核心知识系统及其对相关研究的启示

核心知识系统出现于人类个体发展和种系发展的早期,在人类复杂认知能力的发生发展中起着建构模块的作用。该文以表征物体和数量关系的两类核心知识系统的性质及二者在儿童的“数”概念形成和成人的数学思维中所起的作用为例,综述了以灵长类动物、婴儿、儿童和成人为被试的研究证据,并进而提出了核心知识系统给相关研究带来的若干启示。     

Cognitive ability and the extended cognition thesis

This paper explores the ramifications of the extended cognition thesis in the philosophy of mind for contemporary epistemology. In particular, it argues that all theories of knowledge need to accommodate the ability intuition that knowledge involves cognitive ability, but that once this requirement is understood correctly there is no reason why one could not have a conception of cognitive ability that was consistent with the extended cognition thesis. There is thus, surprisingly, a straightforward way of developing our current thinking about knowledge such that it incorporates the extended cognition thesis.     

Cognitive Evaluation of Machine Learning Agents

Advances in applying statistical Machine Learning (ML) led to several claims of human-level or near-human performance in tasks such as image classification & speech recognition. Such claims are unscientific primarily for two reasons, (1) They incorrectly enforce the notion that task-specific performance can be treated as manifestation of General Intelligence and (2) They are not verifiable as currently there is no set benchmark for measuring human-like cognition in a machine learning agent. Moreover, ML agent’s performance is influenced by knowledge ingested in it by its human designers. Therefore, agent’s performance may not necessarily reflect its true cognition. In this paper, we propose a framework that draws parallels from human cognition to measure machine’s cognition. Human cognitive learning is quite well studied in developmental psychology with frameworks and metrics in place to measure actual learning. To either believe or refute the claims of human-level performance of machine learning agent, we need scientific methodology to measure its cognition. Our framework formalizes incremental implementation of human-like cognitive processes in ML agents with an implicit goal to measure it. The framework offers guiding principles for measuring, (1) Task-specific machine cognition and (2) General machine cognition that spans across tasks. The framework also provides guidelines for building domain-specific task taxonomies to cognitively profile tasks. We demonstrate application of the framework with a case study where two ML agents that perform Vision and NLP tasks are cognitively evaluated.     

Knowledge Representation: Two Kinds Of Emergence

Two different but closely related issues in current cognitive science will be considered in this essay. One is the controversial and extensively discussed question of how connectionist and symbolic representations of knowledge are related to each other. The other concerns the notion of connectionist learning and its relevance for the understanding of the distinction between propositional and nonpropositional knowledge. More specifically, I shall give an overview of a result in Rantala and Vadén (1994) establishing a limiting case correspondence between symbolic and connectionist representations and, on the other hand, study the problem, preliminarily investigated in Rantala (1998), of how propositional knowledge may arise from nonpropositional knowledge. I shall also try to point out that on some more or less plausible assumptions, often made by cognitive scientists, these results may have some significance when we try to comprehend the nature of human knowledge representation. Some of these assumptions are rather hypothethical and debatable for the time being and they will become justified in the future only if there will be more progress in the empirical and theoretical research on the brain and on artificial networks. The assumptions concern, besides some questions of the behavior of neural networks, such things as the relevance of pattern recognition for modelling human cognition, in particular, knowledge acquisition, and the relation between emergence and reduction.     

Studies on the teleost brain morphology in search of the origin of cognition

Although it is frequently assumed that fish possess only simple brain functions, it is becoming increasingly clear that rather complex cognitive abilities are also found in fishes, in particular teleosts. Further studies in teleosts are thus expected to extend our knowledge of cognition from a comparative point of view. The anatomical substrates responsible for such cognitive abilities, however, remain almost entirely unknown in teleosts, offering little clues to understand the evolutionary history or origins of cognition based on neural grounds. Moreover, a firm conclusion on the homology of the teleostean forebrain, in particular the telencephalon, which is a candidate central structure involved in cognitive functions, still remains to be drawn. The present paper introduces an overview of teleost brain morphology as well as different interpretations on the forebrain homology. With the currently available knowledge, it remains possible that the telencephalon of teleosts includes a neocortical homologue. Further studies to determine the homological interrelationships of different brain structures in diverse animals are important for fruitful advancement of comparative cognitive studies.     

How are religious concepts created? A form of cognition and its effects

Science that needs logical demonstration has failed to eliminate religious concepts. It is as if they have own validity that cannot be broken by scientific knowledge we trust the most at present. In this paper, I will attempt to establish a new cognitive theory to help explain the basis of belief in religious concepts. This form of cognition will be named simply unifying-induction or unifying-inductive cognition. As illustrations, I will consider some typical religious discourses involving concepts such as “all-in-one” or “one is everything.” It is these typically religious discourses that science has not been able to easily sweep away by its logical scientific proofs. In the end, although we perhaps cannot know if the religious beings such as gods really exist or not, we may understand these concepts are very the creation of human cognition. It also has important implications for other disciplines such as robotics, developmental psychology, cognitive archaeology, the history of science, the study of religion and so on.     

Radicalizing numerical cognition

In recent decades, non-representational approaches to mental phenomena and cognition have been gaining traction in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. In these alternative approach, mental representations either lose their central status or, in its most radical form, are banned completely. While there is growing agreement that non-representational accounts may succeed in explaining some cognitive capacities (e.g. perception), there is widespread skepticism about the possibility of giving non-representational accounts of cognitive capacities such as memory, imagination or abstract thought. In this paper, I will critically examine the view that there are fundamental limitations to non-representational explanations of cognition. Rather than challenging these arguments on general grounds, I will examine a set of human cognitive capacities that are generally thought to fall outside the scope of non-representational accounts, i.e. numerical cognition. After criticizing standard representational accounts of numerical cognition for their lack of explanatory power, I will argue that a non-representational approach that is inspired by radical enactivism offers the best hope for developing a genuine naturalistic explanatory account for these cognitive capacities.

     

The Intelligence of White Foreign Born Criminals

Children's understanding of cognition increases greatly between early childhood and adolescence. This increase provides a developmental bridge between young children's understanding of mental states to adolescents' and adults' epistemological reflection. The author presents a framework for describing developmental changes in children's understanding of cognitive activities. He distinguishes 4 aspects of children's understanding of cognition: (a) knowledge of mental states, (b) knowledge of occurrence of particular activities, (c) knowledge of organization of cognitive activities, and (d) epistemological thought. He discusses phenomenological awareness of cognitive activities and social experience as influences on children's concepts of cognition.     

Distributed learning: Educating and assessing extended cognitive systems

Extended and distributed cognition theories argue that human cognitive systems sometimes include non-biological objects. On these views, the physical supervenience base of cognitive systems is thus not the biological brain or even the embodied organism, but an organism-plus-artifacts. In this paper, we provide a novel account of the implications of these views for learning, education, and assessment. We start by conceptualizing how we learn to assemble extended cognitive systems by internalizing cultural norms and practices. Having a better grip on how extended cognitive systems are assembled, we focus on the question: If our cognition extends, how should we educate and assess such extended cognitive systems? We suggest various ways to minimize possible negative effects of extending one’s cognition and to efficiently find and organize (online) information by adopting a virtue epistemology approach. Educational and assessment implications are foregrounded, particularly in the case of Danish students’ use of the internet during exams.     

A problem of scope for the free energy principle as a theory of cognition

Those who endorse the free energy principle as a theory of cognition (as well as a theory of biological homeostasis) are committed to three propositions that are jointly incompatible but which will cohere if one of them is denied. The first of these is that the free energy principle gives us a self-sufficient explanation of what all cognitive systems consist in: a specific computational architecture. The second is that all adaptive behavior is driven by the free energy principle and the process of model-based inference it entails. The third is that cognition is not ubiquitous. These three incompatible propositions together comprise a problem of scope for the free energy principle as a theory of cognition. The prospects for rejecting each of these propositions are considered. To drop either the first or the second would limit the explanatory success of the principle. However, there are plausible ways to bite the bullet on denial of the third proposition. In particular, I argue that it is possible for the free energy theorist to admit that cognition is ubiquitous in biological systems while reserving conceptual space exclusively for human cognitive capacities.     

Spatial cognition: evidence from visual neglect

Recent work on human attention and representational systems has benefited from a growing interplay between research on normal attention and neuropsychological disorders such as visual neglect. Research over the past 30 years has convincingly shown that, far from being a unitary condition, neglect is a protean disorder whose symptoms can selectively affect different sensory modalities, cognitive processes, spatial domains and coordinate systems. These clinical findings, together with those of functional neuroimaging, have increased knowledge about the anatomical and functional architecture of normal subsystems involved in spatial cognition. We provide a selective overview of how recent investigations of visual neglect are beginning to elucidate the underlying structure of spatial processes and mental representations.     

Using Dynamic Field Theory to extend the embodiment stance toward higher cognition

The embodiment stance emphasizes that cognitive processes unfold continuously in time, are constantly linked to the sensory and motor surfaces, and adapt through learning and development. Dynamic Field Theory (DFT) is a neurally based set of concepts that has turned out to be useful for understanding how cognition emerges in an embodied and situated system. We explore how the embodiment stance may be extended beyond those forms of cognition that are closest to sensorimotor processes. The core elements of DFT are dynamic neural fields (DNFs), patterns of activation defined over different kinds of spaces. These may include retinal space and visual feature spaces, spaces spanned by movement parameters such as movement direction and amplitude, or abstract spaces like the ordinal axis along which sequences unfold. Instances of representation that stand for perceptual objects, motor plans, or action intentions are peaks of activation in the DNFs. We show how such peaks may arise from input and are stabilized by intra-field interaction. Given a neural mechanism for instantiation, the neuronal couplings between DNFs implement cognitive operations. We illustrate how these mechanisms can be used to enable architectures of dynamic neural fields to perform cognitive functions such as acquiring and updating scene representations, using grounded spatial language, and generating sequences of actions. Implementing these DFT models in autonomous robots demonstrates how these cognitive functions can be enacted in embodied, situated systems.     

身心二元论的困境与具身认知研究的兴起

摘要 由笛卡尔开创的身心二元论一直制约着人们对身心关系的认识。但是近年来兴起的具身认知研究却从理论和实证的角度系统论证了二元论的不可能性,指出了心智对身体的依赖性,并据此提出了身心一体的身心关系学说。最初,有关具身认知的讨论仅仅是哲学领域有关身心关系问题的形而上学思考,随后开始成为心理学中的一种理论思维,并逐步进入实验心理学领域。如今,ERP、FMRI等认知神经科学的手段在具身认知的研究中得到了广泛使用。具身认知已成为心理学和认知科学中的一股汹涌澎湃的实证研究思潮。     

Expanding the scope of reflective knowledge: From MINE to OURS

Ernest Sosa has suggested that we distinguish between animal knowledge, on the one hand, and reflective knowledge, on the other. Animal knowledge is direct, immediate, and foundationally structured, while reflective knowledge involves a knower's higher‐order awareness of her own mental states, and is structured by relations of coherence. Although Sosa's distinction is extremely appealing, it also faces serious problems. In particular, the sorts of processes that would be required for reflective knowledge, as Sosa understands it, are not processes that are instantiated in human cognition. I argue that the problems facing Sosa's notion of reflective knowledge stem from treating human cognitive processes individualistically. They stem from what I will term Sosa's perspective of methodologically individualistic noetic explanation—or MINE. I suggest that these problems disappear if we expand the scope of what counts as cognitive processes to include socially distributed cognitive processes, if we adopt a framework of other‐derived united reflective self‐evaluation—or OURS. In other words, I'll suggest that a solution to the problems facing the distinction between animal and reflective knowledge may be found in a shift of perspective from MINE to OURS.     

Recognizing group cognition

In this paper, we approach the idea of group cognition from the perspective of the “extended mind” thesis, as a special case of the more general claim that systems larger than the individual human, but containing that human, are capable of cognition (Clark, 2008, Clark and Chalmers, 1998). Instead of deliberating about “the mark of the cognitive” (Adams & Aizawa, 2008), our discussion of group cognition is tied to particular cognitive capacities. We review recent studies of group problem solving and group memory which reveal that specific cognitive capacities that are commonly ascribed to individuals are also aptly ascribed at the level of groups. These case studies show how dense interactions among people within a group lead to both similarity-inducing and differentiating dynamics that affect the group’s ability to solve problems. This supports our claim that groups have organization-dependent cognitive capacities that go beyond the simple aggregation of the cognitive capacities of individuals. Group cognition is thus an emergent phenomenon in the sense of Wimsatt (1986). We further argue that anybody who rejects our strategy for showing that cognitive properties can be instantiated at multiple levels in the organizational hierarchy on a priori grounds is a “demergentist,” and thus incurs the burden of proof for explaining why cognitive properties are “stuck” at a certain level of organizational structure. Finally, we show that our analysis of group cognition escapes the “coupling-constitution” charge that has been leveled against the extended mind thesis (Adams & Aizawa, 2008).     

How Otto did not extend his mind,but might have: Dynamic systems theory and social-cultural group selection

Proponents of cognitive Situationism argue that the human mind is embodied, embedded in both natural and social-cultural environments and extended creating both extended and distributed cognition. Anti-situationists reject all or some of these claims. I argue that four major objections to extended cognition: (1) the mark of the cognitive, (2) the function-identity fallacy, (3) cognitive bloat, and (4) scientific irrelevance lose much of their sting in the case of distributed cognition, the extension of cognitive agency to a group of cognitive agents, such as a scientific research team. However, I claim that a crucial fifth challenge, that advocates of the extended mind commit the causal-constitution fallacy, has yet to be satisfactorily addressed. I focus on Spyridon Palermos’ use of dynamic systems theory to refute this charge and I argue that his appeal to dynamic systems theory as a way of understanding system-constitution fails. Instead, I suggest a social-cultural group selection hypothesis for understanding system-constitution. But, I leave it for another day to elaborate that hypothesis’ empirical plausibility.     

Are sensorimotor experiences the key for successful early intervention in infants with congenital brain lesion?

Living with a congenital brain lesion may have detrimental effects on the ability to do everyday activities, but contrary to acquired brain lesions, people and in particular children, with congenital brain lesions may have limited or no experience of how their bodies work. This absence of experience gives rise to challenges for habilitation of sensorimotor abilities and derived cognitive abilities. How can motor and cognitive abilities be achieved and trained in an individual with no experience of potential abilities? In this article, we aim to review the existing knowledge about the development of sensorimotor integration. Further, we will discuss this knowledge in the light of two neurocognitive theories: embodied cognition and predictive coding. Moreover, using developmental knowledge and theory in combination, we will argue that early sensorimotor development serves as a foundation for later cognitive development. Finally, we try to use these elements in a strategy to make interventions as early as possible, with the purpose of improving sensorimotor and cognitive abilities in children with congenital brain lesions.     

Identifying and individuating cognitive systems: a task-based distributed cognition alternative to agent-based extended cognition

This article argues for a task-based approach to identifying and individuating cognitive systems. The agent-based extended cognition approach faces a problem of cognitive bloat and has difficulty accommodating both sub-individual cognitive systems (“scaling down”) and some supra-individual cognitive systems (“scaling up”). The standard distributed cognition approach can accommodate a wider variety of supra-individual systems but likewise has difficulties with sub-individual systems and faces the problem of cognitive bloat. We develop a task-based variant of distributed cognition designed to scale up and down smoothly while providing a principled means of avoiding cognitive bloat. The advantages of the task-based approach are illustrated by means of two parallel case studies: re-representation in the human visual system and in a biomedical engineering laboratory.     

网络使用经验对动作动词加工的影响

具身认知理论认为高级概念认知和低级感知觉认知紧密关联, 且两者共享相同的神经系统。本研究设计了3个实验：实验1观察面部表情动词加工是否受面部情绪表达的影响, 结果发现网络使用经验多的被试在促进和抑制面部积极表情条件下对动词的反应没有表现出显著差异。实验2探讨网络使用经验对肢体动作词汇加工的影响, 结果发现网络使用经验多的被试在动词?名词转换时没有产生显著认知损耗。实验3探讨两类被试对正常序列和随机序列图式动词加工是否有差异, 结果发现网络使用经验多的个体对随机序列和正常序列的回忆成绩并无显著差异。本研究从动词认知加工角度验证了高级认知与低级感知觉加工间的紧密联系, 揭示了网络行为与高级认知加工间的相关关系。