Development of naive beliefs about moving objects: The straight-down belief in action

The naive belief that carried objects fall straight down when released has become known as the straight-down belief in the literature of intuitive physics. The present data show that, without formal instruction, many children revise the straight-down belief between 8 and 12 years of age. In Experiment 1, 6-, 8-, and 12-year-old children repeatedly tried to hit a target on the floor or on a table (without feedback) by dropping a ball while moving and judged the optimal release points. Whereas, in their judgments, the majority of the 6- and 8-year-old children exhibited the erroneous straight-down belief, most 12-year-olds gave correct forward answers. In their actions, children who held the straight-down belief dropped the ball significantly later than children who exhibited correct judgmental knowledge. The results of three additional experiments provide converging evidence for the claim that children use their naive beliefs to plan their actions. The data further suggest that the straight-down belief does not directly stem from a perceptual illusion. Age differences concerning the ability to execute action plans as intended are documented and discussed in relation to conceptual development.     

The relation between infants' perception of catchableness and the control of catching

The authors studied how infants come to perceive and act adaptively by presenting 35 three- to nine-month-olds with balls that approached at various speeds according to a staircase procedure. They determined whether infants attempted to reach for the ball and whether they were successful (i.e., contacted the ball). In addition, the time and distance of the ball at the onset of the catching movements were measured for the successful interceptions. The authors found that not only catching skill but also the perceptual judgments of the catchableness improved with age; infants started to take their catching ability into account when judging whether a ball was catchable. Moreover, the authors observed that infants who made imprecise perceptual judgments were more likely to use a distance control strategy, whereas infants who made accurate perceptual judgments were more likely to use the more adaptive time strategy to control the catching movements. They conclude that the present study supports the proposal that, even in prelocomotor infants, the development of perception is intricately linked to or constrained by development in the visual control of action.     

Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism

Though it enjoys widespread support, the claim that perceptual experiences possess nonconceptual content has been vigorously disputed in the recent literature by those who argue that the content of perceptual experience must be conceptual content. Nonconceptualism and conceptualism are often assumed to be well-defined theoretical approaches that each constitute unitary claims about the contents of experience. In this paper I try to show that this implicit assumption is mistaken, and what consequences this has for the debate about perceptual experience. I distinguish between two different ways that nonconceptualist (and conceptualist) proposals about perceptual content can be understood: as claims about the constituents that compose perceptual contents or as claims about whether a subject’s undergoing experiences with those contents requires them to possess the concepts that characterize those contents. I maintain that these ways of understanding conceptualism and nonconceptualism are orthogonal to one another. This is revealed by the conceptual coherence of positions in which the contents of experiences have both conceptual and nonconceptual features; positions which possess their own distinctive sources of philosophical motivation. I argue that the fact that there is a place in conceptual space for such positions, and that there may be good reason for theorists to adopt them, creates difficulties for both the central argument for nonconceptualism and the central argument for conceptualism. I set out each of these arguments; the Argument from Possession-Independence and the Epistemically-Driven Argument. I then try to show how the existence of mixed positions about perceptual content derived from a clear distinction between compositional and possessional considerations constitutes a significant obstacle for those arguments as they stand. The takehome message of the paper is that unless one clearly acknowledges the distinction between issues about the composition of perceptual content and issues about how subject’s capacities to undergo certain experiences relates to their possession of concepts one runs the risk of embracing unsatisfying philosophical arguments in which conclusions relevant to one conception of nonconceptual and conceptual content are grounded on arguments that concern only the other; arguments that cannot, in themselves, sustain them.     

Individual differences in children's understanding of inversion and arithmetical skill

Background and aims. In order to develop arithmetic expertise, children must understand arithmetic principles, such as the inverse relationship between addition and subtraction, in addition to learning calculation skills. We report two experiments that investigate children's understanding of the principle of inversion and the relationship between their conceptual understanding and arithmetical skills. Sample. A group of 127 children from primary schools took part in the study. The children were from 2 age groups (6–7 and 8–9 years). Methods. Children's accuracy on inverse and control problems in a variety of presentation formats and in canonical and non‐canonical forms was measured. Tests of general arithmetic ability were also administered. Results. Children consistently performed better on inverse than control problems, which indicates that they could make use of the inverse principle. Presentation format affected performance: picture presentation allowed children to apply their conceptual understanding flexibly regardless of the problem type, while word problems restricted their ability to use their conceptual knowledge. Cluster analyses revealed three subgroups with different profiles of conceptual understanding and arithmetical skill. Children in the ‘high ability’ and ‘low ability’ groups showed conceptual understanding that was in‐line with their arithmetical skill, whilst a 3rd group of children had more advanced conceptual understanding than arithmetical skill. Conclusions. The three subgroups may represent different points along a single developmental path or distinct developmental paths. The discovery of the existence of the three groups has important consequences for education. It demonstrates the importance of considering the pattern of individual children's conceptual understanding and problem‐solving skills.     

Cognitive advantage in sport: the nature of perceptual structures

To extend and clarify the nature of the perceptual processes used by sport experts to perceive schematic sport information, two experiments used schematic football diagrams that varied in structure (structured vs. unstructured) and complexity (complex vs. easy). The primary objective was to examine and characterize the nature of the perceptual structures (chunks) that are initially encoded, stored, and subsequently retrieved. In Experiment 1, compared with nonexperts, experts recalled larger perceptual structures following the initial stimulus presentation of structured stimuli only, replicating the recall findings of previous research in other skill domains. Experiment 2 used a long-term memory recognition task and a sorting task. Experts had superior recall and recognition of structured stimuli only, along with more discriminating sorting criteria of perceptual structures within long-term memory. This suggests that experts possess a highly refined semantic network or organized, structured schematic information. This research extends and clarifies the similarities between the perceptual processes of experts in sport (i.e., football) and experts in skill domains that require obvious cognitive involvement (i.e., chess). The results are discussed with reference to the perceptual and conceptual chunking hypotheses. It is proposed that sport experts' knowledge of a conceptual category enables them to retrieve elements using a "generate-and-test process."     

Preconceptual intelligibility in perception

This paper argues that John McDowell’s conceptualism distorts a genuine phenomenological account of perception. Instead of the seemingly forced choice between conceptualism and non-conceptualism as to what accounts for perceptual and discursive meaning, I provide an argument that there is a preconceptual intelligibility already in the perceptual field. With the help of insights from certain nonconceptualists I sketch out an argument that there is a teleological directedness in the way in which latent order and structure can be discriminated at the level of perceptual content. This content can then be brought to discursive, conceptual clarity by understanding in such a way that it is guided by the order already discovered in perception. With the help of Husserlian phenomenology of perception, I argue that the fundamental roots of epistemic normativity lie in the discriminating intelligence or mindedness operative below the level of the explicitly conceptual. By preconceptual is meant the directedness of explication of the structures present in the sensory manifold toward fully explicit conceptual judgments.     

Optical Information to Guide the Head and Handle Movements While Playing Kendama

This study focuses on the perceptual skills used when playing kendama, a toy with a ball, string, and handle. It examines the visual information required for guiding the head and handle movements during the “swing-in” catching maneuver and determines whether information-based strategies such as canceling the rate of change of α (the optical depression angle from the horizon) or cot α (optical acceleration), using tau coupling, or a combination thereof, could be applied to this empirical task. The regressions of both α and cot α with time are found to be highly linear and increase when the skill level increases. For expert players, the k values for the tau coupling based on the center of the ball are clearly lower than those for the tau coupling based on the hole in the ball compared with skilled players. These results suggest that, with increasing skill level, kendama players tend to utilize α or cot α for regulating the observation point and use the sight of the hole as the tau coupling information for controlling the handle.     

Exploring Enactive Realism

Abstract

The paper considers the success of enactive realism about perception; the theory that perceivers gain direct access to the mind-independent physical world through their exercise of sensorimotor skills and understanding. I argue that while it is plausible that the possession of some forms of knowledge, conceptual or practical, may enable perceptual contact with the environment, the role of sensorimotor mastery is not as pervasive as the enactive realist proposes. Non-veridical perception, furthermore, cannot be captured adequately by enactivist resources under a disjunctivist framework.     

Why the Capacity to Pretend Matters for Empathy

A phenomenological insight in the debate on empathy is that it is possible to directly perceive other people’s emotions in their expressive bodily behaviour. Contrary to what is suggested by many phenomenologists, namely that this perceptual skill is immediately available if one has vision, this paper argues that the perceptual skill for empathy is acquired. Such a skill requires that we have undergone certain emotional experiences ourselves and that we have had the experience of seeing the world differently, which is a form of pretence. By investigating how we retain knowledge of what is real while pretending, that is, how we anchor the experience of pretence in something that is not pretended, the paper argues that we split our experiential perspective into a double perspective, which differs from the cognitive act of understanding what a perspective is. With this notion in hand, we can return to the debate on empathy. It is argued that in order to have the capacity for direct empathic perception, one must have undergone experiences involving a double perspective.     

Affordances and the Nature of Perceptual Content

Abstract

According to John McDowell, representational perceptual content is conceptual through and through. This paper criticizes this view by claiming that there is a certain kind of representational and non‐conceptual perceptual content that is sensitive to bodily skills. After a brief introduction to McDowell’s position, Merleau‐Ponty’s notion of body schema and Gibson’s notion of affordance are presented. It is argued that affordances are constitutive of representational perceptual content, and that at least some affordances, the so‐called ‘conditional affordances’, are essentially related to the body schema. This means that the perceptual content depends upon the nature of the body schema. Since the body schema does not pertain to the domain that our conceptual faculties operate upon, it is argued that this kind of perceptual content cannot be conceptual. At least some of that content is representational, yet it cannot feature as non‐demonstrative conceptual content. It is argued that if it features as demonstrative conceptual content, it has to be captured by private concepts. Since McDowell’s theory does not allow for the existence of a private language, it is concluded that at least some representational perceptual content is non‐conceptual.     

Effects of perceptual and conceptual similarities on consumers' evaluations of copycat brand names

Copycats often choose brand names that mimic perceptual, conceptual, or both elements of leading brand names. Yet little is known about how perceptual and conceptual similarities of a copycat interact to affect consumers' evaluations, especially in logographic language systems (e.g., Chinese). Three laboratory experiments demonstrate that perceptual similarity alone leads to negative evaluations of copycat brand names; this negative effect, however, can be mitigated when conceptual similarity is added. The underlying mechanism for this effect can be traced to consumers' persuasion knowledge. Perceptual (vs. conceptual) similarity activates consumers' persuasion knowledge about the insincere motives of the copycat brand, which in turn shapes their brand evaluations. However, this effect can become less prominent when conceptual similarity is added because it alleviates use of persuasion knowledge, or when a consumer is in a happy mood because it neutralizes persuasion knowledge. These findings shed light on how different types of copycat strategies interact to affect copycat brand name evaluations and offer important implications for marketing practice. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Predictive coding as a model of cognition

Previous work has shown that predictive coding can provide a detailed explanation of a very wide range of low-level perceptual processes. It is also widely believed that predictive coding can account for high-level, cognitive, abilities. This article provides support for this view by showing that predictive coding can simulate phenomena such as categorisation, the influence of abstract knowledge on perception, recall and reasoning about conceptual knowledge, context-dependent behavioural control, and naive physics. The particular implementation of predictive coding used here (PC/BC-DIM) has previously been used to simulate low-level perceptual behaviour and the neural mechanisms that underlie them. This algorithm thus provides a single framework for modelling both perceptual and cognitive brain function.     

Conceptual versus Perceptual Priming in Incomplete Picture Identification

This paper examined conceptual versus perceptual priming in identification of incomplete pictures by using a short-term priming paradigm, in which information that may be useful in identifying a fragmented target is presented just prior to the target’s presentation. The target was a picture that slowly and continuously became complete and the participants were required to press a key as soon as they knew what it was. Each target was preceded by a visual prime. The nature of this prime varied from very conceptual (e.g., the name of the picture’s category) to very perceptual (e.g., a similar-shaped pictorial prime from a different category). Primes also included those that combined perceptual and conceptual information (e.g., names or images of the target picture). Across three experiments, conceptual primes were effective while the purely perceptual primes were not. Accordingly, we conclude that pictures in this type of task are identified primarily by conceptual processing, with perceptual processing contributing relatively little.     

Assessing Students' Misclassifications of Physics Concepts: An Ontological Basis for Conceptual Change

Physics novices and experts solved conceptual physics problems involving light, heat, and electric current and then explained their answers. Novices were ninth-grade students with no background in physics; experts were two postgraduates in physics and two advanced physics graduate students. Problems were multiple choice, with one correct response and three alternative responses representing possible misconceptions. For each conceptual physics problem, an isomorphic material-substance problem was constructed by imagining a materialistic conception of the physics topic and creating the resulting version of the problem. In each physics problem, one of the incorrect choices corresponded to the correct choice in the isomorphic material-substance problem. The empirical question was whether novices would reason about the physics problem as if it were conceptually similar to the substance isomorph. This question was addressed by comparing subjects' responses in the problem pairs, as well as by examining their explanations concerning all problems. A content analysis of subjects' explanations revealed that physics novices were strongly inclined to conceptualize physics concepts as material substances, whereas expert protocols revealed distinctly nonmaterialistic representations. A theory of conceptual change involving ontologically distinct categories is substantiated by these findings.     

Knowledge is power: How conceptual knowledge transforms visual cognition

In this review, we synthesize the existing literature demonstrating the dynamic interplay between conceptual knowledge and visual perceptual processing. We consider two theoretical frameworks that demonstrate interactions between processes and brain areas traditionally considered perceptual or conceptual. Specifically, we discuss categorical perception, in which visual objects are represented according to category membership, and highlight studies showing that category knowledge can penetrate early stages of visual analysis. We next discuss the embodied account of conceptual knowledge, which holds that concepts are instantiated in the same neural regions required for specific types of perception and action, and discuss the limitations of this framework. We additionally consider studies showing that gaining abstract semantic knowledge about objects and faces leads to behavioral and electrophysiological changes that are indicative of more efficient stimulus processing. Finally, we consider the role that perceiver goals and motivation may play in shaping the interaction between conceptual and perceptual processing. We hope to demonstrate how pervasive such interactions between motivation, conceptual knowledge, and perceptual processing are in our understanding of the visual environment, and to demonstrate the need for future research aimed at understanding how such interactions arise in the brain.     

Evidence of motor planning in infant reaching behavior

When adults reach for an object, kinematic measures of their approach movement are affected by what they intend to do after grasping it. We examined whether such future intended actions would be reflected in the approach-to-grasp phase of infant reaching. Twenty-one 10-month-old infants were encouraged to either throw a ball into a tub or fit it down a tube. Kinematic measures of the approach phase of the reach toward the ball were obtained using a motion analysis system. Infants, like adults, reached for the ball faster if they were going to subsequently throw it as opposed to using it in the precision action. The perceptual aspects of the ball were the same and cannot account for these kinematic differences. Infants appear to be planning both segments of their actions in advance. Our findings provide evidence for a level of sophistication in infant motor planning not reported before.     

Cognitive Task Analysis for Implicit Knowledge About Visual Representations With Similarity Learning Methods

Visual representations are prevalent in STEM instruction. To benefit from visuals, students need representational competencies that enable them to see meaningful information. Most research has focused on explicit conceptual representational competencies, but implicit perceptual competencies might also allow students to efficiently see meaningful information in visuals. Most common methods to assess students’ representational competencies rely on verbal explanations or assume explicit attention. However, because perceptual competencies are implicit and not necessarily verbally accessible, these methods are ill‐equipped to assess them. We address these shortcomings with a method that draws on similarity learning, a machine learning technique that detects visual features that account for participants’ responses to triplet comparisons of visuals. In Experiment 1, 614 chemistry students judged the similarity of Lewis structures and in Experiment 2, 489 students judged the similarity of ball‐and‐stick models. Our results showed that our method can detect visual features that drive students’ perception and suggested that students’ conceptual knowledge about molecules informed perceptual competencies through top‐down processes. Furthermore, Experiment 2 tested whether we can improve the efficiency of the method with active sampling. Results showed that random sampling yielded higher accuracy than active sampling for small sample sizes. Together, the experiments provide the first method to assess students’ perceptual competencies implicitly, without requiring verbalization or assuming explicit visual attention. These findings have implications for the design of instructional interventions that help students acquire perceptual representational competencies.     

The influence of ball-swing on the timing and coordination of a natural interceptive task

Successful interception relies on the use of perceptual information to accurately guide an efficient movement strategy that allows performers to be placed at the right place at the right time. Although previous studies have highlighted the differences in the timing and coordination of movement that underpin interceptive expertise, very little is known about how these movement patterns are adapted when intercepting targets that follow a curvilinear flight-path. The aim of this study was to examine how curvilinear ball-trajectories influence movement patterns when intercepting a fast-moving target. Movement timing and coordination was examined when four groups of cricket batters, who differed in their skill level and/or age, hit targets that followed straight or curvilinear flight-paths. The results revealed that when compared to hitting straight trials, (i) mixing straight with curvilinear trials altered movement coordination and when the ball was hit, (ii) curvilinear trajectories reduced interceptive performance and significantly delayed the timing of all kinematic moments, but there were (iii) larger decrease in performance when the ball swung away from (rather than in towards) the performer. Movement coordination differed between skill but not age groups, suggesting that skill-appropriate movement patterns that are apparent in adults may have fully emerged by late adolescence.     

Accuracy of perceptual processes subserving different perception-action systems

The accuracy of perceptual processes subserving different perception-action systems was evaluated by presenting subjects (N = 17) with similar optic flow patterns, while requiring different actions from them. Squash balls were dropped along a fixed trajectory, and subjects were asked to (a) hit the ball using their own arm, (b) release an artificial arm to hit the ball, and (c) indicate when the ball was at the point of contact of conditions (a) and (b). The variability of the temporal initiation point of the actions, which served as an operationalization of perceptual accuracy, was compared under all three conditions. The results indicated that the variability of the temporal initiation point was smallest under the natural arm condition, even though movement time was more variable here than under the artificial arm condition. It is argued that, because perception and action are intimately interwoven components of a perceiving/acting system, it is not an extrinsically (experimenter-) determined simplicity of perceptual and/or motor aspects of the task, but the intrinsic make-up of this overarching system that determines which couplings lead to a more accurate performance.     

Formalising a hypothesis for the development of anticipatory skill in time-constrained interceptive actions: Implications for the design of junior sport

When professional athletes strike a ball in tennis, cricket or baseball, the high temporal demands often necessitate the need to exploit pre-ball-flight information in order to anticipate the ball's trajectory. Despite the wealth of research probing anticipatory behaviour in sport, our understanding of when, how or why anticipatory skill develops is limited. In this article, we sought to formalise a hypothesis on the development of anticipatory skill. Using empirical temporal data from tennis, cricket and baseball, we propose that the temporal demands of the task dictate an athlete's propensity to anticipate. We then outline the implications of this hypothesis as it relates to junior sport. Notably, we question whether current playing dimensions in junior sport impose temporal demands that are sufficient to elicit anticipatory behaviour. Using tennis, cricket and baseball as examples, we illustrate differences in temporal demands between the junior and professional game and present implications for anticipation. Our discussion challenges the current junior sport experience as it relates to developing anticipatory skill.