A Royal Road to Consequentialism?

To consequentialise a moral theory means to account for moral phenomena usually described in nonconsequentialist terms, such as rights, duties, and virtues, in a consequentialist framework. This paper seeks to show that all moral theories can be consequentialised. The paper distinguishes between different interpretations of the consequentialiser’s thesis, and emphasises the need for a cardinal ranking of acts. The paper also offers a new answer as to why consequentialising moral theories is important: This yields crucial methodological insights about how to pursue ethical inquires.     

Foundations of Academic Freedom: Making New Sense of Some Aging Arguments

The article distinguishes between the various arguments traditionally offered as justifications for the principle of academic freedom. Four main arguments are identified, three consequentialist in nature (the argument from truth, the democratic argument, the argument from autonomy), and one nonconsequentialist (a variant of the autonomy argument). The article also concentrates on the specific form these arguments must take in order to establish academic freedom as a principle distinct from the more general principles of freedom of expression and intellectual freedom.     

KORSGAARD'S REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM

Abstract: In her recent book Self‐Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, Christine Korsgaard does a wonderful job developing her Kantian account of normativity and the rational necessity of morality. Korsgaard's account of normativity, however, has received its fair share of attention. In this discussion, the focus is on the resulting moral theory and, in particular, on Korsgaard's reason for rejecting consequentialist moral theories. The article suggests that we assume that Korsgaard's vindication of Kantian rationalism is successful and ask whether, nonetheless, her account is consistent with consequentialism. It suggests further that we grant that moral reasons are not based on substantive principles, and that they must instead emerge from the purely formal principles of practical reason. Can consequentialist principles nonetheless emerge from the formal constraints of practical reason? Why can't a consequentialist embrace Korsgaard's account of self‐constitution and normativity?     

Smuggled into Existence: Nonconsequentialism, Procreation, and Wrongful Disability

The wrongful disability problem arises whenever a disability-causing, and therefore (presumptively) wrongful, procreative act is a necessary condition for the existence of a person whose life is otherwise worth living. It is a problem because it seems to involve no harm, and therefore no wrongful treatment, vis-à-vis that person. This essay defends the nonconsequentialist, rights-based, account of the wrong-making features of wrongful disability. It distinguishes between the person-affecting restriction, roughly the idea that wrongdoing is always the wronging of some person, and the harm principle, the idea that all wrongings are harmings. It argues, first, that the harm principle should be rejected, in light of offending intuitions in salient examples. Rejection of the harm principle is not only independently plausible, but also paves the way for a nonconsequentialist diagnosis of wrongful disability. This diagnosis conceives of wrongdoing as a failure to express adequate respect for the humanity or personhood inherent in the person created. The paper defends a theory of humanity-respecting rights that accommodates plausible intuitions about satisficing and fairness, without resorting to consequentialist premises that lead to well-known impossibility results and paradoxes.     

To Act or Not to Act: Nonconsequentialism in Environmental Decision-Making

Research on environmental-decision making is usually based on utilitarian models, which imply that people's decisions are only influenced by the outcomes. This research provides evidence for values and moral positions that reflect nonconsequentialist rather than consequentialist views. In doing this, this article refers to “sacred values,” which are values that are seen as not-substitutable and nontradable. Two studies were designed to examine evidence for sacred values and their role on act versus omission choices within the environmental domain. The studies revealed that sacred values were closely associated with preferences for actions, trade-off reluctance, deontological focus, and position of moral universalism. The results suggest that it is important to account for sacred values and nonconsequentialist views in environmental decision-making research.     

The Role of Self-Focus,Task Difficulty,Task Self-Relevance,and Evaluation Anxiety in Reaction Time Performance

Self-focused attention has been found to facilitate task performance in some instances and inhibit it in others. Among chronically anxious individuals it appears to consistently hinder performance. Less is known about the impact of self-focus on the performance of normal individuals. The present study examines the role of task difficulty, task self-relevance, and presence of evaluation anxiety in the performance effects of self-focus among normal individuals. Participants performed a simple reaction time (RT) and a lexical decision task, in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively, with or without self-focus. Self-focus and evaluation anxiety resulted in faster responding in simple RT, but there was no significant effect of self-focus on performance in the more difficult lexical decision task. Participants' heart rate (HR) was monitored and indicated that orienting was associated with slower RT in both experiments, and less orienting was found during self-focus and evaluation conditions. Results are interpreted in light of several self-focus theories.     

A Probabilistic Model of Lexical and Syntactic Access and Disambiguation

The problems of access—retrieving linguistic structure from some mental grammar —and disambiguation—choosing among these structures to correctly parse ambiguous linguistic input—are fundamental to language understanding. The literature abounds with psychological results on lexical access, the access of idioms, syntactic rule access, parsing preferences, syntactic disambiguation, and the processing of garden-path sentences. Unfortunately, it has been difficult to combine models which account for these results to build a general, uniform model of access and disambiguation at the lexical, idiomatic, and syntactic levels. For example, psycholinguistic theories of lexical access and idiom access and parsing theories of syntactic rule access have almost no commonality in methodology or coverage of psycholinguistic data. This article presents a single probabilistic algorithm which models both the access and disambiguation of linguistic knowledge. The algorithm is based on a parallel parser which ranks constructions for access, and interpretations for disambiguation, by their conditional probability. Low-ranked constructions and interpretations are pruned through beam-search; this pruning accounts, among other things, for the garden-path effect. I show that this motivated probabilistic treatment accounts for a wide variety of psycholinguistic results, arguing for a more uniform representation of linguistic knowledge and for the use of probabilistically-enriched grammars and interpreters as models of human knowledge of and processing of language.     

Linguistic marking,strategy, and affect in syllogistic reasoning

It has repeatedly been shown that three-term-series problems with unmarked comparatives (e.g., taller, higher) are solved more quickly than otherwise identical problems using their marked opposites (e.g., shorter, lower). Clark's principle of lexical marking accounts for these results in terms of a simpler semantic featural coding of the unmarked comparative with respect to its marked counterpart. Huttenlocher's theory of spatial imagery accounts for these same results via the subjects' mental ordering of the three terms as instructed by the problem statements. The present research demonstrated that while the lower latency of the unmarked adjective is a reliable effect, congruent ordering strategies are necessary for significant results. Subjects who order terms from unmarked to marked produce significant results for Clark's principle of lexical marking. Those who order terms in opposite direction do not. Further, it is shown that the choice of direction of ordering is itself significantly influenced by the affective value of the adjectives in context and to the individual subject.This research is based on a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the doctoral degree to the University of Illinois.     

The Cost of Consequentialization

Consequentializers suggest that for all non‐consequentialist moral theories, one can come up with a consequentialist counterpart that generates exactly the same deontic output as the original theory. Thus, all moral theories can be “consequentialized.” This paper argues that this procedure, though technically feasible, deprives consequentialism of its potential for normative justification. By allowing purported counterexamples to any given consequentialist moral theory to be accommodated within that theory’s account of value, consequentializers achieve a hollow victory. The resulting deontically equivalent consequentalist counterpart that results from absorbing originally non‐consequentialist moral intuitions can now no longer explain, in a theoretically illuminating way, why certain actions are wrong and others right. The paper explains why traditional consequentialist theories did not embrace the procedure, and sketches how consequentialism can consequentialize without incurring the same cost.     

The moral significance of the genetic relation

Our ordinary moral attitudes give a prominent place to the principle that each person ought specially to care for any child who is his or her genetic offspring. From this principle of genetic-parental responsibility and other plausible premises, we can derive the principle that each person has the right to control the genetic use of his or her own genes. But there are competing principles of parental responsibility that require consideration. Principles of nurture are among the important competitors. Also, the view that a woman has the right to control her own body for reproductive purposes may be based on a principle that denies the genetic-parental principle. An analysis is developed of the relations that constitute the criteria for the various possible principles of parental responsibility. Causality, temporality, spatiality, and resemblance are considered. The genetic relation is not any one of these relations, but it includes some of them. The justification of any principle of parental responsibility requires a detailed consideration of the principle from the viewpoint of a deontological or consequentialist moral theory. This examination is beyond the scope of this paper, but consideration is given to some issues and problems of justification, and difficult or unusual cases are discussed. There remain, then, complexities that require further study.     

The Quest for a Unified Psychoanalytic Theory: A Retreat from Uncertainty

There has been a historical shift in psychoanalysis from an earlier time of certainty to our present state of uncertainty with the coexistence of multiple theories competing for our attention. We realize retrospectively how entrenched groups ruled our institutions by maintaining faith in their authority as the keepers of “pure” psychoanalysis. Despite struggles between competing ideologies, there has been progress in integrating clinical theories. As no psychoanalytic theory or technique has been proved superior, we advocate an inclusive approach with all psychoanalysts keeping an open mind about the value of competing theories. This integration of disparate theories has led to a resurgence of interest in psychoanalytic training. Examples are given of some of the difficulties encountered when competing ideas are introduced in psychoanalytic groups.     

Therapeutic jurisprudence and the resolution of value conflicts: what we can realistically expect, in practice, from theory

This article assesses the criticisms of therapeutic jurisprudence that it cannot resolve value conflicts, especially between autonomy rights and therapeutic values, or, less radically, that it has not provided a general method for resolving conflicts. Grounded in general jurisprudential principles about conflict resolution, including novel developments respecting the meaning of weighing and balancing, the article rejects the criticisms as unfounded. The article also develops and critiques arguments maintaining that therapeutic jurisprudence cannot resolve certain value conflicts because the values are incommensurable. The argument is illustrated by examples concerning the right to refuse treatment, and jurisprudential analyses of that right.     

Abstractionist versus episodic theories of repetition priming and word identification

This paper reviews research relevant to the question of whether words are identified through the use of abstract lexical representations, specific episodic representations, or both. Several lines of evidence indicate that specific episodes participate in word identification. First, pure abstractionist theories can explain short-term but not long-term repetition priming. Second, long-term repetition priming is sensitive to changes in surface features or episodic context between presentations of a word. Finally, long-term priming for pseudowords is also difficult for pure abstractionist theories to explain. Alternative approaches to word identification are discussed, including both pure episodic theories and theories in which both episodes and abstract representations play a role.     

Minimum Principles in Motor Control

Minimum (or minimal) principles are mathematical laws that were first used in physics: Hamilton's principle and Fermat's principle of least time are two famous example. In the past decade, a number of motor control theories have been proposed that are formally of the same kind as the minimum principles of physics, and some of these have been quite successful at predicting motor performance in a variety of tasks. The present paper provides a comprehensive review of this work. Particular attention is given to the relation between minimum theories in motor control and those used in other disciplines. Other issues around which the review is organized include: (1) the relation between minimum principles and structural models of motor planning and motor control, (2) the empirically-driven development of minimum principles and the danger of circular theorizing, and (3) the design of critical tests for minimum theories. Some perspectives for future research are discussed in the concluding section of the paper. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.     

Interpersonal Psychoanalysis: The Selected Papers of Clara M. Thompson Edited by Maurice Green

The aging process presents a challenge to the narcissism of the individual due to physical, social, and psychological changes and losses. There is a danger that mental health professionals may add to narcissistic trauma by underestimating the elderly patient's potential for change. An older adults group established on a short-term psychiatric unit is presented. Therapeutic principles and strategies are discussed which are aimed at helping the aged patients make restitution for losses and regain self-esteem through renewed engagement with their environment. The importance of cohesion and inclusion in the group is examined, with attention given to the particular needs and conflicts experienced by the older adult population. The use of techniques to promote the experience of mastery is also discussed.     

Subcategorical phonetic mismatches and lexical access.

The place of phonetic analysis in the perception of words is unclear. While some theories assume fully specified phonemic strings as input, other theories assume that little analysis occurs. An earlier experiment by Streeter and Nigro (1979) produced evidence, based on auditorily presented words with misleading acoustic cues, that lexical decisions were based on mostly unanalyzed patterns, since word judgments were delayed by misleading information whereas nonword judgments were not. The present studies expand that work to a different set of cues, and to cases in which the overriding cue came first. An additional task, auditory naming, was used to examine the effects when the decision stage is less demanding. For the lexical decision task, misleading information slowed the responses, for both words and nonwords. In the auditory naming task, only the slower responses were affected. These results suggest that phonetic conflicts are resolved prior to lexical access.     

Subcategorical phonetic mismatches and lexical access

The place of phonetic analysis in the perception of words is unclear. While some theories assume fully specified phonemic strings as input, other theories assume that little analysis occurs. An earlier experiment by Streeter and Nigro (1979) produced evidence, based on auditorily presented words with misleading acoustic cues, that lexical decisions were based on mostly unanalyzed patterns, since word judgments were delayed by misleading information whereas non word judgments were not. The present studies expand that work to a different set of cues, and to cases in which the overriding cue came first. An additional task, auditory naming, was used to examine the effects when the decision stage is less demanding. For the lexical decision task, misleading information slowed the responses, for both words and nonwords. In the auditory naming task, only the slower responses were affected. These results suggest that phonetic conflicts are resolved prior to lexical access.     

Modelling the Moral Dimension of Decisions

In this paper we explore the connections between ethics and decision theory. In particular, we consider the question of whether decision theory carries with it a bias towards consequentialist ethical theories. We argue that there are plausible versions of the other ethical theories that can be accommodated by “standard” decision theory, but there are also variations of these ethical theories that are less easily accommodated. So while “standard” decision theory is not exclusively consequentialist, it is not necessarily ethically neutral. Moreover, even if our decision‐theoretic models get the right answers vis‐à‐vis morally correct action, the question remains as to whether the motivation for the non‐consequentialist theories and the psychological processes of the agents who subscribe to those ethical theories are lost or poorly represented in the resulting models.     

Egalitarian nonconsequentialism and the levelling down objection

Telic egalitarianism is famously threatened by the levelling down objection. In its canonical form, the objection purports to show that it is not, in itself, an improvement if inequality is reduced. In a variant that is less often discussed, the objection is that telic egalitarians are committed to believing that sometimes one ought to reduce inequality, even when doing so makes no one better off. The standard egalitarian response to this ‘all things considered’ variant of the levelling down objection is to embed egalitarianism in a pluralist consequentialist moral theory. In section 1, I briefly recapitulate this familiar strategy. In section 2, I argue that this standard pluralist consequentialist response is inadequate. The inadequacy of the standard response, I argue, stems from the fact that the following are jointly inconsistent: (1) a commitment to levelling down's impermissibility; (2) standard pluralist egalitarian consequentialism; (3) inequality being of non‐trivial importance; and (4) the most plausible measures of inequality's badness. In section 3, I show that egalitarians can better respond to the all‐things‐considered levelling down objection by embedding egalitarianism in a nonconsequentialist moral theory.