Bias versus bias: Harnessing hindsight to reveal paranormal belief change beyond demand characteristics

Psychological change is difficult to assess, in part because self-reported beliefs and attitudes may be biased or distorted. The present study probed belief change, in an educational context, by using the hindsight bias to counter another bias that generally plagues assessment of subjective change. Although research has indicated that skepticism courses reduce paranormal beliefs, those findings may reflect demand characteristics (biases toward desired, skeptical responses). Our hindsight-bias procedure circumvented demand by asking students, following semester-long skepticism (and control) courses, to recall their precourse levels of paranormal belief. People typically remember themselves as previously thinking, believing, and acting as they do now, so current skepticism should provoke false recollections of previous skepticism. Given true belief change, therefore, skepticism students should have remembered themselves as having been more skeptical than they were. They did, at least about paranormal topics that were covered most extensively in the course. Our findings thus show hindsight to be useful in evaluating cognitive change beyond demand characteristics.     

They should have known: Hindsight and outcome biases in child abduction cases

Two cognitive biases might partially account for public support of the ineffective AMBER Alert system. Hindsight bias is a cognitive error in which people with outcome knowledge overestimate the likelihood that this particular outcome would occur; outcome bias is an error made in evaluating the quality of a decision once the outcome is known. Two experiments assessed whether hindsight and outcome bias occur in child abduction scenarios. Study 1 was a pre/posttest experiment that examined whether hindsight bias occurs in situations in which the identity of the abductor (stranger or parent) is manipulated between groups, and all participants are told the child was killed. Study 2, a between-subjects experiment, examined whether hindsight and outcome biases occur in situations in which no AMBER Alert was issued (because the situation did not meet the legal requirements to issue an Alert), and manipulated the identity of the abductor and the outcome (child safely returned, killed, or not outcome provided). Hindsight and outcome biases occurred in both studies, given the correct set of circumstances. Abductor identity also impacted outcome estimates. Results from the two studies indicate that hindsight and outcome bias occur, but this is dependent on the outcome (child killed, child returned safely, no outcome provided) and the identity of the abductor (stranger, dangerous parent, non-dangerous parent). Limitations and future directions are discussed.     

Second-Guessing the Jury: Stereotypic and Hindsight Biases in Perceptions of Court Cases1

This research examined the effects of stereotypic beliefs and hindsight biases on perceptions of court cases. Subjects read evidentiary material pertaining to a criminal trial in which the defendant either was a stereotyped offender or was not. Additionally, some subjects were given outcome information about the verdict attained in the trial; half of these subjects were told that the defendant had been found guilty, and the other half were told that he had been found not guilty. The remainder were not given any outcome information. Subjects were than asked to predict the likely outcome of a trial based on the presented evidence. Typical hindsight bias effects were expected and obtained for nonstereotyped offenders; subjects considering these cases viewed the evidence as less incriminating when they were told the defendant had been found not guilty, and they found it to be more incriminating when they were told the defendant had been found guilty, when compared to the no-outcome-information group. However, no hindsight biases were evident in judgments of cases involving stereotyped defendants, who were seen as relatively more likely to be guilty regardless of the nature of outcome information presented. Particularly striking was the lack of impact of the “not guilty” outcome information on perceptions of the guilt of stereotyped defendants. These findings suggest that strong expectations held in foresight may not be amenable to modification in hindsight.     

学习能动性信念对初中生学习行为中情感预测偏差的影响

为考察初中生学习中是否存在情感预测偏差及学习能动性信念对情感预测偏差的影响,实验一首先考察初中生学习行为中是否存在情感预测偏差,实验二和实验三分别在实验室和真实情景中考察学习能动性信念对初中生学习行为情感预测偏差的影响。结果表明：（1）初中生学习行为中存在影响偏差,高估了积极和消极学习结果对情绪的影响。（2）学习能动性信念强的学生比学习能动性信念弱的学生对积极学习结果的情感预测偏差更小,对消极学习结果的情感预测偏差更大。     

Role of Hindsight Bias,Ethics, and Self-Other Judgments in Students’ Evaluation of an Animal Experiment

Does hindsight knowledge make research seem more ethical and predictable? In line with the notion of hindsight bias, students in 3 experiments knowing the outcome of an animal experiment judged the results as more foreseeable and ethical relative to students who did not know the outcome. Via self to other comparisons, students evaluate themselves more favorably compared to a peer but exhibited hindsight bias in doing so. Uniquely, the findings reveal the possibility that students deem themselves to be more skeptical and objective than their peers. Implications for teaching animal ethics and for Institutional Review Boards are discussed.     

Metacognitive Experiences and Human Judgment: The Case of Hindsight Bias and Its Debiasing

ABSTRACT— Theories of judgment have emphasized the influence of what comes to mind—the content of people's thoughts. But recent research shows that metacognitive experiences accompanying thinking, like a sense of the ease or difficulty with which information comes to mind, qualify the conclusions that people derive from thought content. The case of hindsight bias and attempts to remove that bias (debiasing) illustrate this. After an event outcome is known, people display hindsight bias by exaggerating its inevitability, believing they "knew it all along." The magnitude of hindsight bias varies with the ease or difficulty that known or alternative outcomes come to mind; the usually observed hindsight bias may even reverse when outcomes are difficult to bring to mind or increase when alternatives are difficult to bring to mind. Implications of metacognitive experiences can extend to other biases and their debiasing, as well as to how people make sense of the past more generally.     

Integrating temporal biases: the interplay of focal thoughts and accessibility experiences

We provide an integrative account of temporal biases (confidence changes, planning fallacy, impact bias, and hindsight bias). Students listed either 3 or 12 thoughts about success or failure before an upcoming real-life exam or immediately after learning their grades. Previous explanations had focused on how thought content alone (what comes to mind) influences temporal biases. We found, however, an interaction between thought content and accessibility experiences (how easily or difficultly thoughts come to mind). Thinking about 3 ways to succeed (success was easy to bring to mind) was equivalent to thinking about 12 ways to fail (failure was difficult to bring to mind), and conversely, thinking about 3 ways to fail was equivalent to thinking about 12 ways to succeed. In no case was thought content alone sufficient to predict the biases. These results have implications for debiasing strategies and other judgments over time.     

Hindsight bias: a by-product of knowledge updating?

With the benefit of feedback about the outcome of an event, people's recalled judgments are typically closer to the outcome of the event than their original judgments were. It has been suggested that this hindsight bias may be due to a reconstruction process of the prior judgment. A model of such a process is proposed that assumes that knowledge is updated after feedback and that reconstruction is based on the updated knowledge. Consistent with the model's predictions, the results of 2 studies show that knowledge after feedback is systematically shifted toward feedback, and that assisting retrieval of the knowledge prior to feedback reduces hindsight bias. In addition, the model accounts for about 75% of cases in which either hindsight bias or reversed hindsight bias occurred. The authors conclude that hindsight bias can be understood as a by-product of an adaptive process, namely the updating of knowledge after feedback.     

The desirability of beliefs: preschoolers' appreciation of fact beliefs and subsequent emotions

In this study, we investigated the extent to which preschool children's own knowledge about reality biases their understanding that others' beliefs about reality govern others' emotions and not reality itself. Therefore, an increasing tension was created between the beliefs of the protagonist and the participant, by providing varying degrees of evidence about the validity of the protagonist's belief. Children of between 4 and 5 years of age were asked to predict the protagonist's emotion, given the protagonist's desire and the protagonist's belief. The results show that, to a certain extent, preschool children take others' beliefs into account when predicting others' emotions. When the outcome is clear, children probably feel tied to reality, and in the case of false beliefs, their knowledge about reality biases their emotion predictions, as was also evident in ‘false belief’ research (Wimmer H, Perner I. 1983. Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. Cognition 13: 103–128). However, when it is uncertain what the actual outcome will be, then it is not the likelihood of others' beliefs but the desirability of the outcome that biases children's predictions of others' emotions. In other words, when the actual outcome is yet unclear, 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds show a tendency for wishful thinking in their predictions of others' emotions. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

University students’ views about compatibility of cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) with their personal,social and religious values (a study from Pakistan)

Cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) in its current form might not be applicable in non Western cultures. Differences between Western and non Western cultures have been reported widely. Psychotherapy was developed in the West and is underpinned by many beliefs which might be specific only to the Western culture. However, in order to modify CBT, we need to understand whether the concepts associated with the CBT might cause conflicts among people who receive therapy. This study explored the beliefs of the university students in Pakistan to find out if the concepts underpinning CBT are consistent with the personal, family, socio-cultural and religious values of the university students. Discussions were held with University students in Rahim Yar Khan, Pakistan. Students were given information on various aspects of the CBT and were asked to rate their agreement with these concepts on a visual analogue scale. There was little disagreement for the principles of CBT for personal values, while some disagreement existed for religious values. This study highlights the value of assessing peoples’ beliefs about acceptability of CBT in non Western cultures. Students in Pakistan felt that the principles of CBT are consistent with their belief system in most areas. However, the value system of students might not be representative of the rest of the population.     

Hindsight bias and outcome bias in judging directors’ liability and the role of free will beliefs

Following a corporate disaster such as bankruptcy, people in general and damaged parties, in particular, want to know what happened and whether the company's directors are to blame. The accurate assessment of directors’ liability can be jeopardized by having to judge in hindsight with full knowledge of the adverse outcome. The present study investigates whether professional legal investigators such as judges and lawyers are affected by hindsight bias and outcome bias when evaluating directors’ conduct in a bankruptcy case. Additionally, to advance our understanding of the mechanisms underlying these biases, we also examine whether free will beliefs can predict susceptibility to hindsight bias and outcome bias in this context. In two studies (total N = 1,729), we demonstrate that legal professionals tend to judge a director's actions more negatively and perceive bankruptcy as more foreseeable in hindsight than in foresight and that these effects are significantly stronger for those who endorse the notion that humans have free will. This contribution is particularly timely considering the many companies that are currently going bankrupt or are facing bankruptcy amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.     

Cultural Interpretations of Global Information? Hindsight Bias after Reading Wikipedia Articles across Cultures

Summary: Hindsight bias is the mistaken belief that an outcome could have been foreseen once it is known. But what happens after learning about an event? Can reading biased media amplify hindsight distortions? And do people from different cultural backgrounds — with different cognitive thinking styles — draw equal conclusions from equal media reports? We report two studies with Wikipedia articles and samples from different cultures (Study 1: Germany, Singapore, USA, Vietnam, Japan, Sweden, N = 446; Study 2: USA, Vietnam, N = 144). Participants read one of two article versions (foresight and hindsight) about the Fukushima Nuclear Plant and estimated the likelihood, inevitability, and foreseeability of the nuclear disaster. Reading the hindsight article increased individuals' hindsight bias independently of analytic or holistic thinking style. Having excluded survey language as potential impact factor (Study 2), this result remains. Our findings extend prior research on hindsight bias by demonstrating the amplifying effect of additional (biased) information on hindsight bias. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why are some moral beliefs perceived to be more objective than others?

Recent research has investigated whether people think of their moral beliefs as objectively true facts about the world, or as subjective preferences. The present research examines variability in the perceived objectivity of different moral beliefs, with respect both to the content of moral beliefs themselves (what they are about), and to the social representation of those moral beliefs (whether other individuals are thought to hold them). It also examines the possible consequences of perceiving a moral belief as objective. With respect to the content of moral beliefs, we find that beliefs about the moral properties of negatively valenced acts are seen as reliably more objective than beliefs about the moral properties of positively valenced acts. With respect to the social representation of moral beliefs, we find that the degree of perceived consensus regarding a moral belief positively influences its perceived objectivity. The present experiments also demonstrate that holding a moral belief to be objective is associated with a more ‘closed’ response in the face of disagreement about it, and with more morally pejorative attributions towards a disagreeing other person.     

模拟法官决策中心理控制源对后见偏差的影响

考察模拟法官决策中心理控制源对后见偏差的影响。实验采用2（心理控制源：外控型、内控型）×3（有无策略：后见组、分散注意组、指导组）两因素被试间实验设计。采用自编两个案例及问卷测查模拟法官决策中后见效应的差异。实验结果发现,不同心理控制源是导致模拟法官决策中后见偏差存在差异的影响因素。同时,两种策略都能够有效减少模拟法官决策中的后见偏差。     

Strength of hindsight bias as a consequence of meta-cognitions

Hindsight bias is the tendency of people to falsely believe that they would have correctly predicted the outcome of an event once it is known. The present paper addresses the ongoing debate as to whether the hindsight bias is due to memory impairment or biased reconstruction. The memory impairment approach maintains that outcome information alters the memory trace of the initial judgement, whereas the biased reconstruction approach assumes that people who have forgotten their initial judgements are forced to guess and, in the presence of outcome information, are likely to use this information as an anchor. Whereas the latter approach emphasises the role of meta-cognitive considerations, meta-cognitions are not included in the memory impairment explanation. Two experiments show that the biased reconstruction approach provides a better explanation for empirical findings in hindsight bias research than does the memory impairment explanation.     

Strength of hindsight bias as a consequence of meta-cognitions

Hindsight bias is the tendency of people to falsely believe that they would have correctly predicted the outcome of an event once it is known. The present paper addresses the ongoing debate as to whether the hindsight bias is due to memory impairment or biased reconstruction. The memory impairment approach maintains that outcome information alters the memory trace of the initial judgement, whereas the biased reconstruction approach assumes that people who have forgotten their initial judgements are forced to guess and, in the presence of outcome information, are likely to use this information as an anchor. Whereas the latter approach emphasises the role of meta-cognitive considerations, meta-cognitions are not included in the memory impairment explanation. Two experiments show that the biased reconstruction approach provides a better explanation for empirical findings in hindsight bias research than does the memory impairment explanation.     

后见之明研究综述

后见之明指后见判断(可得益于事件结果反馈的判断)与先见判断(不知晓事件结果时的判断)的系统差异,其研究范式大体可分为两类,假定型设计和记忆型设计。后见效应的研究,具有重大的理论价值和应用价值。文章对后见效应的研究范式、研究结果、及其有关理论进行了简要综述,并对其应用价值加以评述。     

Reversibility of the Hindsight Bias: Manipulation of Experimental Demands

A hindsight bias is found when ratings made after outcome feedback differ from ratings made before feedback. Cognitive processes, motivational factors, and demand characteristics have all been identified as possible mediators of the effect. In the first of two experiments, providing subjects with a forewarning with or without a passage that was predicted to have caused it to be ineffective in previous research failed to reduce the bias. Subsequent instructions to produce the bias inflated the effect, whereas instructions to not produce the bias did not alter ratings. In the second experiment, experimental demands were altered by forewarning subjects about a "never-knew-that" effect. The results from Experiment 2 replicated the failure of the forewarning instructions. However, the hindsight bias was removed by instructions to produce a "never-knew-that" effect. The implications of these two experiments for research into the hindsight bias were discussed.     

Hindsight bias from 3 to 95 years of age

Upon learning the outcome to a problem, people tend to believe that they knew it all along (hindsight bias). Here, we report the first study to trace the development of hindsight bias across the life span. One hundred ninety-four participants aged 3 to 95 years completed 3 tasks designed to measure visual and verbal hindsight bias. All age groups demonstrated hindsight bias on all 3 tasks; however, preschoolers and older adults exhibited more bias than older children and younger adults. Multinomial processing tree analyses of these data revealed that preschoolers' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them substituting the correct answer for their original answer in their recall (a qualitative error). Conversely, older adults' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them forgetting their original answer and recalling an answer closer to, but not equal to, the correct answer (a quantitative error). We discuss these findings in relation to mechanisms of memory, perspective taking, theory of mind, and executive function.     

On the Practical Significance of Hindsight Bias: The Case of the Expectancy-Disconfirmation Model of Consumer Satisfaction

The implications of the phenomenon of hindsight bias for the expectancy-disconfirmation model of consumer satisfaction are investigated, and the moderating effects of choice (i.e., whether or not a product is selected on the basis of one′s expectations regarding the product′s likely performance) on the incidence of hindsight bias and on the relationships between expectations, performance, disconfirmation, and satisfaction are considered. A study dealing with consumers′ satisfaction with personalized envelopes shows that perceived performance biases people′s recall of their foresight expectations in a systematic way (hindsight bias), that hindsight, rather than foresight, expectations are the more potent influence on disconfirmation and satisfaction, and that choice moderates the degree of hindsight bias and the relationships between satisfaction and its antecedents.