Test of the analysis of competing hypotheses in legal decision‐making

The analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH) has been suggested to be a method that can protect against confirmation bias in the context of intelligence analysis. In the current study, we aimed to determine whether ACH could counter confirmation bias in the reasoning with evidence in the context of criminal law proceedings. Law students (N = 191) received information about the ACH method or general information about biases. They were given a case vignette with a main suspect and a list of 24 questions, 6 of which they could ask about the case. Half of the questions related to incriminating information, whereas the other half related to exonerating information. Contrary to our expectations, participants in both conditions favoured questions relating to exonerating information and rated the exonerating evidence as being more important for their decision. Despite the lack of bias observed, it seems participants failed to properly apply the ACH method.     

The Aggregated Extremes Effect: Not All Routes to “Balanced” Bundles are Equally Appealing

Prior research establishes that consumers are averse to extreme options, but what does a “moderate” option look like in the context of choices among bundles of items, such as investment portfolios or product assortment packs? We propose that for bundles, two paths to creating risk and reward balance exist: a “bundle‐of‐pure‐moderation” with all moderate‐risk–moderate‐reward (moderate RR) components and a “bundle‐of‐extremes,” composed of equal numbers of extreme high‐risk–high‐reward (high RR) and low‐risk–low‐reward (low RR) components. We show that consumers have stronger preference for the balanced bundle when composed of a bundle‐of‐extremes rather than a bundle‐of‐pure‐moderation, even when equated on expected value, a phenomenon we term “the aggregated extremes effect.” This effect occurs across different choice set configurations and across multiple domains. Additionally, this effect is eliminated among consumers who view the high RR and low RR components as incompatible, as this undermines the perceived attractiveness of the bundle‐of‐extremes. Finally, this effect is also eliminated by exposing consumers to a depiction of potential outcomes, such that consumers can better perceive the risk reduction upside of a bundle‐of‐pure‐moderation.     

The Impact of “Display‐Set” Options on Decision‐Making

The way a choice set is constructed can have a significant influence on how individuals perceive and evaluate their options, and make decisions between them. Here, I examine whether a “display set” of visible but unavailable options can exert these same types of influences on whether or not to choose a single (target) item. Across a series of experiments, purchase intent is increased when the display set and target are drawn from the same category, but decreased when the display and target items are mismatched. This effect is shown to depend on perceived similarity, such that increasing display‐target similarity increases purchase intent towards the target. Furthermore, contrary to the predictions made by previous neural and behavioral research on choice sets, the relative value and/or number of display‐only items have no significant impact on these decisions. These findings reveal a novel choice behavior in commonly encountered settings such as online marketplaces. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“All‐or‐None” Versus “Most‐or‐Some” Options in Risky Choice: Effects of Domain and Handedness

Two methodological variants of Kahneman and Tversky's Asian disease scenario were investigated. One variant involved replacing the “all‐or‐none” outcome scenarios of the risky choice with “most‐or‐some” scenario outcomes, and the second variant involved replacing the negative domain of lives lost with a positive domain of jobs created. In addition, the effects of strength of handedness, a variable related to individual differences in risk perception, were examined. Results indicated that standard framing effects were obtained across both domains, with a decrease in risky choice under the gain domain. Scenario type also interacted with handedness, such that the all‐or‐none scenario yielded framing effects for consistent (strong)‐handers only, whereas the most‐or‐some scenario yielded framing effects for inconsistent (mixed)‐handers only (consistent‐handers are those who use the same hand exclusively for almost all activities). These results demonstrate that framing effects are strongly influenced by the presence versus absence of extreme/absolute outcomes and that individuals (in this case, decision makers with varying degrees of handedness strength) are differentially sensitive to different pieces of information. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The contribution of “cool” and “hot” components of decision-making in adolescence: Implications for developmental psychopathology

Impairments in either “cool” or “hot” processes may represent two pathways to deficient decision-making. Whereas cool processes are associated with cognitive and rational decisions, hot processes are associated with emotional, affective, and visceral processes. In this study, 168 boys were administered a card-playing task at ages 13 and 14 years to assess response perseveration. This task was designed to initially reward playing and gradually associate playing with punishment. Measures of subjective ordering (cool processes) and neuroticism (hot processes) at age 13 years were used to examine how these individual characteristics relate to perseveration over time. A decrease in perseveration from age 13 to 14 was associated with cool processes whereas hot processes were associated with response perseveration only over time. A complementary but simultaneous assessment of cool and hot processes, such as neuropsychological and personality tests, could facilitate treatment planning of children with behavioral problems.     

The Evolving “D” in “BASIC ID”

The multimodal counseling model is based on the notion that a client's concerns can be dealt with most successfully when the counselor or therapist treats several aspects of a client's functioning. The multimodal model uses the acronym BASIC ID to identify the areas of client functioning that frequently need to be treated. These areas include behavior, affect, sensation, imagery, cognition, interpersonal relations, and drugs. The D mode, which represents drugs, is a misunderstood aspect of the BASIC ID partly because it does not seem to parallel other aspects of the model. Over the past few years the D mode has been expanded to include more than drugs, in particular, to include diet and other physiological factors. This article describes the evolution of the D mode and attempts to show the importance of a physiological dimension to the multimodal counseling approach.     

THE PROBLEM OF “GOD” IN PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION: LONERGAN'S “COMMON SENSE” (RELIGION) VERSUS “THEORY” (THEOLOGY)

The emphasis on God in American psychology of religion generates the problem of explaining divine‐versus‐natural causality in “spiritual experiences.” Especially “theistic psychology” champions divine involvement. However, its argument exposes a methodological error: to pit popular religious opinions against technical scientific conclusions. Countering such homogenizing “postmodern agnosticism,” Bernard Lonergan explained these two as different modes of thinking: “common sense” and “theory”—which resolves the problem: When theoretical science is matched with theoretical theology, “the God‐hypothesis” explains the existence of things whereas science explains their natures; and, barring miracles, God is irrelevant to natural science. A review of the field shows that the problem is pervasive; attention to “miracles”—popularly so‐named versus technically—focuses the claims of divine‐versus‐natural causality; and specifications of the meaning of spiritual, spirituality, science, worldview, and meaning itself (suffering that same ambiguity: personal import versus cognitive content) offer further clarity. The problem is not naturalism versus theism, but commonsensical versus theoretical thinking. This solution demands “hard” social science.     

Identifying Hypothesis Confirmation Behaviors in a Simulated Murder Investigation: Implications for Practice

Investigators have been shown to be prone to accessing information that confirms their preferred hypothesis. This tendency has been termed hypothesis confirmation. Hypothesis confirmation behaviour was explored in two studies using a computer administered simulation of a murder investigation. In Study 1, hypothesis confirmation behaviour did not differentiate successful and unsuccessful participants. However, unsuccessful participants stored more confirmatory information than non‐confirmatory information. Successful participants did not show this pattern. In Study 2, unsuccessful participants tended to settle early on a suspect and then acquired information that supported their decision. Successful participants tended to consider a number of suspects for longer and accessed a greater diversity of information. Taken together, these findings are highly suggestive of the role of information acquisition as an important component of hypothesis confirmatory behaviour, which is associated with unsuccessful information processing in the context of a simulated murder investigation. Implications for practice are presented. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“PURE” VERSUS “PRACTICAL” EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Abstract: In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is “epistemic” in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and “practical” in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of “inner epistemic virtue” to the “outer risks” implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories.     

“Watch out!”: Effects of instructed threat and avoidance on human free‐operant approach–avoidance behavior

Approach–avoidance paradigms create a competition between appetitive and aversive contingencies and are widely used in nonhuman research on anxiety. Here, we examined how instructions about threat and avoidance impact control by competing contingencies over human approach–avoidance behavior. Additionally, Experiment 1 examined the effects of threat magnitude (money loss amount) and avoidance cost (fixed ratio requirements), whereas Experiment 2 examined the effects of threat information (available, unavailable and inaccurate) on approach–avoidance. During the task, approach responding was modeled by reinforcing responding with money on a FR schedule. By performing an observing response, participants produced an escalating “threat meter”. Instructions stated that the threat meter levels displayed the current probability of losing money, when in fact loss only occurred when the level reached the maximum. Instructions also stated pressing an avoidance button lowered the threat level. Overall, instructions produced cycles of approach and avoidance responding with transitions from approach to avoidance when threat was high and transitions back to approach after avoidance reduced threat. Experiment 1 revealed increasing avoidance cost, but not threat magnitude, shifted approach–avoidance transitions to higher threat levels and increased anxiety ratings, but did not influence the frequency of approach–avoidance cycles. Experiment 2 revealed when threat level information was available or absent earnings were high, but earnings decreased when inaccurate threat information was incompatible with contingencies. Our findings build on prior nonhuman and human approach–avoidance research by highlighting how instructed threat and avoidance can impact human AA behavior and self‐reported anxiety.     

The “Islamized Stranger”: On “Chronic” Versus “Contextual” Salience in the Measurement of Anti‐Muslim Prejudice

There is an ongoing debate whether anti‐Muslim prejudice in Western countries is more widespread than prejudice towards other ethno‐cultural groups or general ethnic prejudice. Previous research used different methodologies and yielded contradictory results. In this article, we combine a population‐based split‐sample survey experiment (N = 1,323), where half of the respondents judged items about Muslims and the other half statements about strangers, with an open question probing which groups respondents thought of when thinking about “strangers.” We furthermore extend previous research by not only focusing on general ethnic prejudice, but to differentiate between perceived trustworthiness, economic, cultural, and security threat. Our results strongly support the idea that the difference between the “chronic” and “contextual” salience of the target of prejudice should be taken into account.     

The “Emerging Church” Conversation

As the contemporary discussion on the “Emerging Church” (ECC) conversation shows, there is a shift in the understanding of Christian religion. (In its historical context, this is strongly related to Evangelism.) On closer examination, the ECC actually boils down to a transformation of Christian religion – a version of an experienced‐based, postmodern religiosity. The engine of this transformation is the clarification of the religious identity. The ECC can be described as a movement that serves as a transition for the protagonists in order to shape their individual processes of resistance as well as the processes of disentanglement in regards to their own religious orientation. Therefore, the discussion represents an “alternative space,” which is best seen in five motifs: the change of religious alignment; the significance of community; specific theological themes and strategies; dealing with different “contexts” in the conversation; and the emphasis of values, attitudes, and practices. On the one hand, the conversation can be described as a “biotope of innovation.” On the other hand, protagonists handle intellectual doubt, their lack of religious experience, the lack of moral authority of their previous religious community, and theological uncertainties with courage and a certain nonchalance, which must be addressed critically.