The role of local and global properties in comparison of analogical visual scenes

Love, Rouder, and Wisniewski (1999) obtained interesting results showing that, in a same/different task on abstract visual scenes, subjects were able to process global properties quickly, even before local properties were identified. Our aim in this work is to explore more fully the complex relationships that exist between local processing and global processing. In our first experiment, we tested the robustness and generality of these global and local effects by using another, very different kind of local element. We showed that the global effects remain strong even when the local elements are neither conventional nor easily discriminable. In the second experiment, we showed that there exists an intermediate level of similarity between purely local and purely global similarity. Furthermore, we found that even when a stronger form of local dissimilarity is manipulated (through the introduction of different local elements), global effects were still observed. We conclude with a discussion of the respective roles of global and local properties in light of our findings.     

Peacocke on red and red′

How are we to define ‘red’? We seem to face a dilemma. For it seems that we must define ‘red’ in terms of ‘looks red’. But ‘looks red’ is semantically complex. We must therefore define ‘looks red’ in terms of ‘red’. Can we avoid this dilemma? Christopher Peacocke thinks we can. He claims that we can define the concept of being red in terms of the concept of being red′; the concept of a sensational property of visual experience. Peacocke agrees that his definition of red makes use of a concept that those who possess the concept of being red need not possess; namely, red′. But he thinks that this does not matter. For, he says, the definition is justified provided we can specify what it is to possess the concept of being red in terms of the concept of being red′. What he tries to show is that this might be so even if no-one could possess the concept of being red′ unless he possessed the concept of being red. Peacocke has two attempts at showing this. However, both these attempts fail. What Peacocke does show is something weaker. He shows that, using red′, we can construct a concept that gives what he calls the ‘constitutive role’ of the concept of being red; but, importantly, that it gives the constitutive role of red does not suffice for what Peacocke says is required for giving a definition. Thus, if we accept Peacocke's standard for definition, it follows that he gives us no way of avoiding the original dilemma. If this is right then perhaps we should join with those like Colin McGinn who think that we should give up our attempts to define our secondary quality concepts.     

Interactive property attribution in concept combination

We address the question of how people understand attributive noun-noun compounds. Alignment-and-comparison models suggest that the similarity of the constituent concepts guides interpretation. We propose, as an alternative, an interactive property attribution model wherein the modifier and head concepts have different functions: The head provides relevant dimensions, whereas the modifier provides candidate features for attribution. According to our model, the interaction of dimensions and features, rather than constituent similarity, guides interpretation. In this study, we empirically contrasted the two models by holding constituent similarity of compounds constant while varying the interaction of modifier feature salience and head dimension relevance. Compounds consisting of a head concept with a relevant dimension for attribution and a modifier with a salient property on that dimension were interpreted by means of property attribution. Other compounds with equivalent constituent similarity, but lacking the high salience-relevance interaction, were not interpreted by means of attribution. The interactive property attribution model more accurately predicted interpretation of noun-noun compounds.     

The Epistemic Integrity of Scientific Research

We live in a world in which scientific expertise and its epistemic authority become more important. On the other hand, the financial interests in research, which could potentially corrupt science, are increasing. Due to these two tendencies, a concern for the integrity of scientific research becomes increasingly vital. This concern is, however, hollow if we do not have a clear account of research integrity. Therefore, it is important that we explicate this concept. Following Rudolf Carnap’s characterization of the task of explication, this means that we should develop a concept that is (1) similar to our common sense notion of research integrity, (2) exact, (3) fruitful, and (4) as simple as possible. Since existing concepts do not meet these four requirements, we develop a new concept in this article. We describe a concept of epistemic integrity that is based on the property of deceptiveness, and argue that this concept does meet Carnap’s four requirements of explication. To illustrate and support our claims we use several examples from scientific practice, mainly from biomedical research.     

Critical review: Richard B. Brandt,A Theory of the Good and the Right

Conclusion To sum up. Doubts can be raised about cognitive psychoterapy. The charge of utopianism may apply in part. And a few quibbles are possible about other points. This hardly detracts from the enormous achievement of the book, which really sets a new standard for the subject, in my opinion. Brandt makes abundantly clear the importance and usefulness of trying to state issues in neutral nonmoral terminology in a way that permits them to be answered but also allows one to understand why one might be interested in the answers. He shows how psychological theory can be applied in philosophy in unsuspected ways. He greatly advances our understanding of the sorts of criticisms that actions are subject to, and therefore advances our understanding of practical reasons. He provides an excellent account of what a morality is. He raises an important issue about desire satisfaction versions of utilitarianism and presents a plausible theory concerning the measurement of a group's total happiness.The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979.     

Relative weight of local and global properties depends on both the position of local elements and the saliency of global form

Love, Rouder, and Wisniewski (1999) and Ripoll and Marty (2005) showed that subjects could process global properties very quickly in a same/different task on abstract visual scenes for which the conspicuity of local and global properties had been controlled. In this new experiment, two important new factors were manipulated: saliency of the global pattern and location of local similarity. The results showed that the saliency of the global form as well as the location of local similarity determines the strength of global and local effects. Global effects continue to manifest themselves even when the extraction of the global form is difficult. Finally, the whole pattern of results suggests that local and global processing proceeds simultaneously and involves two attentional systems whose spatial characteristics are very different.     

Familiarity,Priming, and Perception in Similarity Judgments

We present a novel way of accounting for similarity judgments. Our approach posits that similarity stems from three main sources—familiarity, priming, and inherent perceptual likeness. Here, we explore each of these constructs and demonstrate their individual and combined effectiveness in explaining similarity judgments. Using these three measures, our account of similarity explains ratings of simple, color‐based perceptual stimuli that display asymmetry effects, as well as more complicated perceptual stimuli with structural properties; more traditional approaches to similarity solve one or the other and have difficulty accounting for both. Overall, our work demonstrates the importance of each of these components of similarity in explaining similarity judgments, both individually and together, and suggests important implications for other similarity approaches.     

In defense of abstract conceptual representations

An extensive program of research in the past 2 decades has focused on the role of modal sensory, motor, and affective brain systems in storing and retrieving concept knowledge. This focus has led in some circles to an underestimation of the need for more abstract, supramodal conceptual representations in semantic cognition. Evidence for supramodal processing comes from neuroimaging work documenting a large, well-defined cortical network that responds to meaningful stimuli regardless of modal content. The nodes in this network correspond to high-level “convergence zones” that receive broadly crossmodal input and presumably process crossmodal conjunctions. It is proposed that highly conjunctive representations are needed for several critical functions, including capturing conceptual similarity structure, enabling thematic associative relationships independent of conceptual similarity, and providing efficient “chunking” of concept representations for a range of higher order tasks that require concepts to be configured as situations. These hypothesized functions account for a wide range of neuroimaging results showing modulation of the supramodal convergence zone network by associative strength, lexicality, familiarity, imageability, frequency, and semantic compositionality. The evidence supports a hierarchical model of knowledge representation in which modal systems provide a mechanism for concept acquisition and serve to ground individual concepts in external reality, whereas broadly conjunctive, supramodal representations play an equally important role in concept association and situation knowledge.     

Structural alignment facilitates the noticing of differences

High-similarity concept pairs that elicit many commonalities also elicit many related differences (Gentner & Markman, 1994; A. B. Markman & Gentner, 1993a, 1993b, 1996; A. B. Markman & Wisniewski, 1997). This finding has been used to support the claim that the comparison process is one of structural alignment. However, it is possible that the difference advantage results from some other property of high-similarity pairs, such as a greater number of stored differences. The present experiments demonstrate that the comparison process itself leads to the greater psychological availability of differences. In three experiments, participants listed commonalities for word pairs and then listed differences under a time pressure for these old pairs and new pairs. In Experiment 1, participants listed more differences for old than for new pairs, consistent with the claim that the comparison process facilitates noticing differences. In Experiment 2, we showed that the difference-listing advantage is specific to the comparison process: Mere coprocessing of the pairs (specifically, providing thematic relations) does not facilitate, and in fact appears to inhibit, difference listing. In Experiment 3, pairs with deeper common systems elicited a larger number of specific alignable differences than did pairs with shallow sets of commonalities. Overall, the results support the structural alignment claim that the comparison process promotes the noticing of both commonalities and related differences.     

归纳推理中的属性中心性效应

通过三个实验研究了属性的中心性程度对归纳推理的影响,结果表明,在归纳推理中存在属性中心性效应,中心属性比其他属性（次中心属性、再次中心属性）更能影响归纳推理。但属性中心性效应的出现受到了前提对象和结论对象相似性程度的制约,当前提对象和结论对象的相似程度高时,中心属性比其他属性更能影响归纳推理;随着相似性水平的降低,中心属性的归纳推理力度越来越弱,而次中心属性、再次中心属性的归纳推理力度则会依次表现出越来越强的趋势,到最后当前提对象和结论对象的属性完全不相似时,最次中心属性的归纳推理力度达到最高水平,而中心属性的归纳推理力度则降低到最低水平。由于再次中心属性的归纳推理力度的最高水平没有显著高于随机水平,而中心属性的归纳推理力度的最低水平却显著低于随机水平,因此,研究者认为,在前提对象和结论对象完全不相似的情况下,被试将确信不能采用中心属性来进行归纳推理的力度判断,而采用猜测的方式选择了肯定可以排除的项目之外的其他项目,这体现了具有不确定的归纳推理活动的过程的典型特征     

Human Zombies are Metaphysically Impossible

Chalmers (The Conscious Mind, Oxford Unversity Press, Oxford 1996) has argued for a form of property dualism on the basis of the concept of a zombie (which is physically identical to normals), and the concept of the inverted spectrum. He asserts that these concepts show that the facts about consciousness, such as experience or qualia, are really further facts about our world, over and above the physical facts. He claims that they are the hard part of the mind-body issue. He also claims that consciousness is a fundamental feature of the world like mass, charge, etc. He says that consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical and all current attempts to assert an identity between consciousness and the physical are just as non-reductive as his dualism. They are simply correlations and are part of the problem of the explanatory gap. In this paper, three examples of strong identities between a sensation or a quale and a physiological process are presented, which overcome these problems. They explain the identity in an a priori manner and they show that consciousness or sensations (Q) logically supervene on the physical (P), in that it is logically impossible to have P and not to have Q. In each case, the sensation was predicted and entailed by the physical. The inverted spectrum problem for consciousness is overcome and explained by a striking asymmetry in colour space. It is concluded that as some physical properties realize some sensations or qualia that human zombies are not metaphysically possible and the explanatory gap is bridged in these cases. Thus, the hard problem is overcome in these instances.     

Epistemic Presuppositions and their Consequences

Traditional epistemology has, in the main, presupposed that the primary task is to give a complete account of the concept knowledge and to state under what conditions it is possible to have it. In so doing, most accounts have been hierarchical, and all assume an idealized knower. The assumption of an idealized knower is essential for the traditional goal of generating an unassailable account of knowledge acquisition. Yet we, as individuals, fail to reach the ideal. Perhaps more important, we have epistemic goals not addressed in the traditional approach – among them, the ability to reach understanding in areas we deem important for our lives. Understanding is an epistemic concept. But how we obtain it has not traditionally been a focus. Developing an epistemic account that starts from a set of assumptions that differ from the traditional starting points will allow a different sort of epistemic theory, one on which generating understanding is a central goal and the idealized knower is replaced with an inquirer who is not merely fallible but working from a particular context with particular goals. Insight into how an epistemic account can include the particular concerns of an embedded inquirer can be found by examining the parallels between ethics and epistemology and, in particular, by examining the structure and starting points of virtue accounts. Here I develop several interrelated issues that contrast the goals and evaluative concepts that form the structure of both standard, traditional epistemological and ethical theories and virtue–centered theories. In the end, I sketch a virtue–centered epistemology that accords with who we are and how we gain understanding.     

Epistemic Presuppositions and their Consequences

Traditional epistemology has, in the main, presupposed that the primary task is to give a complete account of the concept knowledge and to state under what conditions it is possible to have it. In so doing, most accounts have been hierarchical, and all assume an idealized knower. The assumption of an idealized knower is essential for the traditional goal of generating an unassailable account of knowledge acquisition. Yet we, as individuals, fail to reach the ideal. Perhaps more important, we have epistemic goals not addressed in the traditional approach – among them, the ability to reach understanding in areas we deem important for our lives. Understanding is an epistemic concept. But how we obtain it has not traditionally been a focus. Developing an epistemic account that starts from a set of assumptions that differ from the traditional starting points will allow a different sort of epistemic theory, one on which generating understanding is a central goal and the idealized knower is replaced with an inquirer who is not merely fallible but working from a particular context with particular goals. Insight into how an epistemic account can include the particular concerns of an embedded inquirer can be found by examining the parallels between ethics and epistemology and, in particular, by examining the structure and starting points of virtue accounts. Here I develop several interrelated issues that contrast the goals and evaluative concepts that form the structure of both standard, traditional epistemological and ethical theories and virtue–centered theories. In the end, I sketch a virtue–centered epistemology that accords with who we are and how we gain understanding.     

Forgetting of stimulus attributes: methodological implications for assessing associative phenomena.

Differential responding to changes in the stimulus situation, long central to the concept of stimulus control, also provides the implicit conceptual basis for assessing the nature of a variety of associative relationships. However, there is substantial evidence that the perception of stimulus similarity is not a static property. Generalization gradients to contextual as well as discriminative stimuli flatten over time, and this increase in perceived similarity presumably reflects forgetting of the detailed characteristics or attributes of stimuli. Methodologically, the flattening of the gradient imposes an important constraint: The effect of a stimulus shift will be highly sensitive to the length of the delay interval between training and testing. Conceptually, the loss of memory for stimulus attributes also implies that the sources of interference in retention can increase over time.     

Mathematical constraints and the tulving-wiseman law: A Rejoinder

Abstract

Hintzman (1991; 1992) has claimed that the reason data points approximate the recognition failure function discovered by Tulving and Wiseman (1975) is that they are mathematically constrained to do so, and the reason that a few data points do not approximate the function, but are exceptions to it, is that these data points are less subject to mathematical constraints. He has additionally argued that such exceptions are more likely with low levels of recall and strong underlying sources of positive covariance. We provide empirical evidence relevant to this mathematical model using 301 observations from a database of all relevant experimental conditions published between 1973 and 1992 (Nilsson & Gardiner, 1993). We conclude that mathematical constraints have only a minor influence on the function, not the causal role assigned to them in Hintzman's (1992) model. By our account, both the function and exceptions to it reflect a single psychological principle, the functional effectiveness of contextual cues.     

AN ARCHIMEDEAN POINT FOR PHILOSOPHY

Abstract: According to an orthodox account of meaning and translation, meaning is a property of expressions of a language, and translation is a matching of synonymous expressions across languages. This linguistic account of translation gives rise to well‐known skeptical conclusions about translation, objectivity, meaning, and truth, but it does not conform to our best translational practices. In contrast, I argue for a textual account of meaning based on the concept of a text‐type that does conform to our best translational practices. With their semantic function in view, text‐types are Archimedean points for their respective disciplines. The text‐type of philosophy is no exception. Culture‐transcendent conceptual analysis can proceed on firm footing without having to deny the reality of radical cultural and linguistic difference by treating components of text‐types as the concepts to be analyzed. Analyses of central philosophical concepts are provided as a means of adjudicating philosophical controversy.     

Intrinsicality without Naturalness

Rae Langton and David Lewis have proposed an account of "intrinsic property"that makes use of two notions: being independent of accompaniment and being natural. We find the appeal to the first of these promising; the second notion, however, we find mystifying. In this paper we argue that the appeal to naturalness is not acceptable and offer an alternative definition of intrinsicality. The alternative definition makes crucial use of a notion commonly used by philosophers, namely, the notion of one property being had in virtue of another property. We defend our account against three arguments for thinking that this "in virtue of"notion is unacceptable in this context. We also take a look at a variety of cases in which the definition might be applied and defend it against potential counterexamples. The upshot, we think, is a modest but adequate account of what we understand by "intrinsic property."     

罗尔斯对康德伦理学的“建构主义诠释”——兼论《正义论》证成结构的思想“原型”

一、罗尔斯所理解的康德伦理学的基本特征:道德建构主义罗尔斯在整个学术生涯中从未间断过对康德伦理学的研究,其康德解读的精髓是从哲学方法论上把康德伦理学理解为一种道德建构主义(moral constructivism),在西方哲学史上第一次明确提出了建构主义概念,并把它运用于道德和政治哲学。     

My body and other objects: The internal limits of self‐ownership

Common practices such as donating blood or selling hair assume rights of disposal over oneself that are similar to, if not indistinguishable from, property rights. However, a simple view of self‐ownership fails to capture relevant moral differences between parts of a person and other objects. In light of this, we require some account of the continuity in the form of ownership rights a person has over herself and other objects, which also acknowledges the normative differences between constitutive parts of a person, on the one hand, and external objects, on the other. This paper provides such an account by arguing that there are reasons internal to a general justification of property rights to limit the extent of powers included in ownership of different kinds of object, depending on how the person is situated in relation to them. Rejecting a typical Hohfeldian view of property as a univocal, gradable concept allows us to make space for a new approach to property and self‐ownership: one which can make sense of various uses of the body as property without entailing that our relation to those parts is exhaustively characterised by an ordinary property right.     

Identity and similarity

The standard approach to the so-called paradoxes of identity has been to argue that these paradoxes do not essentially concern the notion of identity but rather betray misconceptions on our part regarding other metaphysical notions, like that of an object or a property. This paper proposes a different approach by pointing to an ambiguity in the identity predicate and arguing that the concept of identity that figures in many ordinary identity claims, including those that appear in the paradoxes, is not the traditional philosophical concept but one that can be defined in terms of relevant similarity. This approach to the paradoxes will be argued to be superior to the standard one.