Reasoning and Explaining

When regimented in a certain natural way, the concepts of explanation and justification manifest a pattern of interrelations connected more or less systematically to their object. Besides its intrinsic interest, this pattern may give us some insight into the nature, source, and limits of the concept of argument.     

Best and Worst Professors: Gender Patterns in Students' Choices

Over 100 primarily White students described their best and worst professor. For best, female professors were chosen more by their female students and less by their male students than expected. There were no gender differences in choice of worst professors. The qualities that students criticize are similar for their male and female professors, mainly a lack of organization and clarity. Best professors most often are described as caring and knowledgeable, but other qualities vary as a function of professor or student gender. These findings suggest that more attention should be paid to gender dynamics in classroom teaching and in student evaluations.     

Expect the Best and Prepare for the Worst: Anticipatory Coping and Preparations for Y2K

The Y2K Bug, the programming glitch expected to derail computerized systems worldwide when the year changed from 1999 to 2000, provided a rich context for examining anticipatory coping and preparatory behaviors. In the last 2 months of 1999, 697 respondents completed an online survey of proactivity, worry about Y2K, dispositional optimism, primary and secondary control-oriented coping efforts, estimates of Y2K-related disruptions, and household preparations. Higher levels of proactivity, worry, and optimism were independently associated with greater self-reported preparations. These predictors were positively associated with greater primary control-oriented coping efforts, but showed differential relations to secondary control efforts, such as accepting the situation or trusting a higher power, especially among participants who thought the damage would be severe and lasting. Implications for understanding multiple ways of coping with potential stressors are discussed.

PERCEPTIONS OF POWER Female Executives' Descriptions of Power Usage by Best and Worst Bosses

This research examined the perceived use of power by women executive's best and worst bosses. Using a new methodology to measure French and Raven's (1959) and Raven's (1965) power bases, members of the National Association of Female Executives responded to a survey in which they evaluated the power bases of their best and worst bosses. Male bosses were more likely than female bosses to be identified as the worst boss, whereas females and males were equally likely to be identified as the best boss, although these women probably had far more male than female bosses.     

On the Role of Biomedical Knowledge in Clinical Reasoning by Experts,Intermediates and Novices

In two studies the role of biomedical knowledge in the diagnosis of clinical cases was explored. Experiment 1 demonstrated a decrease in the use of biomedical knowledge with increasing expertise. This result appeared to be at variance with some findings reported in the literature (e.g., Lesgold, 1984), but supported those of others (e.g., Patel, Evans, & Groen, 1989). In Experiment 2, three possible explanations for this phenomenon were investigated: (1) rudimentation of biomedical knowledge, (2) inertia, and (3) encapsulation of biomedical knowledge under higher order concepts. Using a combined think-aloud and post-hoc explanation methodology, it was shown that experts have more in-depth biomedical knowledge than novices and subjects at intermediate levels of expertise. The findings generally support a three-stage model of expertise development in medicine consisting of acquisition of biomedical knowledge, practical experience, and integration of theoretical and experiental knowledge resulting in knowledge encapsulation.     

Instrumental Bias in Motivated Reasoning: More When More Is Needed

Decision makers must often make judgments in an environment in which they have a strong motivation to reach a particular conclusion. While normative theory would indicate that they should use available information to make their most accurate judgment without being influenced by the conclusion or outcome it may imply, evidence from the social judgment literature suggests that motivation does bias the judgment process. Specifically, decision makers motivated to support a particular conclusion tend to adopt information processing strategies most likely to yield the desired conclusion. We propose and empirically demonstrate two extensions to the motivation literature. First, we argue that motivated reasoning isinstrumental,meaning motivated decision makers bias their judgments more or less as needed to support the desired conclusion, subject to “reasonableness” constraints. Second, we propose that motivated decision makers exhibitconfidence bolsteringand thereby remain at least as confident as non-motivated decision makers in their biased estimates. We illustrate that motivated subjects even report confidence in utilizing these estimates outside the original motivating context. We investigate motivational effects within a business context involving forecasting, strategic decision making, and new product introductions. We explore the impact of motivation on quantitative forecasts and estimates, rather than on social judgments and perceptions. In addition, we go a step beyond the judgment phase to demonstrate that motivation influences choice.     

When contributions make a difference: Explaining order effects in responsibility attribution

In two experiments, we established an order effect in responsibility attributions. In line with Spellman (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 126: 323-348, 1997), who proposed that a person's perceived causal contribution varies with the degree to which it changes the probability of the eventual outcome, Experiment 1 showed that in a team challenge in which the players contribute sequentially, the last player's blame or credit is attenuated if the team's result has already been determined prior to her acting. Experiment 2 illustrated that this attenuation effect does not overgeneralize to situations in which the experienced order of events does not map onto the objective order of events; the level of the last person's performance is only discounted if that person knew that the result was already determined. Furthermore, Experiment 1 demonstrated that responsibility attributions remain sensitive to differences in performance, even if the outcome is already determined. We suggest a theoretical extension of Spellman's model, according to which participants' responsibility attributions are determined not only by whether a contribution made a difference in the actual situation, but also by whether it would have made a difference had things turned out somewhat differently.     

When You Care Enough to Do Your Very Best: Genetic Counselor Experiences of Compassion Fatigue

Compassion fatigue is a phenomenon that occurs when a caregiver feels overwhelmed by repeated empathic engagement with distressed clients (Figley, 2002). Research demonstrates its existence among nurses, physicians, and mental health professionals, but to date no published study has specifically investigated the nature and prevalence of compassion fatigue among genetic counselors. The present study was an initial attempt to identify and describe the phenomena in genetic counseling by conducting focus group interviews with 12 genetic counselors. Data analysis yielded several themes: a) compassion fatigue occurs and may compromise professional and personal functioning; b) prevalent triggers include delivering bad news and difficult patient issues (e.g., terminal illness, anger, psychopathology); c) effective coping strategies include consulting with colleagues, setting boundaries, and humor; and d) risk factors include personality characteristics and traumatic memories. Training, practice, and research recommendations are provided.     

Explaining consciousness: the hard problem

edited by Jonathan Shear, Bradford/MIT Press 1997. ￡33.95/$40.00 (vii+422 pages) ISBN 0 262 19388 4.     

Preparing Students for the Worst: The Power of Negative Thinking

Helping students be prepared for an uncertain future is difficult. Generally speaking, we counselors are least helpful in preparing students for unhappy eventualities: academic failure (failing an exam or flunking out), vocational failure (unemployment, change of career direction), social failure (rejection, loss, loneliness), or even unhappiness itself. If unprepared for, such future eventualities can be a source of present anxiety and fear-motivated, over-protective life-styles or of defensive denial and unrealistic hopes. As helpers, we may collude with those who ignore or deny and offer the anxious a kind of positive thinking that again fails to prepare them for the worst. In contrast, some negative thinking or contingency planning for otherwise fearful possibilities may help to undercut anxiety, restore motivation to move forward and take risks, shift attention from future-oriented coping to living creatively in the present, clarify priorities and values for life planning, and generally expand behavioral freedom and flexibility. This article emphasizes the use of constructive negative thinking in preparing students for life both in and beyond the classroom or the ivory tower.     

Aristotle on Pleasure and the Worst Form of Akrasia

The focus of this paper is Aristotle's solution to the problem inherited from Socrates: How could a man fail to restrain himself when he believes that what he desires is wrong? In NE 7 Aristotle attempts to reconcile the Socratic denial of akrasia with the commonly held opinion that people act in ways they know to be bad, even when it is in their power to act otherwise. This project turns out to be largely successful, for what Aristotle shows us is that if we distinguish between two ways of having knowledge (‘potentially’ and ‘actually’), the Socratic thesis can effectively account for a wide range of cases (collectively referred to here as ‘drunk-akrasia’) in which an agent acts contrary to his general knowledge of the Good, yet can still be said to ‘know’ in the qualified sense that his actions are wrong. However, Book 7 also shows that the Socratic account of akrasia cannot take us any farther than drunk-akrasia, for unlike drunk-akrasia, genuine akrasia cannot be reduced to a failure of knowledge. This agent knows in the unqualified sense that his actions are wrong. The starting-point of my argument is that Aristotle's explanation of genuine akrasia requires a different solution than the one found in NE 7 which relies on the distinction between qualified and unqualified ‘knowing’: genuinely akratic behaviour is due to the absence of an internal conflict that a desire for the ‘proper’ pleasures of temperance would create if he could experience them.     

Rawlsian and Confucian Distributive Justice and the Worst Off

Philosophia - In any complex human society, distinct persons may have strikingly different standards of living. Those who lead the most undesirable, poorest lives in society can be called the worst...     

Character and Knowledge: Learning from the Speech of Experts

This paper discusses the ways in which a person’s character (ethos) and a hearer’s emotional response (pathos) are part of the complex judgments made about experts’ claims, along with an actual assessment of those claims (logos). The analysis is rooted in the work of Aristotle, but expands to consider work on emotion and cognition conducted by Thagard and Gigerenzer. It also draws on some conclusions of the general epistemology of testimony (of which expert testimony is a special subset), where it is argued that we learn not just from the transmission of another’s beliefs, but from the words they speak. This shifts the onus in testimony away from the intentions of a speaker onto the judgments of an audience, capturing better its social character and reflecting our experience of receiving testimony. I conclude, however, that accepting the arguments of experts involves much more than simply believing what they say.     

Explaining Math: Gesturing Lightens the Load

Why is it that people cannot keep their hands still when they talk? One reason may be that gesturing actually lightens cognitive load while a person is thinking of what to say. We asked adults and children to remember a list of letters or words while explaining how they solved a math problem. Both groups remembered significantly more items when they gestured during their math explanations than when they did not gesture. Gesturing appeared to save the speakers' cognitive resources on the explanation task, permitting the speakers to allocate more resources to the memory task. It is widely accepted that gesturing reflects a speaker's cognitive state, but our observations suggest that, by reducing cognitive load, gesturing may also play a role in shaping that state.     

Explaining Normativity: On Rationality and the Justification of Reason

Aspects of the world are normative in as much as they or their existence constitute reasons for persons, i.e. grounds which make certain beliefs, moods, emotions, intentions or actions appropriate or inappropriate. Our capacities to perceive and understand how things are, and what response is appropriate to them, and our ability to respond appropriately, make us into persons, i.e. creatures with the ability to direct their own life in accordance with their appreciation of themselves and their environment, and of the reasons with which, given how they are, the world presents them.
An explanation of normativity would explain the various puzzling aspects of this complex phenomenon. In particular it would explain how it is that aspects of the world can constitute reasons for cognitive, emotive, and volitional responses; how it is that we can come to realise that certain cognitive, emotional or volitional responses are appropriate in various circumstances, and inappropriate in others; and how it is that we can respond appropriately. This paper explores an aspect of the last of these questions.     

Explaining the Success of Science: Kuhn and Scientific Realists

In this essay, I critically evaluate the approaches to explaining the success of science in Kuhn and the works of inference-to-the-best-explanation scientific realists. Kuhn’s challenge to realists, who invoke the truth of theories to explain their success, is two-fold. His paradigm-account of success confronts realists with the problem of theory change, and the historical fact of successful theories later rejected as false. Secondly, Kuhn’s account of the success of science has no need to bring truth into the explanation. In turn, I argue that weakness in Kuhn and the prevailing forms of scientific realism motivate a better account of realism which I characterize as ‘best current theory realism’ and defend against the pessimistic meta-induction and the problem of theory-change. This realism argues that the best explanation of the success of current and past scientific theories only requires the simple claim that our best current theories are true. Kuhn’s account can explain how normal science succeeds but cannot account for why its problem solutions work where they do and why they fail for other puzzles.