental origins of and cognitive constraints on psycho-physical reasoning (e.g., in afterlife concepts). We suggest cross-culturally validated categories of "Body Dependent" and "Body Independent" items for future developmental and cross-cultural research in this emerging area.     

Syllogistic reasoning and belief-bias inhibition in school children: evidence from a negative priming paradigm

Research on deductive reasoning in adolescents and adults has shown that errors in deductive logic are not necessarily due to a lack of logical ability but can stem from an executive failure to inhibit biases. Few studies have examined this dissociation in children. Here, we used a negative priming paradigm with 64 children (8-10 years old) to test the role of cognitive inhibition in syllogisms with belief-bias effects. On trials where negative priming was predicted, results were as follows: For the first syllogism (A), the strategy 'unbelievable-equals-invalid' had to be inhibited. The logic of the syllogism led to affirming a conclusion inconsistent with one's knowledge of the world, such as 'All elephants are light.' For the second syllogism (B), one's real-world knowledge and the syllogism's logic were congruent but the latter required affirming exactly what had been inhibited for A (i.e. that elephants are heavy). A negative priming effect on the A-B sequence was reflected in a significant drop in reasoning performance on B. This supports the idea that during cognitive development, inhibitory control is required for success on syllogisms where beliefs and logic interfere.     

Children are cursed: an asymmetric bias in mental-state attribution

Abstract - Young children have problems reasoning about false beliefs. We suggest that this is at least partially the result of the same curse of knowledge that has been observed in adults—a tendency to be biased by one's own knowledge when assessing the knowledge of a more naive person. We tested 3- to 5-year-old children in a knowledge-attribution task and found that young children exhibited a curse-of-knowledge bias to a greater extent than older children, a finding that is consistent with their greater difficulty with false-belief tasks. We also found that children's misattributions were asymmetric. They were limited to cases in which the children were more knowledgeable than the other person; misattributions did not occur when the children were more ignorant than the other person. This suggests that their difficulty is better characterized by the curse of knowledge than by more general egocentrism or rationality accounts.     

Conditional reasoning following contradictory evidence: A developmental analysis

Recent evidence suggests that young adults do not correctly understand the logical relationship of the conditional (if p the q) as it applies to hypothesis testing, and most training procedures have not been productive. However, the introduction of contradictory evidence following faulty inferences has led to accurate inferences with conditional statements. Third and seventh grade and college studients (9, 13, and 21 years of age, respectively) were tested to assess developmental differences in improvement following contradiction training and to test whether improved performance transfers to other conditional reasoning tasks. Significant improvement in conditional reasoning was found for the young adult group following the introduction of contradictory evidence, and the positive effect of the treatment transferred across tasks. The third grade students showed no effects from the introduction of the contradiction, but the seventh graders were often confused by the introduction of the contradiction. Seventh grade and college student performances were generally worse than that of the third graders for the positive instances (p · q), but while the contradiction training improved college studients' performance it did not affect the seventh graders. The results are discussed in terms of changes in cognitive structures.     

Broadening the study of inductive reasoning: Confirmation judgments with uncertain evidence

Although evidence in real life is often uncertain, the psychology of inductive reasoning has, so far, been confined to certain evidence. The present study extends previous research by investigating whether people properly estimate the impact of uncertain evidence on a given hypothesis. Two experiments are reported, in which the uncertainty of evidence is explicitly (by means of numerical values) versus implicitly (by means of ambiguous pictures) manipulated. The results show that people’s judgments are highly correlated with those predicted by normatively sound Bayesian measures of impact. This sensitivity to the degree of evidential uncertainty supports the centrality of inductive reasoning in cognition and opens the path to the study of this issue in more naturalistic settings.     

Children’s causal inferences from indirect evidence: Backwards blocking and Bayesian reasoning in preschoolers

Previous research suggests that children can infer causal relations from patterns of events. However, what appear to be cases of causal inference may simply reduce to children recognizing relevant associations among events, and responding based on those associations. To examine this claim, in Experiments 1 and 2, children were introduced to a “blicket detector,” a machine that lit up and played music when certain objects were placed upon it. Children observed patterns of contingency between objects and the machine’s activation that required them to use indirect evidence to make causal inferences. Critically, associative models either made no predictions, or made incorrect predictions about these inferences. In general, children were able to make these inferences, but some developmental differences between 3- and 4-year-olds were found. We suggest that children’s causal inferences are not based on recognizing associations, but rather that children develop a mechanism for Bayesian structure learning. Experiment 3 explicitly tests a prediction of this account. Children were asked to make an inference about ambiguous data based on the base rate of certain events occurring. Four-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds were able to make this inference.     

Spatial associations in relational reasoning: evidence for a SNARC-like effect

Relational reasoning (A > B, B > C, therefore A > C) shares a number of similarities with numerical cognition, including a common behavioural signature, the symbolic distance effect. Just as reaction times for evaluating relational conclusions decrease as the distance between two ordered objects increases, people need less time to compare two numbers when they are distant (e.g., 2 and 8) than when they are close (e.g., 3 and 4). Given that some remain doubtful about such analogical representations in relational reasoning, we determine whether numerical cognition and relational reasoning have other overlapping behavioural effects. Here, using relational reasoning problems that require the alignment of six items, we provide evidence showing that the subjects' linear mental representation affects motor performance when evaluating conclusions. Items accessible from the left part of a linear representation are evaluated faster when the response is made by the left, rather than the right, hand and the reverse is observed for items accessible from the right part of the linear representation. This effect, observed with the prepositions to the left of and to the right of as well as with above and below, is analogous to the SNARC (Spatial Numerical Association of Response Codes) effect, which is characterized by an interaction between magnitude of numbers and side of response.     

Language access and theory of mind reasoning: evidence from deaf children in bilingual and oralist environments

This investigation examined whether access to sign language as a medium for instruction influences theory of mind (ToM) reasoning in deaf children with similar home language environments. Experiment 1 involved 97 deaf Italian children ages 4-12 years: 56 were from deaf families and had LIS (Italian Sign Language) as their native language, and 41 had acquired LIS as late signers following contact with signers outside their hearing families. Children receiving bimodal/bilingual instruction in LIS together with Sign-Supported and spoken Italian significantly outperformed children in oralist schools in which communication was in Italian and often relied on lipreading. Experiment 2 involved 61 deaf children in Estonia and Sweden ages 6-16 years. On a wide variety of ToM tasks, bilingually instructed native signers in Estonian Sign Language and spoken Estonian succeeded at a level similar to age-matched hearing children. They outperformed bilingually instructed late signers and native signers attending oralist schools. Particularly for native signers, access to sign language in a bilingual environment may facilitate conversational exchanges that promote the expression of ToM by enabling children to monitor others' mental states effectively.     

Representational and executive selection resources in 'theory of mind': evidence from compromised belief-desire reasoning in old age

Effective belief-desire reasoning requires both specialized representational capacities-the capacity to represent the mental states as such-as well as executive selection processes for accurate performance on tasks requiring the prediction and explanation of the actions of social agents. Compromised belief-desire reasoning in a given population may reflect failures in either or both of these systems. We report evidence supporting this two-process model from belief-desire reasoning tasks conducted with younger and older adult populations. When task inferential complexity is held constant, neither group showed specific difficulty with reasoning about mental state content as compared with non-mental state content. However, manipulations that systematically increase executive performance demands within belief-desire reasoning caused systematic decreases in task performance in both older and younger adult groups. Moreover, the effect of increasing executive demands was disproportionately greater in the older group. Regression analysis indicated that measures of processing speed and inhibition contributed most to explaining variance in accuracy and response times in the belief-desire reasoning tasks. These results are consistent with the idea that compromised belief-desire reasoning in old age is likely the result of age-related decline in executive selection skills that supplement core mental state representational abilities, rather than as a result of failures in the representational system itself.     

The native mind: biological categorization and reasoning in development and across cultures

This article describes cross-cultural and developmental research on folk biology: that is, the study of how people conceptualize living kinds. The combination of a conceptual module for biology and cross-cultural comparison brings a new perspective to theories of categorization and reasoning. From the standpoint of cognitive psychology, the authors find that results gathered from standard populations in industrialized societies often fail to generalize to humanity at large. For example, similarity-driven typicality and diversity effects either are not found or pattern differently when one moves beyond undergraduates. From the perspective of folk biology, standard populations may yield misleading results because they represent examples of especially impoverished experience with nature. Certain phenomena are robust across populations, consistent with notions of a core module.     

Young infants' reasoning about hidden objects: evidence from violation-of-expectation tasks with test trials only

The present research examined alternative accounts of prior violation-of-expectation (VOE) reports that young infants can represent and reason about hidden objects. According to these accounts, young infants' apparent success in these VOE tasks reflects only novelty and familiarity preferences induced by the habituation or familiarization trials in the tasks. In two experiments, 4-month-old infants were tested in VOE tasks with test trials only. The infants still gave evidence that they could represent and reason about hidden objects: they were surprised, as indicated by greater attention, when a wide object became fully hidden behind a narrow occluder (Experiment 1) or inside a narrow container (Experiment 2). These and control results demonstrate that young infants can succeed at VOE tasks involving hidden objects even when given no habituation or familiarization trials. The present research thus provides additional support for the conclusion that young infants possess expectations about hidden objects. Methodological issues concerning the use of habituation or familiarization trials in VOE tasks are also discussed.     

Further evidence for the role of inferential reasoning in forward blocking

Previous studies on human causal learning (De Houwer & Beckers, 2003; De Houwer, Beckers, & Glautier, 2002) showed that secondary task difficulty (performing an easy vs. a difficult secondary task during the main causal learning task) and ceiling information (outcome occurs with a maximal vs. submaximal intensity) had an influence on forward blocking (i.e., lower causal ratings for cue T when AT+ trials are preceded by A+ trials than when no A+ trials are presented). We extended these studies by also examining self-reports of participants about the reasons behind their causal ratings. Blocking was found only for participants who reported an appropriate blocking inference. Furthermore, secondary task difficulty and ceiling information influenced the number of participants who reported an appropriate blocking inference. These findings point to a major impact of inferential reasoning in human causal learning.