Terrorists brought down the plane!—No,actually it was a technical fault: Processing corrections of emotive information

It is well known that people often continue to rely on initial misinformation even if this information is later corrected and even if the correction itself is remembered. This article investigated the impact of emotionality of the material on people's ability to discount corrected misinformation. The focus was on moderate levels of emotionality comparable to those elicited by real-world news reports. Emotionality has frequently been shown to have an impact upon reasoning and memory, but the generality of this influence remains unclear. In three experiments, participants read a report of a fictitious plane crash that was initially associated with either an emotionally laden cause (terrorist attack) or an emotionally more neutral cause (bad weather). This initial attribution was followed by a retraction and presentation of an alternative cause (faulty fuel tank). The scenarios demonstrably affected participants' self-reported feelings. However, all three experiments showed that emotionality does not affect the continued influence of misinformation.     

Political Attitudes and the Processing of Misinformation Corrections

Misinformation often continues to influence people’s memory and inferential reasoning after it has been retracted; this is known as the continued influence effect (CIE). Previous research investigating the role of attitude‐based motivated reasoning in this context has found conflicting results: Some studies have found that worldview can have a strong impact on the magnitude of the CIE, such that retractions are less effective if the misinformation is congruent with a person’s relevant attitudes, in which case the retractions can even backfire. Other studies have failed to find evidence for an effect of attitudes on the processing of misinformation corrections. The present study used political misinformation—specifically fictional scenarios involving misconduct by politicians from left‐wing and right‐wing parties—and tested participants identifying with those political parties. Results showed that in this type of scenario, partisan attitudes have an impact on the processing of retractions, in particular (1) if the misinformation relates to a general assertion rather than just a specific singular event and (2) if the misinformation is congruent with a conservative partisanship.     

Brief Exposure to Misinformation Can Lead to Long‐Term False Memories

Do false memories last? And do they last as long as true ones? This study investigated whether experimentally created false memories would persist for an extended period (one and a half years). A large number of subjects (N = 342) participated in a standard three‐stage misinformation procedure (saw the event slides, read the narrations with misinformation, and then took the memory tests). The initial tests showed that misinformation led to a significant amount of false memory. One and a half years later, the participants were tested again. About half of the misinformation false memory persisted, which was the same rate as for true memory. These results strongly suggest that brief exposure to misinformation can lead to long‐term false memory and that the strength of memory trace was similar for true and false memories. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Assessment of calibration for reconstructed eye-witness memories

Two experiments examined confidence judgments associated with eyewitness memory for events to misinformation [Loftus, E. F. (1975). Leading questions and the eyewitness report. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 560-572]. Participants in each experiment watched videos depicting crimes and either responded to questionnaires (Experiment 1) or read narratives (Experiment 2) containing veridical or non-veridical information. Upon testing for memory performance 24 h later, participants exposed to misinformation accepted the misinformation as part of their memory of the events in the videos. In both experiments, confidence judgments of participants subjected to misinformation were high and comparable to those of participants not subjected to misinformation. The relationship between accurate responding and confidence was assessed via calibration analysis [Yates, J. F. (1990). Judgments and decision making. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall]. Performance on various measures of calibration was generally better for participants who were not exposed to misinformation. We conclude that confidence judgments can depend on factors other than those that improve the accuracy of memory, such as the retrieval fluency of one’s memories.     

Correcting false information in memory: Manipulating the strength of misinformation encoding and its retraction

Information that is presumed to be true at encoding but later on turns out to be false (i.e., misinformation) often continues to influence memory and reasoning. In the present study, we investigated how the strength of encoding and the strength of a later retraction of the misinformation affect this continued influence effect. Participants read an event report containing misinformation and a subsequent correction. Encoding strength of the misinformation and correction were orthogonally manipulated either via repetition (Experiment 1) or by imposing a cognitive load during reading (Experiment 2). Results suggest that stronger retractions are effective in reducing the continued influence effects associated with strong misinformation encoding, but that even strong retractions fail to eliminate continued influence effects associated with relatively weak encoding. We present a simple computational model based on random sampling that captures this effect pattern, and conclude that the continued influence effect seems to defy most attempts to eliminate it.     

Self-relevance enhances susceptibility to false memory

Eyewitness testimony serves as important evidence in the legal system. Eyewitnesses of a crime can be either the victims themselves—for whom the experience is highly self-referential—or can be bystanders who witness and thus encode the crime in relation to others. There is a gap in past research investigating whether processing information in relation to oneself versus others would later impact people's suggestibility to misleading information. In two experiments (Ns = 68 and 122) with Dutch and Chinese samples, we assessed whether self-reference of a crime event (i.e., victim vs. bystander) affected their susceptibility to false memory creation. Using a misinformation procedure, we photoshopped half of the participants' photographs into a crime slideshow so that they saw themselves as victims of a nonviolent crime, while others watched the slideshow as mock bystander witnesses. In both experiments, participants displayed a self-enhanced suggestibility effect: Participants who viewed themselves as victims created more false memories after receiving misinformation than those who witnessed the same crime as bystanders. These findings suggest that self-reference might constitute a hitherto new risk factor in the formation of false memories when evaluating eyewitness memory reports.     

The effect of question type on resistance to misinformation about present and absent details

The typical misinformation effect shows that accuracy is lower for details about which people received misleading compared to non-misleading (control) information. In two experiments, we examined the misinformation effect for non-witnessed details (i.e., absent). Three question types introduced control, misleading, and absent details (closed, closed-detailed, and open questions) about a mock burglary video. On this misinformation test, participants' reports of absent details were less accurate than control details only when they were introduced using open questions. Misinformation effects in a subsequent recognition test were present for misleading details in both experiments, but for absent details only in Experiment 2. Experiment 2 also revealed that participants who avoided answering open questions containing misleading and absent details had more accurate memories for these details on the subsequent recognition test than participants who answered these questions. In both experiments, confidence was lowest for absent details. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

How eyewitnesses resist misinformation: Social postwarnings and the monitoring of memory characteristics

Previous findings have been equivocal as to whether the postevent misinformation effect on eyewitness memory is reduced by warnings presented after the misinformation (postwarnings). In the present research, social postwarnings, which characterize the postevent source as a low-credibility individual, diminished the misinformation effect in both cued recall and recognition tests. Discrediting the source as being either untrustworthy or incompetent was effective (Experiment 1). Also, postwarned participants rated reality characteristics of their memories more accurately than did participants receiving no or high-credibility information about the postevent source (Experiment 2). A social postwarning yielded the same results as an explicit source-monitoring appeal and led to longer response times for postevent items, relative to a no-warning condition (Experiments 3 and 4). The findings suggest that the reduced misinformation effect was due to more thorough monitoring of memory characteristics by postwarned participants, rather than to a stricter response criterion or to enhanced event memory.     

Discrepancy detection and vulnerability to misleading postevent information

When people are exposed to misleading details after a witnessed event, they often claim that they saw the misleading details as part of the event. We refer to this as themisinformation effect. In four experiments, involving 570 subjects, we explored the role that discrepancy detection plays in the misinformation effect. Experiment 1 showed that subjects who naturally read a post-event narrative more slowly were more resistant to the effects of misleading information contained in the narrative. In Experiment 2, subjects who naturally read more slowly were more likely to detect a discrepancy between what they were reading and what was stored in their memory. In Experiment 3, subjects who were instructed to read slowly were more likely to detect a discrepancy than were those who were instructed to read quickly. In Experiment 4, subjects who were instructed to read slowly were more resistant to misleading postevent information. Taken together, these results suggest that longer reading times are associated with a greater scrutiny of postevent information. This leads to an increased likelihood that discrepancies will be detected and that the misinformation will be resisted.     

An experimental investigation of the misinformation effect in crime-related amnesia claims

Research suggests that both internal (i.e., lying) and external (i.e., misinformation) factors can affect memory for a crime. We aimed to explore the effects of post-event misinformation on crime-related amnesia claims. We showed participants a mock crime and asked them to either simulate amnesia (simulators) or confess to it (confessors). Next, some participants were provided with misinformation. Finally, all participants were requested to genuinely recollect the crime. Overall, simulators reported less correct information than confessors. Moreover, these two groups were equally vulnerable to misinformation. In addition, exploratory analyses on strategies adopted by simulators revealed that those who previously, mostly omitted information while simulating amnesia exhibited the lowest amount of correct details. Simulators who instead used a mixed strategy disclosed more fabricated memory errors. Findings suggest that legal professionals and jurors should take into account that even offenders, irrespective of confessing or simulating memory loss for a crime, can be susceptible to post-event misinformation.     

A re-examination of the misinformation effect by means of visual and verbal recognition tests

Abstract: Two experiments were carried out to investigate the factors that produce the misinformation effect (Loftus, 1979a). Experiment 1 of the present study using the visual recognition test was a replica of Experiment 1 of Loftus, Miller, and Burns (1978). The misinformation effect was not found. Experiment 2 differed from Experiment 1 in the following respects: the modality of recognition test was varied between visual and verbal; memorableness (ease of memorization) of the critical objects was varied. The results of Experiment 2 suggest that the original visual memory might be more likely to be recovered with a visual recognition test than with a verbal recognition test, and that the postevent information would not necessarily interfere effectively with memory of an original object of too high or low memorableness, while it works well on objects of intermediate memorableness.     

False memories in music listening: exploring the misinformation effect and individual difference factors in auditory memory

ABSTRACT

The study of false memory has had a profound impact on our understanding of how and what we remember, as shown by the misinformation paradigm [Loftus, E. F. (2005). Planting misinformation in the human mind: A 30-year investigation of the malleability of memory. Learning & Memory, 12(4), 361–366. doi:10.1101/lm.94705]. Though misinformation effects have been demonstrated extensively within visual tasks, they have not yet been explored in the realm of non-visual auditory stimuli. Thus, the present study aimed to investigate whether post-event information can create false memories of music listening episodes. In addition, we explored individual difference factors potentially associated with false memory susceptibility in music, including age, suggestibility, personality, and musical training. In two music recognition tasks, participants (N?=?151) listened to an initial music track, which unbeknownst to them was missing an instrument. They were then presented with post-event information which either suggested the presence of the missing instrument or did not. The presence of misinformation resulted in significantly poorer performance on the music recognition tasks (d?=?.43), suggesting the existence of false musical memories. A random forest analysis indicated that none of the individual difference factors assessed were significantly associated with misinformation susceptibility. These findings support previous research on the fallibility of human memory and demonstrate, to some extent, the generality of the misinformation effect to a non-visual auditory domain.     

The role of self-esteem in the misinformation effect

Previous research using the Gudjonnson suggestibility scale has suggested a role for self-esteem in suggestibility, with participants low in self-esteem being more suggestible than participants high in self-esteem. Four experiments are presented examining the role of self-esteem in the misinformation effect and whether enhanced suggestibility effects in participants low in self-esteem reflect genuine memory impairment. In Experiments 1 and 4 participants completed a standard recognition test. In Experiment 2 participants completed the modified recognition test. In Experiment 3 participants completed a free recall test. In Experiments 1 and 4 participants low in self-esteem demonstrated greater misinformation effects than participants high in self-esteem. In Experiment 3 a 3-day retention interval was employed with the modified test and no differences were found between the two groups on the reporting of the new item. The findings suggest that participants low in self-esteem are particularly sensitive to demand characteristics and post-event suggestion but do not suffer from genuine memory impairment.     

The role of self-esteem in the misinformation effect

Previous research using the Gudjonnson suggestibility scale has suggested a role for self-esteem in suggestibility, with participants low in self-esteem being more suggestible than participants high in self-esteem. Four experiments are presented examining the role of self-esteem in the misinformation effect and whether enhanced suggestibility effects in participants low in self-esteem reflect genuine memory impairment. In Experiments 1 and 4 participants completed a standard recognition test. In Experiment 2 participants completed the modified recognition test. In Experiment 3 participants completed a free recall test. In Experiments 1 and 4 participants low in self-esteem demonstrated greater misinformation effects than participants high in self-esteem. In Experiment 3 a 3-day retention interval was employed with the modified test and no differences were found between the two groups on the reporting of the new item. The findings suggest that participants low in self-esteem are particularly sensitive to demand characteristics and post-event suggestion but do not suffer from genuine memory impairment.     

A comparison of prebunking and debunking interventions for implied versus explicit misinformation

Psychological research has offered valuable insights into how to combat misinformation. The studies conducted to date, however, have three limitations. First, pre-emptive (“prebunking”) and retroactive (“debunking”) interventions have mostly been examined in parallel, and thus it is unclear which of these two predominant approaches is more effective. Second, there has been a focus on misinformation that is explicitly false, but implied misinformation that uses literally true information to mislead is common in the real world. Finally, studies have relied mainly on questionnaire measures of reasoning, neglecting behavioural impacts of misinformation and interventions. To offer incremental progress towards addressing these three issues, we conducted an experiment (N = 735) involving misinformation on fair trade. We contrasted the effectiveness of prebunking versus debunking and the impacts of implied versus explicit misinformation, and incorporated novel measures assessing consumer behaviours (i.e., willingness-to-pay; information seeking; online misinformation promotion) in addition to standard questionnaire measures. In general, both prebunking and debunking reduced misinformation reliance. We also found that individuals tended to rely more on explicit than implied misinformation both with and without interventions.     

错误信息效应的主要理论与影响因素的述评与展望

个体对原始信息的记忆受到随后错误信息的影响而产生错误记忆被称为错误信息效应.通过对新近研究的梳理与归纳,发现错误信息效应的研究热点集中于解释效应产生机制的理论研究以及效应的影响因素研究.因此,本文重点归纳和述评了错误信息效应的五种理论和三类影响因素.未来的研究建议从以下几方面开展:第一,错误信息产生机制和理论研究;第二...     

Is saccade-induced retrieval enhancement a potential means of improving eyewitness evidence?

Saccade-induced retrieval enhancement (SIRE) is the effect whereby making bilateral saccades enhances the subsequent retrieval of memories. Two experiments explored SIRE's potential to improve eyewitness evidence. Participants viewed slideshows depicting crimes, and received contradictory and additive misinformation about event details either once (Experiment 1) or three times (Experiment 2). Participants then performed saccades or a fixation control task before being tested on their memory for the slideshows and making confidence judgements. Saccades increased discrimination between seen and unseen event details regardless of whether or what type of misinformation was presented. Because prior studies indicated that SIRE might be more robust for individuals who are strongly right-handed versus not, we examined SIRE as a function of handedness and found that saccades improved memory for event details regardless of participants' handedness. However, participants who were not strongly right-handed had fewer false memories than participants who were strongly right-handed, extending previous findings of superior memory among individuals who are not strongly right-handed. Saccades also increased confidence in true memories (Experiment 1) and decreased confidence in false memories (Experiment 2). The results support SIRE's potential to improve eyewitness evidence.     

Social and Cognitive Aspects of the Vulnerability to Political Misinformation

In the last few years, especially after the Brexit referendum and the 2016 U.S. elections, there has been a surge in academic interest for misinformation and disinformation. Social, cognitive, and political scientists' work on these phenomena has focused on two main aspects:

• Individuals' (and by extension societies') vulnerability to misinformation;
• Factors and interventions that can increase individuals' (and societies') resistance to misinformation.

In this article, we offer a critical review of the psychological research pertaining to these two aspects. Drawing on this review, we highlight an emerging tension in the relevant literature. Indeed, the current state of the art of the political misinformation literature reflects the combined operation of two opposing psychological constructs: excess gullibility on the one hand and excess vigilance on the other. We argue that this conceptualization is important in both advancing theories of individuals' and societies' vulnerability to misinformation and in designing prospective research programs. We conclude with proposing what, in our view, are the most promising avenues for future research in the field.     

Trauma and memory: effects of post-event misinformation, retrieval order, and retention interval

The present study concerned effects of misinformation, retrieval order, and retention interval on eyewitness memory for a traumatic event (a vivid murder). Relations between misinformation acceptance and compliance were also examined. The classic three-stage misinformation paradigm (Loftus, 1979) was employed, with a multi-component recognition test added. Either immediately or 2 weeks after viewing a distressing film, 232 adults read a narrative (misleading or control) about the murder and then took a recognition test that tapped memory for central and peripheral details. Test-item order either matched the chronology of the film or was randomly determined. Significant misinformation effects were obtained. Moreover, control participants were more accurate in response to questions about central than peripheral information; however, this was not so for misinformed participants. Sequential but not random retrieval order resulted in a higher proportion of correct responses for central as opposed to peripheral misinformation questions. Compliance was significantly related to misinformation effects. Delay increased participants' suggestibility, impaired memory accuracy, and produced higher confidence ratings for misinformed participants compared to controls. Findings indicate that even for a highly negative event, adults' memory is not immune to inaccuracies and suggestive influences.     

From Eyewitness to Academic Contexts: Examining the Effect of Misinformation in First and Second Languages

The present study adapts the typical eyewitness misinformation paradigm into an academic context. Unbalanced English–Spanish bilinguals (N = 81) listened to a lecture in English (L1) or Spanish (L2), read notes in L1 or L2, and completed a forced‐choice recognition test in the lecture language. Unlike prior studies with proficient bilinguals, unbalanced English‐dominant participants showed greater recognition memory accuracy for material presented in English only than did material presented in Spanish only. English misinformation had a greater impact on memory for the Spanish lecture than vice versa. Most importantly, the modified misinformation paradigm is an effective tool to investigate academic misinformation effects and could be used in bilingual and monolingual research. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.