Affordances and the Nature of Perceptual Content

Abstract

According to John McDowell, representational perceptual content is conceptual through and through. This paper criticizes this view by claiming that there is a certain kind of representational and non‐conceptual perceptual content that is sensitive to bodily skills. After a brief introduction to McDowell’s position, Merleau‐Ponty’s notion of body schema and Gibson’s notion of affordance are presented. It is argued that affordances are constitutive of representational perceptual content, and that at least some affordances, the so‐called ‘conditional affordances’, are essentially related to the body schema. This means that the perceptual content depends upon the nature of the body schema. Since the body schema does not pertain to the domain that our conceptual faculties operate upon, it is argued that this kind of perceptual content cannot be conceptual. At least some of that content is representational, yet it cannot feature as non‐demonstrative conceptual content. It is argued that if it features as demonstrative conceptual content, it has to be captured by private concepts. Since McDowell’s theory does not allow for the existence of a private language, it is concluded that at least some representational perceptual content is non‐conceptual.     

Stimulus exposure time and perceptual memory

The recent explosion of research on implicit memory has facilitated the examination of perceptual and conceptual processes in the encoding of information. Nevertheless, stimulus exposure time—the amount of time that a stimulus is physically available to a perceiver’s scrutiny—has received little attention. In the present paper, we examine the effect of stimulus exposure time on three implicit memory measures (word-fragment completion, perceptual identification, and general knowledge) and two explicit memory measures (graphemic cued recall and semantic cued recall). In Experiment 1, we demonstrated that increases in exposure time lead to increases in implicit perceptual memory, but not to implicit conceptual memory, when the encoding task focuses on perceptual features of the stimulus. We replicated this effect in Experiment 2 and demonstrated that increases in exposure time lead to increases in perceptualand conceptual memory when the measures are explicit. Thus, the current experiments demonstrate that manipulations of exposure time lead to dissociations in implicit, but not explicit, memory.     

Conceptual Implicit Memory in Advertising Research

A growing body of research examines the effect of advertising on implicit (unconscious or unintentional) forms of memory, in contrast with typical advertising research focusing on explicit (conscious or recollective) measures. This research primarily examines perceptual implicit memory, but conceptual implicit tests also have clear relevance for advertising research. The present experiments use a conceptual implicit test to determine if conceptual priming is obtained with brand materials and to assess the degree of explicit contamination (using a post‐test awareness questionnaire). The experiments first demonstrated that awareness is a threat to conceptual implicit measures within the advertising context. Steps were taken to reduce awareness, which were successful. Results suggest that brands can be conceptually primed when presented as text or as images but that awareness has to be accounted for as aware participants did show significantly more priming than those who were unaware (Experiment 3). Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Implicit memory for textual materials

As a word moves from isolation in a list to being contextually bound in meaningful discourse, its probability of priming in tests of implicit memory decreases. The present experiments explore whether considerable priming effects can be revealed with conceptual tests of implicit memory as compared to perceptual tests. In the study phase, meaningful actions were described within a coherent text. In Experiment 1 subjects elaborated half of the actions by visual imagery. In Experiment 2, subjects elaborated the actions by enacting them symbolically. In both experiments, subjects in a control condition were simply required to read the same activities. In Experiment 2, a further group of subjects had to detect orthographic errors. The results demonstrated reliable effects of implicit memory in terms of associations with verbs repeated from the studied text. This form of repetition priming for textual materials in a conceptual test of implicit memory was enhanced by both types of elaboration. A word-stem completion task for the same targets revealed a less pronounced and inconsistent priming effect, uninfluenced by both types of elaboration. But the latter form of perceptual priming was found to be more pronounced within the error-detection condition. Measures of explicit memory showed similar effects of elaborative encoding conditions but there were some dissimilarities to measures of implicit memory, too. In general and in accordance with a transfer-appropriate processing view, conceptual tests rather than perceptual tests may be more suitable for detecting effects of implicit memory within the domain of text processing.     

儿童运动认知的朴素理论

主要介绍了关于运动的朴素理论中儿童具有的两类知识系统,一是儿童在日常运动中能够描述出来的朴素信念即外显的概念知识,另一是儿童和运动的物体发生相互作用时所具有的知识即内隐的知识,并进一步阐述了内隐知觉知识和外显概念知识之间具有不可渗透性,内隐运动知识和外显概念知识存在着分离,内隐运动知识可以通过运动表象的方式转化为外显概念知识。提出了有待进一步探讨的问题：错误信念是否具有任务特殊性,内隐知觉知识和内隐运动知识之间关系等     

知觉和概念加工范式对内隐与外显记忆发展的影响

控制知觉材料的熟悉性和概念范例的典型性,以考察它们对内隐与外显记忆发展的影响。结果表明：（1）知觉内隐记忆的启动效应不存在年龄和熟悉性效应,而知觉外显记忆成绩则具有明显的年龄和熟悉性效应;（2）在概念内隐记忆任务上,典型范例的启动效应不存在年龄差异,非典型范例的启动效应则存在随年龄而增长的启动效应：无论是典型范例还是非典型范例的外显记忆成绩均随年龄增长而提高。     

Implicit memory and depression: An analysis of perceptual and conceptual processes

A small number of studies have reported impaired explicit memory and intact implicit memory performance in participants classified as depressed. In the present study we examined this finding taking account of the distinction between datadriven and conceptually driven processing. The performance of participants diagnosed with depression was examined on implicit and explicit memory tasks which were designed to tap either predominantly perceptual or conceptual processes. Depressed participants demonstrated performance deficits on both the implicit and explicit conceptual tasks (category association and free recall, respectively) but showed intact performance in the implicit perceptual task (word-fragment completion). These results suggest that people with severe depression show deficits in conceptual processing and that this deficit occurs under both explicit and implicit task instructions.     

It's about time: revisiting temporal processing deficits in dyslexia

Temporal processing in French children with dyslexia was evaluated in three tasks: a word identification task requiring implicit temporal processing, and two explicit temporal bisection tasks, one in the auditory and one in the visual modality. Normally developing children matched on chronological age and reading level served as a control group. Children with dyslexia exhibited robust deficits in temporal tasks whether they were explicit or implicit and whether they involved the auditory or the visual modality. First, they presented larger perceptual variability when performing temporal tasks, whereas they showed no such difficulties when performing the same task on a non‐temporal dimension (intensity). This dissociation suggests that their difficulties were specific to temporal processing and could not be attributed to lapses of attention, reduced alertness, faulty anchoring, or overall noisy processing. In the framework of cognitive models of time perception, these data point to a dysfunction of the ‘internal clock’ of dyslexic children. These results are broadly compatible with the recent temporal sampling theory of dyslexia.     

Sellars and Nonconceptual Content

In this paper I take up the question of whether Wilfrid Sellars has a notion of non‐conceptual perceptual content. The question is controversial, being one of the fault lines along which so‐called left and right Sellarsians diverge. In the paper I try to make clear what it is in Sellars' thought that leads interpreters to such disparate conclusions. My account depends on highlighting the importance of Sellars' little discussed thesis that perception involves a systematic form of mis‐categorization, one where perceivers mistake their sensory states to be properties of physical objects. I argue that the counterpart color and shape attributes of these states, which become ‘point of viewish’ when organized by the productive imagination, provides perceptual experience with its non‐conceptual representational content. I then argue that this content is not a form of the mythical Given because one can only have a non‐conceptual point of view on an object when an object is introduced into one's perceptual experience through the conceptual mis‐taking of one's sensory states. So, while Sellars has a notion of non‐conceptual representational content, it can only be salient in the context of a perceptual act that is conceptual overall.     

Conceptual implicit memory and environmental context

Changes in environmental context between encoding and retrieval often affect explicit memory but research on implicit memory is equivocal. One proposal is that conceptual but not perceptual priming is influenced by context manipulations. However, findings with conceptual priming may be compromised by explicit contamination. The present study examined the effects of environmental context on conceptual explicit (category-cued recall) and implicit memory (category production). Explicit recall was reduced by context change. The implicit test results depended on test awareness (assessed with a post-test questionnaire). Among test-unaware participants, priming was equivalent for same-context and different-context groups, whereas for the test-aware, the same-context group produced more priming. Thus, when explicit contamination is controlled, changes in environmental context do not impair conceptual priming. Context dependency appears to be a general difference between implicit and explicit memory rather than a difference between conceptual and perceptual implicit memory. Finally, measures of mood indicated no changes in affect across contexts, arguing against mood mediation for the context effects in explicit recall.     

Does conceptual implicit memory develop? The role of processing demands

The author investigated the importance of processing considerations within implicit memory in a developmental design. Second-graders (n = 87) and college students (n = 81) completed perceptual (word stem completion) and conceptual (category generation) implicit memory tests after studying target items either nonsemantically (read) or semantically (generated). In support of previous research, the author found no age differences in priming in the nonsemantic study/perceptual test condition. Age differences in priming were found in the semantic study/conceptual test condition, however, where college students had significantly higher priming scores than did children. These developmental dissociations support the theory that the processing requirements of conceptual implicit memory are similar to those in explicit memory. The author also discusses the contribution of the Transfer Appropriate Processing (TAP; H. L. Roediger, D. A. Gallo, & L. Geraci, 2002) framework to understanding these findings.     

The effect of midazolam on implicit and explicit memory in category exemplar production and category cued recall

Transfer‐appropriate processing theory (Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989) proposes that dissociations between performance on explicit and implicit memory tests arise because these tests often rely on different types of information processing (e.g., perceptual processing vs conceptual processing). This perspective predicts that implicit and explicit memory tasks that rely primarily on conceptual processing should show comparable results, not dissociations. Numerous studies have demonstrated such similarities. It is, however, possible that these results arise from explicit memory contamination of performance on implicit memory tasks. To address this issue, an experiment was conducted in which participants were administered the sedative midazolam prior to study. Midazolam is known to create a temporary, but dense, period of anterograde amnesia. The effects of blocking stimulus materials by semantic category at study and generation at study were investigated on category exemplar production and category‐cued recall. The results of this study demonstrated a dissociation of the effects of midazolam on category exemplar production and category‐cued recall. Specifically, midazolam reduced the effect of blocking stimulus materials in category‐cued recall, but not in category exemplar production. The differential effect of midazolam on explicit and implicit memory is at odds with transfer‐appropriate processing theory and suggests that theories of memory must distinguish the roles of different types of conceptual processing on implicit and explicit memory tests.     

A reevaluation of semantic versus nonsemantic processing in implicit memory

A number of investigations have purported to demonstrate that semantic processing does not produce a memorial advantage over nonsemantic processing on implicit tests, as contrasted with the typical advantage of semantic over nonsemantic processing on explicit tests. A review of 166 outcomes from 38 studies that have manipulated processing on implicit tests reveals that on 131 occasions (79%), priming was greater following semantic than it was following nonsemantic processing. This difference was found in both perceptual and conceptual implicit memory tests, as well as in within- and between-subjects designs. It suggests that implicit tests reflect the involvement of both conceptual and perceptual processes. Although explicit contamination may account for some of the processing difference in implicit tests, the pervasiveness of the phenomenon, especially in perceptual implicit tests, makes it an unlikely account for the entire effect.     

Does Conditional Affordance Imply Representational Non-Conceptual Content?

Jan Alm?ng believes that James J. Gibson’s notion of affordances offers a reason to reject John McDowell’s thesis that representational perceptual content is conceptual through and through. I argue that Alm?ng’s arguments for the claim that the perceptual content in which conditional affordances feature can be both representational and non-conceptual are questionable.     

Implicit memory and depression: preserved conceptual priming in subclinical depression

Depression impairs explicit memory but research on implicit memory is equivocal. Initial studies indicated preserved implicit memory, implying a depressive deficit in intentional but not unintentional forms of memory. Subsequent research indicated that conceptual priming is reduced in depression, implying a deficit in conceptual memory processes be they implicit or explicit. However, the findings with conceptual priming may be compromised by explicit contamination. The present study compared subclinically depressed and non-depressed participants on matched conceptual tests of explicit memory (category-cued recall) and implicit memory (category production). The implicit test was followed by a post-test questionnaire used to categorise participants as test-aware or test-unaware. On the explicit test, the subclinically depressed participants recalled less than the non-depressed participants. The results on the implicit test depended on test-awareness. Among test-unaware participants, conceptual priming was equivalent across the two groups, whereas for the test-aware, non-depressed participants produced significantly more priming than the subclinically depressed. This indicates that when explicit contamination is controlled, depression does not impair conceptual priming. The depressive dissociation between implicit and explicit memory is better accounted for by the difference between intentional and unintentional forms of memory rather than by the difference between conceptual and perceptual memory processes.     

Transfer across modality in perceptual implicit memory

We examined whether words studied in one modality (visual or auditory) would prime performance in the opposite modality in five different perceptual implicit memory tests: auditory perceptual identification, auditory stem completion, visual perceptual identification, visual stem completion, and visual fragment completion. Significant transfer across modality was observed in all five tasks. However, a large proportion of the subjects reported using explicit retrieval strategies during the implicit tests. Those subjects who claimed not to have used explicit retrieval processes during the test phase demonstrated transfer across modalities in the stem completion tests and the perceptual identification tests, but not in the fragment completion test. The results indicate that implicit visual word-fragment completion is unique, in the sense that it relies exclusively on perceptual memory processes, whereas the other tasks rely, in part, on nonperceptual memory processes.     

Input- and output-monitoring in implicit and explicit memory

Previous experiments have shown that the procedure of questioning subjects retrospectively about the input and output status of information (input and output monitoring) is a useful method for assessing the awareness states of subjects during implicit and explicit memory tasks. The main purpose of the present study was to investigate whether the previous findings could be extended to other implicit and explicit memory tasks. We were especially interested in whether differences in input- and output-monitoring performance can be observed when both the implicit and explicit memory tasks are conceptual ones. In a final test phase, the target items from the study phase and new distractor items were presented. In a recognition-like situation, subjects had to decide whether an item had been presented in the study phase (input status), as well as whether they had produced the item in the memory-test phase (output status). In all three experiments judgments about the input status - but only for those items that had been produced in the implicit or in the explicit memory test - were more precise after explicit than after implicit memory testings. This finding was not influenced by the distinction between perceptual and conceptual-memory tasks (Exp. 1), and was obtained under conditions in which the implicit and the explicit memory tasks were both conceptual and differed only in test instructions (Exps. 2 and 3). These results suggest that not only subjects performing a perceptual test of implicit memory, but also subjects in a conceptual implicit test were less aware of using information from a previous study episode than subjects who received memory instructions. It is concluded that requiring judgments about the input status of information is a good method for assessing subjects test awareness and is preferable to the use of a questionnaire (Exp. 3). In contrast, in all three experiments no differences were found with the output-monitoring measure between implicit and explicit test conditions.     

Neural correlates of conceptual implicit memory and their contamination of putative neural correlates of explicit memory

During episodic recognition tests, meaningful stimuli such as words can engender both conscious retrieval (explicit memory) and facilitated access to meaning that is distinct from the awareness of remembering (conceptual implicit memory). Neuroimaging investigations of one type of memory are frequently subject to the confounding influence of the other type of memory, thus posing a serious impediment to theoretical advances in this area. We used minimalist visual shapes (squiggles) to attempt to overcome this problem. Subjective ratings of squiggle meaningfulness varied idiosyncratically, and behavioral indications of conceptual implicit memory were evident only for stimuli given higher ratings. These effects did not result from perceptual-based fluency or from explicit remembering. Distinct event-related brain potentials were associated with conceptual implicit memory and with explicit memory by virtue of contrasts based on meaningfulness ratings and memory judgments, respectively. Frontal potentials from 300 to 500 msec after the onset of repeated squiggles varied systematically with perceived meaningfulness. Explicit memory was held constant in this contrast, so these potentials were taken as neural correlates of conceptual implicit memory. Such potentials can contaminate putative neural correlates of explicit memory, in that they are frequently attributed to the expression of explicit memory known as familiarity. These findings provide the first neural dissociation of these two memory phenomena during recognition testing and underscore the necessity of taking both types of memory into account in order to obtain valid neural correlates of specific memory functions.     

Developmental patterns in priming and familiarity in explicit recollection

Developmental trajectories of two classes of human memory, implicit and explicit memory, appear to diverge. We examined how developmental differences in perceptual and conceptual priming, two types of implicit memory, coincide with differences between familiarity and recollective responses on explicit memory tests that employ the Remember/Know paradigm ( Tulving, 1985 ). Both types of priming were characterized by developmental invariance in 52 children and adolescents ages 8-19 years. Contrary to Komatsu, Naito, and Fuke (1996) results, few age-group differences in perceptual priming were observed following a levels-of-processing encoding manipulation. In contrast, age group differences were found for "Remember" but not "Know" responses. Neither levels of awareness nor strategies influenced priming. Adult levels of performance appear earlier in development on perceptual and conceptual priming tests compared to explicit memory tests. Similar developmental dissociations exist between explicit and implicit memory performance as between "Remember" and "Know" recollective responses.     

Perceptual and categorical judgements of colour similarity

Consideration is given to the tasks that make judgements of colour similarity based on perceptual similarity rather than categorical similarity. Irrespective of whether colour categories are taken to be universal (Berlin & Kay, 1969) or language induced (Davidoff, Davies, & Roberson, 1999), it is widely assumed that colour boundaries, and hence categorical similarity, would be used when categorising colours. However, we argue that categorical similarity is more reliably used in implicit than in explicit categorisation. Thus, in Experiment 1, we found that category boundaries may be overridden in the explicit task of matching-to-sample: There was a similar strong tendency to ignore colour boundaries and to divide the range of coloured stimuli into two equal groups in both Westerners and in a remote population (Himba). In Experiment 2, we showed that a distinctive stimulus (focal colour) in the range affected the equal division in a matching-to-sample task. Experiment 3 tested the stability of a category boundary in an implicit task (visual search) that assessed categorical perception; only for this task was categorisation largely immune to range effects and largely based on categorical similarity. It is concluded that, even after colour categories are acquired, perceptual rather than categorical similarity is commonly used in judgements of colour similarity.