婴儿如何认识他心：“似我”假说述评

“似我”指婴儿借助“我他对等”的认识解读他人行为、意图和心理状态,并通过他人间的互动信息推断和调整自身行为。具体表现在：婴儿能够识别出他人的模仿,能够理解他人的感知,以及提取他人的互动信息。将他人视为“似我”,需依赖动作表征、第一人称体验以及理解他人意图的作用。“似我”假说肯定了模仿与把握他人心理状态以及建立社交互动的关系,促使研究者认识到与他人保持“心理视角”的一致对提升儿童共情能力的价值,凸显了心智化课堂对学习效果的推动作用。     

Recognizing group cognition

In this paper, we approach the idea of group cognition from the perspective of the “extended mind” thesis, as a special case of the more general claim that systems larger than the individual human, but containing that human, are capable of cognition (Clark, 2008, Clark and Chalmers, 1998). Instead of deliberating about “the mark of the cognitive” (Adams & Aizawa, 2008), our discussion of group cognition is tied to particular cognitive capacities. We review recent studies of group problem solving and group memory which reveal that specific cognitive capacities that are commonly ascribed to individuals are also aptly ascribed at the level of groups. These case studies show how dense interactions among people within a group lead to both similarity-inducing and differentiating dynamics that affect the group’s ability to solve problems. This supports our claim that groups have organization-dependent cognitive capacities that go beyond the simple aggregation of the cognitive capacities of individuals. Group cognition is thus an emergent phenomenon in the sense of Wimsatt (1986). We further argue that anybody who rejects our strategy for showing that cognitive properties can be instantiated at multiple levels in the organizational hierarchy on a priori grounds is a “demergentist,” and thus incurs the burden of proof for explaining why cognitive properties are “stuck” at a certain level of organizational structure. Finally, we show that our analysis of group cognition escapes the “coupling-constitution” charge that has been leveled against the extended mind thesis (Adams & Aizawa, 2008).     

A social-cognitive framework for understanding serious lies: Activation-decision-construction-action theory

Little is known about the cognition of deception (Gombos, 2006). We propose a cognitive account of serious lying (i.e., deception involving high stakes) in response to a solicitation of a truth: Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory (ADCAT). Built on the Activation-Decision-Construction Model of answering questions deceptively (Walczyk, Roper, Seeman, & Humphrey, 2003), the theory elaborates on the roles of executive processes, theory of mind, emotions, motivation, specifies cognitive processing thoroughly, and considers the rehearsal of lies. ADCAT's four processing components are (a) activation of the truth, the (b) decision whether and how to alter deceptively the information shared, (c) construction of a deception, and (d) action [acting sincere while delivering a lie]. Core constructs are “theory of mind” and “cognitive resources”. Specifically, throughout serious deception, individuals are inferring the current or potential mental states of targets and taking steps to minimize the allocation of cognitive resources during delivery to appear honest and lie well.     

The Sensitivity to Mean Intentions (SeMI) Model: Basic Assumptions,Recent Findings,and Potential Avenues for Future Research

A large body of research has demonstrated that people who are habitually sensitive towards victimization tend to behave uncooperatively and immorally in socially uncertain situations. The “Sensitivity to Mean Intentions” (SeMI) model (Gollwitzer & Rothmund 2009) aims at describing social‐cognitive mechanisms that underlie and explain this effect. The model posits that in socially uncertain situations, victim‐sensitive individuals are asymmetrically sensitive to cues of untrustworthiness. When such cues are present, suspicious cognitive and motivational reactions are triggered in victim‐sensitive individuals, and they behave preemptively selfish to avoid being exploited by others. Although functional at times, victim sensitivity does have dysfunctional side effects. The present article reviews recent findings regarding the SeMI model and sketches potential avenues for future research.     

A Quantitative Estimate of Schema Abnormality in Socially Anxious and Non‐Anxious Individuals

Although cognitive theories of anxiety suggest that anxious individuals are characterized by abnormal threat‐relevant schemas, few empirical studies have estimated the nature of these cognitive structures using quantitative methods that lend themselves to inferential statistical analysis. In the present study, socially anxious (n = 55) and non‐anxious (n = 62) participants completed 3 Q‐Sort tasks to assess their knowledge of events that commonly occur in social or evaluative scenarios. Participants either sorted events according to how commonly they personally believe the events occur (i.e. “self” condition), or to how commonly they estimate that most people believe they occur (i.e. “other” condition). Participants' individual Q‐Sorts were correlated with mean sorts obtained from a normative sample to obtain an estimate of schema abnormality, with lower correlations representing greater levels of abnormality. Relative to non‐anxious participants, socially anxious participants' sorts were less strongly associated with sorts of the normative sample, particularly in the “self” condition, although secondary analyses suggest that some significant results might be explained, in part, by depression and experience with the scenarios. These results provide empirical support for the theoretical notion that threat‐relevant self‐schemas of anxious individuals are characterized by some degree of abnormality.     

应激条件下的双重学习系统

心理学、神经科学和行为经济学中许多研究一致认为, 人的行为由双重学习系统控制, 分别是反射性系统和反思性系统。前者是自动化的习惯系统, 反应快速, 不需要消耗认知资源, 后者是反应较为缓慢的认知系统, 需要消耗更多认知资源, 但也更加灵活, 可以有效应对外界环境的变化。这两种学习系统并行存在而又相互竞争, 共同影响人的心理和行为。究竟是哪种学习系统对人的特定行为起着主导作用, 又有哪些因素导致该系统对行为的支配, 是近年来普遍受到关注的问题。过去研究者们采用导航学习、概率分类学习或工具性学习及其计算模型, 从行为和大脑层面探讨双重学习系统在急性和慢性应激下的变化。通过回顾和分析这些研究, 我们总结出应激导致个体向习惯行为转变的生理机制, 即去甲肾上腺素和糖皮质激素在杏仁核的参与下与受体结合协同作用于双系统相关的脑区, 并从该角度出发重新梳理和解释毒品成瘾的形成。未来需要重点关注个体基因差异与应激影响学习的关系, 并采用多种研究手段以更好地揭示其背后的神经和内分泌机制。     

Individualism versus interactionism about social understanding

In the debate about the nature of social cognition we see a shift towards theories that explain social understanding through interaction. This paper discusses autopoietic enactivism and the we-mode approach in the light of such developments. We argue that a problem seems to arise for these theories: an interactionist account of social cognition makes the capacity of shared intentionality a presupposition of social understanding, while the capacity of engaging in scenes of shared intentionality in turn presupposes exactly the kind of social understanding that it is intended to explain. The social capacity in question that is presupposed by these accounts is then analyzed in the second section via a discussion and further development of Searle’s ‘sense of us’ and ‘sense of the other’ as a precondition for social cognition and joint action. After a critical discussion of Schmid’s recent proposal to analyze this in terms of plural pre-reflective selfawareness, we develop an alternative account. Starting from the idea that infants distinguish in perception between physical objects and other agents we distinguish between affordances and social affordances and cash out the notion of a social affordance in terms of “interaction-oriented representations”, parallel to the analysis of object affordances in terms of “action-oriented representations”. By characterizing their respective features we demonstrate how this approach can solve the problem formulated in the first part.     

Disequilibrium in the mind,disharmony in the body

Although it is generally acknowledged that experiences of frustration, confusion, and anxiety are embodied phenomena, very little is known about how these processes modulate presumably unconscious, but constantly present, subtle bodily movement. We addressed this problem by tracking the low-level dynamics of body movement, using 1/f noise, pink noise, or “fractal scaling”, during naturalistic experiences of affect in two studies involving deep learning and effortful problem-solving. Our results indicate that body movement fluctuations of individuals experiencing cognitive equilibrium was characteristic of correlated pink noise, but there was a whitening of the signal when participants experienced states that are diagnostic of cognitive distress such as anxiety, confusion, and frustration. We orient our findings within theories that emphasise the embodied nature of cognition and affect and with perspectives that view affective and cognitive processes as emergent products of a self-organising dynamical system (the brain) that is inextricably coupled to the body.     

Speed of word recognition and vocabulary knowledge in infancy predict cognitive and language outcomes in later childhood

The nature of predictive relations between early language and later cognitive function is a fundamental question in research on human cognition. In a longitudinal study assessing speed of language processing in infancy, Fernald, Perfors and Marchman (2006) found that reaction time at 25 months was strongly related to lexical and grammatical development over the second year. In this follow-up study, children originally tested as infants were assessed at 8 years on standardized tests of language, cognition, and working memory. Speed of spoken word recognition and vocabulary size at 25 months each accounted for unique variance in linguistic and cognitive skills at 8 years, effects that were attributable to strong relations between both infancy measures and working memory. These findings suggest that processing speed and early language skills are fundamental to intellectual functioning, and that language development is guided by learning and representational principles shared across cognitive and linguistic domains.     

Cognition in moral space: A minimal model

We describe moral cognition as a process occurring in a distinctive cognitive space, wherein moral relationships are defined along several morally relevant dimensions. After identifying candidate dimensions, we show how moral judgments can emerge in this space directly from object perception, without any appeal to moral rules or abstract values. Our reductive “minimal model” (Batterman & Rice, 2014) elaborates Beal’s (2020) claim that moral cognition is determined, at the most basic level, by “ontological frames” defining subjects, objects, and the proper relation between them. We expand this claim into a set of formal hypotheses that predict moral judgments based on how objects are “framed” in the relevant dimensions of “moral space.”     

Monocular Egocentric Distance Information Generated by Head Movement

The complex systems approach to cognition has been challenged by the need to redescribe cognition in a way that avoids traditional commitments to the notion of efficient-cause relationships between perception, isolated computational components, and action. Guy Van Orden met this challenge head-on. Instead of decomposing consecutive reaction times into means and comparing differences in means across conditions to the variability surrounding those means (which was assumed to constitute white noise), he examined the multiscale dynamics entailed in consecutive reaction times. This led him to develop the notion of interaction-dominant versus component-dominant dynamics. Although Guy's empirical and theoretical work clearly addresses ecological psychology's long-standing concern with indirect, mediated perception, it nonetheless begs the question of just how interactive we are willing to go. This article proposes that Guy's work was leading us toward a metaphysics of interaction, all the way down. In such an interaction-dominant, process ontology, “context” becomes metaphysically fundamental (i.e., vs. “things”); stability comes to be seen as a scale-relative, contextually emergent phenomenon; and the notion of “intrinsic” properties becomes meaningless, as all “properties” find themselves contextually grounded. The article examines the implications of these assertions for ecological psychology specifically and cognitive science in general.     

“Immunity‐to‐Change Language Technology”: An Educational Tool for Pastoral Leadership Education

Abstract. One of the primary aims of pastoral leadership education is to offer reflective processes that enable learners to surface, critique, and construct different epistemological conceptions of reality leading to more effective pastoral practice. In many pastoral leadership education programs, this type of intentional reflection usually takes place in a mentoring or supervisory relationship as well as in a reflective seminar. In this essay, I describe how I have used the “immunity‐to‐change language technology” as one type of reflective process for intentional reflection and transformational learning in pastoral leadership education. The results of my research and ongoing use of this educational tool indicate that it can be valuable for enabling change by helping learners expand their pastoral leadership capacities and become more effective in their practice. Given my findings, I conclude that this educational tool could be of interest to other educators who are seeking to broaden their own repertoire of approaches to transformational learning. A version of this research appears in a forthcoming book by the same author, published by Novalis, in Fall 2008.     

How High Schools Become Empowering Communities: A Mixed‐Method Explanatory Inquiry into Youth‐Adult Partnership and School Engagement

Educational reform efforts emphasize empowerment and engagement, but these concepts are rarely translated into policy or classroom practice. This inquiry explores how schools can become places where students take ownership over their own learning. Phase 1 of this inquiry, a survey of students from diverse high schools, examines pathways to school engagement. Results indicated that youth voice in decision‐making, particularly when the experience is situated within supportive adult relationships and a sense of safety, significantly predicts emotional and cognitive engagement. Phase 2, a case study of an exemplary high school, sought to explain these pathways. Grounded in the theoretical perspectives of “empowered community settings” and “youth‐adult partnership,” analyses highlighted the importance of a shared belief system and core instructional activities that were student‐centered, affirmative, and strength‐based. Within this context, the opportunity role structure allowed students to exercise voice in creating their own educational program. The relational environment offered partnership and safety for academic risk‐taking. Teachers broke down traditional roles and power hierarchies in ways that helped students discover their own sources of engagement. The article identifies ways that community psychologists, as policy framers and as researchers, can help schools become places of empowerment and engagement.     

Does Every Theory Deserve a Hearing? Evolution,Intelligent Design,and the Limits of Democratic Inquiry

Ongoing hostilities between evolution and intelligent design adherents reveal deeper epistemological and ethical crises in American life. First, when adjudicating sociopolitical differences among people, how much epistemological “diversity” can be embraced before the very canons of judgment become suspect? Pragmatist notions of inquiry, warranted assertability, and pluralism can help strike a better balance. Second, the related crisis of factionalized “communities” might be addressed, along Deweyan lines, by the construction of a philosophical “total attitude” redolent of democratic ideals, more broadly conceived. This attitude could grow out of reconstructed educational methods that train imaginative and interactive habits of inquiry and communication.     

认知心理学的实用性转向

认知心理学实用性转向的根本涵义在于强调认知对于行动的效用与价值。传统认知心理学视认知系统的主要工作是怎样精确地 “表征” 世界，以便在大脑中建立一个外部世界的心理模型。实用性转向则强调认知系统的主要工作不是 “表征” 或 “反映”，而是指导有机体更有效地行动，认知是有 “效用” 的，它的效用就在于指导有机体适应和改造环境的活动。认知产生于行动、服务于行动，与行动水乳交融。这些理论观点来源于实用主义哲学。詹姆斯、杜威等人的经典实用主义对行动和效果的强调深刻影响了部分认知心理学家，促使他们放弃表征为中心的认知观而转向行动导向的认知观。在作者看来，由于这种转向强调了认知的 “效用”，因而对于认知心理学的健康发展将产生积极影响。     

Reflective Argumentation: A Cognitive Function of Arguing

Why do we formulate arguments? Usually, things such as persuading opponents, finding consensus, and justifying knowledge are listed as functions of arguments. But arguments can also be used to stimulate reflection on one’s own reasoning. Since this cognitive function of arguments should be important to improve the quality of people’s arguments and reasoning, for learning processes, for coping with “wicked problems,” and for the resolution of conflicts, it deserves to be studied in its own right. This contribution develops first steps towards a theory of reflective argumentation. It provides a definition of reflective argumentation, justifies its importance, delineates it from other cognitive functions of argumentation in a new classification of argument functions, and it discusses how reflection on one’s own reasoning can be stimulated by arguments.     

Radical views on cognition and the dynamics of scientific change

Radical views on cognition are generally defined by a cluster of features including non-representationalism and vehicle-externalism. In this paper, I concentrate on the way radical views on cognition define themselves as revolutionary theories in cognitive science. These theories often use the Kuhnian concepts of “paradigm” and “paradigm shift” for describing their ambitions and the current situation in cognitive science. I examine whether the use of Kuhn’s theory of science is appropriate here. There might be good reasons to think that cognitive science is in a situation of foundational crisis, but that does not entail that the classical paradigm (computationalism) is currently displaced to the benefit of a new paradigm. Larry Laudan’s theory of research traditions is more enlightening than Kuhn’s theory for describing the scope and ambitions of radical views on cognition, and their relations with an anti-intellectualist tradition in philosophy.

     

On Seeing to the Horses: Issues in Teaching and Learning in Theology and Religious Studies After Bonino and Lindbeck

This article re-examines so-called “experiential approaches” to theology and religious studies. In affirming the need of the educator to attend to both cognitive and affective aspects within teaching and learning, and in using many concrete examples from classroom practice, the article critically engages with Latin American liberation theology and post-liberalism in an attempt to clarify what “experience” is being referenced when “experiential methods” are used. The importance of the concrete worlds of individual students, the responsibility of educators to be conscious of their own power in shaping the educational experience, and the desirability of attending to issues surrounding economic disadvantage within theology and religious studies feature prominently in the study. We conclude that, though no experience is neutral, educational contexts in theology and religious studies can offer exemplary settings for profound self-discovery, exploration, and personal development through the “hermeneutical friction” created by critical examination of the narrative worlds within which we live.     

Steps to a “Properly Embodied” cognitive science

Cognitive systems research has predominantly been guided by the historical distinction between emotion and cognition, and has focused its efforts on modelling the “cognitive” aspects of behaviour. While this initially meant modelling only the control system of cognitive creatures, with the advent of “embodied” cognitive science this expanded to also modelling the interactions between the control system and the external environment. What did not seem to change with this embodiment revolution, however, was the attitude towards affect and emotion in cognitive science. This paper argues that cognitive systems research is now beginning to integrate these aspects of natural cognitive systems into cognitive science proper, not in virtue of traditional “embodied cognitive science”, which focuses predominantly on the body’s gross morphology, but rather in virtue of research into the interoceptive, organismic basis of natural cognitive systems.