Over-Determined Harms and Harmless Pluralities

A popular strategy for meeting over-determination and pre-emption challenges to the comparative counterfactual conception of harm is Derek Parfit’s suggestion, more recently defended by Neil Feit, that a plurality of events harms A if and only if that plurality is the smallest plurality of events such that, if none of them had occurred, A would have been better off. This analysis of ‘harm’ rests on a simple but natural mistake about the relevant counterfactual comparison. Pluralities fulfilling these conditions make no difference to the worse for anyone in the over-determination cases that prompted the need for revising the comparative conception of harm to begin with. We may choose to call them harmful anyway, but then we must abandon the idea that making a difference to the worse for someone is essential to harming. I argue that we should hold on to the difference-making criterion and give up the plural harm principle. I offer an explanation of why Parfit’s and Feit’s plural harm approach seems attractive. Finally, I argue that the consequences of giving up the plural harm principle and holding on to the simple comparative counterfactual analysis of harm are less radical than we may think, in relation to questions about wrongness and responsibility.     

Denial of the Parental Alienation Syndrome Also Harms Women

Denying reality is obviously a maladaptive way of dealing with a situation. In fact, denial is generally considered to be one of the defense mechanisms, mechanisms that are inappropriate maladaptive, and pathological. In the field of medicine to deny the existence of a disease seriously compromises the physician's ability to help patients. If a physician does not believe that a particular disease exists, then it will not be given consideration when making a differential diagnosis, and the patient may then go untreated. This is in line with the ancient medical principle that proper diagnosis must precede proper treatment. Or, if for some external reason the physician recognizes the disorder, but feels obligated to use another name, other problems arise, for example, impaired communication with others regarding exactly what is going on with the patient, and hence improper treatment. This is what is occurring at this point with the parental alienation syndrome, a disorder whose existence has compelling verification. In this article I discuss the reasons for denial of the PAS and the ways in which such denial harms families. Particular emphasis will be given to the ways in which this denial harms women, although I will certainly comment on the ways in which the denial harms their husbands and children. In the past, denial of the PAS has caused men much grief. Such denial is now causing women similar grief.     

The Arms Trade and the Slave Trade

We have abandoned the slave trade, and come to abhor it. Could the same happen with the arms trade? Even if we are not pacifists, and allow some use of force in self-defence, we must have serious ethical questions to ask about the trade in weaponry on which our economies are now so dependent. I distinguish the various forms these questions take for governments and individuals, and argue for some answers.     

Robust Individual Responsibility for Climate Harms

According to some scholars, while sets of greenhouse gases emissions generate harms deriving from climate change, which can be mitigated through collective actions, individual emissions and mitigation activities seem to be causally insufficient to cause harms. If so, single individuals are neither responsible for climate harms, nor they have mitigation duties. If this view were true, there would be collective responsibility for climate harms without individual responsibility and collective mitigation duties without individual duties: this is puzzling. This paper explores a way to solve this puzzle. First, it will be argued that individual emissions, though not proper and full-fledged causes, causally contribute to raise the probability of climate harms. As a consequence, individuals are in fact responsible for their expected contributions to climate harms – this is contributive responsibility for likely outcomes. Second, it will be argued that people have responsibility also for the possible impacts of their individual emissions on climate harms. People can plausibly be regarded as individually responsible for the possible outcomes of their actions in close possible alternative worlds – this is robust responsibility. Non-causal individual responsibility for climate harms is plausible, and the puzzle may be solved.     

Harms and deprivation of benefits for nonhuman primates in research

The risks of harm to nonhuman primates, and the absence of benefits for them, are critically important to decisions about nonhuman primate research. Current guidelines for review and practice tend to be permissive for nonhuman primate research as long as minimal welfare requirements are fulfilled and human medical advances are anticipated. This situation is substantially different from human research, in which risks of harms to the individual subject are typically reduced to the extent feasible. A risk threshold is needed for the justification of research on nonhuman primates, comparable to the way risk thresholds are set for vulnerable human subjects who cannot provide informed consent. Much of the laboratory research conducted today has inadequate standards, leading to common physical, psychological, and social harms.     

Ideology and the Harms of Self-Deception: Why We Should Act to End Poverty

In thinking about global poverty, the question of moral motivation is of central importance: Why should the average person in the West feel morally compelled to do anything to help the poor? Various answers to this question have been constructed—and yet poverty persists. In this paper I will argue that, among other difficulties, the current approaches to the problem of poverty (from Peter Singer and Thomas Pogge) overlook a critical element: that poverty not only harms the poor, it harms every human being. Its existence forces us to live in a world where we are compelled by a pervasive ideology to eviscerate our own humanity and neglect our human impulses. Drawing on Karl Marx’s Aristotelian-influenced notion of our human essence as “species-being,” I will construct an account of moral motivation in the face of poverty that stems from a selfish desire to avoid these harms. Thus our moral impetus for acting to help the poor comes not from feelings of guilt about how poverty harms them, but rather from recognizing that poverty is harming all of us. By fighting against global poverty, we seek to make the world a better place for ourselves and the poor alike.     

Longitudinal Predictors of Alcohol‐Related Harms During the Transition to Adulthood

While a range of factors have been found to increase the likelihood of alcohol‐related harms among young people, little is known about their relative importance. This article aimed to identify the risks for alcohol‐related harms at an age when alcohol use and problems tend to peak in Australia (19–20 years). A wide range of concurrent and antecedent factors from multiple domains were examined using path analysis, including individual characteristics, family environment, and externalising and internalising problems. The sample comprised of 941 individuals from the Australian Temperament Project, a large longitudinal community‐based study. The path model controlled for current risky drinking and revealed a number of variables that were significant longitudinal predictors of alcohol‐related harms within each of the domains, including adolescent antisocial behaviour and drinking behaviour, low agreeableness, impulsivity, and paternal drinking levels. The potential for developmental prevention approaches to reduce alcohol‐related harms by targeting externalising behaviour problems, interpersonal influences, and individual characteristics is discussed.     

Microdeviation: Observations on the Significance of Lesser Harms in Shaping the Nature of Cyberspace

This article argues that application of the term “cybercrime” is overly expansive and by this nature exclusive of lesser deviancies, or “microdeviations.” These relatively minor deviant actions are frequently encountered online but are ineffectively checked by regulation. Their banal nature contributes to normalization, informing manufactured uncertainty and moral panic. Several examples of microdeviation are explored emphasizing the intersection of normalization and anxiety and the potential impact on digital spaces. While this issue is only part of the greater societal impact of informationalization, it nonetheless raises important questions as the global north progresses toward harmonizing Internet regulations.     

Customary Trade and the Complications of Consent

Global justice theorists have given much attention to corporations' purchases of state‐owned natural resources controlled by dictators. These resources, the common argument goes, belong to the people rather than to those who exercise effective political power. Dictators who rely on violence to secure their political power and who sell state‐owned natural resources without authorisation from their people, or from their people's elected delegates, are therefore violating their peoples' property rights. But many dictatorships also distribute natural resource revenue to the population, and stopping to purchase natural resources from them is therefore likely to produce relative deprivation for the people, even while increasing the chances of the people gaining control over their property. Given these circumstances, can corporations buying the people's natural resources from a distributive dictatorship appeal to the people's consent as justification for such purchases? I consider this question by inspecting three types of consent to which resource corporations might appeal. I show that, under the circumstances of natural resource trade with distributive dictatorships, none of these types of consent can obtain. Hence, resource corporations cannot appeal to popular consent to defend their transactions with distributive dictatorships.     

The Social Creation of Morality and Complicity in Collective Harms: A Kantian Account

This article considers the charge that citizens of developed societies are complicit in large‐scale harms, using climate destabilisation as its central example. It contends that we have yet to create a lived morality – a fabric of practices and institutions – that is adequate to our situation. As a result, we participate in systematic injustice, despite all good efforts and intentions. To make this case, the article draws on recent discussions of Kant's ethics and politics. Section 2 considers Tamar Schapiro's account of how otherwise decent actions can be corrupted by others’ betrayals, and hence fall into complicity. Section 3 turns to discussions by Christine Korsgaard and Lucy Allais, which highlight how people can be left without innocent choices if shared frameworks of interaction do not instantiate core ideals. Section 4 brings these ideas together in order to make sense of the charge of complicity in grave collective harms, and addresses some worries that the idea of unavoidable complicity may raise.